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IPREFACE
Before placing this thesis in the hands of its examiners and 
readers X must express my gratitude to Dr.J*D.Derrett without whose 
vigilant supervision X would have unknowingly fallen into many errors 
and would have written a lot of gibberish. As L.P.Smith puts it,ftIt
is .....  an advantage for an author to have two or three fastidious
readers whom he can imagine sniffing at his pages.11 Dr. Derrett’s 
suggestions gave ire e ample opportunities of judging the truth of the 
epigram, "Trifles make perfection though perfection is itself no 
trifle."
I have also to thank miss Ysabel Pearce, Mr.Nadirkhan Pathan 
and Mr.S.R.Gupta who ungrudgingly undertook the task of typing this 
intricate thesis. I am also obliged to Mrs. Helen Kanitkar for having 
gone through the introductory as well as the concluding chapters, and 
to Mi*.S.Ganeson and Mr.M.Sivalingam for having helped me in correcting 
the typescript•
X am indebted in general to a galaxy of Hindu law scholars both 
dead as well as living from whom X am constantly gaining some knowledge 
for the last twelve years. X always have great respect for them and 
their opinions. But in writing this thesis X had to contradict them 
at some places; for my motto is, "Amicus Plato, amicus Sodnates, sed 
magis arnica veritas."
Abstract of t h e thesis
The main topic of the thesis has been divided in two parts, 
namely, sastnic law and judge-made law. For the former several Sanskrit, 
works whether published or otherwise and whether in the Devanagari or 
the Bengali script have been considered. Pit-falls of erroneous trans-* ' 
lations have been avoided by giving references to the original texts 
at all places. With the help of the added sastric information new light; 
has been thrown on questions such as whether inherited property is 
strxdhana according to the various Mitaksara sub-schools; whether such % 
property should be considered as saudayika; what are the rights of 
a childless daughter, adopted son, illegitimate children etc. in succe­
ssion to strxdhana; whether degradation amounts to civil death etc.
For the latter part more than 500 decisions have been consi- 
dered. They have been arranged and analysed with a view to demonstrate 
the growth not only of the judge-made law but also of the rift between 
the sastric law and the judge-made law. Incongruity, if any, amongst 
several decisions on the same point has also been pointed out.
A chapter on customary law contains special provisions 
concerning proprietory rights of prostitutes, and a gist of six systems 
of customary kw from South-East Asia including India, Burma and Ceylon*;;
A chapter on the recently codified law in India contains also 
a scrutiny of the similar previous attempts in the former Native States 
of Mysore and Baroda. The chapter also contains a few comments concernir 
the defects and the deficiencies in the enacted law. The conclusion
contains a few suggestions as to how the provisions of the enacted law 
should be amended so as to bring them in conformity with the advanced 
public opinion in other countries as well as in India*
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Chapter I, introduction tbTihe subject..... pp.1-60*
(I) Object of the present work : Possible objections. Reply.
(II)General nature of Hindu law:
(A) Nature ofHSIfostric law : Divine law. Meanigg of Dharmasastra. 
Kchara, vyavahara and prayaschitta. Adjectival and substantive law
(B) Origin and sources of Hindu laws Sphere of Pharma. Smritis* 
Axioms of MXmamsa.General principles of interpretation. Obligatory 
and non-obligatory texts. Arthavada. Atidesa. Commentaries and 
their nature. They supersede the smritis. Because they incorporate 
usage. Usage and ICalivarjya. Judicial decisions. Vyavastha and 
ratio decendi* Enactments. Justice, equity and good conscience. 
Text-book writers and research scholars. Whether pre-British India 
was governed only by the sastric texts, Mistake of the British and 
its results.
(C) Schools of law: Authorities of the different schools.
(D ) Reasons of incongruities or inaccuracies in the judicial 
decisions? Judge’s ignorancd of the Sanskrit language. Reliance 
on Macnaghten and other text-book writers. Application of the law 
of the Bengal school to that of the Mitaksara school. Inconsistenc 
in following the ratio of the previous decisions• Inconsistency in 
principles of interpretations. Careless handling of customs and
cu s t omary 1aws•
(III) General background of the topic of the thesis;
(A ) Factors affecting the proprietory rights of women; Modes of 
aqquisition. Not exhaustively mentioned. Svatva, svamya and sva- 
tantrya. Institution of marriage had a great influence on the 
development of women’s property. Three stages of satric leterature 
Marriage an established institution even during the Vedic age•
Age of the bride. Form of mrriage. Divorce and remmariage. Polygen 
and polyandry. Niyoga. Presents to the bride and dowry system.
(B) Common property of husband and wife; JCpastamba and Haradatta. 
Concept not theoratical but practical• Supported by the commentato 
and evidenced in the inscriptions.
(C) Development of women’s property; Household property during 
the Vedic literature. Two schools about daya. Position dwindled 
during the Sutra period. Reasons of the downfall of women. Germ 
of strxdhana during sutra literature. Concept of strxdhana during 
the Smriti period. Protective measures adopted by the &astra. 
Increasing bulk of strxdhana. Development of women's right to 
inherit property. Commentators' way of interpreting the diverse 
texts. Difference between the position of ordinary respectable 
women and the self-supporting ones.
VChapter II* Acquisition of strxdhana;
(I) Gastric law*
(A) Texts of smritis ; Manu. Katyayana and Narada. Visnu. Conver­
sion of foride-price into dower. Yajhavalkya. Devala* Different 
categories of strxdhana. Katyayana1s importance* Definitions of 
Adhyagni, adhyavanika, prTtidatta and sulka. Saudayika and
non-saudayika. Adhivedanika and its significance. Wealth acquired 
by labour and gift from strangers* Apastamba, Vasistha, Manu 
and Yajhavalkya. Inheritance* Strxdhana had no technical meaning 
during the smriti literature.
(B) Texts of the commentariesi
(i) Benares school: Vijhanesvara. Strxdhana has etymological 
meaning and the word six-fold is illustrative. Except sulka all 
categories of strxdhana defined on an etymological basis by all 
authors. Vijhanesvara followed all over India for the interpre­
tation of the word adya* Mitra Misra. On the whole follows Vijha­
nesvara* Visvesvara and Kamalakara follow Vijnanes varq• Gift gives 
to the bridegroom at the time of marriage* Audvahika transformed 
into strxdhana. Stridhanom or varasulka.
(II) Bombay school: Nxlakantha deffers from Vijhanesvara. 
Ascribes only a limited meaning to the word strxdhana.
(iix) Southern school; Devanna. A remark in favour of Vijha- 
nesvara's theory. Madhava follows Vijhanesvara. According to the 
Southern school all property except gifts from strangers and 
wealth acquired by labour, is strxdhana.
(iv) Mithila school: Laksmxdhara. Chandesvara• Vachaspati Misi 
Gifted or inherited movables constitute strxdhana. Misaru Misna.
A complicated remark. Nearer to Nxlakantha. Mithila school gives 
only a limited significance to the word strxdhana.
(v) Bengal school; Jxmutavahana• Bhartridaya means gift from 
the husband.Definition of strTdhana. Katyayana1s verse and its 
importance in the later works of the Bengal school. Ownership of 
women in the two categories of property mentioned by Katyayana. 
Meaning of sulka. Whether sulka and labha are saudayika. Definiti< 
of strxdhana is defective. Bo is the definition of sulka. Raghu- 
nandana and Srxkrisna. Raghurama Siromani• Non-te clinical strxdhan*
t • • v  ^
devolves like a Male's property. Vachaspati Misra's doctrine of 
factum valet. The t#o categories mentioned by Katyayana coming 
closer to strxdhana.
(II) Judge-made law:
(A) Inherited property: Katyayana's texts on inheritance• Not 
referred to by commentators of Yajhavalkya. Declared unauthorita- 
tive by some authors. Vijhanesvara. Mitra Misra, Nxlakantha, 
Devanna etc. Earliest reported cases came from Calcut ta. Sir 
Milliam Macnaghten. Sir Thomas Strange.
(i) Calcutta decisions: Prankishen v. Mt. Bhagwatee: inherite< 
property of daughter is not hdr strxdhana. Widow cannot make a 
gift of the whole of her inheritance. No distinction between 
realty and the personalty under the Bayabhaga law. According to
Mithila 'and the West* daughter's inheritance not her strxdhana. 
Inherited property is not 'peculium*. Passage non-wxistenrfc: in 
the Mitaksara quoted for support. According to the Mitaksara and 
the Vivadachintamani immoveable property inherited by the mother 
is not her strxdhana.
(ii) Madras decisions;Limited estate of a woman declared in 
Ramasamy v. Vallatah. Bachiraju v. Venkatappadu and Sengamalatha- 
mrnal v. Velayudha.
(i»|)Pri vy Council decisions: Thakore Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Earn: 
Immoveable property inherited by a widow does not constitute 
her peculium according to the Mitaksara xstrasi and the Benares 
school* Bhugwandeen v. % n a  Baee : a widow is not competent to 
dispose of by will or gift intea^vivos either moveable or immoveabl 
property inherited from the husband. Both the decisions against 
the sastric law and violate the princ&ples of interpretation laid 
down in Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga. The decisions 
followed on the basis that inherited proparty is not strxdhana. 
Chotay Lail's case. Property inherited by a female from a male or 
a female is not her strxdhana.
(iv) Special law: Moveable property is strxdhana according to 
the Mithila school. Custom amongst Jains.
(v) Bombay decisions: Deo Baee v. Wan Baee : widow has full 
right over her inherited property. Property inherited by a daugh­
ter descends on her own heirs. Sister takes absolute interest.
But the decisions were against Mayukha and custom in Gujrat.
Vijiarangam v. Lakshman,and Bhagirthibai vX Kahanujirao. All 
females inheritin& from gotraja males thke absolute estate. Gada- 
dhar v. Chandrabliagabai : a widow cannot dispose of by will inhe­
rited moveable property.
(B) Property obtained on partition; Y^jnavglkya. Vi jhanesvara1s 
practical illustration of his doctrine. Apararka and others include 
such property in strxdhana. Allhabad view rejected in Debi Mangal 
Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad.
(C) Immoveable property given by the husband: Earlier view in 
favour of limited estate unless the husband expressly gives 
absolute estate. Later view in favour of equality between the two 
sexes.
(B) Gifts from strangers: Brij Indar v. Janki Koer. Against the 
sastric law.
(E) Accumulations of income; Soorjedmoney v. Denobundo : accumu­
lations form absolute property of the widow* Later view inconsisten 
with the previous decision. Isri Dutt v. Hansbutti : the question 
depends upon the intention of the widow. Two views about a case 
in which there is no evidence about the widow* sjintention. According 
to the first view such accumulations form accretion to the corpus 
of the original property. According to the second view they are 
to be treated as strxdhana. The Supreme Court has left the 
problem unsolved.
VII
(F) Property acquired by adverse possession: Sastric law. Lacchan 
Kunwar v. Manorath Ram and other cases. Lajwanti v. Safa Chand* 
Trend of the P.C. decisions: to treat such property as absolute 
property of the widow if she intended to prescribe for an abso­
lute estate. Two views about a case in Miich there is no evidence 
about the intention of the widow. According to the first view 
the presumption is in favour of an absolute estate. According "io thi 
second view the^presumption is in favour of a limited estate. 
Allahabad High C ourt oscillating between the two views. The 
ratio of the P.C. decisions in favour of the first view.
(G ) Property acquired by labour or skill, under a compromise decree 
or ag a result of a family settlement,is strxdhana•
Xirrpther categorTes~mei^ione^d in the smritis: Gifts from the 
father, mother etc. Dower or sulka. Wrong opinion of Mayne follow­
ed in Surayya v. Balakrishnayya. Ornaments. Property given in 
lieu of maintenance. Finding (adhigama) and seizure (parigraha). 
"With the exception of the property obtained by inheritancd and 
partition the Mitaksara definition of strxdhana is accepted by 
the Courts all over IndiajX Presumption concerning property in 
respect of which there is no evidence whether or not it is strx­
dhana. Trend of the modern Courts more liberal than that of the 
Courts of the 19th century.
Chapter III. Disposition of strxdhana.  pp.197-305.
(I) Sastric law:
(A) Transition between complete dependence and the growing concept 
of strxdhana. Four questions.
(B) Property over which women have absolute contjpol: Saudayika• 
Co-relation with wealth acquired by labour etc. Exception to 
saudayika. Nature and the reason of restriction on alienation of
immoveable property given by the husband. Vijhanesvara’s view : no
right of fred disposition. Mitra Misra does not follow Vijnanesvai 
Kamalakara. Balainbhatta: inherited property is not Devanna
^ -1is very conservative. Madhava, Pratapa Rudra and Varadaraja.
Vachaspati Misra. Jxmuta and other authors of the Bengal school. 
Two views amongst the later authors. Durgayya and Vachaspati 
Misra.
(C) Nature of the restriction placed upon alienations by women: 
Narada:only three persons independent. Manu: women should not exp­
en without the consent of the husband. Commentators * view.
(D) Rights of persons other than women: Punishment for those who 
usurp strfdhana. Katyayana and Revala. Other persons have no 
ownership. Relative oosition of husband and wife in each other's 
property. Hindu law never purely individualistic. Husband's 
right to take strxdhana in famine etc. Only the husband can do so.
The reason behind the provision about famine etc. Vijhanesvara. 
Mitra misra is self-contradictory. XJevala’s provision about 
promised strxdhana. Disappointing and irrelevant comments of the 
commentators.
(E) Whether status of women affectstheir right of disposition: 
Dependent at all stages. Maiden having svyiayamvara. Father loses 
his dominion. During coverture. During m&dowhood.
  (F) Who can dispose of property; Modes of acquisition. Ownership
(an essential pre-requisite to disposition. Jaiminirand Sahara. Nxla­
kantha the only author who repudiates the husband*s ownership 
in his wife. Vijhanesvara and others hold otherwise. From the 
Mxmamsa point of view Nxlakantha is correct.
(II) Jlfdge^made law:
(A) The old view; Complete dependence of women. Sir Francis 
MacnagLten. Sir William Macnaghten is self-contradictory. Sir 
Thomas Strange. All these closer to the Mitaksara view. West 8c 
Biihler. Jolly.
(B)Women1s right to dispose of their strxdhana:
(i) Technical strxdhana: Cases about palla. Property obtained 
from the brother. Immoveable property purchased out of the 
proceeds of strxdhana. Ornaments. Muthukaruppa v. Sellathammal :
a liberal view. Does not consider the D ay a da s as 1 o kx • Right to 
dispose of immoveable property given gy the husband. The restric­
tion of the Sastra as well as the liberal view of the modern 
Courts are both reasonable.
(ii) Mon-technical strxdhana: Wealth earned by women.
Mayne's view: restriction are recommendatory. Muthu Ramakrishna 
v. Marimuthu. Incorrect statement of Mayne followed. Inherited 
property. Gadadhar v. Chandrabhagabai. Bhau v. Raghunath : daugh­
ter cannot dispose of inherited property without the husband’s 
consent. Bhagwanlal v. Bai Divali. Saarubai v. War ay an das : a- 
questionable decision. Gajanan v. Pandurang ; property inherited 
by a woman is her saudayika. Decision totally against the rules 
of the Sastra•
(C) Women’s responsibility concerning financial liabilities; 
Katyayana. Visvarupa. Wife’s liability limited only to the extent 
of her strxdhana. The position is against the Sastra. Both the 
person and the property of a widow are liable. The position of
a remarried woman. Whether she loses all her strxdhana.
(D) Husband’s right to take his wife*s strxdhana; Creditor 
cannot compel the husband to use his right. ’Taking* meqns 
’taking and using*.
Chapter IV. Succession to strxdhana:
(I) Sastric laws
(A T ~ S m r T t i t e x t g ; (jau^ama# Translation by Colebrooke• Meaning 
of gratisthita. Two salient features of succession to strxdhana. 
The reason of preference to unmarried and unstabilised daughters.
IX
Succession to sulka. Baudhayana :traditional property. Succession 
to a maiden*s property. Vasistha: nuptial property. Visnu: 
succession to strXdhana of a childless woman 'depends upon the 
form of marriage. Sanltha and Likhita. Kautilya in favour of s j o h s . 
Manu. Yautaka. Daughters and sons divide equally. Preference to 
a brahmin step-daughter. Competition between two sons who are 
uterine but not consanguine. Yajhavalkya. Narada. Brihaspati. 
Secondary sona of a woman• Katyayana. Vriddha Katyayana. Bevala 
gives silulteneous succession to sons and daughters.
(B) C onunen t at or s s
ITT Visvarupa and Apararka:
(ii) Benares school: Vijhanesvara peculiarly favourable to 
female heirs• Distorts many texts. Interpretation of Manu's verse: 
iharetarayoga. Provision about a brahmin step-daughter• Two 
prominent characteristics : favourable treatment to heirs who
are female or are related through., a female, and succession does 
not depend upon the kind or the source of strxdhana. Subodhinx 
and BalambhattX. DXpakalika and VXramitrodaya (tXka). Mitra Misra. 
Secondary sons succeed in accordance with their proximity. But 
the interpretation resembles that of the Bengal school• ICamalakara 
in favour of joint succession of sons and daughters. Includes 
step-son but does not include illegitimate sons in the xis.t of 
heirs . The heirs of a childless woman are the heirs of the husbdn* 
or the father according to the compact series of heirs. Bhatta 
Ramajit•
(iii) Bombay school:NXlakantha differes widely from Vijhane­
svara. Anvadhyya and prXtidatta. Property obtained by inheritance 
etc. devolves like a malefs property.
(iv) Mithila school: Visvesvara. Chandesvara. Vachaspati 
Misra. According to the Mithila school the Mitaksara order applies 
to $yutaka and prXtidatta whereas sons and daughters have joint 
succession in the rest of strXdliana.
(iv) Southern school: Bharuchi and Kavikantasarasvati nearer
to the Mitaksara. Devanna differs from Vijhanesvara. Three orders
for anvadheya and prXtidatta together, yautaka,and the rest of
strXdhana. Varadaraja. Distributism construction of Brihaspati1s 
text• Includes extra female heirs. Durgayya apparently recognises 
the right of an ddopted son. Madhava and Pratapa Rudra. Durgayya• 
In the absence of a consensus of opinion amongst the authors of 
Southern school the Mitaksara order should be applied.
Bengal school; JXmuta. Joint succession to sons and 
unmarried daughters in all strXdhaha except yautaka. Barren and 
widowed daughters only after the daughter*s son. Texts of Gautama 
etc• apply only to yautaka. Meaning of yautaka. JXmuta followed 
by all in this respect. Meaning of 'brahmanX*. According to 
JXmuta order for pitridat&a and yautaka are same. M&hesvara 
and iSrXkrisna provide a special order for pitridatta. Meaning 
of anvaya. Preference amongst daughters. Meaning of apratisthita.
XThe detailed line amongst the progeny laid down by &rxkrisna
and &rxkrisnakanta. Succession to pp&perty of a childless woman.
Bifurcation of lines applies only to yautaka. The detailed line
of succession laid down by SrXkrisna and SrXkrisnakanta who^ • • • • • •
apply the same rule to both yautaka and ayautaka. JXmuta 
mentions brother as the first preferential heir to bandhutta, 
sulka and anvadhyy aka• Unsatisfactory interpretation. Secondary 
sons. Lacuna in succession to yautaka. Includes step-son in ’suta1 
Eaghunandana includes’ adopted son*. So does SrXkrisna. Contro­
versy between JXmuta and his followers as regards step-sonfs 
position. Paragraph no. 33 is not spurious. Secondary sons succ­
eed in accordance with ihheir capacity to confer spiritual benefit, 
Father^ iw>Iamitlathei-c sakulyas and samanodakas. But
succession does not devolve on father’s sapindas. Other minorJL A m
heirs.
(XI) Judge-made law;
(A) The Mitaksara school;
(i) Succession to a married woman’s strxdhana other than sulks
(a) Amongst progeny:Succession amongst daughters.
Basis of inaccuracy. Comparative poverty the only criterion. The 
law as it should be. Incontinent daughter. Prostitute daughter. 
Concubine daughter. Maxims about intruders. Jains. Watan in 
Bombay. Custom. Y/idowed daughter in Madras. Daughter’s daughter. 
Per stirpes distribution. No preference for unmarried daughter’s 
daughter. Daughter’s son, son and son’ s son. V/hether co-heirs 
take subject to a joint tenancy. Illegitimate children. Mayna Bai 
v. Uttaram. Heritable blood between mother and son. Preference 
between legitimates and illegitimates. The 3av as it should be. 
Legitimate descendants of illegitimate children. Converts to 
Hinduism. Bapu Appa v. Hakka. Adopted son. Adopted son in c»mpe- 
tition with an aurasa son. Adopted son of a co-wife. Step-son.
Does not succeed as a son. Great-grandson.
(b) In default of progenyi Husband and his sapindas• 
Difficulties in determining the order. Kamalakara. West and 
Biihler. Harmony between Mitaksara dnd the Mayukha• Mithila 
law. Brihaspati*s text. Three possibilities about their order. 
Confusion of the Mitaksara and the Dayabhaga• Brihaspati*s 
text to be neglected in the Mitaksara succession. Heirs Op a 
woman married in an unapproved form are same as heirs of a maiden. 
Father’s sapindas• Succession as if to a male’s property. But 
not entirely so. Exceptions. Doctrine of representation not app­
licable. Act II of 1929. Form of marriage. Lacuna in the customa­
ry law. Remarriage and its effect• Alternative lines of heirs 
before escheat. Vithal l^ ulcaram v. Balu Bapu•
(ii) Succession to sulka.
(iii) Succession to a maiden’s strxdhana.
XI
ihe
(iv) Miscdllaneous: Different rules ofAMayukha. Non-technical 
strxdhana. Special rules of the Mithi&A school.
(B) Bengal school:
(il'^ esuine'^of the sastric law; Ayautaka. Yautaka. Pitridatta. 
strxdhana of a ahildless woman. Secondary sons.
(ii) Judicial decisions based on Judoonath v. Bussunti
(a) Heirs amongst the progeny of a married woman ; To 
yautaka. To ayautaka. To pitridatta.
(b) Heirs of a childless married woman; Heirs to yautaka.
To ayautaka. Preponderance of Jxmutaf s provisions. STep-relations. 
Step-brother* step-daughter1s son. Step-sister1s son. Step-son etc. 
Spurious paragraph. Chamatkari v. Narendra.Sapindas. Great-grandson 
position. Sakulyas and samanodakas. Father's and mother's kinsmen. 
The Crown. Two features of the Bayabhaga. Non-technical strxdhana. 
Inherited strXdhana.
(C) Heirs of a maiden.
Chapter V. Customs and Customary laws.
(I) General;
Meaning of the terms law, custom and customary law. The two school* 
Law according to the analytical school• The historical school.
The correct view. Custom. Essentials of a valid custom in England. 
In India. Antiquity. Continuity. Certainty. Absence of unrea­
sonableness. Proof of custom. Meaning of customary kw. The three 
divisions of this chapter.
(II) The proprietory right of profligate womens
(1) The"~sastric law;
(A) Prostitutesi Their position in the Arthasastra. Underground 
prostitutes. The Kamasastra. The Dharmasastra• A distinct class. 
Prohibition of the religious part of the Dharraasasfcra. Recognition 
in the positive part. Succession to prostitute's property. 
Kautilya. The structure of a prostitute's family. Matriarchial 
family. Matrilineal succession. Ommission in the ordinary law. 
Mistake of Jxmuta. A married woman becoming a prostitu te and 
vice anrsa.
(B) ConcubinesiNearer to wives. Succession to liheir property. 
Law. And equity. Adulterous concubines.
(C) Other unchaste women; Three questions about degradation;
(i) The causes of degradation: The mahapatakas and other 
sins• A compromise. Men and women. Adultery an expiable sin.
(ii) The after-effects of degradation: Religious ones. 
Secular ones. Exclusion from inheritance. BAvestion of property.
No divestion. The conclusion.
(iii) Whether degradation is equal to civil death:The 
English law. The opinion of scholars. Self-contradictory.
Sheonauth v. Bayamjiee. The nature and effect of expiation. Com­
plete rehabilitation• No complete severence from nearest relations 
Mo severence. Conclusions.
(0) Miscellaneous: Act XXI of 1850* Extravagance etc,as 
causes of divestion* The opinion1of Colebrooke* A correct one*
judge-made law: ,
(A)•'> Taramunee v. Mpt.ee Buneanee * Strange * An incorrect decision.
(B) Questions on which there is difference of opinions 
TiT^Whether degradation results" in severence: It does* It
does not. Hiralal-'vv -Tripura-. Charan. Banerjeefs criticise* Degna^ 
dation and excommunication.
(i i) ih»efenence he tween de grade d and unde grade d heirs; ;
■\(iifl Whether ordinary law or customary Jay ap plies; Custo­
mary law. Ordinary law. Slight modification needed. ;
(iv) Whether a prostitutefs family forms a coparcenary:
It does. Kamahshi v. Nagaratmam. No right foy birth.
(v) Wh^iher a prostitute takes an absolute interest in 
inheritance:>Ah incorrect decision.
(C) The decision of the Supreme Court a confusing one.
(D) Escheat: A mistaken view of Banerjee.
(E) The trend of the enacted law against prostitutes.
(I I ) Marumakkai t ay am l aw:
No fixed rules before the British, regifoe. Wigram. Marriage in ^4 
the Malabar of the- last century. Property and inheritance in the ;; 
last century. The stage of the development in 1914 A.D. The new 
enactments. The common and conspicuous changes. The two divisions.
The common features of the first set of enactments and the Hindu 
law. The difference•.The matrilineal features of the second set. :y 
A few individual features.
(III) The Punjab Customary haw: *
■ Sources. Text-books. Punjab Eaws Act. Proposed code* y
Village,communities and agnatic kinship. Applicability. Four y
tcanons. Succession to female1s peppratp property.
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CHAPTER X
1
The Hindu law in India has recently undergone a radical
change, and judges, lawyers and social workers in India are busy in
attempting to estimate the effects, beneficial or otherwise, of the
radical reorientation that has been necessitated by the four Acts
passed by the Indian Parliament in the years 1 9 3 5 - 5 7 . The legis-
lation, while it has delighted the progressive element amongst Indian
sociologists, has nevertheless dismayed the public in general who did
not know the law as it stood before and probably continue in that
ignorance as to what the law is. The present work is an attempt to
ascertain,within the limits of its subject, Hindu law as it stood
before the change and as it stands today and, in completion of the
study, tentatively to suggest the law as it ought to be in the future
Two objections might be raised as regards the propriety of
a work of such nature: firstly, that an attempt to ascertain the law
as it was is entirely useless as it is of no help to lawyers as well
as laymen either of whom are rarely interested in the legal position
of the bygone days; secondly, that such an attempt has already been
made, and perhaps with some success, by the previous scholars and
text-book writers, which makes any further attempt redundant.
As regards the first objection it is true that the Hindu
lawyers and scholars have usually treated with scant respect the
study of the development of Hindu law and excepting a few instances
(o)
the subject is decaying through lack of academic investigation.
But when the personal law of nearly one-seventh of the whole human
j jn .innrn'm * nuMn.ft m jiH w w gw a w nn ii)! ■lari .nniu.—j. wm—n— a——■— i p
(1) For these enactments see infra p.£38
(2) See Dr.J.D.M.Derrett's Hindu &aw : The Dharmashastra and the 
Anglo-Hindu law - scope for further comparative study, 
Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1956)p.l99 
at pp.199-200.
2race has been re-cast and re-established it is essential that a 
critical appraisal of the total effect as in comparison with the past 
notions and traditions should be made by persons who are interested 
in keeping the movement of Hindu law in the right direction. More­
over to understand the changes which the new enactments have intro­
duced one must look to the law as it stood before and the proper 
understanding of the previous Hindu law can never be complete without 
visualising its development afo initio. It is also significant that 
when the bills proposing to change Hindu law concerning marriage, 
succession etc. were introduced in the Parliament both the supporters 
and the opposers contended that their respective positions were quite
in conformity with the old sastric law. Again the present changes
(1)need not be considered as final and if, as is likely, there are
going to be further changes it would be worthwhile to anticipate and
(2)
suggest them right now. In view of the fact that nearly one per
(3 )cent of the Indians reside outside India it is also important to 
note that the present changes in India do not apply to Hindus in
(4)
Burma, Africa etc. It does not apply to Hindus in Pakistan also.
As regards the second objection it may be stated that the 
only work which purported exhaustively to deal with the subject of 
strxdhana is a publication in the Tagore Law Lectures Series by 
late Sir Gooroodas Banerji in 1878 the last edition of which was 
published in 1927. Although most of the standard text-books of the
(1) The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 has already been amended by the 
Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act 73 of 1956.
(2) For such suggestions see infra pp. Hie
(3) See India 1954 pp.254-55 -—  a publication by the High
Commissioner of India in Great Britain.
(4) See for instance Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: iv* keuyA j fl*T'R-Q358)
J o m  'V ft a  I pp. I ~  o  -
3present day tend to rely on Banerjee*s opinions and suggestions, his
book is evidently inadequate to expound the law as it stands today.
Moreover even Banerjee's book, as we shall see, contains many
* (1)inaccurate statements concerning the sastric law. The modern text
book writers, though they mention the latest pre-enactment law in
their recent editions, eliminate many Sanskrit texts and judicial
decisions thus making it difficult easily to attain a complete under-
(2)standing of the development of the law. Moreover the present work
<KX\
proceeds in^original manner different in certain respects from that 
adopted by the previous authors and contains some added information 
which has been utilised to give at once a clearer and a more accurate 
picture of the progress of the law.
Before passing to the subject in particular if is advisable 
to state the general background upon the assumption of which the 
present work proceeds viz. the general nature of Hindu law, its 
sources, its schools etc. As this general information does not come 
within the orbit of the topic of the present work it represents, with 
a few exceptions, the general consensus of opinion amongst the Hindu 
law scholars.
The Hindus always believed their law to be of divine origin
and this law included both religious law and civil i.e. positive law
(3)as well. The idea of the Sovereign in the modern jutffid&al sense
(1) For these see infra . , * .  ^/ . / / r
(2) For instance, the case of Pingala v. Bommireddipalli (infra
p. 1*71 ) which has been mentioned by Banerjee (p.367) has not at 
all been mentioned by Mayne or Gupte presumably because it was 
overruled by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkata 
Jagannatha's case (infra jp. 170-71). And moreover even the text­
book writers have made several incorrect statements concerning 
the law of strXdhana. See infra p^.XQ.
(3) W.& B. p.9.
4was unknown to them: the King was supposed to enforce the revealed
law and not to enact law. As it was the King who was controlled by
the law and not the law that was regulated by the King the royal
edicts were binding on the public provided they were not repugnant to
(1)the divine law. The duty of the King was to enforce the law which
was ascertained with the help of the assessors who were expected to
interpret the divine law but could not introduce new legislation.
The present Hindu law is based on the dharmasastra. The
word Pharma* includes **all kinds of rules religious, moral, legal,
physical, metaphysical or scientific, in the same way as the term law
(2)
does, in its widest sense.1* The word *dharma* is derived from
f i
*dhrx* i.e. to hold, support or maintain and the word Sastra* is de­
rived from the root * sas* i.e. to teach, enjoin or control. Dharma
( 3 )is a means of attaining complete happiness and its main source is
the Vedifc injunction or o r d e r w h i c h  is the only proof (pramana) of
(5) *dharma. Although the dharmasastra^ deals with all the desirable
ends of man, viz. the duty arising out of a vedic injunction (dharma)
wealth (artha), other desirable ends (kama) and liberation of soul
(moksa) it primarily deals with dharma in particular, as the other
desirable ends depend upon dharma itself, without the help of which
(1) Sarkar 6th edi.p.13* MVyavqharannripah pasyedvidvadbhirbraii- 
manaih saha / Dharmasastranusarena krodhalobhavivarjitah // - 
Yaj.II.l, see Vis. on it. The sastra admonishes a king who 
transgresses the orders of the Sastra and collects money by 
taxes etc. without the authority of the Sastra - Yaj.1.357 and 
Mit.on it, see also Yaj.1.340, also Sarkar 6th edi.p.13, W.& B. 
p.9 referring to Sankara*s bhasya on the Satapatha Brahamana 
14.2.2.3 and on Brihadaranyaka U pail is ad 1.4.14.
(2) Sarkar p.17.
(3) Jai.Su.1.1.3: *'Tasya nimittaparlstih.**
(4) Jai.Su.1.1.2: **Chodanalaksano*rtho dharmah.M
(5) Jai.Su .1.1.5; infra Pf> Xl>h av*4 A36
5they cannot be attained. Thus wealth cannot be attained without
(1)dharma though dharma can be attained without wealth.
The intermingling of religion, ethics and law (in its
positive aspect) is typical of all early communities and Hindu law
( 2)was not an exception to that. The earlier codes of the dharma- 
sastra such as the Manusmriti give us a clear impression that the 
positive law was treated almost as a part of the religious order of 
the society. Later on, however, authors such as Yajhavalkya are seen 
to distinguish between the different compartments of law i.e. the 
law pertaining to achara or rules of religious behaviour, vyavahara 
or rules of positive law, and prayaschitta or rules prescribing ex­
piation in the absence of, or in addition to, any punishment pre­
scribed by the positive law. The religious element in the positive 
law was on a gradual decrease till Vijhanesvara and his followers 
clearly distinguished between the religious and the secular element
(1) See Mit.on Yaj.I.l: "Tatra yadyapi dharmarthakamamoksah sas­
tro nanena pratipadyante tathapi dharmasya pradhanyat dharmag- 
rahanam. Pradhanyam cha dharmamulatvaditaresam. Na cha vak- 
tavyam dharmamulo'rtho1rthamulo dharma ityavisesa iti. Yato*- 
rthamantarenapi japastXrthayatradina dharmani spat irar thale sopi 
na dharmamantareneti." However, it seems Vijhanesvara is self­
contradictory here as he accepts that svatva is 1laukika* and 
not 1Sastraikasamadhigamya' - Mit. introduction to the Dayavi- 
bhaga Nir. edi.pp.197-98 infra.
(2) "In primitive communities religion, morals and law were indis-
tinguishably mixed together  This intermingling is typical
of all early communities. The severence of the three ideas - of 
law from morality, and of religion from law - belongs very dis­
tinctly to the later stages-of mental progress. This severance 
has gone a great way* Many people now think that religion and
law have nothing m  common  The severance has, I think,
gone much too far. Although religion, law and morals can be 
separated, they are nevertheless still very much dependant on 
each other. Without religion there can be no morality; and 
without morality there can be no law." - Sir Alfred Denning :
The Changing Law p.99.
6of the law and followed, wherever possible, the former in ascertain­
ing the rules of positive law or vyavahara.^^^ It is upon 1 vyava­
hara * that the major portion of the present Hindu law may be con­
sidered to have been based.
Vyavahara was that part of law a breach of which gave rise
to a cause of action and might result in a judicial proceeding.
( 3 )It consisted of both the adjectival and the substantive law' but
some of the later authors wrote two different treatises for these two
(4)kinds of law. The adjectival part of the law was superseded long
ago by enactments such as the Indian Evidence Act, Criminal Procedure 
Code, Civil Procedure Code etc. Even the substantive law which was
/ p" \
divided by the Sastra into eighteen titles has been gradually 
superseded by the Regulations and Acts of the Central and provincial 
governments up till and including the recent enactments passed by the 
Indian Parliament which have almost effaced the operation of the old 
Hindu law in India.
We may proceed to consider further the origin aid sources of 
Hindu law. The sphere (sthana) of dharma consists of the four Vedas 
with their six auxiallary sciences, the codes of the law i.e. the 
smritis, mxmainsa or the disquisition of the rules of scripture, nyaya 
or the science of logic, the puranas or the records of the legendary
(1) See infra.
(2) Yaj.II.5, Mayne 11th edi.p.7, see also Mit.on Yaj.II.l: 11 Any a-
virodhena svatmasambandhitaya kathanam vyavaharah."
(3) Sarkar p.14.
(4) For instance, Vachspati Misra wrote separately the Vivadachint- 
ainani and the Vyavaharachintamani.
(5) Kaull.l; Manu VIII.4-7; Na.Srar. & Na.Sam.1.9; 1,16-19; 
Katyayana eited in Vi.Mi.223 etc.
7f 1)
history* The six auxiallary sciences of the Vedas consxst of the
science of orthography and orthoepy, the rules about the performance 
of sacrifices, grammer, etymology, prosody and a s t r o n o i n y . I n  
fact these represent not the sphere (sthana) but the means of ascer­
taining dharma. Therefore Manu at one place mentions that the smriti
t ( 3 )themselves are the dharmasastra.
The sources of the dharma are different from the means of
ascertaining it, and the sources of the positive Hindu law have been
admittedly stated to be three viz. the sruti i.e. the Vedas, the
smritis i.e. the metrical codes of law, and the immemorial and
(4)approved customs. However, the Courts of law recognise the follow 




Yaj.1.3: "PurananyayamTmamsadharmasastrahgamisritah/ Ve dah
sthanani vidyanam dharmasya cha chaturdasa// Sarkar on p.2 
translates the word ’sthanani* as 'sources* but about the 
1vedangas' he says on p.15 "These, however, cannot be regarded 
as sources of law." From the comments of Vijhanesvara it is 
clear that they all together are the means of attaining the 
different lores and the knowledge of the dharma. Though the 
four vedahgas viz. siksa, kalpa, chhandas and jyotisa are 
practically useless as regards the knowledge of vyavahara, 
vyakarana and nirukta are not, as they are often resorted to by 
the commentators. For resort to etymology see infra pp.
For resort to grammer see infra p. It is interesting
to note that the famous commentary of Balambhatta contains refer 
ences to 93 sutras of Panxni only in the Vyavaharadhyaya. The 
same part contains references to 54 nyayas or the Mxmamsa 
illustrative maxims of interpreiation. Mayne on p.39 says that 
the Mimamsa rules of interpretation "are of doubtful authority 
in the present day administration of Hindu law." But there is 
no reason why they should not be resorted to for the purpose of 
determining a point not so far covered by any of the smritis or 
commentaries. They have often been resorted to by some of the 
eminent judges - see Chunilal v. Surjaram, Bliimacharya v. Rama- 
charya, Bai Parson v. Bax Somli, Meenakshi v. Muniandi, Ganga- 
dhar v. Hiralal, Marayan v. Laxman infra pp. ±t-S73 ^ 7  $
*ta5 'respecK'/alj . *
For vedahgas see Ganganatha Jha; Purva-Mxmamsa in its Sources 
(1942) Vol.I.pp.218-19. For a reference to vedangas see Manu 
111.185. For aUtm'ttof j>K«n of s*«. fp.iss-is^
see also Mit.on Yaj.fTsTl l»l»« nigUf. p.log 
Manu 11.12; Yaj.1.7. "
8(X)commentaries, immemorial customs, judicial decisions and statutes.
Although the &ruti or the Vedic literature is traditionally 
supposed to be the fountain-head of all knowledge and also of dharma, 
it is admitted on all hands that they do not contain much material 
concerning positive law. The smritis consist of the records of re­
collection and they are supposed to have been reproduced by the sages 
who were considered to be the repositories of the revealed law. The 
smritis may be taken loosely to include works of all the sages who
were known as the compilers of the dharmasastra and the famous smriti
inelviclinj +hose
of Yajnavalkya mentions a list of twenty sages who wrote simply
A
aphorisms on the dharmasastra as well as those who wrote metrical 
treatises on it.^^ Vijhanesvara says that the list is by no means 
exhaustive and that the sages like Baudhayana, etc. are also to be
included in the list of the dharmasastrakaras mentioned by Yajnav-
(3) (4)alkya. Some scholars include also puranas in the term smritis.
The original or the old puranas appear to have been eighteen. They
were added to by many other upa-puranas but an eminent scholar like
Golapchandra^denounces these latter as spurious works. The rules
of these smritis are often in conflict with each other, and sometimes
(1) For statutes see Mayne pp.72-73. But against judicial decisions 
being an independent source of law see Mayne p.19. But as 
against this view see The Changing Law p.45 referred to infra
p. 17. Sarkar says that the principles of stare decisis and 
of communis error facit jus should not be resorted to in ascer­
taining Hindu law in India - Sarkar pp. 6 V  GG.
(2) Yaj.I.4-5.
(3) f,Neyam parisankhya kintu pradarsanarthametat• Ato Baudhayan- 
adei'api dharmasas tratvamaviru ddhain. Etesam pratyekam pram- 
anye'pi sakanksanamakanksaparipuranamanyatah kriyate, virodhe 
vikalpah.If - Mit.’on Yaj.1.4-5.
(4) See, for instance, Mayne p.20.
(5) Sarkar p.37.
9at least apparently, a statement in a smriti at one place is in con*
flict with a statement in the same smriti at another place* The
probable explanation of such a wide divergence amongst them is that,
with the exception perhaps of the Manusmriti, each smriti was of
(1)local application only. According to Mimamsa the authority of a
smriti lies in a forgotten sruti upon which the former is presumed to
(2)have been based, and any smriti which is proved not to have been 
based upon the Sruti but upon fabrication etc. is unauthoritative.^  
A smriti is also considered to be unauthoritative if it is in conflic 
with the &ruti.^^
In determining the meaning and intention of the sastric 
injunctions the Mimamsa proceeds upon the following axioms:
(1) Sarthakyata : Every word and sentence has some meaning and 
purpose•
(2) Laghava : When one rule or proposition would suffice, more
(5 )should not be assumed.
(3) Arthikatva : A double meaning should not be ascribed, to' a word 
or sentence occurring at one and the same place.
(4) Gunapradhanatva : If a word or sentence which, on the face of it, 
purports to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal 
idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or altogether dis­
regarded.
(1) Mayne pp•20-21•
(2) K.L.Sarlcar : The Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation pp.74, 227 
and 231; Jai.Su.1.3.1-2.
(3) Jai.Su•I.3.4.
(4) K.L.Sarkar pp.74, 227 and 233-35.
(5) For laghava see infra pp.93, 391-33 .
(6) For arthikatva see infra pj> 3$7S 3 S3,39^,^ 7, 437. Stt <\\s* ?. ISO
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(5) Sainanjasya : Contradiction between words or sentences is not to 
be presumed where it is possible to reconcile them.
(6) Vikalpa : Where there is a irreconcileable contradiction between
(1)the two injunctions either may be adopted at option.
The general principles of interpretation are known as sruti
linga, vakya, prakarana, sthana and samakhya, and represent rules suc3
as the express meaning of a word or a sentence is to be preferred to
(2)
its secondary or suggestive meaning etc. They are not very often
resorted to by the commentators and we need not discuss them at 
( 3)great length.
From amongst the general principles of the application of 
texts the following two must be mentioned as they are often referred
(4)
to by the commentators.
(1) First principle is that of distinguishing between the 
obligatory texts on the one hand and the quasi-obligatory or non-
obligatory texts on the other. The Vedas consist of five classes of
— (5)texts, namely, vidhi, nisedha, arthavada, namadheya, and mantra.
Vidhi is that which enjoins a person to do a certain thing.
Nisedha denotes an order of total prohibition. Arthavada consists of
(1) See IC.Sarkar pp.78-98.
( 2) Jai • Su.X XX•3•14: 116r u t i 1 i ligavaky apr akaranas thanasamakhy anam
samavaye paradaurbalyam arthaviprakarsat.M See IC.Sarkar 70-72, 
110-155. For an excellent utilisation of these principles see 
Sankara's bhasya on the Bramhasutras (first pada of the first 
adhyaya).
(3) IC.Sarkar, however, gives some illustrations of the use of these 
principles by the dharmasastra commentators. On p.165 he argues 
that concerning succession to strXdhana Jimuta resorts to the 
superiority of linga over vakya and interprets Yaj.II.M5 with 
the help of Manu IX.196-97. See Da.Bha.4.2.24-28 infra pp.39X-53




(1)an explanatory statement of a vidhi or nisedha, Namadheya (lit,
nomenclature) is that which is apparently like a vidhi but is not to
be given the imperative force of a vidhi as that would tend to defeat
some basic principle or purpose of the i§astra.^^ The vidhis are
divided into two classes, namely, kratvartha vidhis and purusartha
vidhis. The former represent rules breach of which vitiates the
sacrifice in which they are supposed to be followed whereas the latte:
are rules breach of which attaches a moral guilt to the person who
(3)does not observe them but does not vitiate the sacrifice. As
laying down rules for the performance of sacrifices in accordance
with the rules of the &astra is the main purpose of the Purvamxmamsa
the former denote rules of positive law whereas the latter denote
(4)moral or non-obligatory rules.
An arthavada is an explanatory clause which supports a
vidhi or nisedha by resorting to an allegory, parable, fable, a
popular reason etc. Being merely of the nature of an explanatory
(6)clause it xs treated as a non-obligatory rule. A nisedha is
treated as an obligatory prohibition whereas a namadheya is consider- 
, . . (7)
frrf atf 1  niiin-fiKl rtpfl^ftrv i n  iiinftti n n  .
Addition to p,ll note no,3 ;
See also Dr, J.D.M.Derrett : The criteria for distinguishing between j 
legal and religious commands in the Dharmasastra, A.X,R,1953 Journal f 
pp,52-62* ;
(6) K.Sarkar pp,171-77 wlierexn he disloiiiseS the purport of 
Vidhivannigadadhikarana (Jai,Su*I,2,19-23) and the Hetuvanni- 
gadadhikarana (Jai.Su.1,2,26-29), For arthavada see infra 
pp, JSI AmI
(7) K ,Sarkar pp,177-79,
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(2) Second principle is that of 'atidesa* whereby rules applicable
a.
to certain persons or set of circumstances are, by analogy, madeA
(1)applicable to other persons, or set of circumstances etc. This xs
how in positive law any of the secondary sons of a male assumes the
duties and acquires the rights of his legitimate son.
The smritis were followed by the commentaries which try to
interpret the smritis with the help of the above-mentioned rules and
(2)apparently resolve the conflict amongst the different smritis. As 
regards the divergence, however, what was true of the smritis was 
true a fortiori of the commentaries. Although all the commentators 
and digest-writers profess only to interpret the commandments of the 
ancient sages, nominal authors of the smritis, it is obvious that 
each one of the former has some preconceived definite idea about the 
system of law which he wants to propound with the help of the conv&enl 
smriti texts. To serve this purpose he accepts the favourable texts 
of the smritis, neglects or ignores the unfavourable ones and where a 
particular text is too important to be easily avoided he accepts a 
different reading which changes the meaning of the tdxt. However, he 
cannot lose sight of the j^rinciple of * sarthakyata* which often
(1) Ibid pp.200-207; Bhattacharya*s Commentaries on Hindu Law p.71 
wherein he refers to the commentary of &rxkrisna on Da.Bha. 
3.2.29-33. For the application of this principle to strxdhana 
see infra pp. ^ 98 h'S L h$7
(2) For instance see Vijnanesvara's comments on Yaj.11.4-5 referred 
to supra p. 8* Even at present, for instance, an eminent judge 
and Hindu law scholar, like Mr.Justice Gujendragadkar uncon­
sciously followed the principles of *sarthakyata* and 1saman- 
jasya* in Gajanan v. Pandurang, and, in an enthusiasm to prove 
that some of the old sastric texts are well in conformity with 
the modern conditions of the Hindu society, has done injustice 
to the sastrakaras themselves - see infra p p . . So it is 
not very surprising that having openly accepted these two 
principles the commentators often find themselves in an uncom­
fortable position. See below.
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creates difficulties in his way. Therefore while keeping the balance 
between the axioms of interpretation and the system which he wants to 
propound a commentator is often found to be saying something which is
illogical, unconvincing, ambiguous^ and sometimes even self-contra-
(2)dxctory.
The modern Courts regard the commentaries as having more 
weight and importance than the smritis although the former profess 
only to follow the latter. The position though apparently an 
anomalous one is nevertheless a legal one and the practical relation 
between the smritis and the commentaries was unequivocally laid down 
by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the following words:
!,The remoter sources of the Hindu law are common to all the 
different schools. The process by which these schools have been de­
veloped seems to have been of this kind. Works universally or 
generally received became the subject of subsequent commentaries.
The commentator puts his own gloss on the ancient text; and his 
authority having been received in one and rejected in another part 
of India, schools with conflicting doctrines arose... The duty 
therefore, of an European Judge who is under the obligation to 
administer Hindu law, is not so much to inquire whether a disputed 
doctrine is fairly deducible from the earliest authorities, as to 
ascertain whether it has been received by the particular school which 
governed the District with which he has to deal and has there been 
sanctioned by usage.H(3)
In short, in the eyes of the law the commentaries and digests have 
superseded the smritis and form the main bulk of the basic sources 
of Hindu law.
It is also important to see the reasons why the commentarie/ 
have been held by the Courts to have gained such a dominant position
(1) For such statements see infra pp.^10 340 34£ 3>48 3§S
(2) For self-contradictory statements see infra
Vbl »Yi7 )'Wt,'iV7 ,4o/f. ‘ 5
(3) Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga (1868)12 M.X.A.396 at 
pp.435-36.
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among the sources of Hindu law. One reason is that the commentators 
frequently extended the rules of the smritis to their logical con­
clusion, and brought about a more clear-cut and detailed system of 
law for practical administration by filling in the lacunae left in 
the actual words of the smritis.
But a more important reason lies in the fact that they incor­
porated in their systems of law the usages and the customs of the 
people in general and sometimes even brushed aside the law of the 
smritis in order to fit the custom of their respective countries 
into its proper place in their treatises.^  ^ Most of the smritis
declare that the usage of the country is to be regarded as most
(2)
important. In furtherance to this position some of the commenta­
tors maintain that the science of law is like grammar, and it
embodies into the written form what already exists in the form of
*  ^ (3)an accepted usage.
It is through the incorporation of this usage that the
commentaries gained their worth. Having observed in a very early
case that the Mitaksara "subordinates in more than one place the
(4)language of the texts to custom and approved usage11 their Lord­
ships of the Judicial Committee emphatically laid down later on that
(1) For such instances see infra PP.15^ 1.70,31,*,393,1*05
(2) Infra. 3 * *
(3) Referring to partition amongst reunited brothers Nilakantha 
denies larger share to the eldest son and remarks: "Achar- 
o*pyevam. Tenacharamulakatve1sya vachasah sambhavati tadvir- 
uddhasrutikalpanamanyayyam. Vyavaharasastrasya vyakaranavat 
prayenacharamulakatvachcheti pare." - Vya.Ma.146. See also 
Ma.Ra. ref erred to infra p.3,q£. For the Mayukha embodying pre­
existing custom see Chundika Baksh v. Muna Kuar (1903)29 I.A. 
70; Jawahir Lai v. Jarau Lai (1924)46 All.192.
(4) Bhya Ram v. Bhyah Ugar (1870)13 M.I.A.373 at 390.
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"in the event of conflict between the ancient text-writers and the
(1)commentators, the opinion of the latter must be accepted,11 Con­
firming their reasoning and opinion their Lordships further expressed 
that "the commentators, while professing to interpret the law as laid 
down in the smritis, introduced changes in order to bring it into 
harmony with the usage followed by the people governed by the law;
and .... it is the opinion of the commentators which prevails in the
(2)provinces where their authority is recognised."
After this brief discussion of the commentaries it is 
necessary to refer to usage which > perhaps forms the most important 
source of Hindu law and to which even the commentaries own their 
chief importance. It is probably the divergence in usage that pro­
duced the divergence amongst the smritis and the commentaries as well 
The Sastra had always recognised the importance of usage. But 
according to MImamsa and the earlier authors of the dharmasastra the
validity of a particular usage depended upon whether it was in con-
(4)sonance with the precepts of the Sastra or not. But the restric­
tion of 1 being not opposed to the Sastra* seems to have dwindled into 
insignificance in course of time, and the later authors boldly say 
that even if a particular usage is \n contravention of the injunction 
of the Sastra it is to be followed and may be recognised as positive
(1) Atraaram v. Bajirao (1935)52 I.A.139 at p.143.
(2) Ibid.
(3) See for instance Manu VIII.3 (Pratyaham desadristaischa ...etc); 
Manu VIII.41 (Jatijanapadan dharman ...etc.).
(4) See Jai.Su.I.iii.5-6 (the padarthaprabalyadhikarana) and the 
comments of Sahara and Kumarila discussed in K.Sarkar pp.141-49* 
See also Gau.Su.11.22 : "Desajatikuladharmaschamnayairaviruddhah 
pramanam." (This is Gau.Su.11.22 in Haradatta*s Mitaksara).
See also the comments of Maskai*i and Haradatta on the above 
sutra and of Medhatithi on Manu VIII.3.
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law. Yajhavalkya in fact lays down that the orders of the &astra are
to  be.
not followed if they are detested by the general public. The
A
/ o \
whole idea of 1kalivarjyas1 (things enjoined by the &astra but not 
to be practised in the Kali age) seems to have been based on this 
principle of abhorrance of the people (lokavidvesa). Brihaspati 
recognised as valid several customs which were opposed to the Sastra
and recommended that the people who followed their respective usages
even in contravention of the sastric rules, ought not to be punished 
Yajnavalkya ordains that the king who conquers a new
country should, in governing that country, follow the laws and the
(4)customs only of that country. As it was the duty of the king to
administer justice i*n the country according to the local customary
usage there can be little doubt that as regards positive law customs
(5)always superseded the smritis or the sastric law.
The next most important source of Hindu law is the judicial 
decisions. Their Lordships of the Privy Council always adhered in
(1) Vaj*1.156. Vijhanesvara adds: "Bharmyam vihitamapi lokavicj- 
vistam lokabhisastijananam madhuparke govadhadikam naeharet.,f 
With the help of the above verse he contradicts the authority
of the precept laid down in Yaj.1.109 and,while denying a greater 
share to the eldest son as laid down in the smritis, discusses 
at length the principle laid down by Yaj.I.156 - see Mit.on Yaj. 
11.117. See also Manu IV.176 (Parityajedarthakamau yau syatam 
dharmavarjitau / Dharmam chapyasukhodarkam 1okavikristameva cha//
(2) For this concept of 'kalivarjyas1 see infra PP,
(3) Such customs collected by Brihaspati may be noted in detail:
"Uduhyate daksinatyetirmatulasya suta dvijaih/
Madhyadese Karmakarah Silpinascha gavasinah //
Matsyadascha narah purve vyabhichararatah striyah /
Uttare madyapa naryah sprisya nrinain rajasvalah // 
Khasajatah pragrihnanti bhratribharyamabhartrikam /
Anena karmana naite prayaschittadamarhakah // - Brihaspati 
quoted in Vi.Mi.22 and other treatises.
(4) Yaj.I.343 (Yasmindese ya achara ...etc.)
(5) For customary laws see infra chapter IV.
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principle to the common law rule that the Court merely expounds the
law and does not legislate. But the function of interpretation
sometimes becomes so important and recurrent that it tends to app-
(1)roach the function of legislation. This has particularly been 
true of Hindu law, wherein but for the continuous flow of judicial 
decisions a development of a uniform or at least a harmonious system 
would have remained utterly beyond expectation. Their Lordships of 
the Privy Council have, in some cases, altered the dharmasastra law 
and in others have tried to supplement the same by applying rules of
r  ( 2, )analogy to fill in the gaps left by^the sastric writers.
However, the principle of following the ratio of the 
previous decisions was perhaps utterly unknown to Hindu law and was 
introduced into its field by the British administration. But a dis­
tinction ought to be made between a ratio decidendi and the vyavasthai 
of a pandit. The ratio decidendi denotes a process of reasoning 
whereby a particular provision of law is held applicable to a par­
ticular set of facts in any case. The ratio of a previous case is 
applicable to all the subsequent cases wherein the facts or the data 
is the same. On the other hand, vyavastha is an opinion given by a 
pandit in a particular case after considering not only the law on 
the particular point involved in that case but also such other things 
as caste, community, usages etc. of the parties concerned and it may 
be based on equitable as well as legql consideration. Thus in con­
sonance with its etymological meaning a vyavastha is an arrangement 
or a decision tkhich is peculiar to a particular case and might not be
(1) See Sir Alfred Denning : The Changing Law p.45.
(2 ) See infra.
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applicable to an apparently similar case. Formerly the decisions 
given by the Sudder Courts of the East India Company were usually 
based on the vyavasthas given by the pandits of the Courts. Later 
on, however, the Courts themselves tried to interpret the dharmasastrf 
texts, meeting with general success though leaving certain mistakes 
which were quickly perpetuated on account of the common law rule of 
stare decisis. Hindu law is nowdays interpreted in the light of 
rationes and dicta of the opinions given by their Lordships of the 
Judicial Committee and the decisions of the different High Courts 
in India.
The enactments passed by the legislature form an additional
source of Hindu law.^^ The process of modification of Hindu law
which began in the early nineteenth century reached almost its
pinnacle in the form of the four recent enactments passed by the
( 2)Indian parliament and these latter appear to have almost entirely 
abrogated the old Hindu law. For the purpose of this thesis, how­
ever, Hindu law will first foe ascertained as it existed before these 
recent enactments, and the radical changes brought about by these 
enactments will be measured in the light of the position of Hindu law 
as it stood before.
The principles of justice, equity and good conscience 
which are so well known today were not utterly foreign to the domain
(1) For enactments which have amended Hindu law from time to time 
see infra p. 6 1 7 .
(2) For these see infra p. 6*38 .
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(1)of Hindu law though it must be added that the concept of an
equitable decision in Hindu law is different from the one in
English law wherein the development of equity depended upon reasons
peculiar to themselves.
Reference may be made also to the text-books writ ^ ers and
research scholars whose works - though they were never admitted as
sources of Hindu law - have always exercised a considerable influence
on the development of Hindu law. In the early days works of Sir
William Macnaghten and of Sir Thomas Strange could introduce big
(2)changes in the movement of Hindu law. Even in modern times it is
observed that the works which are generally considered to be standard 
are often relied upon by the practitioners and also by the Court© and 
the latter sometimes give a decision on a particular point merely 
relying upon the position of the law as stated in a particular text­
book and without referring to any previous case or text of Hindu 
The opinion of a well-known research scholar such as G.D.Banerjee or 
R.Sarvadhikari is often followed by the Courts upon points not openly
(4)
covered either by texts or decisions. Moreover the text-book
(1) See Mayne pp.80-81, Gupte p.23. However, Mayne says that ‘yukti 
referred to by Narada and Brihaspati means ‘equity and reason*, 
which does not appear to be correct. See Na.Smr.1.40 & Na.Sam.
1.34, and the two verses of Brihaspati cited in Apa.on Yaj.11.1. 
The comments of Asahaya and Bhavasvami upon Narada*s verse as 
well as the illustration of Mandavya risi given by Brihaspati 
himself suggest that ‘yukti* means *subtle reasoning* and not 
‘equity* known to English law.
(2) For striking instances in which Macnaghten was followed see 
infra pp. 135 ,*+^£,^11.
(3) See, for instance, Emperor v. Sat Narain A.I.R.1931 All.265 
infra p. 3 ^ 8  wherein the decision was given only on the authority 
of Mulla*s Hindu law.
(4) See, for instance, Kanakammal v. Ananthamati (1914)37 Mad.293; 
Chandulal v. Bai ICadhi I.L.R.1939 Bom.97; Bhadu v. Gokul A.I.E. 
1948 Cal.240 infra pp.tf^ O » wherein the decision was give]
only on the authority of Banerjee. See also Munia v. Puran,
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1©iW
writers and the scholars may be said to be highly responsible for the
A
development of Hindu law in as much as they may impress the legisla­
te
jMture as well as public in general with their opinion as to what the
A
ought to have been in the past, or ought to be at prdent or in future 
This common practice of relying on the text-book writers is often in 
the interest of clients since it saves judicial time, but it may be 
submitted that occasionally the adopting of an author*s words in a 
context which he perhaps did not precisely anticipate leads to just 
that element of potential confusion which a first-hand resort to the 
authorities might have avoided with profit. Moreover even leading 
authors like Sir William Macnaghten, Mayne, Sarkar and Banerjee have 
made several inaccurate, and sometimes even self-contradictory^^ 
statements which have unfortunately been followed in some cases by 
the Courts.
Arising out of our earlier discussion of the smritis, the
commentaries and custom a question arises as to whether Hindu law as
it is applied today was ever applied to the people in general in India
by any authority before the British regime. Even a superficial glane<
at the customs of the different provinces collected in works such as
(4)those of Borradaxle, Steele, Thurston etc. immediately convinces 
us that all of them could not come within the scope of a single
(1883)5 All.310 F.B. and Maiyan Dalip v. Sri Mohun I.L.H.1945 
All.315 infra pp.Jt£8tit39» wherein decision was given without 
referring to any Sanskrit text or judicial precedent.
(1) For incorrect statements of the text-book writers and scholars
j3ee infra pp. 89 ,19,2. ,3.66 ,1^-^113-73,XtS >^ 39 M 7 M 6  >5^3,
5*58 « v * For places where Banerjee*s statements have been 
either wrong or inadequate see infra pp.7 7  At'-Sty.hX 3 8 0
ifl3 ,lt39 Ml , W  33.1^ 93 $75 •
(2 ) For self-contradictory statements of such authors see infra 
PP-193. ,169 ,3.60 ,5<t3.
(3) See infra pi> irj , 19J., 173 -79j*85,'t" » etc '
(4) For these works see infra chapter V.
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system: the differences between some of the customs were extreme.
The British who ^ with the help of the pundits ^ made themselves aquaintet 
with the indigenous law were probably misled by the idea - perhaps 
ingeneously suggested by the pundits themselves - that the whole of 
India was governed by the written texts of the sastric law^and con­
tributed to that misconception by their own ideas as to the schools 
of law. The whole process now seems utterly illogical and indeed 
scarcely intelligible in view of the fact that in many parts of: India 
and in many communities all over India the sastric law was never 
resorted to for the purpose of deciding cases, which were usually 
decided according to the usages of the different tracts and communi­
ties with which the local Courts were evidently well acquainted* In 
some of the provinces such as Madras and the North West Frontier
Province the sastric texts were never followed and perhaps never
(1)known. The Sudder Court of the North West Province had to remand 
many cases to the lower Courts; because the latter did not know the 
new rule that Hindu law was to be applied to a case wherein both the 
parties were Hindus. In the South learned authors like Ellis and 
Nelson found that the sastric law was unknown to the masses perhaps m 
with the exception of the Brahmins and that the myriad systems of law 
as administered previous to the British regime were entirely differen 
from the one which came into general application for the first time 
during that period. But shch authors could not stem the tide of
(1) Stating that the authority of the Mitaksara was never recognised 
as binding in the Sastra itself and referring to the struggle 
between the Sryas and the gravidas, their Lordships of the Madrai 
High Court observed: **It was the East India Company*s Courts 
that held for the first time that the laws contained in the 
ancient sruthis and Smrithis were applicable to all Hindus in 
Southern India in the absence of a custom or customary law gover
C Cov\t;vme*l ov» e 3
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successive decisions with the help of which what was originally a 
misconception gradually crystalised into a recognised tradition* 
However, the results of such a mistake were not wholly 
detrimental to the Hindu society and perhaps the most salutory effect 
of this mistake is the formation of what would otherwise have been 
impossible^viz. a fairly harmonious system of Hindu law as it is 
understood today* The British, even if they borrowed from the Bengal 
pundits their misconception that the written sastric law was applic­
able to all Hindus in the absence of a custom to the contrary, 
pursued honestly and meticulously their duty as they conceived it* 
British scholars commencing with Sir William Jones and Colebrooke 
were responsible for the publication of the translations of many 
Sanskrit books on law which, but for the attempts of these scholars, 
might never have come before the eyes of the world. At all events 
it is too late to criticistthe basic mistake upon which the Anglo- 
Indian Hindu law is founded.
The difference between the provisions of the different 
commentaries gave rise to what is known in modern Hindu law as
•schools* of Hindu law. The terms * schools’ has been somewhat
(1)loosely used in this field since Colebrooke first used it. In fad
there appear to be only two schools of Hindu law, namely, the 
Mitaksara school and the Dayabhaga school. The difference between 
these schools is radical since in opposition to JXmutavahana, the 
author of the Dayabhaga, Vijnanesvara, the author of the Mitaksara,
Iting any class of people.** - Viswanatha v. Doraiswami (1925)
- 48 Mad.944 at 947-48.
(1) Mayne p.54.
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maintains that property has a secular origin, that the doctrine of 
spiritual efficacy has no application whatsoever to succession and 
inheritance, and that the male issue of a male up to the third 
generation get a right by birth in the coparcenary property* The 
other 'schools* known to modern Hindu law are the Benares school, 
the Bombay school, the Southern school and the Mithila school* These 
appear to be nothing more than the sub-divisions of the Mitaksara 
school but the notion that these 'schools1 exist has become so deep- 
rooted in the case-law that without taking a historical survey as to 
how these 'schools* arose - a discussion which really falls outside 
the scope of the present work - Hindu law will be ascertained in 
this thesis upon an assumption that these 'schools' do exist.^
Besides the Mitaksara the main authorities of these schools 
are as follows:-
The Benares school : the Vxramitrodaya and the Vivadatandava.
The Southernschool : the Smritichandrika, the Parasaramadhavxy a ,
the Vyavaharanirnaya and the Sarasvatlvilasa. 
The 'Bombay school • the Vy<\ vq, hqvqm«iy£(kh<j.
The Mithila school s the Krityakalpataru, the Madanapari jata, the
Vivadaratnakara, the Vivadachintamani and the* *
Vivadachandra.
The authorities of the Bayabhaga or the Bengal school are 
the Bayabhaga, the Dayatatva and the Bayakramasangraha. Besides 
the above-mentioned authorities there are several others which would 
occasionally be referred to in the forthcoming part of the thesis. 
Even during the British regime in India several Sanskrit works on law
(1) For schools of law see Mayne pp.SVS^Sarkar pp.
Bhattacharya PP*/*7-5o , Trevelyan pp* 13-2.1. , Gupte pp. 3 1 7 - etc.
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were composed by the pundits at the instance of British scholars 
like Colebrooke, Sir William Hones etc. The most outstanding and 
colossal amongst these works are the Vivadabhangarnava (translated 
by Colebrooke), the Vivadarnavasetu (translated by Halhed), the 
Viva dasarar 11 ava and the Vyavaharas i ddhantapiyusa, The first one of 
these became well-known as Colebrooke's digest and was often quoted 
as authority in the Courts. But there is no evidence — though this 
aspect of the matter has never been judicially investigated, so far 
as is known - that the Courts of the East India Company or sub­
sequently the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta or later 
still the High Courts in India ever accepted the possibility of a
t ^
further internal development of the Sastra on traditional lines: 
the Court pundits never assumed to innovate but merely to interpret 
and their authorities were invariably more oir less antiquated and 
thus comfortably beyond suspicion. However, it may be submitted 
that the presumption of an incorporation of usage which gave the 
previous commentaries their own worth cannot arise in the case of 
the commentaries written during the British Regime in India. More­
over no single author, however learned he might have been, could, 
after the introduction of the British regime in India, usurp the <■ 
function of legislature by professing to change^ o* ©w* 5
the already established rules of the Sastra.
Even after one has noted the various sources and school, 
of Hindu law and has accepted, whether correctly or not, the 
traditional line of approach, namely, to interpret Hindu law as
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consisting of the Sastra supplemented and corrected by the judicial
decisions and customs derogating from the former, one cannot at 
once grasp the bewildering diversity in the decisions on Hindu law 
and the Vacillations that took place in the law even of a single
’school1. It is essential to understand the reasons for the mis­
takes, inaccuracies or the incongruities in the decisions of the 
Courts relating to stridhana in particular and these may be sum­
marised as follows
(l) Judges1 ignorance of the Sanskrit language : The
first and the foremost of these reasons was the judges1 ignorance
of Sanskrit in which all the important treatises on Hindu law 
were written. A long interval separated the period during which it 
was admitted that the sastric law was to be applied to all Hindus 
and the time when many of the important Sanskrit books on lav/ were
translated and published; it was during this period which may be 
the
calledAformulatory period of the Hindu law th^t their Lordships of
the Privy Council and of the different High Courts in India gave
important decisions without having any opportunity to have full
access to all the material concerning the point involved.
It is noteworthy that the whole text even of the
Mitaksara was not before their Lordships of the Judicial committee
(1 )when they laid down in Thakore Bay he e v. Rai Baluk RamN ' the 
fundamental principle, namely, immovable property inherited by a 
widow from her husband is not her stridhana according to the 
Benares School• The decision in the important case of Chotav Lai v.
(l) (1866) 11 M.I.A. 139 see infra pp,
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(l)Chunnoo LaJ, was given without considering or even referring to
the Viramitrodaya which later on came to be known as a very import-
(2)
ant authority of the Benares school. Confirming the decision of
(3)the Bombay High Court in Vinayak v. Lakshmibai their Lordships
of the Privy Council referred to the Mayukha, the leading authority
in Bombay school, as ,!a book with which we are not familiar here,
but which seems to be well-known in Bombay and to be considered and
(4)treated as authority there.0
The position of the Sudder Courts in India was by no 
means better;in the beginning they had to depend on pundits who 
gave their opinion based upon very doubtful authority. Borradaile 
in his introduction to his Reports of the S.B.A. of Bombay stated 
that very few works except the Manusmriti, the Mitaksara and the 
Mayukha were ever known and the pundits appointed to give advice on 
legal points used to give it upon the basis of a particular work 
not possessed by raany^and that they were usually disinclined to 
part with it even for the purpose of being copied down* He adds, 
nIn one instance the Sadar Udalut Shastree admitted that purisisthu 
( Parisista i.e. <m ajcjfcft ) was the authority for the exposition, 
but as he alone possessed the work, there is no knowing yet how far 
it was true in other cases.0
(1 ) (1879) 6 I.A. 15 see infra p.IM-l
(2) Mayne pp. 45-46, Sarkar p . ^ g 5 Bhattacharya jp.
Gupte  ^ n p p .  17-15 .
(3) (1861) 1 B.H.C.R. 117.
(4) Venayeck v. Luxoomeebaee (a864) 3 W.R. (P.C.) 41.
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What was true of the judges was true mutatis mutandis of the 
lawyers who argued before the former. Perhaps with the illustrious 
exceptions like Mayne and Cowell counsel never read in full the or­
iginal Sanskrit text or its translation and was forced to proceed 
upon his general knowledge concerning the subject as it was expound­
ed in the early text-books. Even as late as in Balwant Rao v. Baji
(1)Rao we find Sir Erie Richards arguing before the Judicial Commit­
tee that the Mayukha is only a commentary on the Mitaksara and hence 
subservient to the latter.
Even when some of the Sanskrit books were translated in 
English and the judges in the later stage of the development of 
Hindu law started possessing some knowledge of the Sanskrit language 
it was not easy for such judges to understand the meaning correctly,
a© the Sanskrit language itself is very difficult and the intricacy
of the language:; is further worsened by the style of some of the
commentators which gives rise to enigmatical, ambiguous or equivocal
(2)
expressions. Brett J. in .Debi Prosanno v. Sarat Shashi observed i
H The text of the ancient authors, however, do not yield readily to
those methods of construction which we are able to adopt in dealing
with the books of modern date. The style is often involved. No rules
of punctuation are observed, and matters are introduced in para-
nthesis both in passages and in section© of the works without any
(3)apparent system or rule.,r While this cri de coeur would not have
(1) Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao (1920) 4 8  Cal. 30 (P.C.). Tht 4  *><-
(2) ( 1 9 0 9  ) 3 6  Cal. 8 7 .  £ Btiv.oltt 1901 ) i n  ht's S n y j  :
(0 ) Ibid. at p. 100. tUoi: kawaln i $ aj'th
kja. k  h  nvj iU<i V y  ci%r<t h .  T  ci >**■»<* y *i khti « «  4 * t •’ S J . i d  f 
fttTj a k Hiiv hw) c.mp* J t 4 I of*
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escaped the lips of a judge adequately trained in the sastric
techniques it was nevertheless a fair comment upon the meandering
method© of the Hindu jurists. The difficulty was further augmented
by wrong translations^^ of, and misprints in ^ the original texts#
\t
There is no wonder therefore in the case-law on strrdhana we find
A
a hosi of decisions in which the sastric provisions to the contrary 
were either not considered, or misinterpreted#(3)
(II) Reliance on Macnaghten and other text-hook writers : As in
the beginning their Lordships of the Privy Council were almost
incapable of taking recourse to the original Sanskrit authorities
they were compelled to rely on text-book© writers like Macnaghten 
eand Strange# But being unable to examine the basis Macnaghten1s
A
statements their Lordships unintentionally approved and followed
(4)also his mistakes. This tendency of the Courts to rely upon a
standard text-book ha© lingered behind till the present day and
(B)has resulted in many an incorrect decision,
(III) Application of the law of the Bengal school to that of the 
Mitaksara school : In the beginning the Calcutta High Court had to
deal with the law of the three'schools *, namely, the Bengal school, 
the Benares school and the Mithila school# Consequently their
(1) For instance© of incorrect translations see infra pp#78J85,9&lJl1f9j
th Ci'tfl«lst'uck«'r I 0y\ frHt *<efi’erehci'e$ * ^
(2 ) For some misprints pointed out‘*in^£hls $iesxs* see^TnJra* p*P• 7 S , 
" 5 , 3 7 * * 3 8 * . 39<S*K3sS33#
(3) For some of the important decisions^against the provisions of
the sastra see infra pp, US-l*#?,169*19^^ >$.7




Lordships of the same High Court were continuously, though perhaps 
unconsciously, superimposing the lav/ of the Bengal school upon that 
of the Mitaksara sub-schools. This super imposition was quickly and 
unhesitatingly confirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council 
because in the early stage of the development of Anglo-Indian Hindu 
law most of the members of the judicial Committee who were elevated 
from the Indian High Courts had their judicial experience in Bengal# 
The very first case in which their Lordships of the Calcutta High 
Court laid down clearly th%t immoveable property which a widow in­
herits from her husband is not her *peculium1, was decided upon an
alleged passage in the Mitaksara which in fact forms a part of 
* - ' - - (1)Srikrisna1s commentary on the Bayabhaga. It may merely be stated 
at this stage that the^decisions in which it was laid down that the 
property inherited by a widow from her husband i£ not her peculium
or stridhana were based upon this confusion between the law of the
—  —  (2)Bengal and the Mitaksara schools. The basic mistake was further
enlarged by putting on a par property inherited by a widow and
property inherited by any other female heir from any of her male or
(3)female relatives. The scope of the mistake was further widened by 
the Courts wiith,the help of uncalled for analogies between property
m
inherited by a female and property obtained by a woman on partition
(1) Goburdhan v. Onoop (1865) 3 W.H# 140, see infra p.1^7.
(2) Infra pp.(^7-1 .
(3) Infra pp. m g ’-
(4) Infra pp. |£ V  6^ •
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(1)or immoveable property given to a woman by her husband*
(IV) Inconsistency in the decisions : Although the common law rule
of stare decisis was always accepted in principle it was not always
followed in practice. The decisions even of their Lordships of the
Privy Council on whether accumulations of income constitute stri-
(2 )dhana or not, were not necessarily consistent with each other.
Their Lordships failed to evolve some common definite principle in
cases wherein one of the parties claimed that property acquired by
her _
a woman by adverse possession was^stridhana. In some such cases the­
ir Lordships of the Privy Council did not even refer to the precede-
(3 )nts Laid down by themselves. Concerning such decisions Page J.
characteristically remarked, 11 It cannot be pretended, I think, that
in the Privy Council the views which have been expressed from time
(4)to time are all consistent, or can wholly be reconciled.n • In * ■
(5 )Bhugwandeen v. Myna Baee their Lordships of the Privy Council 
termed as 1ambiguous1 the passage in the Mitaksara wherein inherited
# (fi )
property is included in stridhana and rejected its authority 9 but
(7 )
m  Chotay Lall v. Chunnoo hall they admitted that the same pass­
age clearly confers upon the widow or the daughter *an entire
(1) Infra p.(67.
(2) Infra p. \73l-
(3) Infra p.
(4) Sarat Chandra v. Charusila (1928) 55 Cal. 918 at 924. See also 
Rupabai v. Nokhesing A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 236; Lalsingh v. Vithal- 
singh A.I.R. 1950 Nag. 62 at 65 infra.
(5) (1867) 11 M.l.A. 487.
(6 ) Infra p.HH
(7) (1879) 6 I.A. 15 UfWjp.HS.
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(1)estate in land acquired by inheritance*. Moreover their Lordships
of the High Courts followed in several cases not only the exact
decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council but also the
obiter dicta of the latter withour examining the propriety of so
doing* Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court had to admit,
**There have been recent and conspicuous instances of the danger of
applying Privy Council decisions to points which they did not decide
(2)but which, in the language of Halsbury, seem to flow from them*"
Some of the decisions given by their Lordships of the High Courts
were not consistent with the precedents decided by themselves. The
way whereby their Lordships of the Madras High Court in one Full
Bench case nearly overruled their own decision in a previous Full
Bench case was, in the words of their Lordships of the Privy Council^
(3)"full of perplexity*'. As regards the point whether, in the ^ 
absence of any evidence, property acquired by a woman by adverse 
possession should be treated as her stridhana or not their Lord­
ships of the Allahabad High Court have till this day been con-
tinuously oscillating between two views and never thought of
(4)getting the matter settled by their own Full Bench. Their Lord-
Hot only inconsistent olecisions^  ^
ships of the Bombay High Court have given^even a self-contradictory
(5)
decision. There is no wonder therefore that as regards certain 
controvertial points the law was always left in a speculative 
position.
(1) Infra p.
(2) Kali Charan v. Piari (1924) 46 All. 769 at pp. 771-72.
(3) Infra p.|7 |
(4) Infra pp. *
(5) Infra 1p.if.5 5 .
(6) p. Ig'/.
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(V) Inconsistency in principles of interpretation s It has already 
been stated that their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down in 
Collector^v. Mootoo Ramlinga that a commentator1s interpretation 
of a smriti text is to be preferred to the text itself. Bmt in 
Thakore Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Ram and in Chotay Lai v. Chunoo Lai 
their Lordships themselves went against this principle and preferred 
the Jhnriti texts t& the interpretation put upon them in the Mitaksara. 
The former case was no daubt decided before Collecbbr of Madura’s case 
but Chotay Lai1© case was a later case and it is evident that their 
Lordships violated in that case the very principle which they vocife­
rously laid down in a previous case and subsequently d^ f firmed in 
almost every case. Secondly, it is well-known that on the presump­
tion that Niflakantha incorporates into his treatise the customary law
( 5 )
of his province , the authority of the Mayukha has been held to be
superior even to that of the Mitaksara in that part of the Bombay
Province in which the Mayukha is considered to be the most supreme
authority. On the same principle one would have expected the authority
/  / >  \
of JTmuta1s followers to supersede the authority of Jxmuta himself.
conflict between
Strangely enough, it has consistently been held that in the event any
(1) (1870) 13 M. I .A.396 supra] p. 13.
(2) (1866) 11 M.I.A.139.
(3) (1879) 6 I.A.15.
(4) Supra p.13.
(5) Supra p.14.
(6 ) See Acharyya's T.L.L.(1912) p.365.
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the provisions of Jimuta and those of his followers the authority
(l)
of the former prevails over the latter. Thirdly, it is no less
anomalous that the JaindtS and Bauddhas who were, in view of the
Sastra, completely unorthodox were held to he governed by the
(2 )ordinary Hindu law right from the beginning, whereas at least
for a long time dancing girls and degraded persons were in some
cases considered to be outside the pale of the ordinary Hindu law 
their
because of degradation, which arises only on account of the
A
* - (4)infringement of certain Sastric rules. If challenging the very
authority of the Vedas did not prevent the Jainas and the Bauddhas
from being governed by the ordinary law it is difficult to see why
the so-called degraded persons could not be governed by it.
(VI) Careless handling of customs and customary laws : Although
custom is one of the most important sources of Hindu law the Courts
always treated it with scant respect. In some cases customs were too
(5)readily asserted and assumed without any proof of their existence.
There are also cases in which decision© were given against a well-
known custom s the decisions in the Mayukha cases that inherited
(6)property was stridhana were all of this nature.
(1) See infra p . f o r  all such cases.
(2) Mayne p. 5* Gupte pp.ICMl, See also Bhikubai v, Mani lal A.I.R. 
1930 Bom. 517 and Jaiwanti v. Anandi A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 62^infra 
PP* and 417 wherein the authority of the Vardhamananit i and 
the Bhadrabahusainh.ita was flatly rejected.
(3) See infra ptoqptrer 3T.
(4) Infra p. 5119.
(5) Infra pp. ka.8-3-9. , . p
(6) Infra ip.151 .1« same. -rec.j«r4«.J cwih>.w> wore S«r «*••*«.
Foil <*we.4 -  Sivnpr t * .  pp. I £8 , 3 H & 3 -
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Moreover there was no standard measure as to the importance to
be given to authors who have collected detailed information
concerning customs and customary laws of a particular community
or locality. In some cases the statements made by such authors
(1 )
were approved and followed without any further proof whereas
in some others the Courts refused to recognise the authority of
such authors unless they could adduce some first-hand evidence in
(2 )favour of their statements.
Bearing these basic causes of confusion in mind we 
would not be dismayed by the complicated nature of the law of 
stridhana as it stood before 1955 in India. After this succint 
survey of the evolution and the nature of the modern Hindu law 
we shall now turn to the evolution of women*s property in general 
and of stridhana in particular.
(1) Stating that it is difficult to collect customs by judicial 
procedure West J. observed, •' Mr. Borradaile*s work, on the 
contrary, is a pre-constituted evidence. It is essentially
useful   where the point of issue is, which of the two
opposite readings of Hindu law should be received as applicable 
to a particular locality now.11 Navalram v. Nandikishore (1861)
1 B.H.C.R. 209.
($,) Bee Infra pp.It59 562.- 6 3 .
9
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For a proper understanding of the nature of stridhana some 
knowledge of the development of woman's property in general is essen­
tial as it affords a general background against which the concept of 
stridhana became clear and distinct in the course of time. The con­
cept of property is perhaps as difficult to define even today as it 
was a thousand years ago.^^ Nevertheless many Hindu jurists tried
to analyse the nature of property in its abstract sense though their
(2)theories widely diverge from each other. However, the authors of
the sutras and smritis did not attempt to analyse the concept of pro­
perty but, for the practical administration of law, they remained con 
tent with defining the modes of acquiring property.
Thus Gautama declares that inheritance, purchase, partition
(3 )seizure and finding are the modes of acquisition common to all.
He also mentions acceptance (by way of gift etc.), conquering (a
territory etc.) and earnings (by trade, labour etc.) as modes of ae-
qs well
quisition peculiar to Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, and Vaisyas i Sudras
(4) A
respectively. Thus it is clear that from the beginning of the
Hindu legal literature the acquirement of ownership depended inter 
alia upon the status of the acquirer. A particular section of the
(1) For an excellent survey of the nature of property amongst 
different primitive people of the world see E.Adamson Hoebel:
Man in the Primitive World (1949)pp.329-45.
(2) See, for instance, Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: An Indian Contribution to 
the Study of Property B.S.0.A.S.1956 p.475 for the text of the 
Svatvavichara.
(3) See Gau.10.38 and comments of Vijnanesvara on it in Mit.on Yaj.
11.24. See also Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: The Right to Earn in Ancient 
India, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 
(I957)p.66.
(4) Gau.10.39-40. Haradatta explains 1nirvistam* as 'Karmanopattam'
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society was thus privileged to acquire ownership in a particular mode
whereas the other sections were denied it* It will have been shown
how the female half of the society became, for the time being, an
object of discrimination as regards acquirement of property through
(1)certain modes*
The modes of acquisition mentioned just above were in no
case intended to be exhaustive and their number changed according to
the necessities of the period and probably of the locality* Thus
(2)
Manu mentions seven modes of acquisition whereas Narada mentions 
(3 )only six* Some of the later commentators who considered property
to be a secular acquisition went on adding to the already existing
(4) -modes of acquisition till we find that authors like Pratapa Rudra
and NXlakantha openly proclaim that modes of acquisition have for
their sanction the authority not of the Sastra but of public
usage. It also appears that the Vaisyas and Sudras early lost their
monopoly of acquiring property by trade, service etc. as even the
other classes were allowed to acquire wealth by these means originally
in cases of calamity or distress and subsequently even where this
(5)justification could not be alleged.
(1) See infra.
(2 ) Manu X*115*
(3) Narada referred to in Smr.Cha.I£0'
(4) In Mit.on Yaj.II.58 'adhi* or mortgage is mentioned as a mode 
of acquiring conditional ownership* See also the discussion 
about 'kutta* in Sa.Vi.163-65. On p.165 Pratapa Rudra remarks:
'svatvasyapi laukikatvat cha. Yatha loke dristam tatha svikar- 
tavyam.* See also Vya.Ma.92 referred to infra p.AH^*
For *Kutta* see Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: Kutta: A Class of Land-tenures 
in South India, B.S.O.A.S.(1958)p*62.
(5) See Medh.on Manu X.116.
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The word ' sva' means ‘one’s own* and therefore the word 
'svatva' denotes ‘the state of being one's own*. Svatva thus denotes 
the possessive relationship which exists between the subject and the
i
object of property. The commentators usually utilise the word 'svatva 
to denote ownership. The words 'svamya* and 'svamitva' are also 
sometimes used as synonyms for 'svatva' though at times the commenta­
tors use the former in contradistinction from 'svatva* and to denote 
the right to control. The confusing use of these words by the 
commentators will be shown below.^ However, 'svatva' is essentia- 
lly different from 'svatantrya* which denotes right of free disposal 
according to all the commentators. Thus a person may have 'svatva'
in a particular thing; but he may not possess 'svatantrya' in regard
(2 )
to it. We find this distinction often resorted to by the commen­
tators to describe the position of a woman, which appears in some
( 3)cases to be analogous to the position of a minor. The principle 
that the right of free disposal is not an essential incident of 
ownership at all had an important part to play in the development of 
the concept of woman's property in general and of stridhana in 
particular.
It is evident that the development of woman's property must 
have been directed by several changes in the structure of society and
(1 ) Medhatithi appears to have used the words 'svatva', 'svamya' and 
'svamitra* as synonyms and in condistinction from the word 
'svatantrya' - Medh.on Manu VIII.416. But Mitra Misra treats 
'svamya* and 'svatantrya* as synonymous and as different from 
'svatva* - see Vi.Mi.542 and 644. For the use of these words 
see infra pp.
(2) See infra.
(3) TEw^ ira pf?3AX9^ S  * s«.e ^ ls<> f.iyy ^ .
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it is most likely that the development of the institution of marriage 
was a major factor which influenced the former. Hence a succint 
survey of the development of the institution of marriage is an essen­
tial preliminary to the understanding and appreciation of the changes 
it
which may have introduced in the proprietory capacity of females*A
To appraise this development in its respective stages the 
sastric literature itself may be divided into different periods 
bearing it in mind that the division is by no means rigid and does 
not represent water-tight compartments. The first stage is the Vedic 
Age during which the Rigveda was followed by the other three Vedas 
and then by the literature known as the Brahmanas, Sranyakas, and the 
Upanisads. The Vedic period was followed by the Sutra period in
they
which the authors of the sutras tried to establish the systems which A
intended to propound by giving a series of mnemonical catch-phrases* 
The sutra system covered all the branches of knowledge and the com­
pilations of the sutras which dealt with positive law were called the 
Dharma-sutras. The sutra period was, it is generally supposed, 
followed by the Epic period during which the two great epics known as 
the Ramayana and the Mahabharata were written. The Arthasastra of 
Ifautilya and the Manusmriti may be included in this period. The 
Epic. period was followed by the Smriti period which was succeeded by
the period of the commentaries though it is not unlikely that some of
(1)the oldest commentaries preceded some of the later smritis.
Coming to the institution of marriage one finds that 
although the Mahabharata mentions that institution of marriage as
( 1 )  "Tf\ t  vvievetc, 'j'wr- C<» v-wn. in i t n  t a. ao  t  n  e. 1t s s T t  Kj c K t o  v\«
g ^  | >  L'\ | i  1*6. T  ot ira, s c. t ,  ^  Ov X  P*1 ^  I I £ 1" * Pi H i *  pi) v y  a  j-'  ^ 5 P r  • P*
L  i lre  P ^ e  Ip*’ y  I c\*>4 .
F<r T  S  l l t C  I H i; w
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(1 )having been introduced by a sage named Svetakatu there was not a
single stage in the development of the sastric literature which was
characterised by non-existence of the institution of marriage* Even
during the period of the Rigveda it was an already established 
( 2 )institution. However, during its further development the age of
the bride, the form of marriage, the dowry system, the customs of
divorce, remarriage, polygamy, niyoga etc* must have influenced both
the social position and proprietory capacity of women though, it must
be noted, that the progress of the two was not necessarily even.
The age of the bride seems to have undergone a remarkable
change* During the age of the Rigveda the bride was necessarily
grown up and after marriage she used to take the reins of the new 
( 3 )house. Even during the later Vedas and Brahmanas the normal age
(4)of the bride appears to have been not lower than that of puberty. 
During the Sutra period it was being gradually reduced till pre­
puberty marriage became an established custom in the Smriti period
and continued to exist till the introduction of the British regime
• r (5) xn India*
(1) Ma.Bha.1.122.8-21.
(2) Gliate: Lectures on Rigveda pp.155-56. A later vedic text says
a person who has no wife cannot perform sacrifice - *Ayajno va 
esah. Yo *patnikah*. - Tai.Brahmana 2.2.2.6 , 3.3.3.1.
(3) See Rig.Sam.10.85.46 also reproduced in Atha*Sam*14.1*44, Sa. 
Brahmana 1.2.20, Apa.Gri.Su.2.5.22 etc. See also Rig.Sam. 
1.115.2, 1.117-18 etc. referred to for the purpose of this 
inference in The Vedic Age p.389 (a publication of the Bharatiya 
Xtihasa Samiti). See also Dr.P.V.Kane: History of Dharmasastra 
Vol.II.439-40; Dr.A.S.Altekar: The Position of Women in Hindu 
Civilisation (1956)p.49; Prof.Indra: The Status of Women in 
Ancient India (1955)pp.41»43; T.S.Rajagopal: Indian Women in 
the New Age (1936)pp.9 & 52.
(4) The Vedic Age p.452.
(5) Kane Vol.II 430-46; Altekar 53-62; Indra 44-52; Rajagopal 52-54.
40
During the Vedic period the form of marriage appears to
have been very simple and it is unlikely that the eight forms of
(2)
marriage so well-known to Smriti literature existed during the
Vedic period* The form known as the Asura which mainly consists of
a purchase of a girl by paying a bride-price to the bride*s parents
( 3 )was perhaps adopted by the'Sastra from the non-Aryan people* The
Raksasa and the Paisacha forms which mainly consisted of a forcible
abduction of a gitfl were probably recognised by the Sastra by way of
(4)sanction for the customs of the indigenous aborxgins* The Gand-
harva form which was a kind of love-marriage was probably a result
( 5 )of the sastric provisions about svayamvara. By the time of the
sutras the eight forms of marriage were well-known and the Brahma, 
Dc^ iva, Arsa and Prajapatya were termed as approved forms whereas the 
Gandharva, Asura, Raksasa and Paisacha were termed as unapproved 
forms* The Sastra determined, however, that a girl married in an 
approved form should be treated as a sapinda of her husband whereas
(1 ) Rig.Sam*10*85 known as the marriage hymn may be taken as re­
presentative of the ceremony of the marriage as it existed then*
(2) See, for instance, Yaj.I.58-61.
(3) The Asura form is still practised by the aborigins and backward 
classes of Hindus - See Dr.D.N.Majumdar: Races and Cultures of 
India p*143.
(4) Altekar pp.36-37. These forms were recognised by the Sastra 
perhaps to give some status to the unfortunate girl - Vedic Age 
p«511* It is quite possible that these two forms were introduced 
and recognised after the Asura form,foT* in the case of some of 
the indegenous tribes, it is seen that a bridegroom performs 
marriage by capture in case he is unable to pay the requisite 
bride-price—  Races and Cultures of India p.154. But their in­
depent origins may be suspected though not now capable of 
accurate demonstration.
(5) For svayamvara see infra pp, •
(6 ) See Mayne pp. 8 l+-ft3 ; Gupte pp. TST
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one married in unapproved form should be treated as a sapinda of her 
father. The reason probably was that the Sastra treated an unapproved
A
marriage as hardly equal to real marriage.
Coming to the provisions about divorce and remarriage it 
must be noted that the Dharmasastra does not contain specific pro­
visions about divorce. But according to Narada and Devala a woman
(2)can justifiably desert her husband in certain circumstances.
Kautilya, however, gives rules for divorce and even allows divorce
( 3)by mutual consent. As regards remarriage the Atharvaveda appears
to have approved remarriage of a widow and to have laid down rituals
(4) (5)for it. It is also recognised in some of the smritis though
in some others a woman is enjoined to have only one husband in her
(6)life-time. The prejudice against widow-remarriage grew deeper 
during and after the Smriti period and by 1,000 A.D. remarriage was 
included in the notorious list consisting of things which are origin­
ally recognised by the Sastra but which are banned during the ICaliyuga
(1) Bandhayana, for instance, goes to the extent of declaring that
a purchased bride does not become a wife but a slave - Bau. 
1.11.21.4-5; see also Altekar pp.40-41. cu^ vnof- br,^ e>PYlt<L^
(2) Na.Smr.15.97 and Na.Sam.13.100; X)evala cited in Vi.Ra.447.
(3) Kau.III.3, Shama Shastri's 13d.p.155. But he allows divorce 
only in case of unapproved marriages. For divorce in the 
Dharmasastra see Kane Vol.I.96, Vol.II.519-22; Altekar pp.83-86.
(4) Atha.Sam.9.5.27-28.
(g) See Na.Smr.15.97 and Na.Sam.13.100; Pa.Smr.4.26; Katyayana
cited in Apa.on Yaj.1.65 etc. wherein remarriage is allowed 
under certain circumstances.
(6 ) See, for instance, Manu V.158-160, IX.47, IX.71 etc. See also
Ma.Bha.1.104.34. For provisions concerning remarriage see Kane 
Vol.II.508-19; Altekar pp.150-55; Rajagopal 65-69.
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(X)on the authority of the public opinion.' Divorce and remarriage 
continued to exist, however, amongst the Madras and the aborogins of 
India.^ ^
The practice of polygamy made its own contribution to the
development of woman’s property. During the period of the Rigveda
monogamy appears to have been a general rule though there are a few
(a)
references to polygyny here and* there. By the time of the Brah­
mana literature polygyny appears to have become well-established, for
this literature tends to advocate polygyny by giving sacerdotal 
(k)
reasons. The Ksatriya class probably adopted this practice from
the pre-Aryan and pre-Bravidian tribes whom the Aryans must have met
(c )
after they commenced large-scale settling in India. w However, the
authors of the sutras and smritis try their best to prohibit a person
(6)from superseding his wife capriciously or unjustifiably. Generally 
they allow supersession if the first wife is barren or is having only 
female children. However, it is possible that in practice a wife 
could be superseded on flimsy grounds.
Polyandry is another notable feature of the institution of 
marriage. It did not exist during the Vedic age and the later Vedic
(1 ) Commenting .on Na.Smr.1.40 Asahaya refers to the rule of re­
marriage laid down in Na.Smr.15.97 and remarks: *...ityadikam 
dharmasastroktamapi 1okacliaravyavahare parityaktam'. For the 
list of ’Kalivarjyas * (things not to be practised in the Kali 
age) see the Smritikaustubha Nir.Ed.pp.470-79; Nir.Sindhu pp. 
1287-89; see aiso Kane Vol.III.chapter XXXIV, .
(2 ) Altekar p. 156; Rajagopal p.76. See also infra pp. **5 7 -5 9 - <>
(3) The Vedic Age p.390; Ghate p.166; Mayne p.172.
(4) Tai•Sam•6 •6 .4•3; Sha.Bra.9.1.4.6.
(5) Polygyny was common amongst the Nagas and most of the pre-
Dravidian tribes, and amongst the ’lower cultures* of India 
it is still common - Races and Cultures of India p.155.
(6 ) Kau.III.2; Manu IX 80-81; Yaj.1.73.
(7) For instance, see ’sadyastvapriyayadini’ - Manu IX.81.
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literature give© sacerdotal reasons for pex*mitting polygyny and pro­
hibiting polyandry. Polyandry is reported to have been existing
from Kashmir to Assam amongst the Mongoloid people. In the south 
the tribes of Todas, Itotas and Tiyans practiced polyandry. In Ceylon
it appears to have been discouraged during the last century. It was
(2)also deep-rooted amongst the Nayars of Malabar. The Mahabharata
furnishes a spectacular instance of polyandry: the Pandavas, the
five famous heroes of the epic, marry the same daughter of King 
Drupada. But from the depiction of the reaction of their mother 
KuntX as well as of King Drupada it seems that it was a unique in­
stance. It is quite likely that the Pandavas belonged to the non- 
Aryan stock who practised polyandry. Prom the later Sastric litera­
ture it appears that the Aryans not only did not imitate this system
(3)but tried to curb it.
Another custom which ought to be considered here is niyoga 
(sometimes erroneously translated ’levirate*) according to which a 
childless widow was allowed to bear children to her younger brother- 
in-law or to some other sapinga of the deceased husband. The practice 
appears to have been common during the Vedic period though it was 
being restricted in the Sutra period. There was a greater reaction 
against niyoga in the Smriti period and ultimately the commentators
(1) Supra.
(2 ) Races and Cultures of India p.155.
(3) See Kane Vol.II.554-56; Altekar pp.112-114; Indra pp.64-67; 
M.W.Pinkham: Women in Sacred Scriptures of Hinduism (1941)
p.155. See also infra p.$35.
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almost unanimously agreed that niyoga is one of the things forbidden
(1)during the Kaliyuga.
According to the Sastra marriage is a dana or gift o:f the 
bride by her father and each religious gift is usually to be accom­
panied with gift in gold. It is no wonder, therefore, that in the
Vedic and Kpic literature we find many brides bringing rich presents
(2)to their husbands from their parents* houses. From ancient times
the daughter used to bring some property from her father*s house to
her husband*s home although it appears that she had no absolute right
so to do, but was allowed what her parents' and brothers* affection
(3)afforded her. It is quite likely that these presents were intend­
ed for the bride herself or for both the bride and the bridegroom. 
These presents are to be distinguished from varasulka or dowry, which 
denotes an amount to be paid by the bride's party to the bridegroom
or his party and which serves as a condition precedent to the
(4)marriage. The dowry system must have started only in the medieval
period probably through shortage of eligible bridegrooms in certain 
castes and it is quite rampant throughout India even today. If it 
had been prevalent during the Sutra or the Smriti period there is 
little doubt that their authors would have condemned the practice
with the same vehemence with which they condemn purchase of a bride
. (5)in Asura marriage.
(1) For Niyoga see Kane Vol.III.599-607; Altekar pp.142-149;
Indra pp.106-112.
(2) Altekar pp.70-72.
(3) See Durgacharya*s commentary on the etymology of the word 
1duhita* in Nirukta III.4.
(4) For varasulka see infra.
(5) See supra.
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Before turning to the development of woman's property we 
must not fail to notice the concept of the joint ownership of husband 
and wife, which is prominent in the Sastric literature throughout* 
in the age of the §igveda it was common for a newly married wife to 
become the mistress of her husband's house. She must have shared
this controlling authority in common with her husband* With the 
growing importance of land as valuable property the wife's authority 
must have naturally dwindled into insignificance because, unlike any 
male member of the family, she was not much useful in ; - cultivation; 
of land* Probably as a compensation for her loss of individual rank 
in the house her pecuniary interest was identified with that of her 
husband*
The word 'dampatX' (i.e. a couple) which etymologically
means 'the two masters of the house' suggests the idea of joint
ownership of husband and wife* Thus Apastamba declares that the two
spouses are the owners of the wealth and that the other members of
(2)the family should act with their consent and for their benefit. He 
also declares that there can be no partition between husband and wife :
r
as from the time of their marriage there is a continuous partnership 
between them as regards performance of religious duties, the attain­
ment of the results of such performance and the acquirement of 
( 3 )wealth. Commenting on these sutras Haradatta says that the 
partnership in the acquirement of wealth is manifested by the fact
(1) The Vedic age p.388; Ghate: Lectures on Rigveda p.166. See 
also supra p. note V
(2) "Kutumbinau dhanasyaisate. Tayoranumate1nyepi taddliitesu 
varteran. - Apa.2.29*3-4.S«e <*Uo v3 eta yatpqtnT.-
(3) Apa.2.14*16-20 and the comments of Vijhanesvara on these|6«l-8*5. 
sutras in Mit.on Yaj.II.52.
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that the husband earns for the house whereas the wife spends it for
the house. However, the only difference between the positions of
the husband and the wife is that the husband is an independent owner
whereas the wife is a subservient owner. Therefore Haradatta and
Balambhatta hold husband's position in his house to be comparable to
(2)that of a King in his nation.
That this concept of the joint ownership of husband and 
wife is not merely theoretical could be seen from several provisions 
of the Sastra which purport to put this idea into practice: Apastam-
ba declares that one should distribute his property amongst one's !
(3 ) Isons during his life-time. Commenting on this sutra Haradatta
explains that npastamba does not mention the wife's share separately
(4)as he considers the husband's share to be his wife's share. Just
as a husband can take possession of his wife’s property in case of a
(5)calamity like famine, restraint etc., the wife also can contract
a debt for the sake of the family in case of calamity and can thrown
(6)on her husband the burden of discharging that debt. Just as a son 
obtains a right by birth in the property of his father even though it 
was acquired before his birth the wife gets a right,sfrice her marriage^ 
in the property of her husband which he might have acquired even
(7)
before the marriage.
(1) "Dravyaparigrahesu dravyarjanesu tatha sahatvameva. Tatra 
patirarjayati jaya grihe nirvahati ..."
(2 ) Infra p. 3,3.8-
(3) Apa.2.14.1.
(4) "Bharyayapyaraso na darsitah. iitmana evamsah tasya apXti 
manyate•"
(5) Infra pp. -
(6 ) Na.Smr.4.12 & Na.Sam.2.10; Brihaspati cited in Vi.Mi.272 etc.; 
Katyayana cited in Apa.on Yaj.11.45-46.
(7) See Balambhatta on Yaj.II.52 (Gharpure's edi.p.70).
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The fact that husband and wife are united by marriage has
been admitted by all the later commentators and some of them quote
the famous text about the common property of husband and wife
(dampatyorraadhyagam dhanam) to show the reason why the early Hindu
(1)lawyers do not mention partition between husband and wife* Apar-
arlca says that the provision of Yajnavalkya which bars any litigation
between husband and wife applies to the common property between 
(2)them. By resorting to this very idea of common property of
husband and wife Vijhanesvara substantiates Yajnavalkya*s provision
which does not allow relations like debtor-creditor, surety-ship etc.
(3)to exist between husband and wife. Devanna says that Manu*s pro­
vision prohibiting women from spending without their husbands* con-
(4)sent applies also to the common property of husband and wife.
From the legendary and the inscriptional literature it 
appears that this idea of common property of husband and wife was 
brought into execution by several royal families. The King was often 
jointly with his wife. In the Satavahana dynasty the joint­
ly coronated couple used to rule jointly by issuing joint edicts.
From the inscription found in the Madhya Bharata it appears that in 
the medieval age a queen who shared sovereignty with her husband could
(1) For the text and the various reference to it see Dr.J.D.M. 
DerrettI* An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property 
B.S.0.A.S.1956 p.475 at p.490. Raghunandana explains 
*madhyagam* as *ubhayasvamikam* - Da.Ta.19.
(2) *'Tatha cha damnatvoh sadharanadliannt^~+ «—
Addition to p.47 note 2 : Visvarupa commenting on Yaj.II.51 says :"Bam- I
patyoraviilbhaktadhanatve •••'’; but this does not appear to be a reference j
to the above metrical composition but a mere paraphrase of the position j
enunciated in Apa.3u.2.14.16-20 supra p.4-5 note 3. |
xx .o<& in mix; • j •
(3) Mit.on Yaj.II.52, "Sadharanadhanatvat♦11
(4) Infra p.
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bestow royal grants upon any person without taking the consent of
her ruling husband.^ It is not unlikely, therefore, that the
members of the aristocracy followed the principle approved by the
of 'property
royal families. It must also be remembered that communityA between
husband and wife is recognised to some extent amongst the Tamils of
(2)Jaffna (Ceylon) and the peoples of the former Indo-China. The 
concept has reached full perfection in the Burmese customary law 
wherein it is given full effect to as regards both acquisition of 
property and succession to it.^3^
Even with this varied background in mind when one comes to 
examine the development of woman’s property amongst Hindus one is 
surprised to find the vicissitudes through which a Hindu woman had 
to pass till she acquired full proprietory rightsby the recent enact­
ment of 1966. During the age of the Rigveda the woman, according to 
almost all vedic scholars, had a respectable position in the house 
and the daughter-in-law usually used to take the reins of the new
(4)
house* Even though the social position of women in those days 
appears to be fairly high references to their proprietory capacity 
are comparatively very scanty: in the Rigveda they are rare in the
case of the proprietory capacity of males as well. However, the 
later Samhitas declare the wife to be the mistress of the household 
property. Probably this was the time when land as an object of pro­
perty was growing in importance and women who were usually incapable
(1) For a detailed discussion about the inscriptional literature on 
this point see D.R.Bhandarkar: Jethwai Plates of the Rashtra-
kuta Queen Silamahadevi: Saka-Samvat 706, Epigraphica Indica
vol.22 p.98.
(2) B.S.O.A.S.1956 475 at 490 supra.
(5) Infra p. -
(4) Supra p. 39 .
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of regular cultivation of the soil failed to establish their claims 
upon land as well as moveables. However, women did own some property
as can be seen from the fact that one of the Brahmanas mentions that
-  (1) the famous sage Yajnavallqra gave all his wealth to one of his wives.
The wife is also declared to be the mistress of the household pro-
perty.<2>
But it appears that women did not have any share in inheri-
( 3 )tance. The term *daya* was used to denote the father*s wealth in
those days though the term included all kinds of inheritance in the
(4)later days of the development of Hindu law. Therefore some of the
(s)Sutri passages declare that women are not capable of taking *daya1•
The Satapatha Brahamana declares that wives are masters neither of
themselves nor of * daya*. Yaska the author of the Nirukta quotes
a non-extant verse of Manu to show the opinions of the two schools
one of which maintained that daughters were incapable of inheriting
(7)property whereas the other school maintained the reverse. This
(1) The Satapatha Brahmana 14.6.3*
(2) Tai.Sam.6.2.1.1: ,fPatnT parinahyasyese.11 See also the Kathaka 
Samhita 24.8 and the MaitrayanI Samhita 3.7.9.
(3) For instance the daughtdr is not mentioned in Apa.2.14.1.
(4) The definition of the Nighantukara is "Vibhaktavyam pitridrav- 
yam dayamahurmanisinah." - quoted in Sa.Vi.344, Vi.Mi.411 etc. 
But the Sangrahakara quoted in Sa.Vi.344, Vi.Ta.277 defines 
day a as 11 Pi t r i d var a ga t am dravyam matridvaragatam cha yat."
Thus the wealth of the mother seems to have been included in 
the word daya later on. The famous text of Narada which has 
been held by the commentators to be applicable to the property 
of both the father and the mother actually contains only the 
word 'pitrya* - see Na.Smr.16.1 & Na.Sam.14.1 and the comments 
of Vi jrtanesvara on it in Mit.on Yaj.II.114. For the concept 
of ' day a’ see infra p*Xl^.
(5) See MaitrayanX Samhita 4.6.4 : MTasmat pumandayadah stryaday-
ada...11 See also Tai.Sam.6 .5.8.2.
(6 ) Sha.Bra.4.4.2.13 : " *..natmanaschanesate na dffyasya chanesate.”
(7) The Nirukta III.4.
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was probably a time when land was becoming the most valuable kind of
the father's property and during the period of transition it is not
improbable that two schools existed expressing divergent opinions
about the capacity of daughters to inherit a share in all their
father's property*
When the reader passes from the Vedic literature to the
Sutra literature and the early Smriti literature he finds that
women have fallen spectacularly from their original position* The
whole picture is entirely changed and the metamorphosis is so rapid
that even a stage of transition cannot be traced. The Sastra at this
stage became very jealous of giving women either social freedom or
proprietory rights. Thus Baudhayana declares: ftA woman does not
(1)gain independence." He further declares, "The Sruti says that
women, being devoid of any organs, are incapable of inheriting pro- 
(2)
perty." He also lays down that the proper state of woman is that
of perpetual tutelage : she is to be protected by her father, husband,
( 3 )and son during her maidenhood, youth and old age respectively.
Baudhayana is supported in his theories by many other eminent authors
such as Manu, who proclaims that a wife, son and a slave are incapable
of owning any property and that the property which they earn belongs
(4)to the person to whom they themselves belong. The Mahabharata and
(5)the Naradasmriti contain almost an identical text. Authors such
(1) Bau.2.2.3.45 : "Na strx svatantryam vindate."
(2) Bau.2 .2 .3 .47 : "Nirindriya hyadayascha striyo mata iti srutih."
(3) Bau.2.2.3.46. For this perpetual dependence of women see also 
Manu IX.3; Yaj.I.85; Na.Smr.16.31 & Na.Sam.14.31.
(4) Manu VIII.416: "Bharya putrascha dasascha tray a evadhanah 
smritah/ Yatte samadhigachchhanti yasya te tasya taddhanam//
(5) MalBha.*!.82.22 & 5.64; Na.Smr.8.41 & Na.Sam.6 .39.
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as Visnu, Gautama, and Vasistha declare that a woman is incapable of 
having independence.^ Ratifying Baudhayana*s theories about 
women's dependence and their incapacity to have a share in inherit­
ance, Govindasvami, Baudhayana's commentator, discloses an apprehen­
sion that if a woman is allowed to take a share in the 'daya' she
(2)
would become independent. Thus there is almost a remarkable con­
cord amongst all these authors in denying women either social inde­
pendence or a share in the family property and the two appear to be 
closely connected in the jurists' minds.
It is very difficult to trace the reasons why there was 
such a steep decline in the legal and social position of women from 
the Vedic period to the Sutra period# With the scanty information 
that is at hand it is best to offer a few tentative conjectures. 
Firstly, it is quite likely that the gradual reduction in the age of 
the bride in the post-*Rigveda days was mainly responsible for this 
decline. Marriage of a pre-puberty bride estranged her from her 
father's house where she could not have any effective voice; on the 
other hand, on account of her youth she could hardly be entrusted 
with a responsible position in her husband's family wherein the 
husband must naturally have taken a dominent position from the very 
beginning of his married life subject perhaps to the dominance of 
his own father. Probably the husband's initially dominent position 
continued throughout his married life. From a proprietory point of 
view it seems the women's position was intentionally lowered to 
avert the possibility of the young widows getting remarried and
(1) Vis.Smr.25.12; Gau.18.1; Vasistha 5.1.
f \ ■mm * *(2 ) "Dayalabdhe tu tasyah svatantryara bhavet kritalerityatabhiman- 
enetyabhiprayah." - Govindasvami on Bau.2.2.3.45.
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carrying away family property along with them* The second probable
reason is the adoption of the Asura marriage by Aryans following the
practice of the indigenous people. In the Asura form of marriage the
girl was virtually sold to the bridegroom and this must have tended
to reduce her position, at least in the beginning, to that of a
chattel. The idea that women, as they could be bought with money,
were tantamount to chattel became so popular that Jaimini, the author
of the Purvamlmamsa-sutras, had to discuss the same as aspecial topic
in order to refute the idea and to propound that women are capable of
(1)owning property in their own right. Yajnavalkya had specifically
(2)to exclude the wife and son from things capable of being given.
But the usage of the Asura marriage had lowered women's position so 
considerably that the idea that the husband owns his wife lingered 
long after the SHtra and the Smriti periods. Thirdly, it is likely
that the Aryans during this period came into deeper contact with the 
indigenous tribes some of which were matriarchial and polyandrous.
As a violent reaction to the strange customs of the indigenous 
people, which must have stunned the Aryans the latter probably de­
cided to recoil in their primitive stage and to confine their women 
within the four walls of the house. Fourthly, the continuous inva­
sions of the tribes of the Sakas, Hunas etc. were disturbing the 
stability of the society which was being jiundered in every sweep of
(1) See Jai.Su.6.1.6-21 fully discussed in Bwarka Nath Mitter: 
Position of Women in Hindu Law pp.56-133. For the Purvapak- 
sin's argument to the effect that women, being sold and bought 
in marriage, are nothing more than a chattel see Jai.Su. 
6.1.10-12. For references to women being treated as chattel 
in Ancient India see J.J.Meyer; Sexual Life in Ancient India 
pp.507-533.
(2) See infra p*3t5 ).
(3) See infra pp. A 5 )-5 $.
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(1)invasion* As a defensive policy the Aryans probably thought of
cordoning off their women who were more in the danger of being ab­
ducted or defiled. Fifthly, it has already been conjectured that the 
increasing value of land must have decreased the position of women
who had to wait for a long time till the agrarian economy of the
(2)Aryans was also supported by other industries. It is quite likely
that any one or more of these reasons were responsible for the down­
fall of women during the age of the sutras, epics and the early 
smritis*a
But it is in the sutra period itself that the germ of
strxdhana was developing. In the earlier days land was probably not
partitioned and it used to pass undivided to the eldest son* The
other sons used to receive cows, implements of cultivation, the
( 3)family house, cattle etc. in certain shares. But from the earliest
times even women always had some property which they gained as a
(4)nuptial gift either from their father’s house or husband's house.
In the early days, therefore, that was the only property which^in
( 5)addition to their household property^ belonged to them and devolved
upon their heirs. Thus Apastamba declares ornaments and household
(6 )things to be the property of the wife* At the time of the parti­
(1) See Altekar p.350 wherein he quotes the Yugapurana which des­
cribes the Sakas as destroying one-fourth of the population by 
weapons and abducting one-fourth of the population of the invadedi 
territory to their own territory.
(2) From the various references given by the commentators it seems 
that spinning and weaving later on formed the special vacations 
of women*
(3) See rules of shares in partition laid down in Vas.Smr.17*40-46.
(4) See supra p.J*!* noTc ^  -
(5) Supra p. 49
(6 ) Apa.2*14.9, appendix text no.If./ See also Apastamba quoted in <
Mit.on Yaj.II.115: "Paribhandam cha grihe1lankaro bharyayah."
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tion of the father*s property i.e. ’daya* the property of the mother
was divided amongst the daughters. Thus Vasistha declares, "Women
should partition their mother*s nuptial wealth."^*^ Sariicha says:
"When ’ daya* is being partitioned the daughter should get ornaments
(2)and the nuptial strxdhana." Gautama lays down special matrilineal
(3)succession to strxdhana. Thus whereas the father’s property de­
volved upon his issue in the male line the mother’s property devolved 
upon her issue in the female line.
When one comes from sutra period to the Smriti period one 
comes into an atmosphere of greater certainty. The concepts of co­
parcenary property, self-acquired property of males and of women’s 
separate property seem to have grown more precise during this period. 
With the increasing compactness of the coparcenary property the pro­
bability of women and widows being neglected by the family was 
visualised by society and consequently by the Hindu jurists. It was 
necessary to protect their future by giving them some kind of pro-
1
perty to be at their absolute disposal with a view to ensure their j
i!
maintenance in case of misfortune such as widowhood, desertion by !
their husbands etc. The whole concept of strxdhana seems to have
been based upon this urge to provide women with some reserve fund for
their maintenance. Kautilya and Katyayana declare in specific terms
( 4 ) |
this particular purpose of strxdhana* j
i
It was the spirit of Hindu law that things which constituted]
j
(1) Vas.Smr.17.43, appendix text no.8 * j
(2) Sariicha quoted in Sa.Vi.362 etc., appendix text no. 1ST.
(3) Gau.Su.28.22^^|^|||^2^ appendix text no.l j
(4) Kau.III.2: "Vritiirabandhyam va strxdhanam", and "3padartham
hi strxdhanam", appendix text^ no$. . Katyayana cited in
Vi.Ta.443 etc., infra p. 71 , appendix text no. £ 8 . j
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the means of maintenance of a particular person should not be taken
(1) — away from him. It was therefore necessary to protect strxdhana
which formed the reserve fund for maintenance of women. In this
connection the protection given to the earliest category of strxdhana,
namely, nuptial gift must be considered first. We have seen that the
bride*s father gave such gifts jointly to the bride and the bride- 
(2 )groom. Probably it was handed over to the bridegroom and it was 
quite likely that it could have become mixed with the joint family 
property of the bridegroom*s family so as to be permanently lost to 
the bride herself. Therefore like the gains of learning and property 
obtained by valour it was included into the list of impartible pro­
perty of males. Thus Narada declares *wife*s property* to be impart- 
( 3 )ible. The category *wife*s property* is explained by Harinatha
(4) (5)
as *saudayika* and by Bhavasvami as *strxdhana* - terms on 
which further light will be thrown later on. It will also be shown 
later on how women’s property was meticulously protected by totally
/ e \
forbidding the relatives from usurping it under any pretext.
Another protection was given to w*amen*s property by excluding it from
(7)properties capable of being claimed by others by adverse possessxon.
(1) See Na.Sam.18.11-12 which describes the means of livelihood of 
different kinds of people and forbids the King -from
them under any circumstances, see also Bhavasvami*s comments j
on the verses. j
(2) Supra p. if-if. j
(3) Na.Smr.16.6 & Na.Sam. 14.6: ’‘j&auryabharyadhane chobhe yachcha I
vidyadhanam bhavet/ Trxnyetanyavibhajyani prasado yascha j
paitrikah//1* See also *audvahika* occurring in Manu IX.206 and j 
Yaj.II.119. Katyayana cited in Vi.Ta.344 says that conquered 
property, gains of learning and strxdhana are not to be par- j
titioned by heirs.
(4) Smr.Sa.f.60.
(5) Bhavasvami on Na.Sam.14.6
(6 ) See infra chapter III.
(7) Na.Smr.1.82-83 8c Na.Sam.1.74, Manu VIII.149 and Medhatithi*s 
comments on it; Mit.on Yaj*II.125*
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Vijnanesvara propounds the ignorance and lack of understanding of 
women as the reasons why the Sastra forbids anybody to claim the pro­
perty of women by adverse p o s s e s s i o n . I t  is curious that it is
(2)also excluded from the operation of escheat. This was probably
done with a view to deny the King a right which he could have used 
capriciously, maliciously or injudiciously against ignorant women.
Contemporaneously with the instances of protection given 
to women's property the bulk of the same was also increasing. In the 
earlier period the bride used to have as her own property her orna­
ments and some nuptial gifts. After the Ssura form was denounced by 
the &astra the father probably started giving the bride-price to the 
bride herself thus exonerating himself from the blemish of v "sale". 
This was known as sulka and it may be considered to be one of the 
earliest varieties of strxdhana as an early author like Gautama
( 3 )mentions a special and quite a rational order of succession to it.
With the increase of polygamy in the later days it became necessary 
to provide the first wife with some money whether for her maintenance 
in case she could not live happily with her co-wife, or in order to 
obtain her consent by way of appeasement by gifts in case the super­
session was not in accordance with the rules of the Sastra. This
(4) !kxnd of property was called adhivedanika. In this manner the tI
,{
categories of strxdhana were continuously increasing during the j
 ^I
Smriti period. I
(1) Mit.on Yaj.II.^25, see infra . For adverse possession | 
see infra PP*173-1S3
(2) Infra p.if£l . See also Kau.3.5 for restrictions on the King's ]
right to take by escheat.
(3) Infra p. ^ 10 •
(4) Infra pfc72L~7^ r.
57
It is also necessary to consider the development of women's 
right to inherit property* We have already seen that the later part 
of the Sruti and some authors like Baudhayana totally denied this 
right to women. But with the general reduction in the average of the 
bride and the decrease in the custom of remarriage it was probably 
felt necessary to ensure the future of child-widows. Gautama, there­
fore, gave the right of inheritance to the widow if she was willing
(1 )to have a son by 'niyoga* • Vasistha glrottijMthis right to wives of
( 2)brothers only after they had given birth to a child* But after
( 3 )the custom of 'niyoga' was declared to be 'kalivarjya' the widow,
along with some other female heirs, gained this right without the
condition precedent of 'niyoga*. Thus Xpftstamba recognised the
(4)daughter as an heir. Visnu recognised the wife, the mother and
( 5)daughter as heirs* Manu mentioned daughter, mother and father's
mother amongst the heirs of a male.*6) Narada allowed this right at
(7)
least to the daughter. But since the smriti of Yajnavalkya these
female heirs came into prominence and gained an accepted place in {
1
the order of succession known to the modern Hindu law as the 'compact I'-‘I
( 8 ) I
series of heirs'. He gave special importance to the widow by j
'■I
1-
giving her a place immediately after the son, son's son, and son's |
I
son's son. Brihaspati resorted to the Vedic idea that wife is the 
half of the husband's body and gave the right of inheritance to the j
(1) Gau*28.22-23: "Stri chanapatyasya, bxjam va lipsyeta."
(2) Vas.Smr.17.39.
(3) Supra p. JiSL*
(4) Apa.2.14.4 and Haradatta's comments on it.
(5) Vis.Smr•17.4,5,7. Sankha, however, refers to the right only of 
the eldest widow - Sankha quoted in Vis.on Yaj.II.140.
(6 ) Manu IX.130, 217.
(7) Na.Smr.16.50 & Na.Sam.14.47.
(8 ) Yaj.II.135-36.
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widow on the principle of survivorship.^*^ He gave the same right to
the daughter by stating that even the daughter is, like the son, pro-
(2)duced from one's own body. He also recognised the right of the
(3 )mother. Thus the three important relations of a male were recog­
nised during the Smriti period as his heirs.
The commentators when they wrote their commentatories had 
all this development in mind but instead of recognising the different 
vicissitudes in the proprietory capacity of women they resorted to 
the two famous Mxmamsa principles of treating each provision of sruti 
and smriti to be purposeful and of reconciling wherever possible the 
contradictory provisions of the Sastra.^^ But in doing this each of 
them had an ultimate purpose in mind, namely, to propound a system of 
law peculiar to his own time and place. All commentators admit that 
women can own almost any category of property which men can own but
in doing so they have to explain the texts declaring women's total
( 5)
incapacity to own property by stating that these texts do not de­
clare women's total incapacity to own but stress the perpetual de-
/ Q  \







Brihaspati quoted in Apa.on Yaj.11.135; "Smnaye smrititantre cha 
lokachare cha suribhih/ &arxrardham smri(ta) bharya punyapunya- 
phale sama// Yasya noparata bharya dehardham tasya jxvati/ 
Jxvatyardhasarxre*rtham kathamanyah samapnuyat// For the Vedic 
stand see supra p.VS St*
Brihaspati cited in Mit•on Yaj.LL.135: "... Angadangatsambhavati 
putravadduhita nrxnam//" Narada recognises the daughter's right 
on the principle of survivorship; "Yathivatma tatha putrah 
pu trena duhi t5 samH/ Tasyatmani tisthantyam kathamanyo dhanam 
haret//" - Narada cited in Apa.on Yaj.11.136.
Brihaspati cited in Apa.on Yaj.II.135.
These are *sarthyakata' and 'samahjasya' for which see supra 
PP. <3-10
Supra p.SO* *n4
See Medhatithi on Manu VIII.416, Vya.Ma.154. ApararkaA Varad- 
araja treat the &ruti forbidding women from partaking * daya' as 
merely an arthavada - Apa.on Yaj* 11.135, Vya.Ni.459.So>nt
c,p|=>ly K i t s e  tcotts 'plfOpe'rty by s+irqttjevi Civic) <lCiuiTe.a( b y  by S**»l ° v  labatv*
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attitude of the commentators; for, as we shall see, increased pro­
prietory rights of women with a continuation of the previous state of 
their dependance may be considered as a special feature of this later 
legal literature of the Hindus.
Whereas the majority of women suffered from lack of 
independence it appears that Hindu law always recognised the freedom 
of women who could help their husbands in their trade, thus showing
that the dependence of women was due only to their normally restrict-
(1)ed economic value. Thus Yajnavalkya, though he declares that the
( 2)husband need not pay the debt contracted by his wife, provides 
that the debts contracted by the wives of h e r d s m e n , e t c .
ought to foe repaid by their husbands as in their profession such
( 3 ) *husbands depend upon their wives* Commentators such as Visvarupa,
Vijnanesvara etc. explain that the enumeration of herdsmen etc. is not
exhaustive and that the provision refers to all persons who depend
(4)upon their wives for subsistence. Most of these women practised
( 5 ) (6 )also clandestine prostitution. Unlike other respectable women
they had also the right to institute judicial proceedings without the
(7)permission of their husbands. Thus it seems that women who had
(1) See infra chapter V for the special law applicable to these 
women.
(2) Yaj.II.46.
(3) Yaj.II.48: "Gopasaundikasailusarajakd^dhayositam/ Rinam dady- 
atpatistasam yasmadvrittistadasraya//*'. See also Na.Smr.4.19
& Na.Sarn.2.16; Brihaspati cited Apa.on Yaj.II.46 etc.; Katy­
ayana cited in Apa.on Yaj.II.51 all of whom lay down a similar 
provision.
(4) See Vis.on IT^j.11.50; Mit.on Yaj.II.48. Chandesvara says:,fAtra 
cha t a das royal;, i t vame va prayojakam na tu jatyadarah - Vi. Ra. 59-60. 
See also Vyavaharapari^i s t a f*5^(b) to the same effect.
(5) Infra .
(6 ) Katyayana cited in Apa.on Yaj.II.5.
(7) Katyayana cited in Apa.on Yaj.II.5 and the explanation by
Apararka.
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some economic value and who were not a part of the usual agrarian 
economy of the country had full legal independence. The principle 
underlying this reasoning can properly be extended to the con?~: Lc
ditions of the modern society*
After having taken a brief survey of the develop* 
ment of women’s property in general and before examining the !
I
difference if any between women's property in general and stri- 
dhana otf women's separate property it is necessary to remember f 
the three prominent feature of stridhana which we have already 
noticed:
(1) Firstly, the concept of stridhana arose out of a necessity 
to create a reserve fund which could be useful to women in case 
they were unable to obtain maintenance from their families. The i
-f
•i
concept was assuming wider proportion  ^ during the time of the ,3 
smritis and more and more categories of property were being in- 3 
eluded in it. j
"I
(2) Secondly, this fund was well protected from the covetous j
. j
eyes of the relatives, strangers and the King by keeping it away I
f




(3) Thirdly, right from its inception, stridhana usually had a 1
• j
line of descent in which males were postponed to females. j
CHAPTER H 61
"During the voluminous discussions, ancient and modern, 
which have arisen with regard to separate property of Women under 
Hindu law, it© qualities, its kinds, and its lines of descent, the
question has constantly been found in the forefront, what is
(1 ) - stridhan ?" The concept of stridhana being subject to constant
change and development, a wide divergence of opinion as regards its
exact meaning is seen amongst the authors, both of the smritis and
of the commentaries.
Before going into the complicated discussions of the
commentators it is perhaps better to look at the texts of the
different smritis without the help of the interpretations which
(2 )have been put forward by the former. The first and the most 
important text is that of Manu. lie gives the import of the term 
stridhana as follows:- "What is given before the nuptial fire, what 
is given during the bridal procession, what is given in token of 
love and what is obtained from a brother, mother or father is known
(3 ) '3;f<s
as the six-fold stridhana." In the very next verse he also adds
A
(4)after the marriage’ and 'gifts madQ, by the husband out of love’.
(1) Sheo Shankar v. Debi Sahai (/903 ) 30 X.A. 202 at 205.
(2) Incidentally, however, such reference will be made where it 
is absolutely necessary or where the commentators referred to 
do not belong particularly to either of the schools.
(3) Manu 9. 194, For the iScmstribute set s of this verse see the 
appendix text no.^ L5 wherein the main variant readings of 1 _ „ 
the verses concerning stridhana are given. The nuptial gift 
is called 'adhyagni* and the gift given during the bridal 
procession is called *adhyavahanika'.
(4) Manu 9, 195. See the apx^ endix text no -
62.
The second part of this verse lays down a rule of succession to
(1 )stridhana mentioned in both these verses. That the texts do
not give a perfect definition nor an exhaustive enumeration i©
clear from the fact that Manu, after having stated that stridhana
is of six kinds, himself adds two more varieties in the verse. The
enumeration of these different categories does not make these cate-
gories mutually exclusive and a particular property may fall into
(2 )one or more of these categories of stridhana. From the fact
that Manu forbids •heirs' (dayadas) from dividing the ornaments
which women wear during the life-time of their husbands, it appears
that he intended to include, by implication, such ornaments within
(3)stridhana. It is strange that none of the commentators who have
commented upon the Manusmriti itself declares that this six-foldness 
(sadvidhatva) is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. Handana
(1) This is the opinion of Vi tjhanesvara also. The provision is 
similar to Yaj .2.143-4-4. See infra. Some of the commentators, 
however, believe that the rule of succession is meant only for 
the two categories mentioned in this,verse. See infra.
Really speaking 'gift in token of live1 mentioned in the preced­
ing verse would include also gift from the husband mentioned in 
this verse - see ICulluka and Ramachandra on Many 9.194.
(2) i v\ s n t a- fpdyip ptet ’ m Jj q_ ‘ j ^ ^ hr * 0\v\\j n ^
(3) Manu 9.200 compared with Apa.2.14.9 and Bau.2.2.49 supra p.
But see Nandana's comment on the verse. According to Sarva- 
jnanarayana, ICulluka etc. they are not to be partitioned so 
long as the woman is alive. See also Vis.Smr.17.22 for a 
similar provision. But Nandapandita commenting on this verse 
says that partition is forbidden only during the life-t|me of 
the husband. Although grammatically both these interpretations 
are possible the first one is preferable and popular. For a 
religious sanction against the relatives who utilise woman's 
stridhana see Manu 3.52. If any male makes a living upon 
stridhana he commits a second-degree sin (unapataka) - See 
infra p.530 . For Manu 9.200 see appendix text no. 31.
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indeed openly declares that any property falling outside the scope
(1 )of these six kinds is not stridhana.
The enumeration given by the sage Katyayana is almost a
(2 ) _
replica of Manu1s first verse. “ Narada also gives the same kind
of enumeration but he mentions 'bhartridaya1 (lit. inheritance from
the husband) and does not mention 'gift in token of love1 which
(3 )Manu has mentioned. He does not mention even the post-nuptial
gifts (anvadheya) dm tin i one d by Manu.
VisnxA enumerates stridhana in this way : "That which is
given (to a woman) by her father, mother, son or brother, that which
is received before the nuptial fire, that which is received on
supersession, that which is given by the relatives, dower and post-
(4)nuptial gifts constitute stridhana." Thus Visnu adds two impor­
tant categories viz. gift on supersession (adhivedanika) and dower,
(1) Sarvajhanarayana, ICulluka, Kaghavananda and Kamachandra are 
silent on this point. Medhatithi1s comment appears to be lost 
to us. But Nandana specifically says "The meaning is: any­
thing which is obtained by a woman besides these six categor­
ies of stridhana, is not stridhana but becomes only her 
husband's property". However, almost all the reputed commen­
tators of the different schools specifically mention that the 
word sixfold is only illustrative and not exhaustive. - see
infra p. Although some of Manufs commentators are later
than Vijhanesvara and although some of them in fact generally 
support him it seems that the unanimously consdrvative 
attitude adopted by them in this respect is in conformity with 
the spirit of the Manusmriti itself which they chose to comment 
upon.
(2) Katyayana referred to in Da.Bha.4.1.4. See the appendix text 
no * VS *
(3) Na.Smr.16.8 & Na.Sam.14.8 appendix text no.^0.However, Bhava- 
svamin commenting on the latter says that where sixfold 
stridhana is referred to these categories are to be understood* 
Thus he treats the word 1 six-fold' as being illustrative.
(4) Vi Smr.17.18. See the appendix text no.9,
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/ (1 )(sulka), to the enumeration given by Manu. These additions
reveal important changes in the social and legal ideas of the Hindu
society. It seems that by this time men had started taking undue
advantage of some of the provisions of the Sastra which conferred
on males arbitrary power to supersede the first wife even on flimsy
(2 )grounds. Visnu, therefore, probably thought of discouraging
this capricious practice without actually curtailing the rights 
conferred upon the husband by the preceding Sastrakaras and intro­
duced a measure which would have a retributive and consequently a
(3)deterrent effect. The introduction of dower denotes that the
Aryan society of Visnu1 s time was inclined to be guided by Manu1 s
(4)censure against a father who received money for his daughter and 
instead of preventing this practice altogether, thought of convert­
ing the bride-price into stridhana of the bride herself. Customs 
reflecting a change of attitude . the ancient bride-price doubt-A
lessly began to spread about this time as they have continued to 
spread in India and South-East Asia today. Visnu also extends the 
term stridhana to gifts received from any relative, whereas Manu 
mentions gifts only from the three relations. He also confirms
(1) For information about the rules concerning supersession and 
the custom of dower see supra pp.i+a. S’C •
(2) See supra p. .
(3) For another reason see infra pp.7&"3tWhat is said in the text 
above is not to be understood as propounding any view regard­
ing the relationship of the actual author or authors of 
•Visnu1 to public opinion at any particular time.
(4) Supra p.m.
Manu's pronouncement about the ornaments worn by women during their
(1)life-time *
Yajnavalkya says : "That which is given (to a woman) by 
her father, mother, husband or brother, that which is received be­
fore the nuptial fire, that which is received on supersession et
(2)cetera is well-known to be stridhana.11 * In the first line of the 
next verse he also adds gifts from relatives, dower, and post­
nuptial gifts to his enumeration given in the preceding verse and
(3)in the second line gives a rule for the devolution of the property.
There are two important versions of the first verse of Yajnavalkya.
The above translation is in accordance with the reading of the
(4)Mitaksara and is comparatively the more popular. The other
( 5)version reads * cva ’ (only) in the place of ’ adyam’ (etcetera).
The difference between these two versions is most important, as will 
be shown later, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact meaning 
of the term stridhana. The first reading may include any kind of
(1) Vi.Smr.17.22, - .
(2) Yaj .2.143, to.*!
(3) Yaj.2.144. See the appendix text no.3h.The rule of success­
ion appears to apply to the kinds of property described in 
both the verses. For a similar rule in the Manusmriti see 
supra.
(4) The same reading is followed in Smr.Cha.; Ma.Pa.; Pa.Ma.; 
Mri.Pra.; Vya.Ma.; Vi.fa.; Sa.Vi.; Vi.Mi.etc.
(5) This or a reading similar to this has been followed by 
Visvarupa, Apararka, Chandesvara, Misaru Misra and all the 
authors of the Bengal school. But Apararka explains it in
Jthe Mitaksara way. See infra.
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(1)
woman1s property within stridhana whereas the latter expressly 
precludes any other category from being included into the import 
of the term* However, leaving aside the term 1 etcetera', it is 
important to note that Yajnavalkya has, in his enumeration, con- 
firmed all the additions which Visnu has made in his own enumera-
Devala declares : "Money offered as a provision for main­
tenance, ornaments, dower and her gains form the property of a
(3)woman (stridhana).** Thus Devala adds two categories via. main­
tenance money and ’gains* to the list of stridhana categories. It 
is to be noted that the word * gains* (labha) is capable of a wide 
interpretation including gain resulting from gifts from kindred or 
gains arising out of profits from any business wherein some stridhana
(1) Here it must be noted that the word * adhivedanika^am’ is to be 
distinguished from similar compound words such as * brahmadi *,
1brahmanadi’, ’brahmahadi' etc. which stand as representatives 
of a particular well-defined enumeration of a group or class 
etc. Such compound words denote those groups or classes the 
enumeration of which usually begins with the first word in such 
compound words. Thus the word 'brahmadi* denotes the eight 
forms of marriage the enumeration of which begins with the 
brahma form or, by context, only the four approved forms of 
marriage; similarly the word 'brahmanadi’ denotes the four 
varnas or classes of men and the word * brahmahadi’ denotes 
the five mahapatakins (persons who have committed great sins - . 
But the word *adhivedanikadyam’ is not to be confused with 
such words; for, instead of coming at the head of dshe enumera­
tion 'i. i. comes, in fact, at the end of it. Therefore it cannot 
represent anything like a gana or jati • The word * adya’ whicji 
has thus been used very loosely welcomes any kind of woman1s 
property.
(2) See supra pp.
(3) Devala quoted in Apa.on Yaj.2.147 etc. See the appendix text
no.79 •
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has already been invested. The word is really wide enough to
cover any kind of new acquisition of property.
Making a sum-total of these texts one finds that the 
following categories of property are expressly included by the
authors of the smritis in the t e na strTdhana:-0
(i) That which is given before the nuptial fire;
(2 ) That which is given during the continuance of the
bridal procession;
(3) That which is given by the mother, father, brother
husband or the son; -
(4) That which is given in token of love;
(5) That which is given by the rest of the kindred;
(6 ) That which is received on supersession;
(7) That which is received as a grant for maintenance;
(8 ) Bower; and
(9) Other gains.
( 2)Ornaments which form as it were the nucleus of all stridhana may
(1) According to Smr.Cha.657, Ma.Ra.578 and Vi.Mi.545 the word 
'labha* denotes gifts given by the elders on some ceremonious 
occasions. But according to Vya.Ma.157 and SaiVi.381 it de­
notes interest on the capital consisting of the previous strT- 
dhana. According to the Smritisara of Harinatha (f.63) it 
denotes the dower (sulka) of the woman. Most of the other 
commentaries do not contain any comment on the verse. The 
benefit of this 'labha' in the second sense was probably 
secured first by the Vaisya women whose husbands would never 
have liked the idea of keeping stridhana in unproductive forms 
like ornaments etc. They probably started borrowing stridhana 
from their wives and agreed to pay interest in return. Some 
modern Vaisyas, namely, the Chettis in the South often 
indulge in this practice even today. See f*s Pcdcd
V . K  ©i « h  i cv p p  & £  i 9 Lf Q  ' j J '  H  • l  • J . S  %  .
(2) See supra p#53.
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fail into one or more of the above categories though they have not
(1been expressly included in the enumeration given by the smritis.
Katyayana who has enumerated only six categories of 
stridhana given already by Manu, however, defines many other cate­
gories which he himself has not included in his six-fold enumera­
tion. For the study of stridhana Katyayana is of great importance
for the fact that no other sage has tried to define as many kinds
(2)of stridhana as he has. It must also be stated that he has
devoted many more verses to this topic of stridhana than have the 
other sages. But as his smriti is not available in its original 
form it is difficult for a reader to interpret and to co-relate 
his rules with certainty.
Katyayana defines nuptial gifts (adhyagni) as follows:- 
’’That which is given to women near the (nuptial) fire is denomina­
ted by the sages as stridhana made over in the presence of the 
(nuptial) fire. " He defines gifts on the bridal procession as 
’’That which a woman receives while she is being led away from her 
parental abode is stridhana as illustrated by the name adhyavah-
(4)
anika.” Another version of the same verse reads ’from the
(1) But Nandana on Manu 9.200 says that as ornaments are not
included in stridhana the provision concerning them is intro­
duced as exception to the rule that the heirs of the husband
take his property on his death.
(2) Moreover decisions denying that property inherited by a woman 
is her stridhana rest almost entirely on the authority of 
Katyayana. See infra.
(3) Katyayana cited in Mit.on Taj.2.143 etc. See the appendix
text no. 47.
(4) Katyayana cited in Mit.on Yaj.2.143 etc. See the appendix
text no.
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family of her parents' in the place of the words 'from her parental 
abode1 but if one follows the natural construction of the sentence 
the meaning is not materially changed.^^ Some of the commentators, 
however, try to interpret this second version by connecting these
words with the verb 'receives' instead of connecting them with the
(2) - words 'being led away'. ‘ This method naturally restricts adhyav­
ahanika to gifts received only from the parental family. Looking, 
however, to the plain meaning of the two definitions, namely, tj^ ose 
of adhyagni and adhyavahanika it appears that both these kinds of 
property include gifts from strangers as well as from relatives.
Katyayana defines prxtidatta or gifts in token of love 
thus : "That which is given through affection by a mother-in-law or 
a father-in-law and that which is given to a woman by persons at
whose feet she is making obeisance, is called prxtidatta (strxdh- 
(3)ano.) •" The second part of this definition denotes gifts given
through affection on some formal occasion of showing respect to
(1) This i?irst version has been accented in the Mitaksara and the
*■** »
treatises known as authorities of the Benares, Bombay and 
Dravida schools. The second version is accepted in the Baya- 
bhaga and the authorities of the Bengal and Mithila schools. 
According to Vi.Chi.138 the adhyavahanika would include gifts 
given at the time even of the dviragamana ceremony, namely, 
at the time when a bride who has been married before■puberty 
leaves her parents' home for the second time after the attain­
ment of puberty. See infra
(2) This has been done only by the authorities of the Bengal school 
- see Da.Bha.4.1.7 and the commentaries of Srxnatha, Ramabha- 
dra and Mahesvara on the same. The last one includes, however, 
even the gifts from the house of the maternal grandfather of 
the bride.
(3) Kat•quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.143 etc. See the appendix text 
no. 4+0.
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elders and thus comes nearer to the original words in Manu1s de-
(1 ) „finition. His definition of post-nuptial gift (anvadheya) and
dower (sulka) are as follows : "Whatever is gained by a woman after
her marriage from the family of her husband and from the family of
„ (2)her brother as well, is called anvadheya stridhana." "However,
Bhrigu gives the name anvadheya to anything received after the
(3)
sacrament by a woman from her husband or parents through affection." 
"That which is received (by a woman) as a price of the household
utensils, of the beasts of burden, of the milch cattle and of
✓ (4) _making ornaments is well-known as sulka." However, Vyasa de­
fines sulka as : "What is brought (by a woman) into the house of
(5)her lord is well-known to be sulka."
It is evident from the above definitions that anvadheya 
or post-nuptial gifts do not include gifts from strangers. It seems 
a married lady was precluded from accepting gifts from strangers 
lest she should be in the danger of being seduced by lavish gifts 
from designing persons. From Katyayana's definition it appears 
that sulka consisted of money which the bridegroom used to pay to 
the bride for all the house-hold provision including the ornaments 
which her father made for her. It was thus very similar to what
(1) Manu 9.194. The word used in this verse is 'pritikarma*.
(2) Kat.quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.143 etc. See the appendix text
no.S I.
(3) Kat. cited in Vi.Ta.438 etc. See the appendix text no. 5*1.
(4) Kat. cited in Apa.on Yaj.2.143 etc. See the appendix text
no.?^.
(5) Vyasa cited in Vi.Mi.543 etc. See the appendix text no.7^ .
In Da.Bha.4.3.21-22 a slightly different reading is accepted 
to mean whatever is given to woman to induce her to go to her 
husband's house is sulka. But Da.Bha.p.150 edited by Sharma 
contains the first version.
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(1)is known today in Gujrat as pallun. From Vyasa's definition
it appears that sulka included the dowry or property which presum­
ably the father of a bride bestowed upon her as portion to be taken
(2)to her husband's house. None of these definitions, however, in-
elude the other well-known meaning of sulka, namely, the bride-
price ^  ^ though tjiey may be made out to be vestigial survivals of
it in a new social climate.
Then Katyayana gives what may be called a cross-division
of all these categories into saudayika and norv^audayika viz. gifts
from the kindred and the rest of stridhana. He says : "What a
married woman or a maiden receives in the house of her husband or
of her parents from her brother or parents is called saudayika
(4)stridhana." "As their gifts are given through kindness to en­
sure the maintenance (of the woman concerned), women acquire free-
_ (5)dom by obtaining saydayika property." Another version reads
(6)'from her husband' in the place of the words 'from her brother*.
(1) See infra.
(2) A custom to this effect exists even at the present amongst the 
Nattukottai Chetti community and one of the communities of 
Kathiawar,;- :see infra pp«*+18 9 At *
(3) See infra .73-
(4) Kat.cited in Mit.on Yaj.2.143. See the appendix text no.S'O,
(5) Kat.cited in Apa.on Yaj.2.143. See the appendix text no.
(6) The first version is given in Mit.; Smr.Cha.; Ma.Pa.; Vi.Mi.
etc. The second version is accex>ted in the Da.Bha.; Pa.Ma.;
Sa.Vi.; Vi.Ta.; etc. But the above limited interpretation 
on the first version has not been put forward in any of the 
commentaries except in Smr.Cha.655. See also the etymology 
of the word discussed therein; it has been followed by the 
later commentators.
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The meaning, of course, is materially affected thereby. The former 
version would include in the term saudayika gifts only from the 
parental house whereas the latter brings also gifts from the husband 
within its fold. The word 1labdham1 used in the definition of4
saudayika literally means * gained* or 'acquired' and apparently it 
may include any kind of property coming to a woman from her rela­
tions as opposed to property coming from strangers.^^ According 
to the first version it includes any property coming only from her 
parents' family.
Vyasa, however, defines saydayika thus : "That which is
obtained by a woman in marriage or after the marriage, from the
( 2)family of husband or of the father, is called saudayika." It
seems that this definition would exclude anything which a girl
receives before her marriage. There is also a second reading of
this definition giving 'brother* in the place of 'the husband* as
it is in the case of the definition given by Katyayana.
As regards 'adhivedanika' or gifts on supersession no
definition of the category is found in the texts of the smritis.
But Yajnavalkya says ; "An equal gift on supersession should be
given to a woman who is superseded in case stridhana has not been
given to her (already); half of that should be given if (other)
(3)stridhana has (already) been given." This obviously suggests
(1) For a liberal interpretation of the word 'labdham* see 
Gajanan v. Pandurang infra pp. $.$6—91 .
(2) Vyas'a cited in Apa.on Yaj.2.143. See the appendix text no. 75» ’
(3) Yaj.2,. 148 see appendix text no. 38* The word 'half denotes 
only the balance to be given to her to make her property equal 
to that given to the second wife - see the Mit. on the same 
verse and Balambhattx thereon.
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that the husband used to give some property to the second wife and 
that he had to give equal property to the first wife as well, or at 
least as much as will place her on an equal financial level with 
the second wife. ^ ^  it has already been remarked that the category 
of f adhivedanika* was a later introduction. The purpose of intro­
ducing this category may be guessed with some certainty• Firstly,
it has already been seen that the husband and wife Via4 joint inter-
(2)est in the husband* s property. "" Some of the Southern inscriptions
prove that this joint ownership was in fact exercised even by the
royal couples of medieval India so that often a king; and his queen
(3)used to have independent and equal sovereignty in their kingdom.
When a conting’ency of supersession arose if was necessary to adjust 
the shares of the husband and the two wives. In such case the 
husband and each one of his wives had equal share in the husband's 
property so that the husband was required to hand over to the super­
seded wife her own share in the property. The provision of Yajha- 
valkya whereby a person who supersedes his wife without any justifi­
able reason is required to pay one-third of his property to his
(4)superseded wife can best be understood on this basis. The
(1) See Apa.on Yaj.2.148. According to Visvarupa, however, the 
money given to the first wife should be equal to the money 
spent for the second marriage.
(2) Supra p^. lf£.
(3) Supra pp.
(4) Yaj . 1.76. See supra p. For this ingenious and the only
explanation of the verse the present writer is indebted to 
his supervisor Dr. J.D.M. Derrett.
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husband was required to treat both wives equally by equating each 
one of them with himself. The device which was originally intro­
duced to protect a woman who was superseded contrary to the rules 
of the sastra was probably also utilised to maintain or pacify a 
woman who was superseded with the support of the sastra.
There are two verses of Katyayana which specifically ex­
clude some kinds of property from the import of the term strxdhana. 
He declares : "That which is given conditionally or (only) for some
occasion by the father, mother or the husband of a woman, does not
(%)
become (her) stridhana." "The husband has dominion over money
gained by arts or obtained through affection from elsewhere (i.e.
non-relatives or strangers); the rest, however, is called strTd-
hana.” As regards the first verse there is no difficulty; for
anything which is given to a person on some condition or only for
the purpose of celebrating a particular occasion can hardly become
(4)the property of such person. TJ*e second text, however, takes
some property outside the fold of stridhana. The word used is
1svamya1 i.e. dominion or control, and not 1svatva1 which denotes
property1. The two words are not necessarily used as co-relatives
(5)meaning 1 ownership* and 'property1. But one thing is clear,
(1) According to Da.Bha.4.1.4 adhivedanika is given to the first 
wife to satisfy her (paritosikam dhanam). It will be re­
collected in all these discussions that the feelings of the 
wife's family were always sympathetically considered by the law.
(2) Kat. cited in Vi.Mi.542. See the appendix text no• S'JT,
(5) Kat.quoted in Vi.Mi.542. See the appendix text no.g^,
(4) Manu 8.165; Vi.Mi.542.
(5) See Vi.Mi.542 where the words svamikatva, svamya and svatva 
are used. Apjiarently Mitra Misra seems to treat svamikatva 
as equal to svatva but distinguishes svamya from svatva. For
these terms see supra p A 7 and infra pp*;-r 0
f \
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namely, that women, according to Katyayana, could not fx*eely dis­
pose of the property which is acquired in the above ways at least 
so long as the husband lived, Katyayana does not give any rule as
to whether a woman regains her right of free disposal after the
(1)husbandfs death. This verse appears to be an exact counterpart
of the verse defining saudayika. Incidentally it ought to be noted
that many of the older commentators do not mention this text at
(2)all. This increases the difficulty in understanding this verse
properly.
The foregoing texts have been translated without adopting
the views or the explanations given by the commentators of the
different schools. A chronological survey of the above texts makes
it amply clear that the kinds of properties covered by the word
stridhana were continuously increasing. Spastamba mentions that
ornaments belong to the wife and that in the opinion of some
(people) the wealth given by her relatives also belongs to her.^^
The second kind then seems to be on its way to be included in
stridhana, Vasistha mentions nuptial presents of the mother as
devolving upon the daughters suggesting thereby that it was 
- (4)strxdhana. By the time the Manusmriti was written women's pro­
prietory capacity had increased and many other kinds were added.
The succeeding smritis also added different categories to the
(1) But Balambhatta says 'she' does - Bal.255.
(2) The verse has not been cited by Visvarupa, Vi j nane svara nor 
Apararka. Consequently Balambhatta regards this text as tin- 
authoritative - Bal.255 (the word 1salatve' is to be read as 
'samulatve').
(3) A pa. 2. 6.14. 9 ; Bau.2.2.49, appendix text nos. I* <*v»JI 5* -
(4) Vas.Smr.17.43, see the appendix text no.9 • ^
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description of stridhana until Yajnavalkya apparently kept the door 
open for other kinds of property by introducing the word 'adya1 in 
his description.
It will have been remarked that the wealth obtained by
inheritance or partition is not expressly mentioned in any smriti
as being included in stridhana. But the right of inheritance or of
having a share in partition was not granted to women - or at least
(1)to the wife or the widow - for a long time; from the long dis­
cussions made by the commentators about the widow1s right to in­
herit her husband's property it appears that she had to fight for 
the establishment of her alleged right. It is thus natural that 
this kind of property was not included in stridhana by the smriti 
literature. Thus the development of the proprietry capacity of 
women and of the sources comprehended within the term stridhana 
appears to have been almost co-extensive and bot|i may well have 
grown pari passu. ^
From the survey of these texts two prominent points emerge. 
Firstly, it is evident that none of them purports to give a defini­
tion of stridhana in a manner similar to that adopted by the later 
commentators. They simply try to enumerate the different kinds 
without giving precise categories. Katyayana who tries to define 
these different categories does not try to define the word stridhana
(1) For the gradual recognition of women's right of inheritance 
see introduction supra pp. ET1 -•
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itself. He perhaps rightly understood the difficulty in, and the
futility of, defining a growing concept. It follows almost as a
logical consequence that the word stridhana never acquired any
(1)technical meaning till the era of the commentators. At any given
time it was co-extensive with a vague and variable notion about the 
proprietory capacity which women had at the relevant time and 
place•
The smriti texts are, therefore, differently interpreted
by the authorities of different schools. To begin with the Benares
school, the Mitaksara which is the highest authority in that school
contains the following comment on Yajnavalkya’s enumeration : ’’That
which is given by the father, the mother, the husband, or by the
brother; that v/hich is presented (to the bride) by the maternal
uncle and the rest before the nuptial fire at the time of the
marriage ceremony; gift on supersession for which supersession is
the cause as will be subsequently mentioned viz. ’Equal gift on
(2)supersession etc.’; " and that which is acquired by inheritance,
purchase, partition, seizure or finding as designated by the word
I (3)etjcetera (adya); all this is termed as stridhana by Manu and
the rest. The term stridhana is (used with) derivative (i.e.
etymological) and not technical (import) as technical language is
improper (at a place) where a derivative interpretation is
(1) Banerjee, however, says that the word always had a technical 
meaning - Banerjee p.327. The subsequent part of this chapter 
would prove that he has made a too^ wide statement.
(2) Yaj.2.148 supra.
(3) This remark is based on Gau.10.38 for which see $.fci|?ra pp. 15-3 
<smc) in fro.
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possible,^^ Again that six-foldness of strxdhana which is pro™
pounded by Manu as in ’That which is given before the nuptial fire
etc.' is mentioned to exclude a possibility not of a greater number
(2)
but of a lesser one.
(1) Words may have a derivative, traditional or technical meaning,
A derivative (yaugika) meaning is that which is consistent 
with the etymology of the word e.g. 1sodara* which denotes a 
uterine brother. A traditional meaning is a meaning acquired 
by tradition; it either restricts the derivative meaning of a 
word or is inconsistent with it. In the former case it is 
more properly known as derivative-traditional (yogarudha).
Thus the word 1pankaja* (lit. that which is born in mud) de­
notes only lotuses although it may also mean frogs. Similarly 
the word 'asvakarna* denotes a kind of tree and not an ear of 
a horse which, is its etymological meaning. Technical meaning 
is one whichj^expressly attached to a particular word in a 
particular science or treatise. For instance the tvords * ach* 
and 1hal1 in Fanini1s grammar denote all the vowels and con- 
sonents respectively. See^ rtfyayafcosa pp.573-74, 908, 910,
498-99 for yogarudha, rudha, samjha, paribhasiku etc. See 
also Jayatxrth's Tatvaprakasika on the Madhvabhasya on Bra. 
Su.1.1.2, the Chandrika on the same passage in the Tatvaprak- 
usika and the Pr&kasa on the same passage. See also intro­
duction of the editor to Vol.Ill of the Mysore edition (1920) 
of the Madhuabhasya. The meaning of saudayika in Hindu law
on strxdhana may thus be called technical. Visvesvara in 
his Subhodhini explains this clearly : "With the authority of 
Manu's statement viz. 1strxdhana is known to be six-fold* some
persons describe that the word strxdhana has a non-derivative 
meaning as in the case of the word * asvakarna* and is restrict­
ed only tojthe six kinds mentioned by Manu. This is improper. 
For it would come in conflict with the other texts and the 
usage of the wise; and, derivation has px’eponderance over the 
tinestablished usage (about the meaning of a word)." - Subhod- 
hini 76-77. Mr. Gharpure *s translation (pp>. 193-94) is not 




Vijnanesvara then gives the definitions of 'adhyagni',
' adhyavajtiika' , 'prxtidatta' and 'saudayika* as given by Katyayana. 
Commenting on the next verse of Yajnavalkya he explains 'bandhudatta1 
or gifts given by kindred as 'that which is given by the relatives 
of the father and mother of the bride (lit.daughter).' The defini­
tion of sulka is 'that on the receipt of which a girl is given in 
marriage.' Vijhanesvara then explains the term 'anvadheya' by 
giving Katyayana's definition and adding his own etymological ex­
planation of the word viz. 'that which is given after the marriage'. 
Then he adds that the three categories given in this verse are 
connected with the verb 'is well-known' in the j)receding verse, 
which brings them within the fold of strxdhana.
Apart from the question whether Vijhanesvara is justified 
or not in expanding the word 'adya' (etjcetera) to such a wide extent 
it is clear that he defines strxdhana in an unequivocal manner and 
includes every kind of woman's property in the expression strxdhana. 
To justify his broad stand he counters all opposition by stating 
that the expression bears an etymological sense. Whatever might 
have been in the mind of Yajnavalkya when he used (if he did) the
(1) In Mit. mentioned as 'adhyavahanika'.
(2) The word 'bandhudatta* would include gifts from the father 
and mother as well which have been mentioned in the preceding 
verse; but their separate enumeration may be justified on the 
basis of a Sanskrit maxim known as 'gobalivardanyaya' - see 
Smr.Cha.652.
(3) Mit.on Yaj.2.14-4.
(4) Ibid. According to Vi.Mi.543 the words adliyagni etc. have 
both an etymological and technical meaning. The reason which 
he gives is not very clear. See also translations - Setlur 
part II p.440. The reason, however, appears to be that gifts 
only before the nuptial fire are to be included in the word 
adhyagni whereas etymologically gifts given before any fire 
could foe included. St«. infv« p ’i'SZ ■
(5) Yaj.2.145 supra.___
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word ’adya1 there can be no doubt as regards the intention of 
Vijhanesvara in expanding that word to include almost every kind of
property not expressly mentioned in the smriti text. It is also
important to note that Vijhanesvara does not refer to any other
enumeration except the one given by Manu and does not refer to the
text of Katyayana which excludes wealth gained by arts and gifts 
from strangers from the fold of strxdhana. Moreover it ought to foe 
borne in mind that in interpreting the word strxdhana etymologically 
he is by no means merely imaginative; for, except sulka all the 
categories of strxdhana have been almost unanimously defined by all 
authors on a etymological basis. There is, therefore, no reason why 
the word strxdhana itself should hot be understood in its etymolo­
gical sense.
Before turing to the other authorities it may be stated at
the outset that there is a general consensus of opinion amongst the
authorities of all the schools that the word ’six-fold1 appearing in
(2 )Mann's definition is not restrictive but only illustrative. 
Vijhanesvara appears to have been followed all over India on this 
point. Even his extension of the word 'adya* so as to include pro­
perty obtained by inheritance etc. has been expressly followed by 
Apararka, Visvesvara, Madhava, Kamalakara, Pratapa Eudra,
(1) The explanation given by Balambhatta and Visvesvara in their 
commentaries on the Mitaksara confirms this conclusion.
(2) See Da.Bha.4.1.18; Smr.Cha.652; Pa.Ma.368; Vi.Ea.523; Vi.Chi.
133-39; Ma.Ra.375; Vi.Cha.76; Vya.Ma.1525 Vi.Ta.438; Sa.
Vi.379; Vi.Mi. 541; Da.Kra..Sam. 17-18; Ba.253 etc. But see 
Nandana supra p. . Many of the ancient authors like Bharuchi, 
Visvarupa, Laksmxdhara, Kavikanta Sarasvati, Visvesvara do not 
give this remark which is almost invariably found in the later 
commentaries. But Apararka and even Visvesvara appear to be
in favour of this remark - see Apa•on Yaj.2.143 and Ma.Pa.670.
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(1)Balambhatta and Sarvoru Sarman. It has been expressly repudiat-
(2)ed only by the authors of the Bengal school. '* Others do not
attempt to refute it although it must be stated that they do not
(3)come out with an open support.
The VTramitrodaya of Mitra Misra is the next important
authority of the Benares school. After giving Manu1s enumeration
the author remarks that the number six is only a denial of the less
( 4 )and not restriction on the greater number. He then states that
—  (3 )Visnu also mentions 1 six-fold1 stridhana and gives his enumera-« Q W
tion. Then he adds Narada's enumeration and remarks that the ex­
pression stridhana has an etymological meaning. In furtherance to
this opinion he defines stridhana as property the owner of which is
(6)a woman (strisvamikam dhanam). He mentions, apparently with
approval, that by the word 1adya1 Vijhanesvara has included property
( 7 )  _  ( B )
by inheritance etc. He then cites the two verses of Katyayana
(1) Apa.on Yaj.II. 143; Ma.Fa.670; Pa.Ma.368; Vi.Ta.4-40; Sa.Vi.379; 
Vi.Mi. ( tika on Yaj.2.143); Bal.252; Vi.Sa.f.67(b).
(2) See infra.
(3) However, at one place even Devanna appears to support the 
opinion of Vijhanesvara - see infra pp. 3 7~ 9g ,
(4) Supra p. go.
(5) Vi.Mi.341. This is indeed surprising. .Evidently Mitra Misra 
treats the whole compound 'given by the father, the mother, 
son or brother* as one kind of stridhana. It is interesting 
to note that if this method of treating one compound as one 
kind of stridhana is adopted the enumeration as contained in 
both the verses of Manu (9.194-95) and of Yajnavalkya (2.143-44) 
gives only a six-fold stridhana. Other commentators say that 
Visnu has enumerated more than six kinds - Smr.Cha.652; 
Ma.*Ra.375; Vya.Ma.153 etc.
(8) Vi.Mi.542, Apararka while commenting on Yaj.2.143 makes a 
similar statement and uses the word 'strisvamika1.
(7) Vi.Mi.542.
(8 ) Supra p, 7^.
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which declare some kinds of property to be not strxdhana. On the
(1)authority of Manu he accepts that the fxrst verse naturally ex­
cludes conditional gifts etc. from strxdhana as such gifts do not 
create ownership on the donee at all.. But as regards the second 
text Mitra Misra remarks : "Here there is no denial of (such pro­
perty) being woman's property. But there is a denial of its dis­
tribution etc. which might otherwise foe effected (by the choice of 
the woman). Hence in the latter text it is said that the husband
has dominion over the same. The meaning is that the husband and not
(2 )the wife has freedom to utilise such property.11
As regards 'anvadheya* he accepts the second reading.
He also remarks that the words 1adhyagni1 etc. have both a technical
and derivative meaning 'as they are not used in those kinds of
—  (4) /■strxdhana'. He seems to accept tha explanation of sulka given xn
the Madanaratnapra dxpa viz. sulka is that which is accepted, in the
form of ornaments for the girl, from the husband etc. as a condition
for offering the girl and as the price for the household utensils
( 5 ) «- retc. He accepts also Vijhanesvara's definition adding, however,
that the intention must be to benefit the daughter as it would not
(1) Manu 8.165; Vi.Mi.542.
(2) Vi.Mi.542. So the husband has svamya but the wife has svatva.
It is not possible to state whether Mitra Misra intended to 
distinguish between strxsvatva and strxsvamika. For discussion 
about svatva see SLitfFpa qp.^7 pp. y ^ .
(3) For definition see supra p^f. 70 .
(4) Supra p. 70 note no. if .
(5) Vi.Mi.543. See also Ma.Ra.375. It must be stated here that 
more often than not Mitra Misra follows Madanasimha in the— r * r1 same way xn which Vachaspati Misra follows Chandesvara.
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/*" * (1 )be strxdhana*x the daughter has no ownership xn the same. He
also accepts the definition of sulka given by Jxmutavahana. The 
basic reasoning behind the acceptance of all the definitions appears 
to be that whatever is given to a bride or accepted on her behalf 
is her stridhana.
He then cites the text of Katyayana referring to the pro­
vision of maintenance to be made for a woman by her father etc. : 
*'The father, the mother, the husband, the brother or the kinsmen
shall, according to their capacity, give to women stridhana not ex-
(2)
ceeding two thousand (panas) but not immoveables.1* He explains 
that property other than immoveables and not exceeding two thousand 
copper coins should be given to women for their maintenance every 
year. He also refers to Devala*s enumeration and connects the above 
verse as an explanation of the word ’maintenance* in Devala * s 
enumeration.
(1) Vi.Mi.543. The definition given in the Mitaksara has been 
accepted also in Bha.Vi.ma.f.9(b) and Da.Da.Slo.ms.f.43(a).
(2) Kat. cited in Vi.Mi.544. See the appendix text no• £ If. See 
also similar text of Vyasa stating that * daya1 (inheritance) 
up to two thousand should be given to women - text quoted in 
Apa.on 2.143 (see the appendix text no. *77 )• Altekar
holds that this figure two thousands refers to silver panas 
and that the purchasing power of two thousand silver panas
in those days was equal to that of Rs. ten thousand of today - 
) The position of women in Hindu Civilisation p.305. But the 
comments of Devanna and Mitra Misra on Katyayanatetext and of 
Apararka on Vyasa*s text conclusively prove that the panas 
were copper coins and they were ti> be given every year.
See also Dr.D.M.Derrett : A strange rule of smriti and a 
suggested solution J.R.A.S.1958 p.17 * wherein the author 
that the figure two thousand was arrived at not 
arbitrarily with the help of an actual calculation to the 
effect that the sum should be sufficient for the maintenance 
of a widow during all her normally expected span of life, 
namely, 30-40 years.
(3) See supra p. ££ for Devala*s verse.
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It is not necessary to examine all his comments further.
It is clear that Mitra Misra is of the opinion that the expression
strxdhana includes all kinds of property belonging to women. The
above extracts are given from his original treatise the Vxramitro-
day a. In his commentary on the smriti of Yajnavalkya he confirms
this view more emphatically. After having termed all the enumerated
categories as being saudayika he further comments that the word
'adya' includes property inherited by a woman from her husband and
that such property excludes only that property which her husband
held jointly with other p e r s o n s . H e  also repeats that the word
strxdhana has an etymological meaning and not a technical one as it
is improper to adopt a technical meaning where it is possible to
(2)accept the etymological meaning of a word.
In the Madanaparitjata, which is a very old authority of
(3 )the Benares school, the topic of stridhana receives a very
(1) Vi.Mi.Txka on Yaj.2.143-44 : H ...Etatsarvam stridhanam 
saudayikam parikxrtitam. Adyapadena bhartrimaranatsankrantasya 
dhanasya sangrahah. Chakarena tatparigrihTtavasanalankarad- 
isamuchchayah. Evakarena bhartrasadhara^asvatvasya vyavach- 
chhedah.M
(2) Ibid. * h
(3) In the Darmakosa the date of the Madanaparijata is &iven as
being 1360-1390 A.D. But the work has been referred to in
the Smritisara of Harinatha which is dated in the Dharmakosa
as being 1300-1350. Therefore the former appears to be earlier 
than the works of the fourteenth century. The author of 
Parijata is Visvesvara Bhatta who has also written a commentary 
called Subhodhini on the Mitaksara of Vijnanesvara. It is not^ 
surprising, therefore, to find that the views in the Subhodhini 
and the Parijata coincide with each other. The MadanaparijHta
is also a great authority of the Mithila School - see infra,
p. if If ' i-f rJ,
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cursory attention but the author gives a plain and simple explana­
tion of Yajnavalkya* s enumeration : !,By the word ’etcetera* (adya)
that which is acquired by spinning, purchase, partition, seizure,
(1)or by finding of a treasure etc. is included.** It is obvious
that the author of the Madanapari3ata also includes all property of
women in the word stridhana especially as after having explained
the word ’adya* he again adds to his detailed list another word
*adi* which has the same meaning as the word ’adya*.
The authority next in importance in the Benares school is
the Vivadatandava of Kamalakara* His general approach towards the
subject is very similar to that of Mitra Misra and nothing very
(2)special is to be noted about him. After mentioning the enumera­
tion of Yajhavalkya and his provision about gift on supersession 
Kamalakara remarks : **By the word etcetera (adi) that which is 
acquired by inheritance, purchase, partition etc. (is included).**
No comment on this explanation is necessary.
He, however, mentions an additional text of Vyasa : "What­
ever is given to the bridegroom with some intention at the time of
the marriage, becomes the property of the bride and is not to be
. . (4)divided by the relatives.** Kamalakara apparently follows
(5)
JTmuta and comments that the intention in such case must be to 
benefit the girl; otherwise, it would not become stridhana at all.
(1 ) Ma.Pa.670. For translation see Setlur p.53 where it is 
slightly incorrect.
(2) See Vi.Ta.437-446. At p.437 the author introduces his subject: 
"StrTdhane prochyate bhago yatra yuddham kachakachi/" which 
sufficiently denotes the intricacy which the subject had de­
veloped by his time.
(3) Ibid 440.
(4) Ibid 441.
(5) Infra p. 108-
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He also mentions a text of Devala which appears to have a similar 
purpose • These two texts of Vyasa and Devala disclose a note­
worthy attempt to create an additional category of stridhana which 
will be discussed later on*
In the meanwhile it may conclusively be asserted that 
according to the authors of the Benares school the expression strid­
hana has an etymologically derivative meaning and includes all kinds 
of woman*s property* Vijnanesvara has been very closely followed 
by them in this respect* However, while discussing the law of the 
Benares school it must be kept in mind that the question whether a 
particular kind of property is stridhana or not is far different 
from the question whether a woman is entitled to dispose freely of 
all the categories of her stridhana and the latter will be discussed 
in the next chapter*
The text of Vyasa cited by Kamalakara raises an important 
question as to whether and how far does a nuptial gift to a bride­
groom become the stridhana of the bride* It is well-known that 
property acquired by valour, gains of learning and property acquired 
marriage form the important categories of a male*s impartible pro­
perty. Mauu and Yajnavalkya call this nuptial property as
(2)faudvahika** But it appears that deliberate attempts were made
(1) Vi*Ta*442* One more addition of Kamalakara may be mentioned 
here. According to him ornaments only of a negligible value 
are stridhana. In case they are very valuable they can be 
partitioned if the woman has an excessive share on account of 
them. - Vi.Ta.446.
(2) Manu 9.206; Yaj*2.118.
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by the later authors to transform this male1s impartible property 
into his wife’s stridhana in the same way in which bride’s price, 
which originally formed the property of the father of the bride,
r ( 1 )was reduced to one of the categories of stridhana i.e. sulka.
Narada mentions this third category as ’bhHryadhana* (lit.property
(2) — — of the wife). Commenting on this word *bharyadhana* Harinatha
(3)says that it denotes saudayika and Bhavasvami says that it de-
(4)notes stridhana. They do not give these explanations without
any authority behind them; for Vyasa terms this very category as
( 5) ( 6)’saudlyika* and Katyayana calls it stridhana. Commenting on
this word saudayika used by Vyasa, Chandesvara says that it is the
same saudayika which has been defined by Katyayana as ’’What a
(7)
married woman or a maiden receives .. etc.” i.e. stridhana over
which a woman has independent right of disposal.
It is well-known that in the brahma and prajapatya forms
of marriage the bridegroom gets some gift from the family of the
bride which presumably becomes his own property. In Southern India
and espacially in Kerala such gift to the bridegroom is called 
(8)stridhanam. On the other hand, there is also a custom amongst
}
(1 ) supra p#.
(2) Na.Smr.i.6.6 8c Na.Sam.14.6
(3) Smr.Sa.ms.f.60.
(4) Na.Sam.14.6.
(5) Vyasa cited in Apa.on Yaj.2.119 etc.
(6 ) Cited in Vi.Ta.344 etc. See also Prajapati cited in Sa.Vi.
368 who mentions stridhana in addition to audvahika.
(7) Vi.Ra.500. For the definition see supra p.
(8 ) See Vishnu v. Krishnan (1909) 25 T.L.R.196 at 213-14. But 
for a contrary view see ibid at pp.206-8.
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some of the communities in India according to which the parents of
the bride hand over some property to the bridegroom for the benefit
(1)of the bride* This is also called strxdhana in the South* In
Travancore the Malayala Brahmin Regulation provided that 'stridh-
anom' received by a Malayala brahmin should be treated as being the
(2)
joint property of the husband and wife* In Mysore such property
(3)has been declared to be the exclusive property of the woman*
But from the discussion made above it appears that the sastrakaras 
had long anticipated the move which was taken by the Mysore legis­
lature and were coming very close to the position that such property 
should be treated as strxdhana of the bride. The text of Vyasa 
cited by jTmuta and Kamalakara shows a step in transition so that 
Vyasa wanted to include into strxdhana only that property which was 
handed over to the bridegroom for the benefit of the bride.
In examining the law of the Bombay school distinction 
ought to be made between the area in which the Mitaksara supersedes
the authority of the Mayukha and the area where the Mayukha is the
(4)paramount authority. Much confusion has been caused xn ascert­
aining the law of the Bombay school on account of a uniform belief 
of all scholars and judges that there is very little difference
(1) See supra p. 71 and infra pp.
(2) The Travancore Malayala Brahmin Regulation III of 1106 (1931) 
s • 21 •
(3) The Mysore Hindu Law Woman's Rights Regulation X of 1933 s.10
(3). This section covers both sulka i.e. bride's price and 
property which is given to the bridegroom by the bride's 
family i.e. property which is known as varasulka or strxd-
hanam in the South, hunda in Bombay and dahej in the Northern 
India.
(4) PI £ p, Xf t
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between the Mitaksara and the Mayukha as regards the meaning of the 
word strxdhana. It has always been thought that Nxlakantha divides 
strxdhana into technical strxdhana and non-technical strxdhana, in­
cludes in the former division all the categories mentioned in the 
smritis, and includes in the latter division all the categories like 
property acquired by inheritance, purchase, partition etc. which 
have been included in the word ’adya* by Vijhanesvara and other 
authors.^^^ That this supposition is entirely wrong can be seen 
from a careful and comparative analysis of the text of the Mayukha.
Nxlakantha begins with the enumeration of Manu and says
that as borne out by the word 'adya* in Yajhavalkya* s verse the word
(2 )'sxx-fold* xn Manu's verse denotes only a denial of the less. To
elucidate his point further he mentions the ‘additional* categories
(3)mentioned by Visnu. Then he gives the definitions of the differ­
ent categories of strxdhana. For sulka he accepts the definition of 
Katyayana and remarks : "The meaning is, when the bride does not 
(as usual) obtain household utensils and the rest, then whatever is 
given to her at the time of her marriage as their value, is termed
(1) W.& B. 4th Edi.pp.258, 485-86; Banerjee pp.334, 505;
Bhattacharya 2nd Edi.p.566; D.N.Mitter : Position of Women 
in Hindu Law (1912)p.511; S.Venkatarama Ayyar : Outlines of 
Hindu Law (1931)p.408; H.D.Cornish : A Short Manual of Hindu 
Law p.l43t; History of Dharmasastra Vol.Ill pp.782, 796-99; 
Kane's Notes to Vya.Ma.157; Gour's Hindu Code 3rd Edi.pp. 
1561-62; Mayne 11th Edi.p.733; Gupte 2nd Edi.p.587 etc.
(2) "...tena Yajnavalkyxyamadyapadam sangachchhate." - Vya.Ma. 
152-53.
(3) HVisnuschadhikamaha.11 - Vya.Ma.153.
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her p e r q u i s i t e . T h e n  he explains adhivedanika and then gives
the provisions of Vyasa and Katyayana about two thousand panas to
(2)be given annually to a woman for maintenance*
Then to show that property obtained from non-re1ativ&s -
( 3)even if they be friends - is not stridhana he cites the verse of
Katyayana which specifically declares such property to be not strXd-
( 4 )
hana. He then remarks that the verse of Manu which declares
( 5)women to be incapable of owning any property refers to the two
categories mentioned in the above verse of Katyayana. He further 
says that it is proper to hold that this Manu*s verse denotes also 
the lack of independence (asvStantrya) on the part of a woman as
/ a  \
regards *adhivedanika etc* 1
Up to this point Nilakantha nowhere says expressly that 
stridhana has an etymological meaning and that it includes property 
obtained by inheritance, purchase, partition etc. - an explanation
which has been unambiguously given by Madhava, Mitra Misra, Fratapa
- (7)Rudra, Kamalakara and several other authors. When he says that
the word *adya' shows that the w o r d 1 six-fold* is only a denial of 
the less he means nothing more than to say that many other categor­
ies are spoken of by other authors like Yajnavalkya, Visnu etc. This
(1 ) l,Grihopaskaradyalabhe tanmulayam kanyadanakale kanyayai dattam 
tatsulkamityarthah.11 - Vya.Ma.153.
(2) Ibid 154*
(3) "Silpaprapte pitradibhinnasakhyadiprapte * pi stridhanatvam 
nastityaha.** - Vya.Ma. 154.
(4) Supra p. 7*t •
(5) Manu 8,416 supra p. 5 6  .
(6 ) "Mhivedanikadisvapyasvatantryapararaiti tu yuktam1* - Vya.Ma. 155.
(7) Supra pp. % 0.S |
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explanation is borne out by his next sentence, namely, nVisnu also 
has stated additional categories.11 Jxmuta and other authors of the
Bengal school also give a similar explanation of the word 1 six-fold1
..
{ (sadridha) #| The explanation given by Vachaspati Misra, the
author of the Vivadachintamani, conies very close to the one given
by Nxlakantha. Vachaspati says that the word sixfold is only a
denial of the less; to substantiate his remark he further states
that adhivedanika is the Seventh1 variety and gives the enumera-
(2)tion given by Visnu. % Even the words 1adhivedanika etc.1 used by 
Nxlakantha do not mean adhivedanika and other property obtained by 
a woman by inheritance etc. They denote all kinds of property ob­
tained by a woman from her husband and Nxlakantha wants to suggest
(3)that such property is not at the free disposal of a woman. This
inference is supported by the fact that after making the above-
mentioned remark the author refers to the definition of saudayika
given by Katyayana to show the property which is at the free disposal
of a woman and accepts that version of the verse which restricts the
meaning of the word saudayika to property received from the family
(4)of the parents only. He then cites the text of Narada which de­
clares that a woman cannot freely dispose of immoveable property
(5)
given to her by her husband. The words 1 adhivedanika etc.* have
(1) Infra p.log.
(2) Infra p. |oj^ . See also note to p. go mentioning some other 
authorities. a siw»» i^r inttrpnirqKovi set » " p.|o*> .
(3) Even adhivedanika is a kind of bhartridatta. For a woman’s 
right of disposition see the next chapter.
(4) Vya.Ma.155. For the verse see supra p. 7| .
(5) See infra .
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been also used by Vachaspati Misra, the author of the Smritisaras- 
angraha, who divides strxdhana into technical strxdhana i.e. strxd­
hana which has been mentioned by the sages, and that which is 
etymological.^*^ It is evident that this author uses this phrase 
to denote only technical strxdhana and therefore it would not be 
improper to think that Nxlanantha also meant the same thing by 
these words.
It is also important to note here that whereas jjroperty
acquired by labour etc. and gifts from strangers are included in
* (2)strxdhana by Mitra Misra and whereas eveh the authors of the
Bengal school admit that the woman has at least some kind of owner-
(3)ship in the same, Nxlakantha openly suggests that the woman has 
no ownership in such property and that it becomes the property of 
the husband.
In his provisions concerning succession the author uses
the phrase *paribhasika strxdhana* although it must be noted at the
same time that he never uses the phrase 1aparibhasika strxdhana*
(non-technical strxdhana) which is nowadays too readily ascribed to
him. After having laid down the whole scheme of succession which
(4) «is far dxfferent from the one given by the Mitaksara, Nxlakantha 
makes a long comment as follows ;
"This right of inheritance of the daughter etc., in the 
mother*s property pertains only to the above-mentioned paribhasika
(1) Smr.Sa.Sam,ms,f.44(a). See infra p. 117.
(2) Supra p. SSL*
(3) Infra pp. )og > 11 a--)**.
(4) Infra pp.35VS^. c
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strxdhana i.e. adhyagni, adhyavahanika etc. If it is understood 
as pertaining (also) to the property which is merely owned by the 
mother then the technical language (i.e. the enumeration) would 
become purposeless.11 Therefore the texts of Brihaspati, Gautama 
etc., namely, 1Stridhana should devolve upon the issue.. •*, *Strxd­
hana devolves upon the daughters . ..* etc. which have been referred 
to above and which contain the word ’stridhana* apply to paribh­
asika only. On account of the maxim of the desirability of tracing 
<|<ny two similar texts to the same source, those texts which do not 
contain this word but have a similar purpose in view e.g. * ..should 
divide maternal estate.•' etc. also apply to the same (i.e. paribh­
asika). But the text of Yajnavalkya : ’The sons should equally 
divide the property and debts after (the death of) their parents..’ 
applies to property acquired by partition, spinning etc. which is 
beyond the scope of the paribhasika. Therefore, despite the exist­
ence of daughters, sons and others alone should get their mother’s 
property which falls beyond the scope of the paribhasika. However, 
in default of issue Yajnavalkya makes a specific provision concern­
ing paribhasika stridhana : ’In the event of a woman dying child­
less her relatives should take her stridhana’ This whole
(1) ’’Ayarn duhitradlnam matridhanadhikaro*dhyagnyadhyavahanikarai- 
tyadipurvoictaparibhasikastrldhana eva. Matrisvamikadhanamat- 
raparatve paribhasavaiyarthyam. Tena ’Strldhanam syadapaty- 
anam..', ’Strldhanam duhitrlnam..* iiyadxni purvoktani 
strTdhanapadavanti BrihaspatiGautamavachanani paribhasikapar- 
anyeva. Yani tu strldhanapadabhave*pyekarthakani ’Bhajeran-
matrikam riktham..* iiyadlni tanyetatparanyeva. Ekamulakal- 
panalaghavat. Yattu 'Vibhajeran sutah pitrorurdhvam riktham­
ir inain samam’ iti Yajhava1kyoktam tatparibhasikatiriktavibh-
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comment shows that according to NTlakantha there is nothing like 
non-technical strxdhana. He refers to such property as mother*s 
property or property which is merely oiraed by the mother - a phrase­
ology which is very commonly used by the authors of the Bengal school 
to denote property ivhich, according to them, is not strxdhana at
Secondly, Misru Misra, the author of the vivadachandra, 
shows, in the same way as Nxlakantha does, the danger of the techni­
cal language becoming futile and purposeless in case the word strxd­
hana is held as being capable of including categories which are not
mentioned in the sinritis. He specifically limits the meaning of the
(2)word strxdhana to categories which are enumerated in the sinritis.
The reasoning of both these authors being similar it is evident that 
according to Nxlakantha also the word is limited to the enumerated 
categories.
Thirdly, all texts which lay down a special line of suc­
cession to female*s property are applied by Nxlakantha only to the 
paribhasika categories or the so-called technical strxdhana• As
agakart anadi1abhaparam• Tena paribhasikat iriktam matridhanam 
duhitrisatve putradaya eva labheran. Ubhayavidhasamtatyabhave 
tu paribhasikastrxdhanam prakritya visesamaha Yajhavaltyjfeah 
'Atxtayamaprajasi bandhavastadapnuyuh* • '* - Vya.Ma. 160.
For the texts of Brihaspati, Gautama and Manu see infra 
chapter IV. The text of Yajnavalkya i$ Yaj.II.117.
(1) See infra pp.Il3,U7* The phrase
f,matrisvamikadhananiatraM should really be "matrisvamikamatr- 
adhana". See the phrase "strxsvatvaspadamatra used in Smr.
Sa•Sam.ms.f•44(a).
(2) Infra pp. | o A cursory perusal would show that the position 
taken by these two authors is almost identical.
95
regards succession to other categories of femalefs property he refers 
to the text of YSjnavalkya which applies to succession to male’s 
property, laying down thereby that these non-enumerated categories 
devolve like male’s property upon son, son’s son etc. in preference 
to daughter, daughter’s daughter etc. This is also clear from the 
fact that he does not give a further line of succession to non­
enumerated categories but deals with the enumerated categories only.
Fourthly, proceeding on the hypothesis that Nxlakantha 
divides strxdhana into technical and non-technical strxdhana it must 
be noticed that Raghurama Siromani, the author of the Dayabhagarth- 
adxpika, appears to be the only other author who divides strxdhana 
in this way. But it is evident from his further elucidation as also 
from the line of succession which he prescribes for aparibhasika 
strxdhana that in his opinion aparibhasika strXdhana is really not 
strxdhana at all.^^ Nxlakantha does not go to the extent of giving 
expressly a category called aparibhasika strxdhana, while, on the 
other hand, he refers to the enumerated categories as ’paribhasika 
strxdhana* and sometimes merely as ’paribhasika1 which shows that 
he uses the word paribhasika as a synonym for strxdhana itself*
Fifthly, as it has been held that the preponderance of the 
Mayilkha in its own area is due to the fact that its author has in­
corporated into his treatise the customary law of the localit^f^it 
must be stated that the customary law of Gugrat has been in favour
(1 ) Infra pjf. 115.
(2) Chandika Baksh v. Muna K«tar (1903)29 I.A.70; Meghaji v. 
Anant A.I.R.1948 Bom.396
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of the above interpretation put upon the provisions of Mayukha con-
(1 )cerning stridhana* In the Gujrat Caste Rules collected by Borra- 
daile it is found that out of the two hundred.castes questioned by 
Borradaile on several points relating to Hindu law a hundred have 
replied that property which a daughter inherits from her father de­
volves, after her death, upon the heirs of the father; fortyseven 
castes have given an opinion in favour of the husband of the dau­
ghter and the rest of the sixtyeight castes either did not give any
reply or said that the daughter does not inherit at all or that the
bt . (2)matter should decided in accordance with the sastra* It isj\
evident from these replies that according to the majority of the 
castes in Gujrat a daughter takes only limited estate in the pro­
perty which she inherits from her father which, in other words, means 
that property inherited by a woman is not stridhana. It is no 
wonder, therefore, that Nilakantha ventured to differ from the 
Mitaksara as regards the meaning of strxdhana and gave only a limit­
ed significance to it. This view of the Mayukha was, as we shall 
see, not current in the Anglo-Hindu law.
In the Southern school or the so-called Dravida school 
the leading authorities besides the Mitaksara are the Smritichan- 
drika, the Farasaramadhaviya, the Vyavaharanirnaya and the
 ^ — r - n  ,««*   .
(1) For information about^see infra pp.
(2) For this statistics and some more arguments in favour of 
this point see B.IC. Acharyya : "Codification in British 
India T.L.L.(1912) p.346.
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(1) - Sar&svativilasa. As regards the Smritichandrika it must he
admitted that Devanna, its reputed author, does not expressly state
that the word *adyaf includes property obtained by inheritance etc*
nor does he assert that the expression strxdhana is used etymologic-
( 2 ) #ally and not technically* As regards sulka he accepts the de­
finition of Katyayana. The second verse of Katyayana which excludes 
certain property from the import of the expression strxdhana is 
connected with the verse of Manu which declares women to be incap­
able of owning any property. This shows that according to him
acquisitions by labour and gifts from strangers do not create any
( 3 )
kind of proprietory interest of the woman concerned. All these 
points show a big deviation from the Mitaksara theory of strxdhana 
and one may think that according to Devanna strxdhana consists only 
of categories mentioned.in the smritis. But at another place in the 
Smritichandrika there is a small parenthetical remark which leads 
the reader to an exactly opposite conclusion. Dealing with the 
mother's right to succeed to her son's property Devanna remarks : 
"Whatever the mother takes she takes for herself like the strxdhana
(1) The Vyavaharanirnaya of Varadaraja is no doubt an important 
and an extensive treatise of the Southern school; but as the 
author rarely gives comments of his own his work often 
dwindles down to a mere anthology of selected and categoric­
ally arranged verses of the smritis. For ascertaining the 
connotation of the word strxdhana Varadaraja is of little 
help. - See Vya.Wi.pp. But for succession to strxdhana
see infra pp.3 7 0 -7 2 .  •
(2) For a general discussion see Smr.Cha.651-54.
(3) Smr.Cha.654. To the same effect are Ma.Ha.376; Vya.Ma. 
154-55 etc. For 'nirdhanatva* smritis see introduction pj^ . 5© .
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called adhyagni and the like, and not for the benefit of both her-
(1)self and her husband*” The passage suggests that according to 
the author property which a mother inherits from her son is her 
strXdhana. This inference is fortified by the fact that both accord­
ing to Madhava and Pratapa Rudra property inherited by a woman is 
strXdhana.
The parasaramadhaviya is in full concord with the Mitaksara
as regards the expansion of the word 'adya' in Yajnavalkya1s text*
Commenting on the enumeration of Yajnavalkya Madhava says : "By the
word 'etcetera1 (adya) that which is obtained on the bridal proces-
(2)sion or by inheritance or sale (is included)• " He then adds that
(3)the number six is a denial of the less* The whole treatment is 
similar to that of the Benares school. It is surprising to note 
that according to Banerjee the MadhavXya gives only a 'limited
(1) Smr.Cha*689; translation XI*iii*8 in Krishnasawmy Iyer's 
edition is reprinted in Setlur part I p.290* The context of 
the passage shows that Devanna is refuting the opinion of one. 
Sambhu according to whom such property belongs to both the 
mother and the father* Banerjee refers to this passage and 
remarks "...from this passage it has been sometimes inferred 
that inherited property does plot rank as strXdhana." It is 
surprising that he does not declare his own opinion upon the 
interpretation of this passage which is obviously in favour 
of inherited property being treated as strXdhana. - Banerjee 
p.336.
(2) Pa*Ma*368* See also^wfek*^ Sanskrit Series edition p.5*t7«
where the same reading is given. But the translation given by 
Setlur p.343 omits the words 'by inheritance1, The same is the 
case with Burnell's translation quoted by Banerjee (p.330). It 
seems Banerjee depended only on the translation of the treatise I
(3) Pa. Ma • 3 £ $.
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(l)signification* to the word 'adya*. With great respect it must
be added that the translation given by him is not in accord with
the original text of the Madhavxya, the correct translation of
which has been given above. Not only does Madhava expand the word
*adya* in the way in which Vijnanesvara does but he also defines
wealth given by kinsmen (bandhudatta), sulka and gifts given after
the marriage (anvadheya) exactly in the same way as Vijnanesvara
(2)does. This firmly establishes his affinity to the Mitaksara.
There is one important difference between the provisions
of the Benares school and of the Madhavxya, namely, the author refers
to the two verses of Katyayana about conditional gifts etc. and hold©
( 3)that property mentioned in both the verses is not strxdhana at all.
On this point he seems to agree with Devanna, Madanasimha, Dalapat- 
iraja, Nxlakantha and the authors of the Bengal school. Thus it 
may be concluded that according to Madhava all property which be­
longs to women except gifts from strangers and property acquired by 
women by labour is strxdhana.
Coming to the Sarasvativilasa it is clear that Pratapa 
Rudra, its 7 7 C ] a u t h o r ,  follows the Mitaksara in expanding the 
word 'adya' to include property obtained by inheritance, purchase,
(1) T.L.L. (1878) pp.330, 335. At p.359 Banerjee expressly 
mentions that inherited property is not included by Madhava 
in strxdhana..
(2) Pa.Ma.368, translation Setlur pp.34*3-44.
(3) Pa.Ma.370.
(4) Smr.Cha. 653-54; Ma.Ra.376; Nri.Pra.237; Vya.Ma.154-55 etc.
See also infra.
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(1 ) ,partition etc. As regards sulka he seems to accept the defini­
tions both as given in the Mitaksara and the one given by Katyayana
which is accepted also in the Smritichandrika but he seems to be in
(2)favour of the former. He refers to the opinion of Bharuchi,
namely, "bride-price is denoted by the word sulka and that obtains
only in the eisura and the other forms of marriage.” Pratapa Rudra
refutes a possible objection based on this statement by saying :
"Here the question whether it is prohibited or not is not relevant,
( 3 )but the question whether it is partible or not is.” He explains 
the word 1 gains' (labha) in Devala's enumeration as interest which
(4)
accrues upon the capital consisting of previous stridhana. It is
also noteworthy that the author, like Vijnanesvara, does not at all 
refer to the two verses of Katyayana about conditional gifts etc.
This confirms the fact that this treatise substantially follows the 
Mitaksara as regards the interpretation of the term stridhana#
It may, therefore, be concluded that according to author-
S■ i
j ities of the Southern school all property which belongs to a woman
i
j is her stridhana with the exception that property given to a woman
jI
| by strangers and property acquired by a woman by her own skill or
l
exertions is not her stridhana and that she has no kind of pro- 
prietory interest in such property. Presumably such property becomes
\ t h e - p i - o p e / r t ^ y  o p
I ;fI her husband.X
(1) Sa.Vi.379, translation Setlur p.149. See also Sa.Vi.386-87
where Pratapa Rudra cites the opinions of Bharuchi, Apararka,
Somesvara, Vijnanesvara etc. and concludes that the word 'dHya* 
(inheritence) includes also stridhana.
(2) Sa.Vi.379.
(3) Sa.Vi*380, translation Setlur p.150.
(4) Sa.Vi.381. An etymological definition of 'labha' is given.
For various interpretations see supra p. note 1.
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In the Mithila school the Krityakalpataru of Laksmxdhara
may be considered as being the oldest authority* Lamsraxdhara quotes
the enumeration given by Manu, Katyayana, Narada, Visnu, and Devala
(1)and refers to the definitions given by Katyayana. As regards
(2)
sulka he seems to adopt the definition given by Katyayana. For
saudayika he accepts the second reading limiting that kind to the
( 3)property received from the families of the parents of a woman. He
does not refer to the first verse of Yajnavalkya containing the word
(4)’adyam* though he refers to the second verse only for the purpose
(5)of setting out the line succession to strxdhana. He cites the
text of Katyayana about properties gained by art or labour etc. which
(6)do not form strxdhana. He does not make any comment on many of
the quotations and so it is difficult to gather his exact opinion 
though it may be inferred with some confidence that Laksmxdhara did 
not contemplate extending the list of strXdhana properties to pro­
perties acquired by inheritence etc.
The Vivadaratnakara of Chandesvara is chronologically the 
next authority in the Mithila school. He professes to add something
(1) ICal. 693-94.
(2) Ibid 695. See also Vi.Chi.139. For Katyayana*s verse see 
supraf,70.But the Dayabhaga explanation appears to have been 
adopted in Vi.Ra.525 and the Mitaksara explanation in Vi.Chi. 
141. But in the latter there appears to be an attempt to blend 
the definitions given by Katyayana and Vijnanesvara.
(3) ICal.684; also Vi.Ra.510. But in Vi.Chi.139 and in another ms. 




(6 ) Where no comment is offered on this text it may be inferred,
that in accordance with the apparent and unambiguous meaning
of the text, the author does not want to treat these pro­
perties as strxdhana.
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to the general law as stated in the Kalpataru, Parijata, Halayudha*s
Nihandha and Madanaratnaprakasa•^^ He seems to have followed the
general tenor of the law as stated in the Kalpataru. However, he
adds that the number six is only a denial of the less, the reason
being that Yajnavalkya has also quoted some additional categories
(2)
like gifts on supersession* He then quotes Yajnavalkya1s enumera­
tion without offering any comments. He also accepts the opinion of 
Medhatithi that gifts on the bridal procession should include gifts
given also at the time when the bride is taken from the house of her
(3)husband to the house of her parents. His reading of the enumera-y
tion given by Visnu brings into the term stridhana also the property
(4)given by friends though he does not expressly say so. As regards
Katyayana*s text about property acquired by skill or labour etc. he
remarks : "The meaning is that the husband alone has dominion over
the strTdhana which has been acquired by a woman besides the cate-
(5)gories already spoken of.,f This remark as coupled with his read­
ing of the Visnusutra may lead one to the conclusion that according
(1) Vi.Ra* epilogue p.670.
(2) Vi.Ra.523; see also Ma.Ra.375, Smr.Cha.652 and Vi.Chi.138 for 
a similar remark.
(3) Vi.Ra.522-23. This appears to be a prelude to the Bviragamana 
for which see supra p. £ 3 &**d infra py. For ^iie same
reference to Medhatithi*s comment see also the FrithvTehandro- 
daya ms.f.248(a). From this remark of the author it seems 
that the parts of the valuable commentary of Medhatithi which 
appear to have been lost to us were available to the early 
commentators like Chandesvara, Vashaspati Misra, Raghunandana 
etc. - see infra pp.Io^uif.
(4) Vi.Ra.523 reads 1 suhrid* for 1 suta* in Vis .Smr. 17* / ? />,6*3 •
(5) Besides Raghurama Siromani (see infra p .11 $ Chandesvara appears 
to be the only author to refer expressly to such property as 
being strxdhana.
103
to Chandesvara these kinds of property are strxdhana* Like Laksmx­
dhara, however, he does not appear to be in favour of extending the 
import of the strxdhana as it has been done by the authors of the 
Benares and the Southern school.
The Vivadachintamani of Vachaspati Misra is a later but 
the most important authority of the Mithila school. Vachaspati first 
quotes the enumeration of Manu and Katyayana, remarks that the number
six is only a denial of the less and to substantiate his remark he
(1)refers to gift on supersession as 'the seventh* variety. He then
mentions the enumeration given by Visnu and states Katyayana*s de-
( 2)finitions of sulka and gifts given after the marriage. He further
remarks : "The categories of strxdhana are formed in this way. These
( 3 )alone are the saudayika (strxdhana) of a woman.11 He then accepts
the first reading of Katyayana*s verse including in saydayika pro-
(4)
perty received from the families both of the husband and father,
and remarks that money given for maintenance etc. which he describes
( 5 )further is also included in the same category. As regards orna­
ments he quotes and accepts the opinion of Medhatithi that ornaments
which are worn by a woman with the consent of her husband become her
/ /■» \
property although they are not given to her by him. It therefore




(4) Ibid. The word ’brother* in the first version is held by the
author to be only symbolical as to represent the parents, the
husband etc. This reconciles the two readings.
(5) Vi.Chi. 139, (for maintenance see Bevala quoted in Vi.Chi.141.)
(6 ) Vi.Chi.139. 'Given* appears to mean 'given absolutely'. The
same reference is given by Raghunandana infra p. Il*f .
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husband*s property by the wife changes, in some cases, also the
oivnership of the property*
Vachaspati then independentaly> refers to the woman’s right
of disposing of the property gifted to her by her husband and holds
that she has an absolute power of disposal only over gifted moveables
but not over immoveables and applies the same conclusion incident-
(1)ally to property inherited from the husband. The whole discuss­
ion is parenthetical and not very clear; hence it is difficult to
state ^vhether he includes within the word strTdhana any kind of pro-
(2)perty inherited by a woman from her husband. He, however,
suggests that this whole discussion or at least the part of it which
(3 )deals with inheritance does not pertain to strTdhana. He then 
gives the enumeration given by Devala and explains sulka as ’’That
( 4)which has been given to the girl out of a desire to marry (her).’*
He then concludes : ,fAll this is strTdhana.11 From his confusing 
discussions it appears that Vachaspati Misra was himself not very 
clear about the import of the term strTdhana; but it seems that he 
also did not think of accepting the Mitaksara interpretation of the 
word 1adya**
(1) Vi.Chi.140-1. Vachaspati Misra includes in the word *bhartrid- 
aya* found in Katyayana* s verse (see infra p.IIX ) all pro­
perty which a woman gets from her husband whether by inheri­
tance or by gift inter vivos. - Vi.Chi.140.
(2) However, one thing is clear, namely, that moveable property 
acquired howsoever by a woman from her husband is her absolute 
property according to Vachaspati.
(3) See the remark 1prakrite tu JDevalah* following the discussion 
on inheritance - Vi.Chi.141.
(4) Vi.Chi. 141.
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This general trend of the Mithila school is also to be 
found in the Vivadachandra of Misaru Misra. He says that the number 
six is a denial of the less but not a restriction upon more cate­
gories for some additional categories have already been spoken of by
(1)YajnavalUya. However, by this remark he does not intend to extend
the import of the word strTdhana so as to include property acquired
by inheritance etc. as has been done by the authors of the Benares
and the Southern schools; for, in the first place, he does not read
the word 'adya* in Yajnavalkya1s enumeration which shows that he did
not want to extend the list of categories of strTdhana beyond those
which have already been mentioned in the smritis. Moreover, like
the authors of the Bengal school, he treats property acquired by a
woman by her own skill and gifts given by strangers as being not
strTdhana* He goes even a step further and says that such property
belongs to the husband alone and is inherited (vibhajanTyam) by sons
(2)alone. He makes one more complicated remark which appears to be 
in furtherance of this position i "StrTdhana denotes only that (pro­
perty) which has been specifically mentioned (in the sastra)
(paribhasikam lit. that which is technically defined), and not all 
(property of a woman); for, nomenclature (samjna) and technical
(1) Vi.Cha.76. This shows that the interpretation put upon the 
word 'sadvidha' is only for the purpose of incorporating also 
the categories which have been mentioned by other sages but 
not by Manu. The reasoning is very similar to that of NTlak- 
antha - see supra pp. 3 0 -3 ) .
(2) Vi.Cha.77. For a similar provision in the DayabhagarthadTpika 
see infra p. MS. For the remark of Misaru Misra on this point, 
however|it appears that women used to do business also (vani^Ya) 
It is no wonder, therefore, that Pratapa Hudra and NTlakantha 
include such profits in the word 'labha1 - see supra p. 67
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definition (paribhasa) are used for some particular purpose (karya-
kala), otherwise, although accompanied by the defining injunctions
of the Sastra they would, in every sphere, be left without any dis-
(1)tinctive meaning (avisesa) and consequentially would be useless."
The translation has been kept nearest to the original and needs some 
clarification. What Misaru Misra means to say is when the nomen­
clature 'stridhana1 which has been used in the Dharmasastra has been 
explained by many enumerative texts it would be improper to attribute 
to the word its ordinary and etymological meaning; for, in that case 
the enumeration in the sastra becomes purposeless as it is already 
included in the ordinary and the etymological meaning of the word. 
This is the only possible meaning one can make out of this apparently 
unintelligible remark. On the whole, however, it is certain that 
Misaru Misra is very near to the position taken by the authors of 
the Bengal school and is nearest to Nxlakantha.
The Vivadasararnava of Sarvoru Sarman may also be consider­
ed as being an authority of the Mithila school. Like Vachaspati 
Misra Sarvoru Sarman also treats property inherited by a woman from
her husband and property acquired by a woman from her husband by
(2)
gift inter vivos to be on a par. But it has already been stated
that he expressly includes in the word 'adya' property inherited by 
( 3 )a woman. He also reproduces almost exactly the above-mentioned
(1) "Strldhanam cha paribhasikameva na sarvain, karyakala eva 
samjnaparibhasayorupayogat anyatha vaiyarthyat vinigamanavira- 
hena sarvatra tayoravisesat" - Vi.ChH,.76.
(2) Vi.Sam.ms.f.6 8 (a)•
(3) Ibid f.67(b), supra p.|olf .
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remark of Misaru Misra but does not care to explain it.^^ From the
context, however, it appears that according to him this remark would
mean that only technical strxdhana would devolve as strxdhana* In
this respect he seems to be very close to Eaghurama Siromani who
treats some categories of property as non-technical strxdhana but
provides that they devolve on the heirs of the husband?which really
(2)
means that they are not strxdhana at all. Therefore, on the whole 
it may be concluded that according to the Mithila school strTdhana 
consists only of categories which are mentioned in the smritis*
In the Bengal school the ©ayabhaga of JTmutavahana is con­
sidered to be of paramount authority. JTmutavahana begins with the
(3 )enumeration given by Visnu, quotes the definition of post-nuptial
(4)gifts (anvadheya) given by Katyayana and explains it* Gifts from
the families both of the husband and of the parents are included in
post-nuptial gifts. Thus the definitions of Manu and Katyayana and
(5)of Narada are quoted. As regards the definition of adhyavahanika 
i.e. gift on the bridal procession, the second reading of Katyayana*s 
verse is accepted which restricts the meaning of the word to gifts 
received only from the families of the father or the mother of a
(1) Ibid f.70(b).
(2) Infra p^ f. II 5.
(3) ©a.Bha. 4.1.1.
(4) Ibid 4.1.2-3* According to JImuta the word bandhu (relative) 
denotes parents in Katyayana*s definition whereas it denotes 
the maternal uncle etc. in Visnu*s enumeration. Srxnatha, 
j§rTkrisna and SrTkrisnakanta commenting on the above passage, 
however, add that a gift from a son cannot be included into 
post-nuptial gifts as the son is directly related to the woman 
and not through her husband. See also Da.Bha.Di.verse 70 to 
the same effect. The reasoning is not very clear.
(5) ©a.Bha. 4.1.4*
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(1)woman. About the words ’inheritance from the husband* (bhartri-
daya) Jxitfuta explains : Manu has not mentioned ’inheritance from the
(2)
husband’ but has said ’gifts from the husband* and Narada does not
mention ’gifts froin the husband* but says ’inheritance from the
(3 )husband*; consequentially the words ’inheritance from the husband
denote only ’property given by the husband*• The explanation does
not appear to be convincing as the reverse conclusion can also foe
arrived at with this fallacious logic. He also cites a text of
Katyayana containing the word ’inheritance from the husband* which,
(4)in his opinion, are used in the sense of ’gift from the husband.w
After having quoted the enumerations given by Yajnavalkya 
and Devala, Jxmuta quotes Vyasa*s text about nuptial gifts to the 
bridegroom becoming the strxdhana of the bride and remarks that the 
property must be given with an intention that it should belong to the 
daughter and that in the absence of such an intention it will not
(5)
become the property of the daughter. He also comments that the 
<
words < at the txme of the marriage* have been used in this text 
only illustratively and quotes a text of the logicians to elucidate
/ n \
his point.
(1) Ibid 4.1.5. See supra pp. for, the reading.
(2) Manu p.194-95 supra pp. .
(3 ) Supra p • 6 3 *
(4) For the text see infra p. MS ■
(5) Da,Bha,4.1 • 17. For the text see supra p. 8 6 .
(6 ) The text which is quoted by Kamalakara as being of Devala is
given by Jxmuta as being a text of the logicians. It is obvious
that Kamalakara has followed the provisions of the Dayabhaga in 
this respect which shows that at least on soke occasions authors 
of one of the schools used to follow the agreeable provisions
of the treatises of the other schools. For another instance of 
Kamalakara following the provisions of the Dayabhaga see i»n
.».Foy '■ t of- Ikt. I- or* c rcU.il I ( . w i* rt-N fi-v*.
,C,:. , - j <" ^ 1 J
I jcc. r«.^-rcfc t 3  q g ^ 3 g 3 ^ LfO$ ,
10 9
jXmuta then makes the following comment which forms the 
crux of the stand of the Bengal school as regards the import of the 
term strxdhana : "Thus as the enumeration of strxdhana has been made 
without any precise number (of categories), the number six is not 
specifically meant; but the texts of the (different) sages are in­
tended simply to enumerate (the kinds of) strxdhana. That alone is 
strTdhana which a woman can give, sell or utilise independently of 
her husbandfs control*11 The definition is peculiar to the Bengal 
school and has been accepted also in the Dayatatva and the Dayakram- 
asangraha.
Jxmuta then cites the verse of Katyayana about property 
acquired by a woman by labour etc. and remarks : "Over these proper­
ties the husband has dominion i.e. independance, and the husband has 
a right (lit. deserves) to take them even in the absence of distress 
Therefore, the wealth which belongs to a woman (in this way) is not 
strxdhana on account of the absence of independant control (of the
woman). Property besides that of these two kinds, however, belongs
(3)to the woman only wherein she has a right to give or sell etc."
To elucidate his point further he then quotes the definition of saud
(4)ayika given by Katyayana and explains the word etymologically.
According to all authors of the Bengal school, namely 
Jxmuta, Srxkrisna, Srxkara, Varesvara, ¥idyaratna Smartabha11acharya 
Narayana, Ganesabhatia, Ragkunatha Sarvabhauma etc. this verse of
(1) Da.Bha. 4.1.18.
(2) Da.Ta. 24; Da.Kra.Sam. 17-18.
(3) Da.Bha. 4.1.20-21. See also Da.Ta.24 and Da.Kra.Sam.18.
(4) Da.Bha. 4.1.23.
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Katyayana about property acquired by skill or labour and gifts from
strangers forms as it were the gist of all descriptions and enumera-
(1)tions of strldhana. Therefore the two categories of property
deserve special attention. Achyuta and Srxkrisna in their commen-
(2) _ 
taries on the above-mentioned passage in the Dayabhaga and Raghun-
( 3 )andana in his Dayatattva admit that a woman has svatva or owner­
ship in such property. &rxkrisna in his Bayakramasangraha uses the 
word 1strxsvamika1 to show that a woman has ownership in such pro­
perty. In his commentary on the Dayabhaga, however, he adds
that by mere desire the husband is able to put an end to the owner­
ship of a woman and to create his ownership in the property coming 
under these two categories. It seems that he wants to distinguish 
these two categories from the categories of strxdhana which the 
husband can take and puir an end to the ownership of the woman in 
them only in the case of calamity etc56)
As regards sulka Jxmuta accepts the definitions both of 
Katyayana and Vyasa and remarks ; f,What is given to a woman by 
artists constructing a house or executing some other work, as bribe 
to send her husband or other person to labour on such particular
work, is her fee. It is the renumeration since its purpose is to
(7) #
employ.” He specifically repudiates the interj)retation of sulka
(1) Da.Bha.4.1.18; Da.Kra.Sam.17; Da.Bha.Nir.ms.f. (a & b);
Vi.Se.ms.f.31(a)32(b); Sinr.Sa.Vya.ms .f .42(a); Vya.Sa.Sam. 
ms.f.32(a 8e b); Ba.Bya.Sam.ms.f.1.(b); Smr.Sa.Vya.(Raghun- 
atha) ms.f.56(a).
(2) Da.Bha.4.1.20-21.
(3) Da.Ta.24, see infra.
(4) Da.Kra.Sam. Ifc *n|V* p.IIV-
(5) Da.Bha.4.1.20-21.
(6 ) See infra next chapter.
(7) Da.Bha. 4.3.20.
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as being a gratuity given in the case of marriages in the j^sura and
other forms because if that were the meaning, in the Raksa$a and
* (X)other forms there would be no possibility of sulka at all.
Achyuta and Srikrisna implicitely admit that sulka and labha do not 
form saudayika but state that the woman has independant right of dis­
posal over them as they do not come under the two categories mentioned
by Katyayana, viz. property acquired by a woman by her own skill and
(2)gifts from strangers. It is impossible to see why these two cat­
egories, namely, sulka and labha cannot be saudayika according to 
these commentators unless they treat them as being given by strangers 
a suggestion which SrXkrisna specifically refutes.
Not only dues Jumutavahana restrict the enumeration of 
stridhana by accepting the second reading of Yajnavalkya*s text but 
he also specifically states that wealth inherited by a woman from
her husband, father, son or other relatives is not stridhana and
(3)does not devolve upon her stridhana heirs. On this point he has
been expressly followed by Srikrisna, Srikara, Anantarama and
- A . (4)Raghurama Siromani.
Thus according to Jimuta the test of stridhana is its
quality of being freely alienable. But we do not know which property
is freely alienable by a woman and so Banerjee rightly remarks :
(1) Da• Bha.4.3.22-23. The term 'fjfsuradi* denotes the four 
unapproved forms of marriage - see introduction pp.JfO-M*
(2) Their commentaries on Da.Bha. 4.1.23
(3) See Da.Bha. 11.1.57-58 (inheritance from the husband), 11.1.65 
(inheritance from the father), 11.2.30-32 (prescribing limited 
estate for all female heirs).
(4) Da.Kra.Sam. ** ^  | ; Yi.Chandrika ms.f.41(b); Da.Bha.Ni.ms.
f.4(b); Da.Bha.Di. verse 109.
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** ... The foregoing definition is open to the objection that it de-
(1)fines one unknown thing in terms of another.” Really speaking
according to this theory only saudayika can be stridhana. But in
that case Katyayana would have expressly mentioned that saudayika
itself only is stridhana. It has been observed that Achyuta and
&rikrisna implicitely include in the term stridhana property which
(2)is not saudayika. Moreover it will be shown later on that a dis­
tinction has been made throughout between the alienability of the
(3)two kinds of stridhana, namely, saudayika and non-saudayika. It 
must also be remembered that although JTmuta says that the property
(4)
coming under the categories of stridhana belongs to the woman only,
her interest therein is not absolute in the fullest sense of the
term; for in case of calamity etc. the husband can take and utilise
(5)his wife*s stridhana and put an end to her ownership in it. As
he admits that a woman has ownership in property acquired by a
woman by her own skill and gifts from strangers it appears that,
notwithstanding the fact that such property is not stridhana, if the
woman alienates such property the alienation will be valid according
(6)to the doctrine of factum valet. If this is so it must foe said
that according to the Bengal school the line which divides a woman*s 
stridhana from the rest of her property is a very thin one•
Another patent defect in the provisions of the Bayafohaga
(1) Banerjee pp. 339-40.
(2) Supra p. lit.
(3) Infra next chapter.
(4) Supra p. | a$ .
(5) Infra next chapter.
(6 ) Infra p .||7 .
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is the interpretation put upon the definition of sulka as given by 
Katyayana. The explanation conveys an idea that the bribe etc. as 
stated therein proceeds from the strangers. But in that case it 
ceases to be stridhana according to the verse of Katyayana which 
Jimuta accepts and relies upon. Thus Jimuta is self-contradictory 
as he accepts sulka as one of the categories of stridhana but exp­
lains it in a way by which it falls outside of the scope of strid- 
hana. It has been shown that his commentators have made an unsucc­
essful attempt to wriggle out of this dilemma.
The Bayatattva of Raghunandana is considered to be the 
next most important authority in the Bengal school. The provisions 
in the Bayatattva are similar to those in the Dayabhaga. However, 
the comment on the verse of Katyayana about property acquired by 
labour etc. is slightly different. Raghunandana says : ,!0n account
of the right to give away etc. the woman alone has ownership in the
(1)property besides the property of these two kinds.” Thus whereas 
JTmutavahana divides woman's property into 'property which belongs 
to a xvoman' (striya dhanam) and 'property which belongs to a woman , 
alone' (striya eva dhanam) i.e. stridhana, Raghunandana sets out tjie 
distinction between the two categories as 'property which belongs to 
a woman* (striya dhanam) and 'that in which woman alone has property* 
(striya eva svatvam)• The only difference between Jimuta and Rag­
hunandana is that the former uses the i*/ord property in its concrete
(1) Da.Ta.24. It is notable that Raghunandana begins his discuss­
ion about stridhana with the verse of Katyayana about property 
acquired by labour etc. which shows the growing importance of 
this text in the Bengal school.
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sense whereas the latter uses the word in its abstract sense* In 
technical terms it may be said^the two divisions represent property 
in which a woman has merely svatva and property in which a woman has 
both svatva and svatantrya or svamya.
The only other indepdndant contribution of Raghunandana is 
that he quotes the opinion of Medhatithi about ornaments given by 
the husband and accepts it.(1) The provision is the same as has been
r ( 2 )cited by Vaehaspati Misra.
The Dayakramasangraha of $rlkrisna is also not very diff­
erent from the Dayabhaga. On Katyayana1s verse Srlkrisna comments : 
"Thus although both these kinds of property are those in which a 
woman has ownership, they do not form an object of her independant
dealing. Similarly, the woman requires the consent of the husband
(3 )in disposing of such property...” He, therefore, confirms the
definition of stridhana as given in the Dayabhaga.
As regards the term 'inheritance from the husband'
(bhartridaya) occurring in the enumeration given by Narada he says
that it does not denote property acquired by inheritance, as the
term has been used in the chapter dealing with stridhana and as the
root *da* in the word 'daya* would, in that case, acquire only a
(4)secondary meaning.
(1) Da.Ta. 24.
(2) Supra p-0 . |o3 .
(3) Da.Kra.Sam. 18.
(4) Da.Kra.Sam. 15-18. This explanation widens the scope of limited 
estate to cover even stridhana of a female which has been in­
herited by another female. For an application of the general 
principle, namely, inherited property is not stridhana see 
15a.Kra.Sam. pp. 4 and 18.
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Specific reference must be made to two authors of the 
Bengal school who diverge from the general line adopted by the 
authors of the same school. Raghurama &iromani, the author of the 
metrical treatise called the Dayabhagarthadxpika is one of them. 
According to him the two categories mentioned by liatyayana, namely, 
property acquired by labour and gifts from strangers together with
the third category, namely, immoveable property given by the husband,
—  —  —  (1) constitute the non-technical (aparibhasika) strxdhana of a woman.
But he says that the husband being the owner (prabliu lit. the master)
(2)of such property it devolves like male’s property upon the heirs
(3 )of the husband. In the same breath he also says that excluding
these three categories the other property of a woman is her strxd-
(4)hana. From this remark, coupled with the line of succession whxch
he j>rescribes lor such property, there can be no doubt that according
to Raghurama the so-called ’aparibhasika strxdhana* is not strxdhana
at all. It may be remembered that Srxkri^na calls such property 
(5)*strxsvamika* and Nxlakantha describes the so-called *aparibha­
sika strxdhana* as being simply ’matridhana* or *matrisvamikadhana-
(6)matra*. On the whole it seems that the stand adopted by
(1) Bhartridattasthavare tu na danadyain striya matam / Bhartridatta- 
sthavaram na strxdhanam paribhasikam // Ulctanyadatte silpapte 
sthavare bhartridattake/ Patyuh prabhutvam vijneyam sesam tu 
strxdhanam smritam// Aparibhasikesvesu cha strXdhanesu trisu 
cha/ Pumsam dhanoktarTtya tu pare jneyo*dhifcarabhak // - Verses 
52-54 in Ba.Bha.Di- (’jheya* ought to be substituted for ’jneyo* 
in the last line.)
(2) Ba.Bha.Di. verse 53 supra and verse 55 infra.
(3) "Prityub prabhutaya patyurdayada adhikarinah / •• .Ba.Bha.Di. 55.
(4) Ibid verse 53 supra.
(5) Supra p. no.
(6 ) Supra p. 3 ^
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Raghurama is very similar to the one taken by Nxlakantha, namely, 
woman's property consists of two kinds : her technical property i.e. 
strxdhana, and her other property in which she has ownership only. 
However, there is one subtle difference between Nxlakantha and 
Raghurama as regards the categories which constitute a woman's non­
technical property. According to Nxlakantha the two terms, namely, 
technical property and non-technical property denote strxdhana which 
has been spoken of in the smritis and property which is acquired by 
inheritance, purchase, partition etc. i.e. property which has been 
included by Vxjnanesvara in the word 'adya'. Nxlakantha considers 
that property mentioned in Katyayana* s text, namely, property ac­
quired by labour and gifts from strangers is not woman's property 
at all. According to Raghurama non-technical strxdhana means only 
property which comes under these last two categories; for according 
to him property acquired by inheritance etc. does not appear in the 
picture at all when strxdhana is being discussed. So when the authors 
of the Bengal school comfortably divide woman's property into pro­
perty whieh comes under the above-mentioned verse of Katyayana and 
woman's 'other' property, they mean to include only strxdhana in 
this latter category and not also property which a woman gets by 
inheritance, partition etc. which might otherwise be included in 
'woman's other property*.
As according to the authors of the Bengal school a woman 
has some kind of ownership in property which she acquires by her own
(1)skill or labour and property gifted to her by strangers the
(1) Supra pp. I 03-1 o ^ 111-Iif .
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question arises as to whether a woman is capable of making a valid 
disposition of such property notwithstanding the fact that such pro­
perty is not strxdhana. The earlier authors of the school are not of 
any help on this point. But Vachaspati Misra, the author of the 
Smritisarasangraha throws some light on this point. He divides strxd­
hana, quite sensibly, into two categories, namely, saudayika, and
strxdhana which is etymological (yaugika) and which merely forms the
(1)object of the woman's ownership (strxsvatvaspadamatram). The
phraseology is very similar to that used by Nxlakantha. He further 
says that the husband has no dominion (prabhuta) over the former which 
is at the free disposal of the woman owner whereas the husband has 
dominion over the latter and that the husband's disagreement creates 
a bar for the woman in dealing with such property. However, he furthei 
adds that if a woman in fact enters into any transaction concerning
such property the transaction in fact remains valid for the woman
(2) . 
alone has ownership in such property. Thus it appears that thxs
author is in favour of applying the doctrine of factum valet to such ! 
cases. He is by no means alone in adopting this stand and is support­
ed by the author of the Dayasarvasva who expresses his opinion in
(3 )almost identical terms. It seems, therefore, that the intention
of the later authors of the Bengal school was to bring the two cat­
egories mentioned in Katyayana's verse closer to strxdhana itself.
(1) Smr.Sa.Sam. ms.f.44(a).
(2) Smr.Sa.Sam. 44(a) : " ... Dvitxye cha bhartuh prabhutvam tad- 
vimatau striya vyavahare pratyavayah vyavaharastu siddhatyeva 
svamatrasvatvat tadubhaye adhikarah kalpyate.11
(3) The Dayasarvasva I.O.L. microfilm no.363 f.8 : " ...Etattu 
bharturanumat im vina vyavahare striya pratyavayarthameva na 
tu tasyah svatvanirasaya ato vyavaharah siddhatyeva.1'
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In the light of these texts we may proceed to see how far
the opinions of the leaders of the different schools have been accepted
by the courts. Amongst the most important topics to be taken up in
this connexion conies the controvertial question of inherited property.
Before we can review the history of the case-law on this point we
should digress momentarily to inspect the texts which are at the root
of the doctrine of widow's estate or women's limited estate according
to which a woman can own certain kinds of property only subject to
v certain restrictions on alienation and does not become a fresh stock
of descent in respect of such property.
Vriddha Manu says : "The childness widow keeping unsullied
the bed of her lord and preserving the vow (of chastity) shall alone
(1 ) ^offer him oblations and shall obtain his entire property." In two '
verses Katyayana says : "The woman may spend the inheritance from her ;y-
husband according to her pleasure after death; but if he is living ,4
(2)she should preserve it or spend it for the sake of his family."
"l;j
"The childless widow, preserving unsullied the bed of her lord and I
•:i
. . . j
abiding with her venerable preceptor shall enjoy with moderation the j
(3) ^property until death. After her let the heirs take it.11 In a j
-i
third text Katyayana says : "A chaste widow shall, after the death .:j
i]
•I
of her husband, obtain her husband's share; but throughout her life
(1) The verse is not found in the extant Mamismriti but it has been i
unanimously ascribed to Manu - cited in Mit, on Yaj.2.135 etc. |
(2) Cited in Vi.Ta. 433 etc. See the appendix text No. 73. x*
(3) Ibd at 389, 443 etc. See the appendix text No. 7^.
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/hall not have freedom (svamya lit. dominion) to alienate such
/erty by gift, mortgage or sale."(i) The doctrine derives its
/or support from the second and third verses of Katyayana since
they contain provisions concerning succession to and disposition of
such property respectively. It may be stated at the outset that the
second text of Katyayana has not been referred to by any of the
commentators of the Yajnavalkyasmriti, namely, by Visvarupa,
Vijhanesvara or Apararka. The only reputed authors who refer to the
third text of Katyayana are Devanna, Madanasimha, Fratapa Hudra,
WTlakantha, Mitra Misra, Kamalakara and Balambhatta; but Kamalakara # * ' » » '
declares this text to be unauthoritative on the basis that it has not
(2)been referred to by Apararka, Madanasimha (?), or Madhava.
It need not foe repeated here that the Bengal school clearly
repudiates the idea of inherited property becoming stridhana of the
woman who inherits it and all the authors of that school appear to
be unanimous on that point.
Coining to the Mitaksara school Vijhanesvara refers to the
text of Manu conferring entire estate on a widow but does not refer
(3)to any of the texts of Katyayana. Moreover at one place he gives
a practical illustration of his stand that a share obtained in par-
(4 )tition by a woman is her stridhana. Therefore by parity of
(1) Xbd at 389 etc. See the appendix text No-7A, *
(2 ) Vi.fa.SBQ.^U^bfo-itt* *Ucl Jecw*vd[ Uni' be Uhcikhiart hbt'e-Bj.oH Vv
(3) Mit. on Yaj.2.135 (Nir.Edi.p.217.|
(4 ) Se e »*'»[•«'•« j» p . | C o - Q | .
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reasoning it may be concluded that he intends strictly to adhere
to his definition of the word strxdhana which includes inherited
property into the import of the term.
Mitra Misra who refers to all the texts cited above
enters into a long discussion in which he refutes all the points
(1)of the Bengal school and on the basis of the principle that
property of a person must devolve on the heirs of that person and
not of any other person© he clearly repudiates the idea that on the
death of a widow her husband's heirs and not her own heirs would
(2)
take the property in which she had acquired ownership. In the
end he suddenly changes his position and comes to the conclusion
that only on account of the texual provision to that effect the
husband's heirs and not widow's heirs should take the residue of
the property inherited by her from her husband.^^ But even then
he rejects the stand taken by the Bengal school that the widow has
only right of enjoyment in the property. Referring to the third
text of Katyayana he says that the restriction mentioned in that
verse operates only against gifts to actors, dancers etc. and that
the widow has full freedom to dispose of such property for spirit-
(4)ual purposes. It may be mentioned that almost all the authors
who refer to this third text of Katyayana put the same interpreta­
tion on the verse and stress the point that the restriction






mentioned is of no avail against alienation for spiritual purposes.
However, the abrupt conclusion at which Mitra Misra 
arrives is utterly incongruous with the preceding prolonged dis­
cussion and with his definition of the word stridhana. Moreover 
in his commentary on the Ya j ha va llty asmr i t i he specifically includes
into stridhana the property which a woman inherits from her
(2)husband. As he is not unequivocal on this point the opinion
of Vijnane; svara must be followed in ascertaining the law of the
(3 )Benares school.
Nilakantha does not refer to the second text of Katyayana
but refers to his third text which, according to Nilakantha, puts
(4)restrictions only on gifts to actors, dancers etc. But even
here he does not specifically say that inherited property is
stridhana and therefore, in conformity with the other passages in
the Mayukha, it may be confirmed that according to this commentator
(S)
inherited property is not stx-idhana.
Coming to" the authorities of the Southern school we find
that the second verse of Katyayana is applied to joint family
. . -(£)property in the Smritichandrika and, at one place, in the 
— (*9) «.Sarasvativilasa. Madhava utilises this verse to prohibit
(1) Smr.Cha.677 » Ma.Ra.3Ql, Vya.Ma.138 etc.
(2) Su pVA 'p , /(j t
(3) For this principle see Jagannath v. Ranjit (1897) 25 Cal.354.
(4 )
(5) jpp. $ S’- 6 *
(6) Smr.Cha.677.
(7) Sa.Yi.410. But at p.412 the author repudiates the possibility
of the inherited property of a widow being succeeded to by her 
father etc. in the absence of her daughter, or daughter1s son.
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(1)niyoga. Moreover inherited property has expressly been included
(2)in stridhana by Madhava and Pratapa Rudra. “*
According to Chandes vara and Vachaspati Misra the first
two texts of Katyayana confer upon a woman absolute right in
movables and restricted right in immovables which she acquires from
(3)her husband by way of gift or inheritance. Although the question 
whether particular property is stridhana or not is not based upon 
the question of whether a woman can freely dispose of such property 
or not it ought to be submitted that property which a woman freely 
dispose of can hardly be treated as anything else than her 
stridhana* On this basis it may be suggested that movable property 
which a woman inherits from her husband should be considered as 
stridhana according to the law of the Mithila school.
As the reports of the cases decided in the Calcutta Courts
were the first to be published the earliest cases on stridhana also 
come from Bengal. Before examining the case-law in detail, it may 
be noted that some of the earlier decisions of the Courts were based 
upon the opinion of the pandits who were specially appointed by the 
courts in those days for advice on matters concerning Hindu law. 
Therefore an incorrect opinion of a pandit in a single earlier case
could set the whole subsequent law on a wrong footing as regards
the point decided in that particular case.
(1) Pa.Ma.358. This is an appropriate interpretation. For
niyoga see ^ 3-q/f .
(2) See SMpv* p. %\ .
(3) Vi.Ha.511-12; Vi.Chi.140-41.
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Before turning to the case-law on this point it is 
necessary to note the opinions of Sir William Macna ghten and Sir 
Thomas Strange who have frequently been referred to as authorities 
in the earlier decisions* Macnav ^hten says : MIn the Mitacshara, 
whatever a woman may have acquired, whether by inheritance, purchase, 
partition, seiaure, or finding, is denominated woman1s property, but
it does not constitute hex” peculium.  ....... And it may be here
observed, that stridhun which has once devolved according to the 
law of succession which governs the descent of this peculiar 
species of property, ceases to be ranked as such, and is ever after­
wards governed by the ordinary rules of inheritance . From
I""*N
the further discussion it seems that Macna jhten uses the words
strxdhana and peculium as synonyms. It is not easy to guess what
he means by the words 'woman's property' but the distinction which
he makes between 'woman's property' and peculium is obviously
without any authority* However, this baseless statement of
Macna. ghten has served as a foundation for the development of the
doctrine that even according to the Mitaksara school inherited
(2)
property is not stridhana*
(1) vMacna' gbten's Hindu law (1829) Vol*I*38.
($) Goburdhan v. Onoop (1865) 3 W.R.10S; Sengamalafhammal v.
Yelayanda (1867) 3 M.H.C.R.312; Thakore Beyhee v. Rai Baluk 
Ram (1866) 11 M.I.A*139; Bhaugwandeen v. Myna Baee (1868)
12 M*I*A*397; Dowlut Kunear v. Burma Deo (1874) 14 B.L.R.246; 
Chotay La11 v. Chunnoo LI11 (1878) 6 I.A.15; Phukar Singh v. 
Ranjit Singh (1878) 1 All*661; Huridayal v. Grish Chunder 
(1890) 17 Cal.901; Sheo Shankar v* Debi Sahai (1903) 30 I.A. 
202 infra.
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On the other hand, Strange states : "But according to
the Mitacshara, and its followers, property which the widow may
have acquired by inheritance, is transmissible to her own heirs,
(1)classing with this school as part of her stridhana;  n. His
(2)son also supports him on this point. It will be seen, however,
that throughout the development of the case-law the opinion of
Strange has never been relied upon by the Courts although it is
supported by the textual authorities of the Mitaksara school.
The earliest case on the question whether inherited property
is stridhana, is Prankishen v. Mt. Bhagwutee.^  ^ Although the point
was not under direct consideration of the Court the opinion of the
Pandit as well as the obiter dictum of the Court suggested that
stridhana of a mother which has been inherited by her daughter does
not become stridhana of the latter and does not devolve upon her
heirs. No reason is given in the text of the report but it may foe
inferred that the pandit of the court depended, in all probability,
upon the authorities of the Bengal school.
(4)In Mt. Runnoo v. Jeo Ranee the property which a
daughter inherited, together with her sister, from her mother was 
held to have been inherited, on the demise of such daughter, by her 
sister 'as the heir at law' in preference to the widow of the 
paramour of the mother. It is not possible to guess the nature of 
the claim the latter could make on the suit-property and it is
(1) Strange (1830 edi.) vol.X.248. See also Vol.I.31.
(2) Thomas Lumisden Strange ; A Manual of Hindu Law (1863 2nd edi.) 
pp.34-35.
(3) (1793) Mac.Rep. Vol.I.3.
(4) (1795) Mac.Rep. Vol.1.8.
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also not clear whether the sister was declared to be entitled to
such property as a sister or as daughter to her mother. The case
is thus of little direct authority.
(1)In Mahoda v. Kuleani, wherein Colebrooke presided
over the Court, it was held that a gift of the whole of the 
property inherited from the husband is invalid even if the widow 
executes it in favour of the nearest reversioner. The case, how­
ever, did not decide as to what is the limit upta which a widow
can dispose of property inherited from the husband. In Bijya v .
(2)
Unpoorna the same conclusion as regards the limited estate of
a woman in inherited property was confirmed and extended to the
iKc
inheritance taken by $ mother from her son. It is to be noted 
that according to the pandits in the three courts in the adjacent 
districts and the decisions of the District Court and the 
Provincial Court in this case the gift, being given for charitable 
purpose, was valid.
However, in accordance with the vyavastha of the pandits 
who cited the authority of the Dayabhaga, the Dayatatva, the j
VivadabhangarwAvcp. and the Dayarahasya it was decided in Ramchander j
(3)  '?
v. Gangagovind that a widow can make a gift over of only three- i
sixteenths of her husband’s property for the benefit of his soul. j
(4) >In Cossmaut v. Hurrosoondry it was decided that under
(1) (1803) tec.Rep.Vol.I.62.
(2) (1806) Mac.Rep.Vol.1.162. Colebrooke presided in this case also*!
(3) (1826) Mac.Rep.Vol.IV.117.
(4) (1819) 2 Mor.Dig.198 reprinted in 1.D.IIX.907. 1
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the Dayabhaga law f,no distinction is taken between the realty and
the personalty as to the quantum of the widow’s estate, but the
whole appears to be given to her absolutely for some purposes,
though restricted in her disposition as to others; and therefore
she takes more than a life“estate in the realty for those allowed
purposes, and less than an absolute estate in the personalty for
other and different purposes; ..... .M The Court distinguished as
(1)arising from the Mithxla the 'Corformaha1s case' decided by that
Court in November 1.9T2 and followed in Juggomohunmey v. Eamhun
(decided on 23-6-1814) and Jupada v. Juggernaut (decided on
7-2-1816), and held that the doctrine followed therein was not
(2)applicable to Bengal. The case seems to have undergone review,
(3)revision and appeals and finally came before their Lordships of
(4)the Prxvy Council as G. Bysack v. Cossinaut and their Lordships
(1) Referred to in 2 Mor.Big.198 at 216
(2) Ibid at p.219. It was held that the authority of the Yivadar-
atnakara and the Vivadachintamani, being in direct conflict 
with the Dayabhaga on this point, ivas not applicable to Bengal. 
According to these Mithila cases it was decided that a widow 
has full right of disposal over moveable property inherited 
from the husband.
(3) See also G.WK. (1794) 2 Mor.Big.234 reprinted in I *D. Vol.Ill. 934. 
which is one of the stages of the same case. j
(4) (1826) Mor. by Montriou p.495 from which it is reprinted in I.D.
Vol.L.303. It is to be noted that the Court pandits, after hav- j
ing referred to the distinction between property obtained in j
partition and by inheritance referred to the difference of ]
opinion amongst the pandits as to whether the former should be 
treated as strxdhana and expressed that the better opinion was 1
to regard the former as strxdhana,as share given in partition
to a woman is rather in the nature of a gift. The decree of j
the Supreme Court against which the appeal was preferred to the ;
P.C. was passed by Sir Francis MacnatTghten. It is also to be I
noted that Raghurama &iromani, the author of the Dayabhagarth- I
adxpika, gave opinion in this case as an outside pandit.
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of the P.C. confirmed the decision of the lower Court.
(1)
In Gyan v. Dookhurn Singh it was declared that accord­
ing to the law "as current both in Maithila and the West11 the 
property which a daughter inherits from her father is not strxdhana 
and that she cannot dispose of such property by way of gift. The 
case was decided in accordance with the opinion of the pandits of 
the Court who seem to have relied upon the argument of Jxmutavahana 
to the effect that when a widow cannot dispose of property which 
she inherits from her husband a fortiori the daughter whose right 
is weaker than that of the widow cannot possess that right at all.
It may merely be stated here that this is the first instance of 
superimposing the theory of the Bengal school upon the Mitaksara 
school.
(2 )
In Goburdhan v. Qnoop it was decided that immoveable
property which a widow inherits from the husband is not her
’peculium1 according to the Mitaksara. Their Lordships of the
Calcutta High Court relied upon the statements of;Macnajlghten and 
(2*)Strange and quoted for support a passage in the Mitaksara which
(1) (1829) Mac .Rep. Vol .4.330. See also She o Sahai v. Mt.Gined
ICunwu r (184-0) Mac .Re p.Vol.6.301. and He e r a La 1 v. Dhu n c o omarry 
3.A.D.R.(1862) p.190.
{?> <i§S*> aJt£-io5.
(3) fMacnaughtejpJVo1.1.3 8, Strange Vol. 1.137, 246 etc. were quoted. 
Their Lordships also cited two passages in the translation of 
the Vivadachintamani by Tagore according to which property which 
a widow from her husband is and is not her strxdhana respect­
ively and made an unsatisfactory attempt to resolve the conflict 
between these passages.
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which really does not exist in the text of the treatise. Their
Lordships farther observed that nthe extended doctrine of the 
Mitakshara which goes so much beyond Manu" had never been acted 
upon in any case and that had the law been otherwise the doctrine, 
namely, inherited property is strxdhana, would not have remained in 
’abeyance' for such a long time. Their Lordships also remarked 
that the doctrine was never followed as law in Madras nor was it 
attempted to be urged before them on any previous occasion. From 
the foregoing discussion it would appear that none of the authorities 
which their Lordships resort to in support of their* decision is 
correct. It is clear that this case is another instance of mis­
leading extension of the law of the Eastern school to the law of
i
the Mitaksara.
' (2)In Funchadand v. Lalshan which appears to foe a Mithila.
case it was decided that both according to the Mitahsara and the
Vivadachintamani immoveable property which a mother inherits from
her son is not her strxdhana. Their Lordships expressed the view that
inherited property is nowhere laid down in the Mitahsara as
(1) 3 W.R.105 at 107. The alleged passage in the Mitahsara has
been quoted from Strange (1830) Vol.II.253. The passage runs 
thus : n0n failure of descendants down to the son's grandson, 
the wife inherits : and she, having received her husband's 
heritage, should take the protection of her husband's family 
or of her father's, and should use her husband's heritage for 
the support of life, and make donations and give alms in a 
moderate degree, for the benefit of her deceased husband; but 
not dispose of it at her pleasure like her own peculiar 
property." In Strange's work the passage has been quoted from 
H.T.Colebrooke : Two Treatises in the Hindu Law of Inheritance 
(1810) p.226 wherein it is quoted as an extract from the 
commentary of &rxkrisna on the Dayabhaga. The extract occurs 
in that portion of the book which ^ contains the translation of 
the Dayabhaga and not of the Mitak ssara.
(£J (1865) 3 W.R.140.
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(1)becoming strxdhana of the woman who inherits it. Though the
decision is correct as regards the law of the Mithila school the 
remark about the law of the Mitaksara is evidently baseless. But 
their Lordships further added : nlf the law of the Mitakshara on 
this point was so different from that prevalent in Bengal, as it
in -   ............ i -i— i i • H    —  - —     T— i— - A t — 1 ~t ............... ....... r ■■+*?-■  -—   
is contended, the commentators would have distinctly laid down the 
discrepancy. As a general rule, the laws may be considered to 
correspond although there are certain special points on which they 
differ. o
In Madras it appears that woman*s limited estate was
recognised by the Supreme Court as early as in 1813. In Ramasamy 
(3 )v. Vallatah the obiter dictum of the Court was that property
which a mother inherits from her son devolves, her s(eath, not
upon her own heirs but upon the heirs of her son. It is surprising,
however, that only Colebrooke*s Digest has been cited as an author-
(4)ity for thxs dictum.
(5)In Bachiraju v. Venkatappadu their Lordships of the 
Madras High Court followed the dictum. They further observed that 
the. Mitaksara doctrine was not followed in any of the cases reported
(1) Tagor* s translation of the Vivadachintamani, which was cited
in Goburdhan*s case was also cited in this case.
(2) (1865) 3 W.R.140 at 141. For a contrary remark of their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council see Giridharilal*s case p. fygg.
(3) Strange * s Notes of Cases Vol.II.211.
(4) Col.Dig.8 vo.edi.VolIIII p.505 was cited. It appears that Sir 
Thomas Strange himself gave this decision-#See the reference to 
his name in Bachiraju v. Venkatappadu (1865) 2 M.H.C.R.402 at 
406.
(5) (1865) 2 M.H.C.R.402.
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in Morley' s Digest and that in the Mitaksara itself "no illustra­
tion is given of the bare declaration that property acquired by
(1)inheritance also comes under the head of stridhanam." It was
also observed that Jagannatha in his chapter on woman's property
(2)
makes 'no allusion whatever' to the doctrine. It must be stated
that the cases reported in Morley's Digest come only from Bengal
and that it is unlikely that the digest should contain any case in
which the Mitaksara doctrine is expounded. It must also be noted
that Vijhanesvara does give a practical illustration of his broad
(3)definition which will be noted below. However, the whole trend
the
of the reasoning of their Lordships is leaning heavily towards^1aw
(4 )
of the Bengal school. The decision cannot claim to derive any
support from the Mitaksara itself or from any of the treatises of 
the Southern school.
(5)In Sengamalathammal v. Valaynda the above case was 
followed and a broader proposition was established, namely, property
(1) Ibid at p.405.
(2) Ibid. Their Lordships, however, noted that Sir Thomas Strange 
in the first edition (1825) of his book at pp.165-66 mentions 
that property inherited by a mother from her son is her 
stridhana according to the Southern school but further added 
that his particular passage has been 'accidentally* omitted ih 
the edition of that work edited by Mayne in 1859 p.144. Their 
Lordships did not refer to the other passage in Strange's work
which clearly states that property inherited by a widow etc. is
her stridhana according to the Mitaksara and its followers -
p .  ,
(3) pp. l£o-6 I.
(4) Da.Bha.11.1.30,31,56,65 were referred to for limited estate.
(5) (1867) 3 M.H.C.R.312.
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acquired by inheritance is not stridhana. This was a case of a
daughter succeeding to the stridhana of her mother and, following
the authority of the .Dayabhaga, the Dayakramasangraha and Sir
(1)William Macnaughten, it was held that such property was not
stridhana in the hands of the daughter.
Their Lordships, however, referred to the passage in the
Sraritichandrilea where its author states that when a mother inherits *
property from her son she takes it for herself alone like her 
(2)
adhyagni etc. and merely observed that by this passage "no more
is meant than that some property acquired by women by inheritance
will follow the rule applicable to the descent of stridhanam
(3though not falling under any of the descriptions of such property." 
Their Lordships did not elucidate their remark further and it seems 
that the passage did not affect their decision in any way.
The decisions of the Bombay Courts which are quite 
contrary to the above decisions will be noted below. In the mean™ 
time we shall consider the two important decisions of their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council which have for their background the 
above-mentioned decisions and which form as it were the corner­
stones of the distinction between widow's estate and stridhana
as known to modern Hindu law.
 ~        "..  — ...
(1) Ibid. at 315.
(2)’ fJP-°j7"9*8 *
(3) 3 M.H.C.R.312 at 314.
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The first case was Mt. Thakore Beyhee v. Rai Balulc Ram
wherein their Lordships of the Privy Council decided that according'
to the Mitaksara or the law op the Benares school the widow has no
power to dispose of the immoveable property inherited from the
husband and that such property does not constitute her peculium.
Their Lordships appear to have rejected the opinion of Sir Thomas
(2)Strange that such property is stridhana and to have approved
(3)the famous passage in Macnaytghten1s book. As regards the
Mitaksara passage declaring widow1s right to inherit her husband's
(4)property their Lordships remarked : "The text is wholly silent
1 as to the disabilities of the woman, or the nature of the interest
(5)which she takes in her husband's estate." "It is certain that
upon other subjects the Mitacshara cites with approbation Menu,
Catyayana, Nareda, and others, upon whose dicta the limitation of
the widow's enjoyment of her husband's estate, and of her power
over it, chiefly depends; and that these authorities are received
(6)by the Western schools as well as by that of Bengal."
It is obvious that their Lordships had no apportunity 
to consider the texts of the Benares school which expressly include 
in stridhana property inherited by a woman. It appears from their 
Lordships' remark that in those days even the translation of the
(1) (1866) 11 U . I.A.139.
(2) Ibid at pp.173-74. For the opinion of Strange see p. \Xh .
(3) For this see
(4) Mit. on Yaj.2.135™3Q Nir.Edi.p. 21311 .
(5) 11 M.I.A.139 at 172.
(6) Ibid at 173.
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(l)whole of the Mitaksara was not available to them. Under such
circumstances it is not surprising that their Lordships gave a 
decision which, it must be stated, does not appear to be in 
consonance with the law laid down by the texts of the Benares 
school. It must also he remembered that the two texts of
(2)Katyayana which are the mainstay of the doctrine of limited estate
have not been even referred to by many authors of the Mitaksara
school and that Kamalakara and Balambhatta declare these texts to
* •
be spurious (lit. unauthotitative).^^ Moreover the method of
depending upon the verses of the ancient sages as against the
express opinion of the commentators appears to be directly contrary
to the principle which was so emphatically laid down afterwards by
their Lordships themselves in Collector of Madura v. Mottoo
(4)Ranialmga, namely, the interpretation which a commentator puts 
upon an ancient text is more important than the text itself.
(5)
The next important case is Bhugwandeen v. Myna Baee
wherein the principal question to be decided was whether according
to the law of the Benares school a Hindu widow is competent to
dispose by will or by deed of gift of either moveable or immoveable
property inherited from her husband, to the prejudice of his next
(6)
heirs. Their Lordships after considering all the facts and so
(1) Ibid. at 173.
(2) Smj>v. p p. 118-19 .
( 3 )  p. i ig ,
(4) (1868) 12 M.I.A.397 at 436. See supra p.^|.
(5) (1867) 11 M.I.A.487.
(6) Ibid at 495.
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much of the law as was placed before them decided that "according 
to the lav/ of the Benares school, notwithstanding the ambiguous 
passage in the Mitacshara, no part of her husband1s estate, whether
\ moveable or immoveable, to which a Hindu widow succeeds by inheri-
\ (1) v tance, forms part of her stridhun, or peculiar property." The
appellant had produced 21 Benares pandits before the Court all of
whom had opined that the widow gained an absolute interest in her
property whereas the respondent had produced 37 Benares pandits
who claimed that the widow secured a limited interest only. From
amongst the Court pandits all the Benares pandits were in favour of
absolute estate whereas the Calcutta pandit and two other pandits
(2)declared their opinion in favour of limited estate only. The
case being the most important one in the sphere of stridhana the
reasoning and the grounds of the decision of their Lordships must
be examined in detail.
Their Lordships first abstracted immoveable property 
(3 )from the question by wholeheartedly following their decision in
(4)Thakore Deyhee*s case. Then their Lordships proceeded to the
question of moveable property and referred to a case under the
Mithila school cited at the Bar from Indian Jurist of the 31st
(5)March of 1866 in which it was laid down that as regards the
(1) Ibid at pp.513-14.
(2) Ibid at pp.501-3 * The property was inherited by two co- 
w i d o w s and one of them had disposed of her own share which 
she was holding as a result of the partition between the two.
(3) 11 M . I . A . 487 at 505.
(4 ) ostfon M  it'B}.
(5) 11 M.I.A.487 at 507. From the remark it appears that the 
case is the same which is reported in Criminal and Civil 
Reporter Vol.II.190 as Brojorutton v. Poorandi.
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absolute right of the widow over the inherited moveable property
the law of the Mithila school ivas on all fours with the law of
the provinces governed by the Mitaksara. The case had also
(1)referred to the two decisions of the Madras Suudder Court and
( 2)
two decisions of the Bombay High Court giving absolute right
of disposal over moveables. Their Lordships of the Privy Council
were not satisfied that the statement in the decision of the above-
mentioned case was correct. They further observed that all these
hUe
cases were respectively decided according to the law of Mithila
A
school or according to the law peculiar to the Bombay and Madras
Presidencies and that it could not be applied to a case of the
Benares school.
Observing that Vijnanesvara has not distinguished between
inherited moveables and immoveables their Lordships further reasoned
that as immoveable property has already been declared in Thakore
Deyhee*s case to be not strXdhana ,!The legitimate inference from
this seems to be, that neither moveable nor immoveable property
inherited from her husband forms part of a woman*s peculium or
(4)stridhun." Their Lordships relied on Macnaughten*s statement 
to this effect.^  ^
(1) 11 M.I.A.487 at 508. The decisions are S.D.A.(1845) p.117
and S.I).A. (1850) p.77.
(2) For these see inpnr** • Their Lordships also referred to case
Mo.VII in Macnaughten Vol.XI.46.
(3) 11 M.I.A.487 at 509.
(4) 11 M.1.A.487 at 510.
(5) Ibid at 511.
136
Remarking that Katyayana1s text about limited estate
applies to both moveables and immoveables inherited from the
(1) . husband their Lordships observed that ' treatises current in
other schools1 do not support the extension of strXdhana as intro­
duced by the Mitaksara. They further added !,Both the Vivada- 
Chintamani and the Mayukha confine stridhun within the defini­
tions of Manu and Katyayana. They exclude property inherited, and 
the other acquisitions which are comprehended in the last clause of
the paragraph in the Mitacshara, but are excluded by Sir W .
(2)Macnaughten.•' Referring to the fact that the husband has been
mentioned as an heir to the strXdhana of a woman in default of her 
issue their Lordships said HThis is intelligible, if the words 
•property which she may have acquired by inheritance* in the
second clause, are considered to be property inherited in her
(3 )husband*s life-time, or from some persons other than him.**
With respect for their Lordships it must be submitted that the 
grounds on which their Lordships relied i^ pon for their decision 
and the process of reasoning which they adopted is far from 
convincing and that they have given in this case a decision which 
merely enlarges the scope of the mistake they committed by giving 
an incorrect decision in Thakore Deyhee's case.
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid at 512.
(3) Ibid at 513.
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Firstly, the decision in Thakore Deyhee!s case has been 
enlarged into a broader proposition only on the authority of 
Macnaughten and without citing a text or a case of the Benares 
school in its favour. Secondly, the process whereby the judicial 
precedents of the Mitaksara school have been distinguished as per­
taining only to the law of a particular sub-school and whereby 
reliance has been placed on the text of Katyayana which has not 
been referred in the Mitaksara and has been differently inter­
preted in the commentaries that follow the Mitaksara, is highly 
objectionable. In ascertaining the law of the Benares school the 
decisions pertaining to the law of the other Mitaksara sub-schools 
should have carried more weight than the misleading statement of a 
text-book writer. Thirdly, instead of referring to the Vivadach- 
intarnani and the Mayukha their Lordships could have more profitably 
referred to the authorities of the Benares school, viz. the 
VTramitrodaya or the Vivadatandava which wholeheartedly support 
the doctrine enunciated in the Mitak sara. Fourthly, the logic 
whereby their Lordships observe that the wife camiottake property 
inherited from her husband as her strxdhana as the husband himself 
has been mentioned as an heir to her strxdhana in default of her 
issue, appears to be strange.^ For, more often than not, heir­
ship has been mutual in Hindu law. If a person is held not to gain
(1) See the comments of West J. on this reasoning in Fijiarangam 
v. Lakshuman (1871) 8 Bom.H.C.R. 244 at 272-73. It is sur­
prising to find that the same logic has been adopted in Mayne 
11th edition pp.728-29.
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absolute interest in the property of another person simply on the 
ground of the other person being mentioned in the law as a 
possible heir to the former, it must be submitted that almost no 
heir under Hindu law would gain an absolute estate in inherited 
property. Thus a husband would not gain absolute estate in the 
property which he inherits from his wife because also the wife has 
been mentioned a© an heir to the husband's property in the absence 
of his son, son's son, or son's son's son# Similarly even a son 
would not inherit his father's property with an absolute interest 
therein for even the father is one of the possible heirs to the 
son's property. However, it must be specially noted that their 
Lordships admitted at least that the Mitaksara explanation of the 
word 'adya* might include property inherited by a woman from some 
persons other than her husband - a suggestion which was flatly 
denied by their Lordships in their subsequent decisions.
It is not necessary to discuss any further the reasoning 
of their Lordships in this case# These two decisions of their 
Lordships of the Privy Council, however, gave a lamentable turn 
to the flow of Hindu law; for in the later cases in which these 
decisions were followed with all sox'ts of far-fetched and unreliable 
analogies the original mistake went on assuming wider and wider 
proportions•
After these two decisions all the High Courts in India 
except the Bombay High Court started on their way to accept a
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broader proposition, namely, inherited property is not strxdhana
according to the law of the Mitaksara school. In Deo Persad v.
(1) (2)Lajoo Roy and Dowlut Kooer v. Burma Deo their Lordships of
the Calcutta High Court decided that a daughter succeeding to the
estate of her father takes only a limited estate in the same and
that it does not become her strxdhana. In the second case it was
stated that the law was applicable to cases both under the
Mitaksara and the Dayabhaga schools. In Phukar Singh v. Ranjit 
( 3)Singh their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court held that 
property inherited by a grandmother from her grandson is not
strxdhana. Their Lordships extended the ratio of Bhagwandeen*s
(4) (5)case to the case before them. In Kutti Animal v. Radakrxstna
their Lordships of Madras High Court held that the property which 
a mother inherits from her son is not strxdhana. The Bombay 
decisions which, as far as possible, accepted the liberal inter­
pretation of the word strxdhana as given in the Mitaksara will be 
set out below.
(1) (1873) 14 B.L.R.245.
(2) (1874) 14 B.L.R.246. As was common in those days the authority f
of Macnaughten was relied upon in this case. In this and in '{
Deo Persad* s case the Bombay decisions were distinguished as ;! 
being not applicable to the Bengal province.
(3) (1878) 1 All.661. Macnaughten 3rd edi.p.38 and Strange 4th edi.J
Vol.I.144 were relied upon and the decision in Bijya v.
Unpoorna (supra) and the two P.C. cases were followed. f
(4) 1 All. 661 at 663.
(5) (1873) 8 M.H.C.R.88. In Madras the law on this point has long 
been settled and was confirmed in Collector of Masulipatam v. 
Cavaly ( 1% 60 ) 8 M. I. A. 500.
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The question about the nature of the interest of a 
H e
daughter in property inherited from the father came before their
Lordships of the Privy Council through a Mitaksara case from
Calcutta: i.e. Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lalh1* in which their Lord-
ships of the Calcutta High Court reviewed almost all the decisions
of the different High Courts and preferred to confirm the precedents
of their own High Court. The grounds on which their Lordships of
the Calcutta High Court appear to have brushed aside the decisions
of the Bombay High Court do not appear to be convincing. As regards
(2)one Bombay case ' they say : tflt is to be remarked upon this
decision, that the learned judges considered the text of Manu and
the opinions of the commentators and other authorities on Hindu law,
but they do not appear to have been aware (at least they do not
notice) any of the decisions of the Courts 011 this side of India
on the subject: and in considering whether we should treat this
case as an authority, this is very material. We may fairly say
that a judgement of another High Court in which no notice was taken
of the decisions of this Court upon the point, ought not to receive
the same respect from us as it would receive if the learned judges
(3)had considered the decisions on this side of India.11 Their Lord­
ships passed a similar remark on the judgement of Mr. Justice West
(1) (1878) 6 I.A.15.
(2) Navalram v. Nandikishore (1865) i Bom.H.C.R.209.
(3) 6 I.A.15 at 21.
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(in Vijiarangam v» Lakshuman)^^ who, according to their Lordships,
(2) (3)had argued that Bhugwandeen1s case was not correctly decided.
Admitting that he had discussed the Mitaksara text and other
authorities tfwith much ability** their Lordships, however, added,
“Certainly, when we have the various decisions of the Sudder Court
here upon the law which is applicable in this suit, and the decisions
of the High Court at Madras upon a similar law, in which no sub™
stantial difference can be pointed out with reference to this
question, we ought not to unsettle the law which appears to have
been received on this side of India for the last fifty years on
account of the opinion of a judge of a High Court at Bombay, however
(4)learned he may be.'1
It must be submitted that it would have been better if
their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court had investigated into 
the textual authorities which had been discussed in the Bombay 
decisions. There is not a single 19th century case of the Calcutta 
High Court or even of the Privy Council in which so elaborate and 
learned a discussion of the textual authorities has been made as
(1) (1871) 8 Bom.H.C.R.24-4 see infra.
(2) 11 M. I.A.487 supra.
(3) See the remark in 6 I.A.15 at pp.22-23. It seems that the 
discussion has been treated here with scant respect. But 
West J. in Bh.agirthibai1 s Full Bench case (see infra pp. I S 3>r 
showed how fallacious was the reasoning which formed the 
foundation of the decision of their Lordships of the Calcutta 
High Court in Chotay Lall1s case. It seems, however, that the 
latter soon realised the value of this eminent judge and 
scholar; for in a later Full Bench case they frankly admitted 
that “Great weight is due to any opinion of that learned judge 
oil a question of Hindu law.,f - Sorolah v. Bhoobun 15 Cal.292 
F.B.at 314.
(4) 6 l.A.15 supra at pp.22-23.
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was made by Mr. Justice West in Vi ,j iarangam1 s c as e. The older
decisions of the Bengal Courts were given merely on the question-
(1)able authority of Sir William Macnaughten. It was high time
that the decisions based on incorrect authorities were reversed
even at the cost of endangering existing titles as it would
correctly have regulated at least the future groivth of the law.
When the case came before their Lordships of the Privy
Council the decision was confirmed and their Lordships held their
(2)decisions in Thakore Deyhee's case and Bhugwandeen1s case as
being applicable to the case of a daughter succeeding to her
(3)father's property. Instead of going into the respective values
of the decisions of the different Courts in India, their Lordships
simply depended on the opinion of Sir William Macnaughten to the
effect that such property does not have strxdhana succession
according either to the Benares or Bengal school. As regards the
word 'adya1 in Yajnavalkya1s verse their Lordships observed that
the correct translation of the word should be 'or the like1 instead
(4 )of 'as also any other (separate aquisition)'. Scrutinising the
Mitaksara interpretation on this verse of Yajnavalkya their Lord­
ships said, "The original text does not afford any foundation for
(1) They were also based on the Dayabhaga etc. which are of no 
use in ascertaining the law of the Mitaksara school.
(2) Set S upifA >
(3) 6 I.A.15 at 31.
(4) 6 I.A.15 at 31. It need not be repeated here that the trans­
lation 'et cetera* appears to be a better one - see
PP. 6"g - £ <Y".
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the argument in favour of the right of the widow and daughter to
the entire estate in land acquired by inheritance; the interpre-
(1)tation no doubt does." But then their Lordships further observed
that the rule of inheritance as settled by a long course of
decisions in Bengal and Bihar ought not to be unsettled unless it
was 1 opposed to the spirit and principles of the law of the
Mitakshara* which, 'on the contrary1, appeared to their Lordships
(2)'to be in accordance with them*. It is to be noted that the
very passage in the Mitaksara which their Lordships in Bhugwandeen's
( 3)case considered to be ambiguous was accepted by them in this
case to be unequivocal as regards the proposition: inherited
property is strxdhana. It is lamentable that in violation of the
principles of interpretation laid down by themselves in a previous
(4)case, namely, Collector of Ma<jUy»«v. Muttu Ramalinga their Lord­
ships in Chotay Lall's case placed reliance on the text of 
Yajhavalkya as contrasted with that of his commentator.
Following their decision in Chotay Ball's case their 
Lordships of the Privy Council confirmed the decision of the 
Madras High Court on the same point in Muttu Vaduganadah v .
(1) 6 I.A.15 at 31.
(2 ) The decision is obviously opposed to the spirit of the 
Mitaksara. Moreover there is no text of any smriti which 
extends the limited estate of a widow to property inherited 
by a daughter, and none of the authors of the Mitaksara s c ha<»] 
appears to make a provision to that effects
(3) Snp ra )>• I'Jif <
(4) (1868) 12 M.I.A.397 at 436* It is to be noted that the 
decision in Chotay Lall1s case was given after the decision 
in Collector of Madura's case.
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(1)Dorasingha and declared that the law is the same in 'Carnatic1 
where the Smritichandrika and the Madhavxya are of great authority. 
It may only be remarked that the authorities of the Southern school 
ax*e in full support of the doctrine that inherited property is 
strxdhana.
It has already been noticed that the property which a
daughter inherits from the mother and the father respectively had
been held to be not her strxdhana in Madras and in Calcutta
respectively. The ratio of these decisions being a broad one,
namely, inherited property is not strTdhana both the High Courts
applied the same principle to property which a female inherited from
(2)either a male or female including, of course, the property 
which a daughter inherited from her mother according to strxdhana
(1 ) (1 881) 8 I,A.99. Mayne who appeared on behalf of the
appellant referred to the Mitaksara and to Strange (1830 edi.) 
pp.130,137 etc. but failed to convince their Lordships that 
the law in the Madras province was in fact different from the 
one settled in Chotay Lall1s case. It is also to be noted 
that although the opinion of their Lordships was read by Sir j
Arthur Hobhouse it was at the instance of Sir Barnes Peacock, i
a member elevated from the bencb of the Calcutta High Court, !
that the respondent's counsel was not called upon to reply j
to Maynefs argument on the point of strxdhana. Their Lord­
ships were also wrong in holding that the Smritichandrika
and the Madhavxya do not follow the Mitaksara "in assigning
to a woman as her strxdhana property inherited by her." j
(2) Virasangappa v.Rudrappa (1886)19 Mad.110 at 118; Venkayamma v.
Venkataramanayamma (1902)29 I.A.156; Haju v.Ammani (1909)29 Mad. j 
358; Subramania v •Arunacha1am (1905)28 Mad.F.B.l; Janakisetty v. j 
Miriyala (1909)32 Mad.521; Mullangi v.China (unreported case 
approved in Janakisetty's case); Raghavalu v.Kamsalya A.I.R.1937 * 
Mad.607; Venkateswarlu v.China (1955) Andh.W.R.39. For the Cal­
cutta see Jullessur v.Uggar Roy (1883)9 Cal.725; Huri Dayol v. 
Grish Chunder (1890)17 Cal.911; Madhumala v.Lakshan (J913 )20 
C.W.N.627; Jogendra v.Phani Bhushan (1916)43 Cal.64; Mohendra v. 
Dakshina A.I.R.1936 Cal.34; Sisir Kumud v.Jogeneswar (1938) 42 
C.W.N.359. _ _ . _   ^ . 7; p
Gunnam Papamma v. Valluri Kamaraju 1955 And.#. R . 7 ^
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succession.
In other parts of India the Courts were reluctant to
extend the principle laid down in Bhugwandeen1s case to the case
of a daughter succeeding to her mother's strxdhana. In Sheo
(2)Shankar v. Debi Sahai their Lordships of the Privy Council 
reversed the decision of the Allahabad High Court and held that 
a female inheriting even from a female takes only limited estate 
in the property. Referring to the text of the Mitaksara, their 
Lordships said that the property which a woman inherits from a
male has already been declared to be not strxdhana and that there
was a remarkable concurrence of opinion amongst judges, scholars
and text-book writers that no distinction could be made between
property which is inherited by a female from a male and from a 
-p ' i (3)i cmEile *
(1) Janakisetty v.Miriyala (1909) 32 Mad.521; Huridayal v.Grish 
Chunder (1890) 17 Cjal • 911; Madhumala v • Lakshun ( 1913 ) 20 C.W.N. 
627. An obiter dictum of their Lordships of the Madras High Court 
in Venkataramakrishna v.Bhujanga (1896) 19 Mad.107 to the effect 
that property which a daughter inherits might form an exception 
to the general rule that inherited property is not strxdhana, 
was not followed in Janakisetty* s case. In HuridayalIs case, 
which was a Dayahhaga case, the decision was given on the author­
ity of the Dayabhaga and the Bayakramasangraha and the opinion
of ' . JagannathAto the effect that the daughter can alienate
such property at pleasure was disapproved on the basis that 
Jagannatha* s opinion is not in itself a sufficient authority 
f,when he speaks in his name" - especially when his provisions 
are opposed to those of Jxmuta and &rxkrisna. Similarly Mac- 
na.-.$hten * s opinion to the effect that such property is not 
strxdhana or peculium of the daughter is followed but his opinion 
that such property devolves upon the daughter's heirs has been 
disapproved.
(2) (1903) 30 I.A.202.
(3) For this point their Lordships relied upon the authority of 
Banerjee, West & Buhler, Jolly and upon the opinion expressed 
in the judgements of West J. , Telanj) J. , and Best & Ayyar JJ. 
respectively in Vijiarangam v.Lakshman (1871) 8 B.H.C.R.244 at 
272, Manilal v.Bai Rewa (1892) 17 Bom.758 at 761 and Virasang- 
appa v.Rudrappa (1895) 19 Mad.110 at 118. Their Lordships
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The Calcutta and the Madras cases were apparently approved by their
Lordships though there was no Benares precedent on this point. The
Bombay decisions were distinguished as being based on the authority
of the Mayukha. Ultimately their Lordships praised Macnaughten and
(1)approved his authority on this point.
Immediately after this case their Lordships of the Privy
(2)Council reversed an excellent judgement of the Oudh Court in 
which the Judicial Commissioner had very ably discussed the pro™ 
visions of the Mitaksara, the VXramitrodaya and the Vivadatandava 
and had pointed out that the texts of Itatyayana and Narada do not 
touch the daughter's case at all. Wo new arguments could be 
adduaed in favour of the doctrine of the reverter and therefore 
their Lordships of the Privy Council simply followed their previous 
decisions.
simply followed the previous decisions mentioning that in 
those cases they had Mexamined the primitive texts upoh which 
the Mitacshara puports to be based” and that "they had con™ 
sidered the fundamental principles of Hindu law” also. See 
report at p.208.
(1) 30 I.A.202 at 208. Their Lordships observed that Pontifex J. 
had expounded the law to the same effect in Chotay Lall*s case. 
But see Banerjee p.356.
(2) Sheo Pertab v. Allahabad Bank (1903) 30 I.A. 209. For the 
judgement of the Oudh Court see Lai Sheopartab v. The 
Allahabad Bank ( ) 0*0. 130. The decision of the Oudh 
Court appears to be correct both according to Hindu law and 
according to Oudh Estate Act X of 1869.
147
Since this case, however, all the Courts in India except
those of Bombay held that property inherited by a female whether
from a male or a female is not her strldhana and reverts to the
(i)heirs of the previous ov/ner male or female as the case may be.
According to the Mithila school, however, the moveable
property which a widow inherits from her husband has always been
(2)
recognised to be at her free disposal. * Being at free disposal
(1) Sham Behari v. Ramkali (1923) 4*5 All.715; Ramkali v. Gopal Dei 
(1926) 45 All.658; Gaya Din v. Badri Singh I.L.R. (194*3) 230
at 235; Kehar Singh v. Attar Singh A.I.E. (1944) Lah*442 at 444; 
Matru Mai v. Mehri Kunwar A.I.R. (1940) Ail.311; Venkateswarlu 
v. Chinna Raghayulu A.I.E. 1957 Andh.Pra. 604. In Matru Mai's 
case the daughter was held to have taken onf limited estate 
in the property which she had inherited from her mother and 
the daughter's daughter was preferred to the daughter's son 
but the expression 'her heir' has been used ambiguously so that 
it creates an impression that the daughter's daughter succeeded 
to the estate as an heir to the daughter. It is also to be 
noted that the decision in this case rests entirely upon the 
authority of Mulla's Hindu haw. See also Varada Char v.
Yedoogiri (1883) 6 Mys. L.R. 29; Nanki v. Nathu (1886) 1 C.P.L.R 
45; Khushal v. Dalsingh (1996) 1 C.P.L.R. 77; Mula Bai v. Mohraj 
Singh (1888) 2 C.P.L.R. 166; flyikutti v. Cliithambarathanu (1890) 
8 T.L.R. 51 (no custom to the contrary amongst the Krishnavakas) 
Nagamani v. Chinnakannu (1892) 10 T.L.R. 37; Isakki v. Narayanan 
(1892) 10 T.L.R. 74; Ramacharan v. Jagannath (1898) 12 C.P.L.E. 
143; Venkata v. Puttaiya (1902) 7 M.C.C.R.l; Govindji v.
Gosalia (1904) 4 K.L.R. 234 (no custom amongst the Bakhais of 
Kathiawar to the effect that a widow takes absolute interest in 
inheritance); Puthumadan v. Thanvan (1904) 20 T.L.R. 209; Roy 
Radha v. Naur*atan (1907) 6 C.L.S. 490; Puthumadan v. Thannvan 
(1909) 26 T.L.R.l; Pathan v. Kuchumini (1911) 28 T.L.R. 61.
(2) The earliest cases appear to be Corformah's case (1812) referred 
to in Cossinaut v. Huf o o s oondry (1819) 2 Mor.Dig.198 at 216; 
Rajunder v. Bijay (1839) 2 M.I.A.181 (more known as Bhya Jha’s 
case); Brojorutton v. Mt.Poorandi (1866) Revenue Civil and 
Criminal Reporter Vol.11 p.190. In Bhagwandeen*s case their 
Lordships of the Privy Council apparently accepted that this 
was the correct position of the law as far as the Mithila school 
was concerned. The decisions in Thakore Deyhee's case, 
Bhugwandeen*s case and Chotay Lall's case, though based on the 
general authority of the Mitaksara, were expressly limited to 
the law of the Benares school.
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(1)
of the woman such property is her strxdhana and descends as such*
a
The case of a Jain widow is customary exception to the
a
rule that inherited property is not strxdhana. She gets an
asbolute interest in the property, moveable or immoveable, which
she inherits from her husband. As the Mitaksara does not make any
distinction between strxdhana and the property which is at the
(2)absolute disposal of a woman, such property has been held to
(3 )be her strxdhana and it devolves as such. However, the right
(1) Sureshar v. Maheshrani (1921) 47 I.A.233 at 238; Latur Rai 
v. Bhagwan Das A.I.E. (1936) Pat.80; Jagarnath Prasad v.
Suraj Deo A.I.E. (1937) Pat, 483.
(2) For this reasoning see Hukumchand's case infra.
(3) In Sheo Singh v. Bakho (1878) 5 I.A. 87 the widow was given 
absolute right in her husband's self-acquired property. In 
Shimbhunath v. Gayan Chand (1894) their Lordships of the 
Allahabad High Court extended this right to the 1non-ancestral' 
property of the husband. See also Harnath Pershad v. Mandil 
Dass (1900) 27 Cal.379; Nekram Singh v. Sriniwas (1926) 24 
A.L.J.751; Pahar Singh v. Shamsher A.I.E. (1931) All.695;
Hukum Cnahd v. Sitai Prasad (1927) 50 All.232; Chauli v.
Meghoo I.L.R. (1945) All.804; Sahu Joti v. Bahai Singh I.L.R. 
(1946) All.1. The obiter dictum of their Lordships of the 
Calcutta High Court in Harnath Pershad's case to the effect 
that the application of this customary right of the widow could 
be extended to the joint family property of the husband, was 
not followed by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in 
Nekram Singh's and Pahar Singh's cases. In the latter the 
Calcutta decision was distinguished as being the law of a 
different province. However, the daughter's right to take 
absolute interest in property inherited from her father was 
decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council who held that
a custom to that effect was not proved. In Bombay, however, 
only ordinary Hindu Law was held to be applicable to the widows 
of the Dasha Shrimali Porwad community of Jains. In Bhikubai 
v. Manilal A.I.E.(1930) Bom.517 Patkar J. rejected the author­
ity of the Sanskrit texts of the Jains and observed, "... the 
texts from Arhan Niti, Bhadrabahu Samhita and Fardhamana Niti 
are conflicting and relate to a state of society of the Jains 
when the widow was preferred to a son and would not be binding 
on the courts in view of the Privy Council decisions that the 
Jains are governed by Hindu law in the absence of a custom," 
For the texts see p.^  o5L. •
See also Krishna Bai v. Secretary of State for India (1920)
42 All.555; Ayisvaryanandaji v. Sivaji (1926)49 Mad.116 at 
152-53.
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is held to be limited only to the 1 non-aneestra1’ property of the 
husband. As regards his joint family property there being no 
custom to that effect the ordinary Hindu law is applicable which 
gives only a right to be maintained out of such property.
The decisions of the Bombay High Court proceeded from the 
first upon a different line. From the early part of the 19th cen­
tury the bench of Bombay High Court was adorned by several erudite
k ,  A . t -
judges who, in dealing with cases on Hindu law, depended[upon the
authorities of the Sanskrit texts ithc^ upon the opinion of the
text-book writers like Mac|fi*^ g|itGn, Strange etc.
As early as in 1810 A.B. the Sudder Court in Deo Baee v.
(1)if an Baee accepted the opinion of the pandits who relied on the
Mitaksara and opined that a widow who inherits the property of her
husband fhas a full right and power over her late husbandfs property1.
(2)In Kapoor Bhuwanee v. Sevuteram it was held on the authority of
the Mayukha that a widow is entitled to give away for any religious 
purposes property which she has inherited from her husband. Denying 
the contention that an alienation made by a widow without the consent
(1) (1810) Borr. 1,29. But see Chuneelal v. Jussoo Mull (1809)
Borr.I• 60; Ganga v. Jeevee (1811) Borr. 1.4-26 and Ram ICoonwur 
v. Ummur (1818) Borr.I.458 which appear tojljlmitfe^widow's 
right of disposition. Bee also Krishnarani v. HtTBheekhee (1822) 
Borr.II.362 in which the court appears to have mistaken the 
ratio of the decision in Poonjeeabhaee v. Prankoonwur (1817) 
Borr.I.194 and to have come to the conclusion that a daughter 
inheriting property from her father takes only limited interest 
in the same. See also Madhowrao v. Yuswada (1822) Borr.II.480 
in which the widow was held entitled to (disposefjonly moveable 
property. *
(2) (1815) Borr.I.448; Lukmeeram v. Khooshalee (1817) Borr,I.455. 
Borradaile remarks that this was the correct position of the 
law - see his notes to the cases of Chuneelal, Kapoor Bhuwanee 
and Lakmee^*ad| supra.
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of the next reversioners is null and void the Sudder Court, in Dae
(1)v« Ganpat, emphasised the fact that the restriction on aliena­
tion applies only to gifts in favour of actors, dancers etc, and 
that according to the Mayukha and the Viramitrodaya 1 a woman is 
not subject to control in making a gift to secure happiness in 
another world,1 It was further observed by the court that the 
required consent of the reversioners was meant only for giving a 
formal proof of the fact as to whether the family was separate or 
joint and where the husband is decidedly separate alienation made 
by his widow without the consent of the reversioners is valid.
Coming to the decisions of the Bombay High Court, in
(2 )Pr an j i vand as v . Be vkuvarbai, Sausse C .J. held that the widow
has an uncontrolled power over the moveables inherited from the 
husband and that the daughter takes an absolute interest in the 
property inherited from her father. He relied on the Mitaksara, 
the Mayukha, the custom as prevalent in the Western India and as
stated by Steele, and on the opinion of the sastris. In WiwafTqw ^  l^M-*
(3)
kishor it was held that the property which a daughter inherited 
from her father "whether or not it be strictly entitled to the 
name of stridhan or peculium" descends on her death to her own heirs.
(1) (1849) Perry1s Oriental Cases p.
(2) (1859) 1 Bom.H.C,R,130* For Custom as a source of modern 
Hindu law see infra pp. - lo . For Steele see infra.
(3) (1865) 1 Bom.H.C.R. 209.
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Their Lordships treated Jagannatha and Macnaughten as of little
authority outside Eastern India
Strange 1s ork wherein the author states that inherited property
^  ^ and approved a passage from
is strxdha a according to the law of the Mitaksara school and
descends (2) (3)such. In Venayeck v. fxixoomeebaee their Lord-
hxe T’t it/y Conned
ships confirmed the decision of the Bombay High Court that a 
A
sister inheriting her brother’s property takes absolute interest
(4)in it. Following the decision Arnould J . in Bhaskar v . Mahadev 
observed that the general provision of the Mitaksara to the effect 
that inherited property is strxdhana should be treated as law in
...     . ■ — JT“ i » —       .......... ...... HU' 1*^ -i_ -■ n,
Western India subject only to the exception laid down by their
(5)Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhugwandeen*s case, namely, 
property inherited by a widow from her husband is not strxdhana.
It may be mentioned that the decisions of the Bombay High Court,
though quite in conformity of the law of the Mitaksara, were against
C o ^  ^^  \
provisions of the Mayukha and the customs of Gujrat.
(1) Ibid at pp.216 and 218.
(2) Ibid at p.215. For Strand's passages see SHfrr*. £ .
A passage from the Manual of Hindu Law of Mr.Justice Strange
also was approved. But Macna t^hten's passage (supra p.($3 
was disapproved as being contrary to the Mitaksara. it is to 
be noted that the note added to Steele's work by Bhalachandra 
&astri to the effect that sastris in Gujrat do not include in 
strxdhana property inherited by a woman, was not we11-received 
by their Lordships who further observed that even if it were 
not to be treated as strxdhana it would devolve upon the heirs 
of the woman herself.
(3) (1864) 5 W.R.(P.O.>41.
(4) (1869) 6 Bom.H.C.R.l followed in Rindabai v. Anacharya (1890)
15 Bom.206.
(5) 6 Bom.H.C.R.l at 16-17.
(5) Supra pp. 98-96*
(7) Supra p.££> and infra pj> Grnj*r*f T?v, It % .
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Consequently they must be treated as being incorrect as regards 
5 a
that j>art of the Bombay province which is governed by the Mayukha 
in preference to the Mitaksara.
In Vijiarangam v . Lakshuman, ^  ^ while approving the 
previous decisions of the Bombay High Court as regards property 
inherited by a daughter from her father, Mr. Justice West took the 
opportunity of discussing many basic questions about strxdhana and 
of commenting upon the Sanskrit texts as well as the decisions of 
their Lordships in Thakore Deyhee's case and Bhugwandeen1s case.
He then observed : "Unreservedly accepting their Lordships deter­
mination as conclusive in all similar cases arising under the same 
laws, .... I should not feel bound by the reasoning on which it is 
founded to the inference that for Hindus in Bombay the doctrine 
holds good that a husband's property inherited by a widow is not
stridhan, with the logical consequence, drawn by Eastern lawyers,
(2 )that no inherited property is stridhan."
(1) (1871) 8 Bom.H.C .R .244• West J. pointed out that if such
property is not to be treated as devolving upon the strxdhana
heirs of the daughter then it must be noted that no special T mIc.
for the devolution of such property has been mentioned in the 
Mitaksara. Such rules have been specially mentioned in the 
case of the property of a celebate student, an ascetic, a 
foreign merchanat etc. - see Yaj. 2.136 and 2.264.
(2) 8 Bom.H.G.E.244 at 266-68.
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The rule that a daughter takes an absolute estate in
property inherited from her father was followed in all the later
cases in Bombay and was applied also to property inherited by a
(1)daughter from her mother.
(2)
In the Full Bench case of Bhagirthibai v. liahanjirao 
Mr. Justice West gave a judgement which might be considered to be 
the best attempt to expound, according to the Mitaksara, the mean­
ing of the term strxdhana. The main points of his arguments were 
as follows
In the first place, according to the Mitaksara inherited
property is strxdhana and that at least in Bombay the widow has
long since been held by scholar© and by judges to be entitled to
the entire estate of the husband with full rights of disposal over 
(3 )
it. Secondly, West J. argued that the supposed restriction on
the widow was incorrectly applied by analogy to other heirs like
(4)the mother and other female heirs entering into the family.
(1) Haribhat v. Damodarbhat (1879) 3 Bom.171; Babaji v. Balaji 
(1881) 5 Bom*660; Bulakhidas v. Kesavlal (1832) 6 Bom.85; 
Bhagirthibai v. Kahnujirav (1887) 11 Bom.285 F.B.; Jankibai v.
Sundra (1890) 14 Bom.612; Gulappa v. Tayawa (1907) 31 Bom.453;
Vithappa v. Savitri (1910) 34 Bom.510; Kisan v. Bapu (1925) 27 
Bom.L.R.670; Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao (1920) 47 I.A.213;
Jawahir Lai v. Jarau Lai (1924) 46 All.192 (the parties were 
Nagar brahmins who had migrated to Aligad in U.P. from Vadnagar 
in the Baroda state). In Jakibai v. Sundra (14 Bom.612 at 617) 
Jardine J. admitted that the absolute estate of the daughter 
was 1stridhan in some sense of the word.'
(2) (1886) 11 Bom.285.
(3) See ibid at pp.297-99 where West. J. refers to Deo Baee v. Wan
Baee, Kapoor Bhuwanee v. Sevukram, Doe v. Ganpat etc. For
these cases see supra ,
(4) 11 Bom.285 F.B. at 300.
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He maintained that Jxmutavahana has made the exception in the case 
of a widow a general rule > applicable even to the daughter etc. 
which is totally incorrect and without any authority, and further 
observed that the process of applying this law of the Bengal school 
to the eases arising under the law of the Benares and other sub­
schools of the Mitaksara had been responsible for the decisions 
in Chotay Lallfs case and Vaduganatha!s case.^  ^
In Bombay the rule enabling a daughter to take an 
absolute interest in the property inherited from the father has
been extended to all females inheriting from their gotraja males
(2 )i.e. males in whose family the female heir is born.
It has already been shown that the decision of their 
Lordships in Bhugwandeen1s case had been treated in Bombay as an
(3)exception to the general rule that inherited property is strxdhana.
(1) Ibid p.305. It is important to note that West J. maintains 
that full ownership does not necessarily involve rights of 
disposal over the property owned. - see the report at p.309.
In Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao (1920)47 l.A. 30 at 42 Lord
Dunedin admitted that the position of the Bombay law, although j
it was declared by the Bombay High Court for the first time in j
Pranjivanda&’ss) case, was settled long before that decision as |
shown by the decision in Deo Baee v. Wan Baee (1810)Borr.I .29 j
and censured the Judicial Commissioner in Balwantrao? s case j
for having refused to apply that law to this case on the j
ground that the parties concerned had migrated to the Central 1
Province from Berar before the decision in Pran j i van d as S s I
j^case was given. '{
(2) ' TuLjaram v. Mathuradas (1381)5 Bom.662 the ratio was really j
Aa broader one, namely, females inheriting from a person into i
whose family they have not entered by way of marriage take 
absolute estate in the property.
(3) Supra p. I£l.
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The exception has been extended, by parity of reasoning, to all
females inheriting the estate of males into whose family they
(1)have entered by marriage i.e. the mother, the paternal grand-
( 2) (3)mother, or a widow of any other gotraja sapinda of the
propositus•
The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court subsequently
decided that all females inheriting from other females take an
(4)absolute estate xn the property so inherited. In this case it
ivas held that the paternal grand-mother inheriting from her grand­
daughter took an absolute estate in the property. Treating the 
case of widows and widows of gotraja sapindas as exceptions 
Jenkins C.J. observed, HThe principle of dependance which perhaps 
governs the extent of power may regulate the exceptions where 
widowed females inherit from males, but in all other cases the
(1) Narasappa v. Sakharam (1869)6 Bom.H.C.H.215; Vrijabhukandas 
v. Bax Parvati (1908)52 Bom.26.
(2) Dhondi v. Radhabai (1912)56 Bom.546 (Chandavarkar J. simply 
extended the rule in Vri jabhukandas1s case to this case, but 
see Mr. Shingne's argument that according to Gandhi Maganlal 
v. Bai Jabad (1900)24 Bom.192 at 212 the grand-mother comes, 
in her own right and not merely as a widow and that therefore, 
unlike other widows of the gotraja sapindas she takes an 
absolute estate.
(3) Bharmanganda v. Rudrapagauda (1880)4 Bom.81; Lullobhoy v. 
Cassibai (1880)7 I.A.212; Gadadhar v. Chandrabhaga (1892)
17 Bom.590 F.B.; Madhavram v. Dave (1896)21 Bora.739;
Narayan v. laman (1922)46 Bom.17.
(4) Gandhi Maganlal v. Bai Jadab (1900)24 Bom.192 F.B.
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rule of absolute dominion must be allowed to prevail.»(1)
Originally the moveable property which even a widow
inherited from her husband had been treated in Bombay to be at
(2)her absolute disposal. Later on, however, someconflict arose
as to whether such property would follow a course of strxdhana
+ (3)successxon or not.
(1) 24 Bom.192 at 214. Macpherson, the appellant1s counsel, 
rightly pointed out that widows of gotraja sapindas are 
themselves not gotraja sapindas but sagotra sapindas. It
is to be regretted that even so learned a judge as Ranade J. 
uses the word gotraja sapinga rather inappropriately in 
Madhavram v. Dave 21 Bom.739 supra. The ratio of Gandhi 
Maganlal*s case appears to have been approved by their Lord­
ships of the P.C. in Itesserbai v, Hunsraj (1906)30 Bom.431 
P.C. at 442. The ratio of the Full Bench case was applied 
in Narayan v. Waman (1922)46 Bom.17 to the property of a 
female which was inherited by a widow frp*« her distant gotraja 
sapinda but their Lordships in that case appear to be aware 
of the anomaly that females inherit absolute estate from their 
female sapindas whereas they inherit only a limited estate 
from their male sapindas. Parshottam v. Keshavlal (1932)56 
Bom.164 was a peculiar case in which the adoptive mother re­
ceived a life-estate in the property through the grant of 
her adopted son and later on also inherited the vested interest 
in the remainder ultimately from the daughter of her adopted 
son thus attaining an absolute interest in the property.
(2) Bechar v. Bai Lakshmi (1863)1 B.H.C.R.56; Pranjivandas v.
Devkuvarbai (1859)1 B.H.C.R1130. Property gifted or be­
queathed by the husband and property inherited from the 
husband appear to have been treated to be on an equal par 
in Damodar v. Parmanandas (1883)7 Bom.155 in which it was 
held that a widow could dispose of by will the moveable 
property bequeathed to her by her husband. The estate of a 
widow in inherited moveable property was not called in 
question in Bombay for a long time - see Gadadhar v. Chand- 
rabhagabai (1892)17 Bom.690 F.B. at 709.
(3) It appears that the ratio of Bhugwandeen*s case, nafaely, that 
undisposed moveables or immoveables devolve upon the husband*s 
heirs was adopted also in Harilal v. Pranj ivandas (1888)16 
Bom.229 at 232 and Bai Jamana v. Bhaishankar (1891)16 Bom.233 
at 237. But in Murarji v. Parvatabai (1876)1 Bom.177 it 
appears that the view in Dainodardas * s case was adopted in as 
much as it was assumed that the widow could dispose of the 
inherited moveables by will, the disputed question in this 
case being only about the validity of the will.
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(1).In Gadadhar v. Criandrabhagabai the Full Bench of
the Bombay High Court considered the question whether the widow
could dispose by will of inherited moveables. Sir Charles
Sargent C.J. quoted the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy
Council in Bhugwandeen* s case, namely, that the widow's "'power
of disposition over both moveable and immoveable property is
limited to certain purposes, and on her death both pass to the
(2)
next heirs of her husband" « 3&claring that the decision 
of the Privy Council was to be given effect to "throughout the
rwiwM>«».nwuwimwH»H*J5aMmiLii'.Lj—mim  n a n iw m m im w n
presidency" he expressed the opinion of the Full Bench thus :
Assuming then, as we think we must, that the moveables existing
at the time of the widow's death devolve, by inheritance, on
her husband's heirs, we think the widow's power of alienation
over the moveables cannot be regarded as including the power of
willing them away at her death so as to displace the right of
(3) **inheritance by her husband's heirs.
With due respect to their Lordships it must be sub™
mitted that this appears to be the first error into which the
(1) (1892)17 Bom.690 F.B.
(2) 17 Bom.690 at 708. See also fhakore Beyhee's and 
Vaduganathais cases referred to at report pp.710 and 
708 respectively.
(3) Ibid p.711. The decision in Damodardas1s case was 
overruled tb this effect only.
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Bombay High Court fell of its own volition. The decision in 
Bhagwandeen1s case was expressly limited to the law of the 
Benares school only and a possibility of a different interpre­
tation in other schools was not excluded. Moreover the power 
of alienation over the inherited moveables being held equal to 
that over immoveables in Bhugwandeen*s case a common rule of 
reverter in both kinds of property does not appear to be ill­
ogical, But in Gadadhar1s case the rule of reverter was declared 
without questioning the right of the widow to alienate the 
inherited moveables by gift inter vivos. Again the decision in 
Bhugwandeen1s case coult not have affected the previous decisions 
of the Bombay High Court recognising an absolute power of the 
widow over inherited moveables since those decisions were based
both on the textual law and a usage of the country to that
(1)effect.
However, after the above decision the moveable property 
which a widow inherits from her husband and which, according to 
the general rule that absolute property of woman is strxdhana, 
should have been treated as her strxdhana, has ceased to be so 
in as much as it does not devolve like strxdhana after the
(1) See Pran j ivandas1 s case supra. p.jS"o-
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widow's death.
The second disputed question about the acquisition of
stridhana is whether property which a woman obtains on partition
(2)of joint family property is her stridhana. Yajnavalkya says :
"If (the father) makes equal allotments his wives to whom no
stridhana has been given by the husband or the father-in-law
(3) «  rshould be made partakers of equal shares." Vijnanesavra
commenting on this adds : "But if stridhana has been given to a 
woman, the author subsequently directs half a share to foe alloted
(1) In Chamanlal v. Ganesh (1904)28 Bom.453 which was a Mayukha 
case the decision of the Full Bench was followed. But in 
Motilal v. Ratilal (1895)21 Bom.1? Ranade J., while holding 
that a widow has power to bequeath the moveables bequeathed 
to her by her husband with express power of alienation, 
appears to have distinguished Gadadhar's case on two grounds 
viz, that it referred to inherited property and that it was 
a Mitaksara case whereas Motilal's case was a Mayukha case.
The second ground is obviously wrong. In Pandharinath v.
Govind (1907)32 Bom.59 it was decided that under the Mitaksara 
the widow has no power even to gift away the moveable property 
inherited from her husband. Notwithstanding the argument of 
Mr. Gharpure, the appellant's counsel, that Gadadhar's case 
does not affect the power of alienation inter vivos (see 32 Bom. 
59 at 62) Russell A.C.J. held that the widow's power of testa­
mentary disposition being denied in Gadadhar's case and the 
analogy between gift inter vivos and gift by will being com­
plete in Hindu law the widow cannot have a power to dispose
of the moveables even by gifts inter vivos - see 32 Bom.59 at 
74-75. It need not foe added that the previous decisions stated 
the law as existed in the Western India and not as it existed 
only in the Mayukha districts. However, it seems that in the 
Mayukha districts the widow still appears to have unrestricted 
right to dispose of moveables during life-time - see Chamanlal 
v. Bai Parvati A.I.R.1934 Bom.151 at 154. See also Nanji v.
Bai Hemi (1927)3 W.I.S.L.R.81.




to her : 'Or if anything has been given, let him assign the
(1)half1", and then connects this verse to the verse which makes 
provision for a woman's adhivedanika or gift on supersession.
From the very fact that Yajhavallcya treats strxdhana 
as a substitute for a share to be given to a woman on partition 
it is clear that he treats such share to be strxdhana. Moreover 
the provision about alloting such share is connected in the 
Mitaksara with the provision concerning gift on supersession.
It has already been shown that gift on supersession was intro­
duced in the sastra for the purpose of giving to the superseded
( 2)woman her share in the joint property of the husband and wife.
is no reason why a share given to a woman in a partition of the
j oint family property should not be treated as her strxdhana.
Although no practical illustration of the rule 1 inherited
(3)property is strxdhana' is to be found in the Mitaksara, such 
an illustration in regard to partitioned property is actually 
found therein. While conferring on an after-born son a right to 
inherit the share which his mother had secured on partition
(1) Mit. on Yaj. 2.115. The words in the single inverted 
commas form a part of Yajnavalkya's verse concerning gift 
on supersession for which see supra p . . . The analogy 
has been accepted by almost all the commentators * For an 
explanation of the analogy see Vi.Mi.441.
(2) See supra pp 74-7^ .
(3) For this complaint see supra p.130
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Vi jnanesvara says that he succeeds to such share only in the
(1)absence of daughters, clearly indicating thereby that the
share which a mother obtains on partition devolves first upon
her daughters according to the line of succession to strTdhana.
Madhava is more explicit on this point and says that such share
(2)devolves upon the daughters.
Apararka specifically includes in strTdhana the wealth
which a woman gains on partition in accordance with the verse of 
« (3 )Yajnavalkya. From the other authorities the Madanapari j at a
of Visvesvara Bhatta and the Vivadatandava of Kamalakara of the
* * • •
Benares school as well as the MadhavTya and the Sarasvativilasa 
of the Southern school adopt the suira of Gauta^wi quoted in the 
Mitaksara in order to include within strTdhana property obtained
(4)
by inheritance, partition etc. Some of the other leading
authorities which have not expressly included property obtained
(5)on partition are at least silent about the question. In such
case such property ought to have been declared to be strTdhana at 
least according to the law of the Benares school, the Southern 
school and of that part of the Bombay province which is governed 
by the Mitaksara in preference to the Mayukha.
(1) Mit. on Yaj. 2.122. See also the explanation of the passage 
in the Subhodhini p.53 and the BalainbhattT p. 153.
r \ • * *(2) Pa.Ma. 340 - the provision in Yaj. 2.122 is accepted subject 
to the provision in the second part of Yaj. 2.117
(3) Apa. on Yaj. 2. ^ 3.
(4) Supra p . $ j i
(5) See for instance V.Mi.440-42.
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In the Calcutta High Court it has always been maintained
that the share which a mother obtains under the Bayabhaga law is
to be considered as being given in lieu of maintenance and that
after her death it reverts to the heirs of the original estate
(1)from which it was taken.
( 2)In Chhiddu v. Haubat their Lordships of the Allaha­
bad High Court examined many authorities and came to the correct
conclusion that the share which a mother obtains on partition is
(3)
strxdhana and that on her death it devolves upon her own heirs.
(1) Sorolah v. Bhoobun (1888)15 Cal.292 F.B.; Hemangini v. 
Kedarnath (1889)16 Gal.P.C.758; Hridoy Kant v. Behari Lai 
(1906)11 C.W.N.239. In Sorolah1s case their Lordships of 
the Full Bench considered the famous text about community 
of property between husband and wife as quoted in the 
Sraddhaviveka (see supra p.m.) but, on the authority of 
Jagannatha, held that the wife's joint interest in husband's 
property ceases by 'the lapse of her husband's right' if a 
lineal heir in the male line survives him - 15 Cal.292 F «*&. 
at 311. However, their Lordships appear to be aware of the 
'incongruity' of the mother having only a life-estate in the 
partitioned property with a vested interest in the remainder 
remaining with the sons. In a Mitaksara case it was de­
cided in Calcutta that though such property has been termed 
in the Mitaksara as woman's property the woman has 'no 
absolute power of disposition' over it - Beni v. Puran (1895) 
23 Cal.262 at 279,
(2) (1901)24- All.67.
(3) Their Lordships referred to the practical illustration in the 
Mitaksara showing that a share obtained on partition is 
strxdhana - 24 All.67 at 76. Opinions of Sir Francis Mac- 
naught en (1824 edi.p.43) and Sir William Macnaughten (3rd. 
edi.p.3?) were not followed. Banerjee's opinion to the 
effect that according to the Mitaksara and the Mayukha a 
share obtained on partition is strxdhana (2nd edi.p.305) and 
that a woman has the same right over such property as she has 
over inherited property, (2nd edi.p.330) was quoted with 
approval. - See 24 All.67 at 78. The above was the judge­
ment of Aikman J, Banerji J. in a short judgement concurred 
with him but expressed, "The question is, however, beset with 
difficulties, and 1 must say, ... my mind is not free from 
doubt." - Report at p.81.
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Their Lordships appear to have advanced the argument that if
the share is by way of maintenance it is strxdhana but if it is
-  (1)by way of inheritance it cannot become strxdhana. The reason­
ing seems to be sound as a widow would, by inheritance, take the 
whole property of her husband whereas she receives only a part 
of the property if it is divided in partition by her sons. Their 
Lordships accepted the view of the Calcutta High Court that such 
share is to be treated as being given in lieu of maintenance with­
out accepting, however, the decision of that High Court to the
(2)effect that such share is not strxdhana,
(3)
However, in Debi Mangal Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad, 
which was a ease under the Benares school of law, their Lordships 
of the Privy Council decided that immoveable property which a 
woman obtains on partition is not her strxdhana in the sense 
that it passes on, upon her death, to her own heirs, and that 
such property reverts to the next heirs of her husband. The 
ratio of this decision appears to be the assumption that property 
obtained by partition is on par with property obtained by a woman
(1) Ibid at p.75. It may be mentioned that according to Devanna 
only that much property should be given to the woman as would 
be sufficient for her maintenance - Smr.Cha.625. But Madhava 
refutes such a suggestion saying that such an interpretation 
would voilate the rule as expressed in the words 1 equal share* 
appearing in Yajnavalkya’s verse. - Pa.Ma.i341.
(2) Opinion of Trailokyanath Mitra (T,L.L. 1879 p.4-67) to the 
effect that such share of a woman devolves upon 1 her sur­
viving heirs*,, was approved. The case was followed in Sri 
Pal <Rai v. Raghunath (1901)24 All.82.
(3) (1912)39 I.A.121.
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by inheritance which, by their Lordships, had already been de~
-  (1)clared to be not stndhana.
The ratio and the decision in Debi Manual Prasad’s case
was later on followed by all the High Courts so that according to
all the schools the property obtained by a woman on partition is
(2)not her strTdhana. " It need hardly be emphasised that the 
decisions stating inherited property not to be strTdhana being 
themselves incorrect as regards the law of the MitaR~sara school, 
the decisions as regards property obtained upon partition are much 
more so as they are in conflict with more direct and express texts 
of the same school.
It has already been noticed that gifts from relatives 
form some of the most important and usual categories of strTdhana. 
Gifts from the husband, however, stand upon a different footing 
from the rest in as much as the texts do not allow a woman to have
(1) See Smt.ICamala Devi v. Bachulal A.I.R.I957 S.C.434 at 44o. 
However, in Bhugwandeen*s case itself the question about 
share on partition appears to have been left open - see
11 M.I.A.487 at 514.
(2) Munilal v. Mt. Phula (1927)50 All.22 (the obiter dictum in 
this case is rather unintelligible); Bhagwantrao v. Pun- 
jarcun I.L.R.1938 Na.255; Chamanlal v. Bai Parvati A.I.R. 
1924 Bom.151; Krishan Panda v. Jhora A.I.R.1942 Pat.429; 
Sital Prasad v. Sri Ram I.L.R.1944 Luck.450. See also 
Memon Adam v. Hakiani Bai (1922)22 K.L.R.165. In Chaman- 
lalfs case, however, it was decided on parity of reasoning 
that the widow under the Mayukha has unrestricted right to 
dispose of moveables obtained by way of partition as well 
as by inheritance. It may incidentally be noted that 
though the share which-a woman obtains ., in partition is not 
strTdhana, the amount ^ strTdhana which she has received 
already from the husband etc. is material in one respect 
viz* if it exceeds her share she gets nothing but if it is 
less she gets the balance in which she gains widow's inter™ 
est - see Shaimdas v. Savitribai A.I.R. 1937 Sind 181; see 
also Memon Andhreman v* Memon Osman (1908)18 K.L.R.195.
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a right of free disposal over immoveable property given to her
by her husband. Narada says : "Whatever has been given to a
woman by her husband out of affection, she can utilise or give
away at her pleasure even after the death of the husband
except immoveable property."^^ A text of Katyayana to which
(2)a reference has already been made has also been interpreted
by their Lordships of the Privy Council as referring to gifts
(3)from the husband.
It ought to foe noted in the first place that whether*
such property is at the absolute disposal of the woman or not
it will nevertheless be strTdhana according to all of the
Mitaksara sub-schools as "to foe at one's absolute disposal" is
not regarded there as an essential ingredient of strTdhana*
According to the Bengal school, however, such immoveable
property cannot be strTdhana of the woman in as much as she
(4)cannot freely dispose of the same. In Madras, Bombay,
and Allahabad immoveable property given to a woman by her 
husband has been regarded as her strTdhana though in some of 
the cases it was held that her power of disposition over such 
immoveables depended upon whether the husband has expressly
(1) Na.Smr. 4 . 2 8 ,  See the appendix text Mo. tjo*
(2)/ SMprap//8.
(3) Bhugwandeen v. Myna Bai (1867)11 M.I.A.487 at 511.
(4) See Supra p ./©9 for the definition of strTdhana as 
given in the Dayabhaga.
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conferred upon her the right to alienate such property. The
decisions in some of the cases, however, seem to lay down a
general principle that simple words of gift in a document
generally would not confer an absolute estate but only a limited
estate which is equivalent to a widow's estate i^ ith a reverter
(B)of succession to the husband's heirs.
In Bengal the question whether a property became
*
strxdhana of a woman or not depended upon whether it was at her
absolute disposal or not. The question whether a particular
property would devolve like strxdhana or not naturally depended
upoh the construction of the deed of gift or will whereby the
husband gave or bequeathed the property to his wife.
(3)In Koonjbehari Bhur v. Premchand, notwithstanding 
the excellent argument of Banerjee to the "contrary, their Lord-
'i
ships of the Calcutta High Court held that only simple words of
N
transfer in a testamentary bequest would confer merely a limited
(1) Appeal No.174 of 1851 decided on 3oth August 1865 by N.W.F.P. 
High Court referred to in Baboo Gunpat's case; Bagoo Gunpat 
v. Gunga Pershad N.W.P.H.C.R.(Pershad)(1867)p.30; Jeewun 
Panda v. Mt.Sona N.W.P.H.C.R.(1869)p.66; Kotarbasapa v. 
Chanverova (1873)10 B.H.C.R.403; Mulchand 7 Badharsha v.
Bai Mancha (1884)7 Bom.4-91; Bhujanga v•, Ramayamma (1884)
7 Mad.387. In Mulchand's case and Jeewun Panda's case a 
testamentary bequest from the husband has been treated to 
be on the same footing as a gift inter vivos from the 
husband>. The analogy has been followed in all the later 
cases on the same point.
(2) For instance see Mohammad Shamsool v. Shewakram (1874)2 I,A.
7,wherein it was held that as a general rule women do not
take an estate of inheritance ujjder Hindu law and that the
word 'malik' does not by itself confer an absolute estate
on the female donee. But see Surajmani v. Ravi Nath (1907)
35 I.A.17.
(8 ) (1880)5 Cal.684.
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estate on the wife and that "it would be necessary for the husband 
to give her in express terms a heritable right or power of aliena­
tion" if he intends to confer upon her an absolute estate in such 
property.^  ^
(2)But in Ram Narain v. Pearay Bhugat the same High 
Court refused to follow the dictum expressed in the above case and 
held that in order that a wife may take an absolute estate in 
immoveable property gifted to her by her husband it is not necess­
ary that there should be such express terms in the grant as would 
convey an estate of inheritance.
The ratio of the earlier cases appears to be that women 
generally take only limited estate in any property whether inherited 
or obtained at a partition especially if it is immoveable property 
and that the same rule should be made applicable to immoveable 
property given to a woman by her husband unless the husband uses
(3 )some express words which rebut this presumption of limited estate.
(1 ) Banerjee pointed out the following things : that the words of
gift used in the case of the widow and the daughter* s son were
the same, that the rule as to gift inter vivos should not be 
applied to gift by bequest in as much as there will be no 
purpose in making a will as the widow would gain limited
interest in the property even without the help of the will
and that the reason of the rule about husband1s gift inter 
vivos is that the husband 'in fact reserves to himself a 
control over the property given1. Remarking that the 
position stated by them was 'a rule of law, well-established 
in this Court1 their Lordships further observed that 'there 
can foe no reason why such control should not be reserved to 
the male heir of the husband as well as to himself.* - Report 
at p.687. They also reasoned that the nature of the estate 
depends upon the capacity of taker in each particular case.
(2 ) (1883)9 Cal.830.
(3) But in Atul Krishna v. Sanyasi Churn (1905)32 Gal.1051 
Harrington J. observed that such presumption applies not to 
all females but only to a childless widow.
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The position soon changed when it was held that no 
distinction could be made between a gift to a man and a gift to 
woman^^ and so the inferior status of a woman in this respect 
did not persist long. Accordingly it was decided by their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council that such simple words like ’malik’ 
would confer an absolute estate of inheritance on a woman unless
there is something in the context which curtails her full pro-
(2) . . .prietory rights. Similarly it has been held that words like
generation after generation’ used in a deed of gift have almost 
a technical meaning in India conveying a heritable and alienable 
estate; and it has been held that when on a true construction of 
the whole of the document it appears that an absolute estate has
been conferred thereby, the right of alienation, though not stated
( 3)in express terms, will be presumed to have been included.
Thus it may reasonably be said that now property given 
by the husband does not, under the law of any school, form an
(1) See Jatindra faohun v. Ganendra Mohun (1872)1 I.A.Sup.Vol.47 
at 65; Surajmani v. Rabinath (1907)35 I.A.17 at 22; Jagmohun 
v. Sri Nath (1930)57 I.A.291 at 294. See also Mayne 11th 
edi.pp.869-70, 905.
(2) Kollaney Looer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875)24 #.R.395; Lalit 
Mohun v. Chuk&an Lai (1897)24 I.A.76 at 8 8; Surajmani v. 
Kabinath (1907)35 I.A.17. The ratio was applied to both 
married women and widows - see 35 I.A.17 at 22. See also 
Fatech Chand v. Rupchand (1916)43 1.A.183; Bhaidas v. Bai
/,QQlUQ t.a.i at 6-7: Sasisman v. Shib Narayan (1921) 
Addition to p.ISS note 3 :
L  y v \ v \  j -j ^  -  •  *  »
- raes.,- • ,
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2 W.I.S.L.R.133.
3) Jagmohun v. Sri Nath (1930)57 1.A.291. ^Narsingh Rao v.
V* fi THpahiAfnwt^  #9 • X■ R • / 9 S ^ PrH* 7 ioTJ
’ — ----■ ~ -- " mmj
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exception to the general rule that gifted property is strxdhana 
unless a limited interest is specifically indicated by the 
donor.
Gifts from strangers form an exception, according to 
—  „ (1)Katyayana, to the usual rule that gifts constitute strxdhana.
But in the Courts it has always been accepted unhesitatingly
that such property is strxdhana of the female donee. In Bri j
(2)Indar v. Janki Koer it was decided by their Lordships of the 
Privy Council that property which is granted by the government 
to a widow and her heirs with full power of alienation becomes 
her strxdhana and devolves upon her heirs. Despite the argu­
ments of Mayne and Cowell to the contrary, Sir Barnes Peacock 
approved the definition of the Mitaksara^ which was ’the
Mahalateshmi (1928)55 I,A.180 was a peculiar case in which 
a testator had bequeathed his estate absolutely to his 
widow subject only to the ulterior disposition in favour 
of his son’s son who was unborn at the time of hie death. 
Their Lordships of the P.C. held that gift to unborn 
person being void the widow took an absolute interest as 
according to sections 28 and 30 of the f.P.Act invalidity 
of an ulterior disposition does not affect the prior 
disposition. In Basant Kumari v. Kamikshya (1905)33 Cal.
23 (gift to a sister) it was held that words of inheritance 
stating even an unusual order of succession would confer 
an absolute estate. But for a conditional gift to the 
contrary see Sham Shivender v. Janki (1908)36 I.A.I.
(1) Supra p.
(3) (1877)5 I.A.I.
(3) Supra pp. 77-7 ,^
170
(l)ordinary law1 applicable to this case and held that the 
property was strxdhana. However, Mayne and Cowell do not appear 
to have drawn the attention of their Lordships to the verse of 
Katyayana.
Similarly lands which are enfranchised in the name of a
widow as service inam or emoluments for the office of a karnam
have been held to be her absolute property and they devolve as
(2)strxdhana after the death of the woman concerned.
(1) Under the Oudh Estates Act I of 1869 s.22 clause 11 1 ordinary 
law1 would have governed the succession in this case. The 
ordinary law in this case was held to be the Mitaksara - see 
report at p.14. About the interpretation of the word 1adya1 
in Yajnavalkya1s verse Sir Barnes observed ”It was stated in 
the course of the arguments by the learned counsel for
Shankar B u x   that proper translation is 1 and the like1
or 1 and such like1. Xt does not appear to their Lordships
to be important whether this is so or not. The learned 
counsel may be correct. But the words ’and the like’ or 
’and such like’ would shew that the author did not intend to 
limit his definition to the particular kinds of property 
therein enumerated. This is very clear when the subsequent 
paragraphs are referred to.” - 5 X.A.l at 14. But see Chotay 
Lall’s case (6 I.A.15 at 51)
(2) Srinivasayyar v. Lakshmamma (1883)7 Mad.2.06; Bada v. Hassu 
(1883)7 Mad.236; Venkata v. Rama (1884)8 Mad.250 F.B. ; Ven- 
katarayunda v. Venkataramayya (1891)15 Mad.284; Dharniprag- 
ada v. Kadambari (1897)21 Mad.47; Salemma v. Lautchmanna 
(1897)21 Mad.100; Sub bar ay a v. Kamu Chetti (IS>00 )23 Mad.47; 
Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabhadrayya (1921)44 Mad.643 P.C.
The ratio of all these cases was that the land thus enfran­
chised becomes the personal property of the person to whom
they are granted. For the law about enfranchised lands see j
Madras Act IV of 1866 and Madras Act VIII of 1869 referred j
to in Pingala’s case (infr&J. In Venkata v. Rama the Madras j
Regulations of 1802, 1806 and 1831 were considered. The text i
of Katyayana was considered only in Salemma’s case wherein, <
pointing out the significant fact that Vijnanesvara does not 
refer to this text at all, Subramania Ayyar J. held that the >
broad definition in the Mitaksara must be preferred .especially }
as B^vanna and Madhava do not express any opinion on this point.
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Some of the decisions of the Madras High Court distin­
guished between a personal inara and a service inam and tried to 
establish that a title-deed does not confer a new and an absolute 
right in the enfranchised lands.  ^^  It is strange to find that a 
later decision of the Madras High Court has not followed the ratio 
of a previous Full Bench decision of the same High Court in this 
respect. ^ ^  in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabhadrayya, however, 
their Lordships of the Privy Council set this conflict at rest 
by overruling this later Full Bench decisions and held that such 
service inam do in fact form the personal property of the person 
in whose name they are granted and that no other member of the 
family of the karnam has any right in the same.
In all the above cases the gift or the grant proceeded 
from the government. But it has always been held that gifts also 
from strangers who are private persons constitute stridhana of
(1), Subba v. Nagayya (1901)25 Mad.424; Gunnaiyan v. Kamakchi 
(•003 )26 Mad.339; Vangla v. Vangla (1904)28 Mad.13; Pingala 
v. Bomireddipalli (1906)30 Mad.434 F.B.; In Vangala1s case 
the decision in Subba v . Magayya appears to have been un­
necessarily distinguished. In a foot-note to the former it 
has incorrectly been added that the latter is an unreported 
case.
(2) In Pingalafar case (supra) their Lordships of the Full Bench 
expressed that it was difficult to find any definite principle 
common to the majority of the judges in the previous Full Bench 
case of Venkata v. Rama (supra).
(3) (1921)44 Mad.643. See ibid at p.653 where theirLhrdships of
the P.O. have described^1full of perplexity’ the whole pro­
cedure whereby the later Full Bench of Madras High Court 
declined to follow the decision of a previous Full Bench of 
the same High Court• See also supra p.^ >l.
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(1)the female donee. It must be mentioned that the position of
the judicial law on this point is contrary to the sastric. lono.
Though the widow and other limited owners cannot take 
an asbolute interest in the inherited property their absolute 
right in the income of such property has never been doubted. But 
the question whether an accumulation of such income is to be re­
garded as strxdhana or not has not always received a uniform 
answer and it is submitted that even the decisions of their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council have not been consistent on this point.
(2)The oldest case appears to be Soorieemoney v. Denobundo 
wherein one Bustomdoss Mullick had devised his estate in equal 
shares to his five sons who stayed together as a joint family 
under the Dayabhaga school. He had provided in his will that on
the death of any of the sons the property should go to the surviv­
ing heirs and not to the heirs of such deceased son. One of the 
sons Surropchunder died and his widow claimed his one-fifth share
r
on the ground that he gained an absolute interest therein. Their 
Lordships of the Calcutta High Court decided that as Saroopchunder 
secured an absolute interest the widow was entitled to a one-fifth
part in the joint estate, to the accumulations on such one-fifth
part which accrued during the lifetime of Saroopchunder and to
(1) Bai Narmada v. Bhagwantrai (1888)12 Bom.505; Parvin Kumari 
v. Gokul Chand A.I.R. (194-9) East Punjab 35.
(2) (1862)9 M*I.A.123. For the facts and details of this case 
see Soorjeemoney v. Denobundoo (1857)6 M.I.A.526 at 529-32.
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* the interest and other profits* which accrued to these accumula-
(} )
tions after the death of Saroopchunder. * They gave her only a
limited interest in all this property. When the case came before
their Lordships of the Privy Council it was decided that as
Saroopchunder secured only a life-interest in the property the
widow was entitled only to the accumulations which accrued to his
share during his lifetime. But then it was added, " ... it ought
to be declared that the Appellant is entitled absolutely in her own
right to all such interest and accumulations as, since the death
of Saroopchunder Mullick, has or have arisen from the one-fifth
part of the accumulations to which she is before declared to have
been entitled. ”
Since the absolute right of the widow in these accumula-
C *3)tions was neither claimed in the plaint nor pressed before their
Lordships by the appellant’s counsel the decision on this point
appears to be somewhat sudden. Moreover although the widow has
deposed that ,fshe was excluded against her will from the family
(4 )
house”, this fact does not appear to have been the basis of 
their Lordships’ decision on this point.
(1) This being a case under the Dayabhaga school once it was
held that the will conferred absolute interest on Saroop­
chunder the widow became automatically entitled to claim 
his share by inheritance notwithstanding the clause in the 
will which made defeasible the interest of the son.
(2) 9 M.I.A.123 at pp.138-39.
(2) For the plaint see 6 M.I.A.526 supra.
(4) 9 M.I.A.123 at 126.
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Even after this decision of their Lordships of the Privy 
Council some of the decisions of the Calcutta High Court and a 
decision the Privy Council itself appear to have distinguished
(1)
between the yearly income of the estate and xts accumulations, 
and the view expressed was that the widow could not have an abso­
lute right in the accumulations or at least in the property pur­
chased out of such accumulations. In Bhagbutti v. Bholanath, Sir 
Robert Collier observed that "Whatever she purchased out of them
r~
(2)would be an increment to her husband* s estate.11
But since the decision of the Calcutta High Court in
(3)Pannalal v. Bamasundari the authority and the ratio of Soor- 
jamoney1s case was followed and it was never doubted that a widow 
could, if she had an intention to do so, convert the accumulations
(1) In Kailasnath Ghose v. Biswanath reported in the Englishman 
of the 2nd July 1859 (referred to and reprinted at the bottom 
of the report of Grose v. Amritamayi (1869)4 B.L.R.I at 42)
Sir Lawrence Peel remarked "Money in hand and accumulations 
are not the same thing." In Chandrabu11ee v. Mr. Brody (1868)
9 W.R.584 it was held that as accumulations were not mentioned 
in the six categories referred to by Jxmutavahana and as the 
widow is "most strictly enjoined to live a life of economy, 
austerity and seclusion" such accumulations can never be 
strxdhana. In Grose v. Amritamayi 4 B.L.R.I at 40 Macpherson 
J. observed that accumulations are to be treated as corpus 
only and referred to the above-mentioned remark of Sir Lawrence 
as his authority. The same view was adopted by their Lord­
ships of the P.C. in Bhagbutti v. Bholanath (1875)2 I.A.256.
(2) 2 I.A.256 supra at 260-63..
(3) (1871)6 B.L.R.732; Gonda Kooer v. Kooer Oodey Singh (1874)
4 B.L.R. 159 P.C.; Fuddo Monee v.^w^rkanath (1876)25 W.R.335.,
Isri Dutt v. Hanshutti (1883)10 Cal.325 P.C. This point has 
been accepted in all the decisions mentioned hereafter. But 
see Kulachandra v. Bamasundari (1914)41 Cal.870 at 874.
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and the purchases made out of them into her own absolute pro- 
perty devolving upon her own heirs as strTdhana.
In Isri Butt v. Hansbutti^  their Lordships of the
Privy Council observed that it is not '‘possible to lay down any
sharp definition of the line which separates accretion to the
husband’s estate from the income held in suspense in the hands
of the widow, as to which she has not determined whether or not
(2)she will spend it.” The question was then decided on the
facts as depending on the intention of the widow whether to treat 
the property as an accretion or not.^^
But the question as to what the presumption should be 
in case there is no evidence about the widow's intention, appears 
to be beset with difficulties. It has, however, been held that 
where a female limited owner acquires a life-estate under a 
written document like a gift-deed or a will, the proceeds of the 
estate will be the absolute property of the woman and would
(1) Supra 10 Cal.325 P.C.
(2) Ibid at p.337.
(3) The two co-widows in this case had gifted to the daughter
of one of them property which they had inherited from their
husband and the purchases which they had made afterwards out 
of the accumulations of the income. On the basis that the 
property was purchased immediately after the death, that it 
was not alienated for a long time and that both inherited 
and purchased property was alienated with an intention to 
change the line of succession from the husband's heirs to
the widow's heirs, their Lordships of the P.C. held that
clear intention Of accretion was established. Similar 
reasoning was adopted in Sheolochun Singh v. Saheb Singh 
(1887)14 Cal.387 P.C.; Kulachandra v. Bamasundari (1914)
41 Cal.870.
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devolve on her strxdhana heirs.
It has also always been held unanimously by all the 
High Courts that in a case where a female limited owner has been 
wrongfully withheld from possessing the estate or the accumulations,
the presumption would be in favour of such accumulations being
/ (B)treated as absolute property devolving as strTdhana* The dis­
tinction was created by following the supposed ratio of Soorjee- 
money1s case to the effect that the widow in that case was de­
clared to be entitled absolutely to the accumulations only because 
she was withheld from possession of the estate.
As regards the presumption to be accepted in a case 
where the limited owner has been in possession of property but 
wherein there has been no evidence as to the intention of the 
owner whether to treat it as an accretion or not there are two 
views. According to the first and relatively the older view if
(1) Bhagbutti v . Bholanath (1875)2 I.A.256; Bohini Mohun v. 
Rashbehari Ghose A.I.R.(1937)Cal.229. In the latter case 
it was observed, nthere was a separation of the income from 
the estate from the very start and she could not possibly 
express any intention to treat the income or the savings
as part of the estate.ft
(2) Soorjeeraoney v. Denobundoo (1862)9 M.J.A.123 as followed 
in Pannalal v. Bamasundari (1871)6 B.L.R.732; Saudamini v. 
Administrator General of Bengal (1893)20 I.A,12; Subramania 
v. Arunadhelam (1905)28 Mad.l F.B.; Venkatadri v. Parthas- 
arathi (1925)48 Mad.312; Ayiswaryanandaji v. Sivaji (1926) 
49 Mad.116 at 135-6 and 150. However, the decisions of the 
Madras High Court appear to have been based on a broader 
ground, namely, in absence of any evidence about the in­
tention of the widow the property should foe treated as 
strxdhana - see infra.
177
the female who is limited owner has not shown any specific in-
A
tention to keep the accumulations or the property purchased there­
from as her separate property, they should prima facie be consid­
ered as an accretion to the corpus of the property which she 
inherited.^  ^
According to the second and relatively a better view the 
presumption, in the absence of any evidence about the intention of
the limited owner, should be in favour of such property being
— (2) regarded as strTdhana.
(1) The view has its root in Gonda ICooer v. Kooer Oodey Singh 
(1874)4 B.L.R.159 P.C. at 165. In this case their Lordships 
of the P.C. distinguished Soorjeemoney's case on the grounds 
that it was a Bengal case and that "the accumulations of 
income to which the widow was declared absolutely entitled 
were the produce of a reserve fund." - Report at pp.164-65. 
See also Sheolochun v. Saheb Singh (1887)14 Cal.387 P.C.;
Kula Chandra v. Bama Sundari (1914)41 Cal.870; Naba Kishore 
v. Upendra Kishore A.I.R.1922 39 P.C.; Krishna Kumari v. 
Rajendra A.I.R.1927 Oudh 240; Bhugwan Das v. Bittan I.L.R. 
1945 All.148.
(2) Akkanna v. Venkayya (1901)25 Mad.351; Subramania v. Aruna- 
chelain (1905)28 Mad.1 F.B.; Venkatadri v. Parthasarathi 
(1925)48 Mad.312 P.C. at 324; Ayiswaryanandaji v. Sivaji 
(1925)49 Mad.116 at 150-51; Kailasanatha v. Parasakthi (1934) 
58 Mad.488 at 507; Rupabai v. Nokhesing A.I.R.1940 Nag.236; 
Prabhakar v. Sarubai A.I.R.1943 Nag.253; Laisingh v. Vithal- 
singh A.I.R.1950 Nag.62; Ganu v. Shriram A.I.R.1954 Nag.353. 
See also Sankarmurthia v. Oppanayana (1905)21 T.L.R.56; Lai 
Bahadur v. Sheo Narain (1913)16 Oudh Cases 359. In Keshav
v. Maruti (1921)46 Bom.37 the Bombay High Court appears to 
have adopted the view as expressed in Akkanna•s case. In 
many of these cases it has been pointed out that even the 
decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council have not 
been uniform on this point. - See supra 28 Mad.l F.B. at 5;
49 Mad.116 at 151; 58 Mad.488 at 497-505. In Venfcatadri * s 
case the female limited owner was not in possession of the 
property but that does not appear to be the ratio of the 
decision of their Lordships - see the discussion in Kailas- 
anath's case 58 Mad.4-88, For a similar view as regards
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In a recent case ^ ^  the Supreme Court does not appear 
to have clearly solved this problem. Their Lordships confirmed 
the previous position, namely, that each question is to be de­
cided on its own facts and that the decision depends upon the 
intention of the widow. The accumulations were treated as the 
absolute property of the widow in this case as a definite inten­
tion on her part was proved. But holding that there is no pre­
sumption that accumulations are accretion to the corpus their 
Lordships observed : nAs the reversioners can only claim the 
property which belonged to the propositus, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to establish that these properties formed the part of
(p)
Naubat Lai1 s estate.fl
Thus the opinion of their Lordships of the Supreme
Court appears to foe leaning towards the second view. The second
view is obviously a more reasonable, progressive and an equitable
view; for, presumptions must after all be based on general
experience : every acquirer of property has an intention to retain
( 3)dominion over it and a widow who cannot be an exception to 
the rule will have an intention in 99 out of 100 cases to keep
property purchased with the income out of the estate given 
for maintenance see Ham Das v. Ram Sevafc A.I.R.1935 Nag.362. 
See also Dakhina v. Jagadishwar (1997)2 C.W.N.197 for pre­
sumption in favour of strTdhana in cases there is no evidence 
that the property is bought out of the income of the husband1s 
estate.
(1) Sitaji v. Bijendrd A.I.R.1954 S.C.601.
(2) Ibid at p.605.
(3) See Akkanna v. Venkayya supra for a remark to this effect.
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(1)it separate. Moreover it cannot be forgotten that the first
i
view of the presumption is based on^erroneous interpretation of 
sastra that women do not take absolute estate in the property 
which they inherit.
i
j The next point to be considered is whether property
I
1 acquired by a woman by adverse possession is her stridhana. It
if
should be stated at the outset that adverse possession was known
(2)to the Hindu lawyers since the days of the smritis. According
to Yajnavalkya a person can acquire absolute title in immoveable
and moveable property by adverse possession of that property for
(3)twenty and ten years respectively. There appears to be no text
of the smritis which distinguishes between the male’s and female's
(4)capacity to acquire property by adverse possession. As accord­
ing to the current statutory law of India, so according to the 
old sastric law^the neglect of the rightful owner to challenge
(1) See 23 Mad.l F.B. supra at 5. In arecent case Yelu Servai 
v. Srinivasa M.L.J.(1956)II.60 the Madras High Court held 
that the construction of a house by a widow with her own 
funds on a vacant site forming a part of her husband's 
estate will not by itself prove accretion.
(2) However, adverse possession (bhoga) is different from 
seizure (parigraha) mentioned by Gautama as one of the modes 
of acquisition. Seizure is taking possession of property 
which did not belong to anybody before - see Haradatta's 
Mitaksara on Gau.10.38 and Mit.on Yaj.2.114. For mis­
understanding between the two see i>vf-r«t f? I3^i-
(3) Yaj.2.24. Vijnaesvara adds that adverse possession, though 
not mentioned by Gautama, is one of the modes of acquiring 
property as these modes themselves depend on popular usage. - 
Nir.Edi.p.136.
(4) But Hindu law does not allow adverse possession to be claimed 
against the property of the Crown, minors and women. - Yaj. 
2.25. Vi j hane svara say© that in all these cases there is 
some reason for the neglect of the rightful owner e.g. the 
King is too busy to take any objection and women are dull 
and ignorant•
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the wrongful possession of the tresspasser forms the basis of the 
acquirement of title by adverse possession* ^ ^  The decided cases, 
however, are based upon the modern law and not upon the concept as 
enunciated in Hindu law*
The question of woman's acquisition by adverse possess­
ion has proved to be a very intricate point upon ivhich the de­
cisions of the Courts in India have widely differed. Therefore 
it is necessary to examine individually the older decisions of 
their Lordships of the Privy Council.
(2)In Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram which appears to be
or not
the oldest case on the question whether such property is strxdhana,A
their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the question is to
be decided on the individual facts, and that it turns upon whether
she claimed the property absolutely or claimed merely a widow's
estate in the same. In this case, however, as the widow had
claimed hex* husband's property despite the existence of the son
it was held that she claimed an absolute interest and acquired
(3 )the property absolutely by adverse possession.
(4)In Mahabir Prasad v. Adhikari it was held by their
Lordships that where a widow of a sole surviving coparcerner 
gifted away the property to the other two widows of the family
(1) See Mit. on Yaj.2124 at p.136. See also (upeksa) stated in 
the above passage of the Mitaksara. Vi j hane s vara also says 
that the statement of the usurper,viz. : "If I have enjoyed 
the property of this person wrongfully why was this person 
quiet for such a long time?" would make the original owner 
dumbfound.
(2) (1894)22 Cal.445 P.C.
(3) The view of the Judicial Commissioner that she actually 
treated the property as her absolute property was accepted 
22 Cal.445 P.C.at 450.
(4) (1896)23 Cal.942 P.C,_________________________ _
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the latter acquired an absolute interest after the period of
/
limitation. The question about the intention of these widows was 
not discussed at all.
(1)In Sham Koer v. dahkoer their Lordships held that
where a widow who is not entitled to anything except maintenance
from a joint family property takes possession of such property in
her own right, she gains an absolute interest after the statutory 
(2)
period.v- The fact that a widowed daughter-in-law claimed the 
property under an alleged will was held sufficient to confer an 
absolute estate on her.
In Satgur Prasad v. Raj Kishore^^ wherein a widow had
come into possession of a joint family property as her husband's 
heir it was held that the widow gained an absolute interest in 
the property on account of her subsequent attitude of publicly 
claiming the property in her own right.
(1) (1902)29 Gal.664 P.C.
(2) In this case the joint family property of a sole surviving 
coparcener was taken possession of by his widow and widowed 
daughter-in-law in 1862. In 1876 in a suit between the 
widows and the reversioners the widows claimed the property 
under a will from the propositus. The H.C. decided that the 
widows could not be disturbed during their life-time. After 
the death of the widow in 1879 the daughter-in-law alienated 
the property in 1884. Held, that as the widows had claimed 
under the will, whether that position is tenable or not, the 
daughter-in-law acquired absolute title as her possession was 
adverse especially after the death of the widowed mother-in- 
law,
(5) (1919)42 All.152 P.C.
(4) Her brother-in-law had died as the last surviving coparcener. 
She got into possession in 1861 as her husband's heir. In 
1870 in a suit before the H.C* she claimed the property as 
her husband's heir and alternatively under a document pur­
porting to give her that property for her maintenance.
After having gifted the property in 1880 she died in 1895.
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(1)
Lajwanti v. Safa Chand is the next and perhaps the 
most important ease on this point. The facts of this case were 
as follows : One Jawahar Mai died and in 1869 in the litigation 
which followed Jawahar*s death his widows were held by their 
Lordships of the Pm njcib CKVcjt Court to be entitled to the widow's 
estate in certain villages which formed his separate property.
After the death of the last widow in 1910 the plaintiff claimed 
as a daughter of Jawahar whereas the defendants who were his male 
agnates sought to prove for the first time that he had a post­
humous son and claimed through him or alternatively they claimed
that the last widow took the property as strTdhana and that they
(2)were heirs preferrable to the plaintiff.
A© regards the first claim of the defendants their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council reversed the decree of the High Court 
and held that a posthumous son was in fact born to Jawahar but that 
his right was barred by the adverse possession of the widows. As 
regards the alternative claim they observed : "The Hindu widow, 
as often pointed out, is not a life-rentor, but has a widow’s 
estate - that is to say, a widow's estate in her deceased husband's
(1) (1924)51 I.A.171.
(2) The third widow survived the other two. The daughter was by 
the second widow whereas the posthumous son whose existence 
was totally disbelieved by the H.C. was by the first widow of 
Jawahar. It appears that even admitting that the property was 
strTdhana of the third widow the plaintiff would have succeed­
ed in preference to the defendants as a step-daughter is to
be preferred to the collaterals of the husband. - See infra
Addition to p.182 note 1 : See Br.J.D.M.Derrett : A strange Privy 
ouncxl decision and the Hindu Widows * Remarriage Act 1856, A.I.R. 
Journal ( 1 9 5 5 )  pp.10-20.
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estate. If possessing as widow she possesses adversely to any
one as to certain parcels, she does not acquire the parcels as
(1)strTdhana, but she makes them good to her husband’s estate.”
It is important to note that the widows enjoyed a
widow’s estate throughout their life under the decree of the High
(2)
Court and the point about the posthumous son was raised for 
the first time after the death of all the widows who, during
- -       miniri-i in • • ..i..*i«mniw  t - nm f- i~ rm------- —itii--------------- - ---- —  i ■' n nr ' n" 'n.iT in..i...i..<Min«iifw ■■■« T—-r— ■ r------------------------- ■■■■■■......i........-.-  ■   ■■i y i
their life-time, could never have claimed any other title except 
a widow’s estate. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had to 
hold the possession of the widows to be adverse as they believed 
that a posthumous son did in fact exist and held that the judge­
ment of the High Court which had conferred widow’s estate on 
them was wrong.
In three of the above-mentioned cases there was evidence, 
according to their Lordships of the Privy Council, that the female 
limited owners tried to establish an absolute title. In Lajwanti * s 
case, however, the widows had claimed, fought for and gained only 
a widow's estate and there could be no intention on their part to 
treat the property as strxdhana. It is also important to note 
that in Satgur Prasad’s case the widow, though she originally 
claimed only as her husband's heir, was held to have prescribed 
for an absolute estate because of her subsequent attitude of
(1) 51 I.A.171 at 176.
(2) The decree was given against the nephew of Jawahar Mai who 
tried to establish his alleged adoption to Jawahar Mai.
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(1)treating the property as her absolute property.
But when there is no evidence as to the nature of
iinterest which the widow wanted to prescribe for, the question
whether such property should be treated as her absolute property
or not, cannot be easily decided and the decisions under this head
can be grouped into two main views which are diametrically opposed
to each other.
According to the first view where a widow enters into
possession of any property over which she has no claims except
(2)for her maintenance 4 and there is no evidence about the intention 
of the widow as to the nature of the estate she wanted to pre­
scribe, the presumption is in favour of such property being treated 
as her absolute property unless the possession was the result of 
an arrangement with the reversioners. The fact that she claims
an interest by alleged right of inheritance does not affect this
( 3 )presumption unless the widow expressly limits her claim.
(1) See supra. The difficulty of interpreting these decisions 
is increased by the fact that none of them considers the 
judicial precedents on the same point.
(2) Such property may include the joint family property of the 
family to which the female belongs or the separate property 
of any of her male relatives which she is not entitled to 
as an heir.
(3) Uman Shankar (1923)45 All.729; Kali Churn v. Piari (1924)
4-6 All.769; Rikhadeo v. Sukhdeo (1927)49 All.713; Sant 
Bakhsh Singh v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh A.I.E.1931 Oudh 25;
Mt. Hubraji v. Chandrabuli A.I.E.1931 Oudh 89; Mathakutty 
v. Lakshmi (1931)48 T.L.R.18; 'Bh&gilal v. Ratilal A.I.R. 1939 
Bom.261; Ram Sarup Singh v. Mohun Singh I.L.R.1939 All.713; 
Patipal Singh v. Eampal Singh A.I.R.1940 Oudh 63; Udai
185
Pratap Singh v. Marotam Singh I.L.R.1946 Luck 143; Suraj 
Balli v. Tilakdhari (1927)7 Pat.163; Ulfat Rai v. Kamia 
Devi A • I.K. 194-9 All.458; Bheron Singh v. Ramchandra A.I.E.
1957 M.B. 138; Thai lamb al Ammal v. Kesavan Nail- A.I.R.1957 
Kerala 86 at 90. Only Uman Shankar's case has been decided 
before Lajwanti1s case. Udai Pratap's case has approved 
the following^ precedents of the same Court viz. Raj 
Bahadur v. Kandhaiya 4 0.W.N.350; Deo Dutt v. Raj Bali 
5 0.W.N.653; Ram Dulari v. Sher Bahadur 5 0.W.N.832;
Abdur Rahman v. Ahmadkhan 10 0.W.N.42. Suraj Balli*s case 
has followed Jagmohan v. Prayag (1925)P.L.T.206. The 
common ratio of all these decisions is that in the absence 
of any evidence about the way in which the widow claimed 
such property or got into possession, such property is to 
be treated as being strTdhana. However, according to Ram 
Sarup1s case the presumption is in favour of absolute estate 
unless she claims it by way of succession to the husband or 
son. In Suraj Balli1s case wherein a widow had taken poss­
ession of the property of her brother-in-law such presumption 
was held to exist unless it were shown that she took possess­
ion ' as representing her husband* s estate *• But the decisions 
in Uinan Shankar v. Mt. Aisha and Udai Pratap v. Narotam favour 
the view that even if the widow enters into possession claim­
ing it as an heir, the presumption is not affected. Ulfat 
Rai's case also appears to favour the same view. In other 
cases it is not stated whether such claim of inheritance shows 
an intention of restricting the claim only to a widow's estate. 
But most of the cases tend to take the view taken in Uman 
Shankar's case. In Kali Charan v. Piari their Lordships of 
the All.H.C. distinguished Lajwanti's case and observed :
"There have been recent and conspicuous instances of the 
danger of applying Privy Council decisions to points which 
they did not decide but which, in the language of Lord 
Halsbury, may seem to flow from them" 46 All.769 at 772. 
Where a widow had taken possession of joint family property 
their Lordships of the Bom.II.C. observed : "Moreover it seems 
unreasonable to assume that Bai Suraj who inherited no estate 
from her husband could benefit by her individual act an 
estate she did not represent on the principle stated in 26 
Bom.L.R.1179" (i.e. Lajwanti * s case). - A.I.E. 1939 Bom.261 
supra. In Udai Pratap * s case it was observed : "The-mere \> 
fact that a Hindu widow declares that she is in possession 
of such property by way of inheritance does not show that 
she declares herself to be in possession as a limited owner. 
The real view in such a case would be that she not being 
entitled to by way of inheritance, her possession must be 
deemed to be that of a trespasser and consequently adverse
(c
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According to the second view if a widow, who is not
entitled to any joint family property or to the property of a
relative (to whom she is not an heir), takes possession of such
property claiming it by way of inheritance she gains by adverse
(1)possession only widow1s estate in such property* This view
against the reversioners, unless they prove that it was 
with their consent." In Ulfat Rai' a case Mushtaq Ahmad J. 
enunciated five points the last two of which are as follows : 
"That the question of widow's possession as a limited owner 
can arise only if she claims through the last male owner, 
that is to say if she is his heir and not otherwise."; and 
"That a fortiori if she is not the heir of the last male 
owner, her possession is adverse to the latter*s heirs, and 
after the lapse of 12 years the property becomes her 
(strldhaiiyi descendible on her own heirs*" - A.I.E. 1949 All.
458 at 462. However, in a later case the same learned 
judge "feeling somewhat doubtful about the correctness of 
his decision" in Ulfat Rai's case referred the case to a 
divisional bench which ultimately followed the second view - 
see Jamuna Pandey v. Bansdeo Pandey A-I*R.1958 All.739. It 
is distressing to find that instead of referring any case on 
this point to the Full Bench their Lordships of the Allahabad
High Court have remained content with oscillating capriciously 
between the two views - see the cases below. Litigation on 
this point, therefore, must be considered to have been merely 
speculative in United Province since the decision in Dungar 
Singh v. Mt, Maid Kunwar A.I.E.1933 All.822. The presumption 
does not exist where the possession of the female is proved 
to be permissive or to be the outcome of a family arrange­
ment - see supra A.I.R.1931 Oudh 25; A.I.E.1931 Oudh 83 at 
96; A.I.R.1949 All.458 at 462.
(1) Dungar Singh v. Mt. Maid Iiunwar A.I.R.1933 All.822; Gaya
Din v. Badri Singh I.L.R.1943 All•230; Chandrabali v. Bhag- 
wan I.L .R .1944 All.533; Virabhadrappa v. VTrabhadrappa A.I.R. 
1947 Bom.1; Maganlalji v. purshottamlalji A.I.R. 1949 Bom.80; 
Gaya Din v. Mt. Amrauti A.I.R.1955 All.630; Gunderao v. 
Venkamma A.I.R.1955 Hyd.3 F.B.; Jamuna Pandey v. Bansdeo 
Pandey A.I.E.1958 All.739. The second view started with 
Dungar Singh's case which has been followed in almost all 
the later cases of this set. It must be stated that this 
case does not appear to have been rightly decided. In the 
first place, their Lordships have not noticed the contrary 
decision of their own High Court viz• Uman Shankar's case
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is in fact based on the doctrine that women generally take limited 
estate in heritance and such other property.^^
the ratio of which has been followed in the first set of 
cases. Secondly, the widow in this case, unlike the widow 
in Lajwanti's case, was alive and had executed several 
mortgage bonds before the one which was considered in this 
case. This clearly showed that she treated the suit- 
property as her absolute property and following Satgur 
Prasad's case it ought to have been held that she prescribed 
for an absolute estate notwithstanding her claim by way of 
inheritance. The later cases simply adopt the ratio of 
Dungar Singh's case, namely, where there is a claim by way 
of inheritance only limited estate is presumed to have been 
gained by the female "unless she specifically states that 
she claims an interest which a Hindu woman cannot acquire 
by inheritance under Hindu law." - I.L.R.1943 All.230 at 
236. The Hyderabad Full Bench decision has been given only 
by a majority of 3 to 2. In Virabhadrappa1s case their 
Lordships of the Bombay High Court have given a self-contra­
dictory decision. In this case a widow had taken possession 
of the joint family property of her father-in-law and it was 
held that as against the other joint members she had acquired 
title by adverse possession but that her title was a "title 
of the widow of a deceased separated member of the family" 
and that it went by succession to the heirs of the son who 
was adopted to her husband. The decision is highly illogical 
in as much as it involves a fiction that the widow carved out 
from the joint family property an absolute interest in favour 
of her husband and then carved out for herself a widow's 
estate from such interest leaving the rest for the benefit of 
the reversioners of the husband. It must be submitted that 
if a widow in such a position is held to have prescribed for 
a limited estate the property must go back into the joint 
family property after her death, or, if she is held to have 
prescribed for an absolute estate the property must be held 
to devolve upon her own heirs and not upon the heirs of the 
* Kand. Their Lordships could not possibly hold that the
p. 187: In Mst. :<.irpal Kuar v. Bachan Singh (1958) S.C.J.439 their Lord­
ships of tne Supreme Court held that the possession of the widow of 
a edeceased son which is not proved to have been under any arran^ment 
wich the heirs of the deceased or under a claim as the heir of the 
deceased, must be taken to be adverse to the reversioners.
W T T — — —1 ■' ■“ - r , ■» ..... . , ul ,  _ _ _  ___
stated above.
(1) See Thailambal Animal v. Kesavan Nair A.I.R.1957 Kerala 85 
at 90.
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cases. Secondly, the widow in this case, unlike the widow 
in Lajwanti's case, was alive and had executed several 
mortgage bonds before the one which was considered in this 
case. This clearly showed that she treated the suit- 
property as her absolute property and following Satgur 
Prasad's case it ought to have been held that she prescribed 
for an absolute estate notwithstanding her claim by way of 
inheritance. The later cases simply adopt the ratio of 
Dungar Singh's case, namely, where there is a claim by way 
of inheritance only limited estate is presumed to have been 
gained by the female "unless she specifically states that 
she claims an interest which a Hindu woman cannot acquire 
by inheritance under Hindu law." - I.L.R.1943 All.230 at 
236. The Hyderabad Full Bench decision has been given only 
by a majority of 3 to 2. In Virabhadrappa's case their 
Lordships of the Bombay High Court have given a self-contra­
dictory decision. In this case a widow had taken possession 
of the joint family property of her father-in-law and it was 
held that as against the other joint members she had acquired 
title by adverse possession but that her title was a "title 
of the widow of a deceased separated member of the family" 
and that it went by succession to the heirs of the son who 
was adopted to her husband. The decision is highly illogical 
in as much as it involves a fiction that the widow carved out 
from the joint family property an absolute interest in favour 
of her husband and then carved out for herself a widow's 
estate from such interest leaving the rest for the benefit of 
the reversioners of the husband. It must be submitted that 
if a widow in such a position is held to have prescribed for 
a limited estate the property must go back into the joint 
family property after her death, or, if she is held to have 
prescribed for an absolute estate the property must be held 
to devolve upon her own heirs and not upon the heirs of the 
husband. Their Lordships could not possibly hold that the 
widow prescribed for a limited estate; for in that case 
their decision would have directly come under the teeth of 
their previous decision to the contrary - see bhogilal v. 
Ratilal supra. Hence if they did not want to follow their 
own precedent they could have resorted to the second alter- 
native but they came out with a confusing conelusion as 
stated above.
(1) See Thailambal Ammal v. Kesavan Nair A.I.R.1957 Kerala 85 
at 90.
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It is submitted that looking to the facts of Lajwanti’s 
case the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council does not 
appear to support the second view at all. The widows in that case 
were entitled to such possession as heirs under the decree of the 
High Court and throughout their lives they owned the property 
under a legal title of heirship. It xvas only long after their 
death that a birth of a posthumous son was proved which automatic­
ally attributed ; : incorrectness to the decision of the
High Court and changed the nature of their possession. On the 
other hand in all the cases coming under the second set the female 
owners were not entitled to possession of the property at all.
They might have claimed the property, in some cases, by way of 
inheritance but that is altogetherly a different thing; for in a 
claim by adverse possession the ostensible title of a usurper has 
nothing to do with the title acquired by adverse possession unless 
the ostensible title is a result of force, fraud etc. For instance 
a person who is in wrongful possession of a particular property 
under an alleged claim that the property was gifted over to him 
by the rightful owner, shall acquire an absolute interest in it 
after the statutory period irrespective of the fact whether the 
deed of gift was void or not. His title would be. perfect and 
absolute after the statutory period even if he had no title or 
a defective title under the deed of gift.^^ There is no reason
(1) See Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal (1920)46 I.A.285 and
Mt.Maluka v. Pateswar A.I.R.1926 Oudh 371 F.B• in which the
females had entered into possession under an alleged oral 
gift of immoveable property. It was held that the deeds of
gifts were void but that^presumption conferred on the females
absolute title in the property which devolved upon their heirs*
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therefore why a female who apparently claims certain property hy
way of inheritance but becomes entitled to it by adverse possession
should be considered as having gained only that much interest in
the property which she would have gained if she had become en»
(1)titled to that property by way of inheritance*
It has already been seen that Katyayana's provision as
regards gifts from strangers has been disregarded by the Courts
and that such property has always been considered as being 
- (2)stridhana. The other category of woman's property which has
been declared by Eatyayana to be not stridhana, namely, property 
acquired by a woman by labour or skill, has also been accepted \ 
by the Courts as being stridhana. So also the wife's inter­
est in the property jointly acquired in trade by husband and wife
(4)is stridhana. Similarly the absolute property of a prostitute
(1) For possession ceasing to be adverse before the completion 
of the statutory period see Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathna- 
mmal (1920)46 I.A.285; Dhurjati v. Ram Bharos (1929)52 All. 
222. For* res Judicata on this point see Bansidhar v. 
Dulhatia (1925)47 All.505.
(2) Supra pp. {(>3- H Z  .
(3) Bai Narmada v. Bhagwantrai (1818)12 Bom.505; Sunder Devi v. 
Thaboo Lai A.I.R.1957 All.215; Mumumma v. Krishna A.I.R.
1933 Rang.347; Madaswami v. Madhavan T.L.R.(1947)822; Naji 
v. Ealiani (1889)12 Mys.L.R.54 (property acquired by a 
maiden).
(4) Muthu Ramakrishna v. Marimuthu (1915)38 Mad.1036. The Court 
following Salemma's case (21 Mad.loo supra) held that a 
woman can acquire property by any mode which is open to a 
male. Reliance was placed on the authority of Mayr who 
adduces , many passages in the Vedas which show that in 
those days women persued independent occupations and 
acquired property thereby. - Report at p.1039. Katyayana's 
text was referred to but the opinion of Mitra Misra, namely, 
such property is stridhana, is accepted.
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is her stridhana.^^ So also property which has been acquired
—  ( 2 )by a woman under a compromise decree is her stridhana. So is
property which is given to her absolutely as a result of a family 
settlement.^
Only those categories of stridhana concerning which 
highly conflicting decisions were given by the different Courts, 
were considered in the hitherto discussion. The categories which 
have been mentioned in the Smritis or categories of the so-called 
technical stridhana have always been recognised unhesitatingly 
by the Courts. Accordingly moveable or immoveable property given
(1) Tripura Charan v. Barimati (1911)38 Cal.493. Property given 
to a woman by her paramour is stridhana if given after her 
husband's death - Saraswati Bai v. ICashiram (1884)4 C.P.L.R. 
43. In Maharana v. Thakur Pershad (1911)14 Oudh Cases 234, 
it was held that property given to a woman by her paramour's 
brother cannot technically be called stridhana but that it 
devolves upon her own heirs.
(2) Raj Rajeshar v. Bar Eishen A.I.E.1933 Oudh 170; Kuppammal
v. Rukmani A.I.R.1946 Mad.164. In this case the amount given 
to the relatives of the deceased as compensation for his 
death by accident was distributed amongst them and the share 
of the mother and the daughter of the deceased was considered 
to be stridhana. On the principle embodied in the then pro­
posed bill for the Hindu code the daughter was given only 
half the share of the son.
(3) Vatsalabai v. Vasudeo A.I.R.1932 Bom.83. But property which 
a woman received under a compromise 'for her sole, absolute 
and exclusive use* from her husband's relatives whom she had 
sued for 'her share and proportion in the right of her 
husband1 was held by their Lordships of the P.C. to be not 
stridhana. - Rabutty v. Sibchunder (1854)6 M.I.A.l. Looking 
to the document, however, it appears that the judgement of 
the H.C. which their Lordships reversed in this case was a 
correct one. In Dulhin Parbati v. Baijnath (1935)14 Par.518 
Mohamood J. gave a queer decision and held that where two co­
widows divide their inherited estate and hold it is severc^tty 
after relinquishing the right of succession to each other'£ 
share the share of any of those co-widows, on her death, is, 
for all practical purposes, stridhana and would devolve upon 
her heirs who would be entitled to hold it as long as the 
other co-widow is alive.
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or bequeathed^ ^ to a woman by her brother, ^ mother, father^^
etc. has always been considered as stridhana.
Similarly whatever the first wife receives from her
husband on the occasion of his second marriage, whether gained
(5)under a threat or otherwise, is her stridhana.
A woman's dower is her stridhana and so also are all
(6)gifts which a bride receives from the bridegroom or his family.
(7)
But in Surayya v. nalakrishna.yya it was held that such stridhana 
cannot be called sulka. Observing that sulka was originally a
(1) Property bequeathed is considered to be equal to property 
given by gift inter vivos - Judoonath v. Bussunt (1873)11 
B.L.R.286; Prankissen v. Nayanmoney (1879)5 Cal.222.
(2) Gosaien v. Kishenmunnee (1836)Mac.Rep.Vol.IV.77; Munia v. 
Puran (1883)5 All.310 F.B.
(3) Prankissen v. Nayanmoney (1879)5 Cal .222.
(4) Janku v. Zeboo A.I.R. 1956 Nag.550 (gifts made by the father 
to his daughter at the time of her marriage were considered 
to be stridhana notwithstanding an unsuccessful attempt to 
prove a custom amongst the Kunbis to the contrary). See 
also Daolut v. Nand Lall (1895)9 C.P.L.R.95; Sun,jeevappa v. 
Nimba Jetty (1928)6 Mys.L.J.379. For ukanthudama gifts in 
Kerala, arising Kumkuma gifts in Mysore and hathgarna grants 
in Kathiawar respectively see Christianiseri v. Ghanaprak- 
asam (1904)20 T.L.R.215; Chenna v. Kempamma (1936)14 Mys. 
L.J.456; Government resolution concerning Kumribai's appli­
cation H 909)20 K.L.R.145. According to a custom amongst
A uition to p. 191 note 4 : Where a landed estate is settled on a woman 
for £asupukumkuma' she gets an absolute estate therein Chatrathi 
Jagannadti.a Rao v. Jatmal Madanlal Jakotia Firm A.I.R.1958 And.Pra.662.
Ramdulol v. Joymoney (1816)2 Mor.Dig.65.
(5) Oodey Cower v. Mohun Lall (1791) Montrion p.311.
(6) Manukchand v. Prerakoonwur (1822)Borr.II.321; Surayya v. 
Balakrishnayya A.I.R.1941 Lad.618; Venkata Reddi v. Sankara 
Reddi A.I.R.1955 Andhra 31.
(7) Supra.
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or bequeathed^^ to a woman by her brother, mother, father^^
etc. has always been considered as stridhana.
Similarly whatever the first wife receives from her
husband on the occasion of his second marriage, whether gained
(5)under a threat or otherwise, is her stridhana.
A woman’s dower is her stridhana and so also are all
(6)gifts which a bride receives from the bridegroom or his family.
(7)
But m  Surayya v. Balakrishnayya it was held that such stridhana 
cannot be called sulka. Observing that sulka was originally a
(1) Property bequeathed is considered to be equal to property 
given by gift inter vivos - Judoonath v. Bussunt (1873)11 
B.L.R.286; Prankissen v. Nayanmoney (1879)5 Cal.222.
(2) Gosaien v. Kishenmunnee (1836)Mac.Rep.Vol.IV.77; Munia v. 
Puran (1883)5 All.310 F.B.
(3) Prankissen v. Nayanmoney (1879)5 Cal .222.
(4) Janku v. Zeboo A.I.R. 1936 Nag.350 (gifts made by the father 
to his daughter at the time of her marriage were considered 
to be strTdhana notwithstanding an unsuccessful attempt to 
prove a custom amongst the Kunbis to the contrary). See 
also Daolut v. Nand Lall (1895)9 C.P.L.R.95; Sunjeevappa v. 
Nimba Jetty (1928)6 Mys.L.J.379. For ukanthudama gifts in 
Kerala, arising Kumkuma gifts in Mysore and hathgarna grants 
in Kathiawar respectively see Christianiseri v. Ghanaprak- 
asam (1904)20 T.L.R.215; Chenna v. Kempamma (1936)14 Mys. 
L.J.456; Government resolution concerning Kuniribai's appli-
—  cation (1909)20 K.L.R.145. According to a custom amongst 
. the Nattukottai Chetty community all the property which a 
woman receives at the time of her marriage is her strTdhana.- 
Palaniappa v. Chokalingam (1929)M.L.J.817. A legacy given 
to a woman by her husband's relations is her strTdhana - 
Ramdulol v. Joymoney (1816)2 Mor.Dig.65.
(5) Oodey Cower v. Mohun Lall (1791) Montrion p.311.
(6) Manukchand v. Premkoonwur (1822)Borr.II.321; Surayya v. 
Balakrishnayya A.I.R.1941 Mad.618; Venkata Reddi v. Sankara 
Reddi A.I.R.1955 Andhra 31.
(7) Supra.
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gratuity paid only to the bride’s father which was later on trans-
(1)formed into a gift to the bride herself Horwill J . relied, for
his decision, upon Mayne who argues : sulka in the sense of bride-
price is obsolete; for, if it is paid to the bride’s father it
is not strTdhana at all and if it is paid to the bride herself
(2)it is only ordinary strTdhana. In the first place, the very
fact that the sastra does in fact recognise as sulka property
’ ( 3 )which a bridegroom gives to the bride or her father clearly
proves that the dilemma posed by Mayne is entirely fanciful.
Secondly, it’ is incorrect to say that sulka in the sense of bride-
price is obsolete in India for paying foride-price is almost an
invariable rule amongst the millions of the aborigins of India
(4 )like the Santals, the Gonds, the Bhils etc• It is quite common
(1) Trevelyan 3rd Edi.p.475 and Ghose’s Hindu law Vo1.1.p.331 
were referred to as authority for this statement. Holding 
that the Mita!c~~§ara definition ought to be read with the 
definition in the Smritichandrika Horwill J. observed that 
sulka is possible also in the Brahma form of marriage. But 
he further remarked that such presents to the bride are not 
sulka unless they are ’’not tainted with the idea of purchase.H
(2) Mayne 10th Edi.p.755 was relied on. See also 11th Edi.p. "7^3.
(3) Manu 3.31 read with 3.51 and 3.54 shows that sulka is some-
thing paid by the bridegroom to the bride1s father etc. See
vfalso supra pp.~X for the different definitions of sulka
Jf) which prove that sulka is also something which is given
-ft } / directly to the bride herself. In Meenakshi v. Narayana
%nj * pp. 31°-4 (2891)8 T.L.R. 112 it was observed that sulka is property
,617, j received by the bride’s parents etc. in trust for the bride
6^3o-31 J  ierself. However, sulka is not to be confused with vara-
sulka or varadaksina which is often called in the South* *
strldhanam. The latter is nuptial property given to the 
bridegroom by the bride's party and becomes the exclusive
property of the bridegroom - Vishnu Savithri v. ICrishnau
(1909)25 T.L.R.196; Thandaveswara v. Sundaram T.L.R.(1946)
224 F.B.
(4) Infra pp. 63<>-3/ .
193
—  (1)also amongst the lower classes in Maharastra, Gu j i-qtqetc.
Therefore it is evident that any kind of gratuity paid by the
bridegroom or his party to the bride or her parents must be
treated as the sulka of the bride.
Ornaments which are given to a woman are her stridhana
if they are given to her unreservedly and, for the jjurpose of
being treated as stridhana, if is not necessary that they should
(2)be constantly worn by the owner woman. When, given during the
celebration of marriage the precise occasion or ceremony at which
they are given is not at all important in determining whether
—  ( 3)they are stridhana or not. The value of such unproductive
strTdhana like ornaments is not to be taken into consideration
in settling the amount of the owner's maintenance in (proceedings
(4) S..instituted by her.
(5)Money given to a woman by her mother or any of her
(1) See for instance, infra p clJLo Q .
(2) Radha v. Bisheshur N.W.F.P.H.C.R.(1874)p.279. But if they 
are not proved to have been given to her absolutely they do 
not constitute strTdhana - Sharad Boyee v. Ragharendra (1385( 
9 Mys.L.R.244; Mi.Mitha Bai v. Bhikori Laila (1887)2 C.P.L.R. 
42.
(3) Hanuman v. Tulsubai A.I.R.1956 Nag.63. See also Bistoo 
Pershad v. Radha v. Soonder (1871)16 W.R.115 for a similar 
ratio whereby it was held that property given by the father 
at the time of marriage of the bride is to be called 'gift 
before the nuptial fire' whether it is actually given before 
such fire or not. It seems Mitra Misra rightly treats the 
words like 'adhyagni* etc. as possessing a semi-technical 
meaning - see supra p.79.
(4) Gurushidappa v. Parwatevva A.I.R.1937 Bom.135; Krishna,ji v» 
Anusaya A.I.R.1939 Nag.130. See also Parvathy v. Chinna- 
thumby (1886)4 T.L.R.4 at 17; Narayana v. Kuppachi (1899)15 
T.L.R.45; Anantha v. Chandamma (1911)17 Mys.C.C.R.92.
(5) Doorga v. Tejoo (1866)5 W.R.S3.
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husband’s relatives is stridhana. So is any lump sum given as
arrears of maintenanceor 'in quit of her maintenance'.^^
Though the property given to a woman for her maintenance is
usually not her strTdhana such property is her stridhana if it
is given together with a responsibility for the discharge of
(4)certain debts of the deceased. Moreover the income of sucn
property and purchases made out of the accumulations of such
— (5)income are her stridhana. Thus for this purpose under the
(6)
Treasury Trove Act property found by a woman would be her
absolute property. Such property comes under the Mitaksara head-
—  (7)ing 'finding' (adhigama) and hence it would become her stridhana. 
Property acquired by a woman by 'seizure' (parigraha) which is 
hardly different from property acquired by 'finding* would also 
be considered as being stridhana.^ It is thus clear that with
(1) Ramdulol v. Joymoney (1816)2 Mor.Dig.65.
(2) The Court of 'Yards v. Mohessur (1871)16 Y.R.76; Rajamma v. 
Varadarajulu A.I.R.1957 Mad.198.
(3) Nellaikumaru v. Marakathammal (1876)1 Mad.166.
(4) Sahab Rai v. Shafiq Ahmad (1927)10 C.W.M.972 P.C.
(5) Ram Das v. Ram Sewalc A.I.R. 1935 Oudh 362.
(6) Act IV of 1878.
(7) Subraminia v. Arunachelam (1905)28 Mad.l F.B.
(8) Ibid at p.7. However, the learned O.C.J.Sir Subramania Ayyar
considers property acquired by 'seizure' to be property 
acquired by adverse possession. This is, of course, incorrect 
- see supra p.f/Qnote . Vijnanesvara and his followers 
explain 'seizure* as taking possession of such property like 
water reservoirs, grass, fuel etc. which had no previous
owner and 'finding' as discovering (hidden and, of course,
unclaimed) treasures. - See Mit.on Yaj.2.114. Thus there is 
hardly any difference between the two. Objecting that the 
two definitions in that case become redundent MaskarT defines 
'seizure' itself as strTdhana - Maskari on Gau.10.38. But
seizure' is a mode of acquiring property and not a kind of 
property.
the exception of property inherited by a woman and property 
obtained by her on partition the Mitaksara definition of stridhana 
has been accepted almost totally by ail the courts in India.
The question whether there is any presumption, in the 
absence of any evidence, as regards the nature of property stand­
ing in the name of, or in possession of, a woman is an important 
one. At first in Bengal it was held that it is for the person
who asserts such property to be strTdhana to prove so specifical-
(1)ly. It was observed m  George Lamb v. Govind Money that ”A
\
wife, in a Hindu family, setting forward a title on a purchase
by means of her own streedhun as exempting particular property
from responsibility for her husband’s debts, is bound to prove
her allegations, first by showing that she really had streedhun
funds or other means, and next, by establishing on the best
attainable evidence, that the property in question was purchased
by her with those means.”
Their Lordships of the Madras High Court, however, held
that the presumption in such case is in favour of holding such
property as being strTdhana and that it is for the opposing
(2)
party to prove that it is not so. The Madras view was later
on accepted by the Calcutta High Court and was also approved by
(1) S.B.A.Beng.(1852)125 at 128; see also Brejomohun v. 
Rathakumari (1864)W.R.60; Chunder Monee v. Joykissen (1864)
1 SNR. 107.
(2) Kullammal v. Kupu (l#6^ -)l M.H.C.R.85,
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(1)their Lordships of the Privy Council in Diwan Ram v. Indarpal 
wherein their Lordships held that notwithstanding the fact that 
the husband*s estate at his death is shown to have been consider­
able the onus of proof does not shift from the reversioners 
unless the widow*s title is shown to have accrued otherwise.
From all the above discussion it is clear that the 
modern trend of the Courts in India was much more liberal than 
the one they had in the 19th century and that a more equitable 
view of treating men and women as being equal in the eyes of the 
law was already gaining ground before the recent codification in 
India commenced. Some inequalities remained, and it remains to 
be seen how far Parliament has succeeded in its attempt to 
eradicate them. Having surveyed the development and the pre­
enactment position of the law concerning acquisition of strxdhana 
it is now necessary to turn to the history of woman's right of 
disposing of her strxdhana.
(1) (1899)26 I.A.226. This view has also been followed in
Narayana v. Krishna (1884)8 Mad.214 (government promissory 
notes standing in the name of female member of a joint 
Hindu family is her strxdhana); Dakhina v. Jagdishwar 
(1897)2 C.tif.N. 197 (even in the absence of proof that the 
property was bought with the income of husband's estate 
it is strxdhana); Ram Kinkar v. Commissioner of Income- 
Tax A.I.R.1936 Pat.267 (the income accruing to the name of 
a woman in her capacity cannot be assessed for income-tax 
in the name of her husband as such income is her absolute 
property); Sisir Kumud v. Jogneswar (1937)42 C.W.N.359. 
See also Sitaji v. Bijendra A.I.R.1954 S.C.601 at 605 
quoted supra p.{78.
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It has already been shown that the ancient law-givers of
the Hindus believed in complete dependence of women and their
complete incapacity to own property and that these two doctrines
generally receded into the background with the growing concept of
(1)strxdhana. The earliest smriti literature represents a trans­
itional stage: the very sages like Manu and Yajnavalkya who de-
(2)
clare complete dependence of woman also declare her to be
entitled to her strxdhana, which is her exclusive and absolute
property. The later law-givers who continued to presume women
to be dependent and ignorant were probably alarmed by the extensive
and rapid growth of the categories of strxdhana and thought of
protecting the interest of women by adopting two methods: firstly,
by following the provision of Manu whereby he prohibits relations
(3)of women from usurping the latters1 property and secondly, -
this was a new method - by reserving only a part of strxdhana to
be at the absolute disposal of women. By this second device the
alienation of the other part of strxdhana, which could be a result
of a possible fraud, coercion or deceit of the proposed alienee,
was allowed subject only to the approval of some other person
(4)havxng supervxsory capacxty.
(1) See supra pp. *>1,
(2) Manu IX.3,"Yaj.1.85.
( 3 ) See infra.
( 4 ) According to Medhatithi this device also prohibited women 
from subsequently repudiating their own transactions by 
subsequently pleading ignorance as an excuse. "Kevaiaya 
Krite karye nahaiji Kihchij janami tvaya vipra 1 abdh asm xti 
vachanasyavasaratvat. Bhartradyanumatau tu kim vaksyati.u - 
Me dh. on Manu VIII.163. From the word * bhartradi1 it appears 
that according to him even relations other than the husband 
have a right to control alienations by women - a suggestion 
which is emphatically repudiated by other authors. See infra.
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But the diverse provisions of the smrtis adopting this 
second method added intricacies to the conflict between the 
doctrine of dependence and the concept of strxdhana. The com­
mentators who apparently had to co-ordinate and co-relate ail
the smritis with each other according to the rules of interpre-
_  (1) 
tation laid down by the Mimamsa or Hindu Jurisprudence. viewed
this conflict from different angles. The question of the extent
of women’s right to dispose of their projjerty independently
became as controversial as the question of the extent of strxdhana
itself and the two schools resolved the conflict in two different
ways. The Bengal school limits the word strTdhana to categories
expressly mentioned in the smritis but with regard to those
categories it confers full right of disposal upon the woman.
The Mitaksara sub-schools with the exception of the Mithila
school are generally inclined to extent! with varying degrees the
term stridhana to include many categories which are not mentioned
in the smritis; but according to these sub-schools women do not
necessarily possess an absolute right of disposal in all their
strxdhana. Thus as the right to dispose of one's own property
has been separated from right to own it absoluiey it is necessary
to examine the various provisions concerning the former.
(1) For these see supra
This question may he sub-divided into the following 
questions:-
(1) Is there any property over which women always have an 
absolute right of disposal?
(2) What restrictions, if any, are placed upon the right of 
women to dispose of their own stridhana?
(3) Has anybody other than the women themselves any right in 
strTdhana which belongs to 'ttaevn?
(4) Whether the status of women affects their right to dispose
-  (1) of their stridhana?
It ought to be noted that Manu does not declare par­
ticular kind of strTdhana to be at the absolute disposal of
(2)
women. He forbids relations of women to usurp their strTdhana 
and, unlike Ya jhavalkya, does not authorise even the husband 
of a woman to utilise her strTdhana in exceptional circumstances. 
But in fact he does not include in strTdhana anything except 
gifts made to a woman on different occasions. Hence it may 
reasonably, though the argument ex silentio has its dangers, be 
inferred that according to Manu all the strTdhana of a woman is 
at her absolute disposal.
(1) Question No.4 could have been phrased as a sub-question 
to question No.1 but it has been considered separately 
as the answer to question No.3 is helpful in considering 
question No.4
(2) Manu III.52 and ¥111.29 infra.
(3) Yaj. II.148 see infra.
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The distinction between stridhana which is at the
absolute disposal of a woman and the rest of her stridhana does
not appear to have been anticipated either by Visnu or Yajna-
(1)valkya. However, on the subject of saudayika Katyayana
declares : "It is well-known that women always have freedom to
sell or give away at pleasure their saudayika even consisting of
(2)
immoveable property♦ " It is obvious therefore that the
distinction between saudayika and non-saudayika has been intro­
duced into Hindu law at a later stage with a view to adopt the 
second device of protecting women's interest. The question why 
only saudayika has been kept at the absolute disposal of women 
does not appear to be without an answer* Saudayika is property 
which is given to a woman by her relatives as a sort of security 
for her maintenance in case of distress and one would reasonably 
expect the relatives to be vigilant in watching whether at any 
time the object behind the original gift is standing in the danger 
of being frustrated. If under the garb of an alienation a woman 
is being deprived of her saudayika by a designing person her 
relatives would naturally advise her not to part with her property
indiscreetly and if she persists in her folly they would be slow 
S uch
to make^gifts any further.
(1) For the definition of saudayika see supra p . 7J , fexlr gj .
(2) Katyayana referred to in Vi.Mi.544 etc. See the appendix 
text Mo.58•
(3) See supra H o.5 7.
/
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It is important to remember another text of Katyayana,
wherein he declares that wealth earned by women and gifts given
to them by strangers are not stridhana while the rest is 
- (1)stridhana. The co-relation of this text with the above text
about saudayika is most illuminating for the purpose of assessing
women’s right of disposing of their own strTdhana; for, in
attempting to correlate these two texts different commentators
have arrived at different conclusions which will be considered
below. However, from Katyayana's own point of view it seems that
saudayika is not the whole of stridhana but only a part of it.
If he considered saudayika itself to be the sum total of strTdhana
he would expressly have said so. Therefore the word ’rest*
(sesam) in the above text does not represent saudayika alone.
However, there is one exception to the rule that women
can freely dispose of their saudayika. . Narada says :
’’Whatever has been given to a woman by her husband through affection
she may enjoy or give away at her pleasure even after his death
(2)
except immoveable property.” “* Co-relating this text with
Katyayana’s text about saudayika all commentators admit that
except immoveables given by the husband a woman can alienate at
pleasure all her immoveable property having the character of
—  (3)saudayika. Devannabhatta in fact cites a text of Katyayana
(1) See supra p.*7If
(2) Na.Smr .!¥. 28, Na.Sam.II. 24. See the appendix text No.lf-O.
(3) ’’Svancha saudayike SthavaretaraprTtidatte cha strTnam 
svatantryam” - Smr.Cha.556, see also Sa.Vi.379.
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according to which immoveables given to a woman by her father-in-
(1)
law etc. appear to be at her absolute disposal.
It cannot be doubted that notwithstanding the text of
Narada women can, with the consent of the husband himself, dispose
of immoveable property given by him. For she only does not have
independent control (svatantrya) over such immoveable property
whereas in respect of moveable property given by the husband she
( 2)enjoys full independence as the word 'yathakamam* indicates.
Once such immoveable property is alienated by a woman with the 
consent of her husband and during his life-time the question
whether in the hands of the woman such property was stridhana or
not cannot affect the validity of the transaction; for, the
woman, her husband, the alienee and all persons claiming through
either of them would be estopped from challenging the validity of 
the transaction. But the question whether a woman can alienate 
such property after her husband’s death but with his previous 
consent is a more intricate one. The answer to it depends upon 
whether the restriction as regards immoveables given by the husband
is considered as a mandatory (Kratvartha) or merelyArecommenda-
* (3)tory (purusartha) provision. But since the restriction regard­
ing the immoveable property is not the main but the incidental
(1) Katyayana cited in Smr.Cha.679 <*v\d 'Bod* ov\ Yaj ■ 7j['
(2) "Yathakamamityanena s vat ant ry amulet am" - Smr.Cha.656;
Sa.Vi.378.
(3) For ICratvartha and purusartha see supra pp. |o-|J.
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object of the injunction contained, in this verse, it is better to
(1)suppose that it is of a recommendatory nature. Moreover when
the husband can give his self-acquired property to a stranger with 
absolute right of disposal thereof there appears to be no reason 
why he cannot rectify any inherent deficiency in his wife's right 
to alienate immoveable property given by himself.
The reason of this restriction on alienation of immove­
able property given by the husband appears to lie in the presump- 
tion that the husband, when he gives immoveable property to his 
wife, in fact always reserves his own right to resume the ownership 
of the property in case he requires it for his own needs. Such 
presumption cannot exist in the case of gifts made over by other 
relatives of a woman; for those gifts are specially given for the 
welfare of the woman and for her maintenance whereas the husband
is always bound to look after the welfare of his wife and to
■d f , . . (2) This responsibility of the husbandprovxde for her maintenance. J
exists quite irrespective of the gifts which he might have already 
given to his wife. So the lav/ while it burdens the husband with 
greater responsibilities also gives him a special right of resump­
tion of gifts.
(1) Speaking in the MTmamsa terms the rule giving full right of 
disposal to women as regards property given to them by their 
husbands forms a vidhi (rule) whereas the provision concern­
ing immoveables forms an ajiavada (exception) .
(2) See "Patisabdo hi palanakriyaniinittako " - Medh.on Manu
IX.76; "Bharyaya bharanatbharta palanachcha patih smfitah/" - 
Ma.Bha.I .104,30.
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Another verse of Katyayana which has been referred to 
in the previous chapter may be mentioned here again : "Whatever 
a woman receives as a gift from her husband she can dispose of at 
her own pleasure after his death; but if he is alive she should 
preserve it or should spend it for the sake of his family.
This is the reading of the text which is found in the Dayabhaga,
_ (2 ) the Smritisara, the Vivadaratnakara etc. Banerjee, however,
depends upon Jagnnnatha and adds to the first clause the words 
"if it be moveable". This addition is made obviously with a
view to bring this text on par with the above-mentioned text of 
Narada and to suggest that even according to this text ohly move- 
able property given by the husband is at the absolute disposal of 
the woman. Whatever might be the interpretation put upon this 
verse by a late commentator like Jagannatha the reading found in 
the comparatively older commentaries shown that this text apparent­
ly applies to both moveable and immoveable property given to a 
woman by her husband.
Before coming to the law which is laid down by the 
various commentators concerning woman’s right to dispose of their 
strxdhana it must be mentioned that the case-law concerning
immoveable property given to a woman by her husband has already
(4)been dealt with xn the previous chapter as the question whether
( 1 ) See S U p r a  p . 1[ g uo h eve. ^  ^ Yc*v'“'4 ieci c\_^ * j n htv itctute.
(2) See Da.Bha.lV.i.8; Smr.Sa.f.62(b); Vi.Rat.511 etc.
(5) See Banerjee p.371 where the words are printed in italics.
(4) Supra pp.K^-^3-
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such property is at the absolute disposal of a woman or not has 
been treated by the Courts as being tantamount to the question 
whether such property is stridhana or not. That this equation 
of the two questions is a mistake which arose through the super­
imposition of the law of the Bengal school upon that of the 
Mitaksara school can easily be seen from the forthcoming dis­
cussion.
Coming to the law as laid down by the commentators it
is interesting to note that Vijnanesvara refers neither to the
above verse about saudayika^ nor to the verse of Katyayana about
(2)
property earned by women etc. Although he refers to Narada*s
(3)verse about immoveable property given by the husband he does 
not make any comment as regards the wife's right of alienating 
such property. His only comment is that the husband should give 
immoveable property, if ever, only with the consent of the sons 
as moveable property alone is the proper object of ,fa gift out of 
affection.^ Vijnanesvara probably thought that if the husband 
were freely allowed to make gifts of immoveable property to his 
wife he is likely to defeat the claims of his creditors by this 
device.
(1) Supra p.7 |,
(2) Supra p.7 .^
(3) Mit* on Yaj. IX.114 Nir. edi.p*199 wherein the quotation 
has been mistakenly ascribed to Visnu.
(4) ‘‘Sthavaravyatiriktasya eva pritidanayogyatvanischayat.M 
Ibid p.200.
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So it is evident that Vijnanesvara does not divide
strxdhana into property which is at the absolute disposal of the
woman and property which is not at the absolute disposal of a
woman. Whether he intended to put a general restriction on
women's right to dispose of their strTdhana is a question which
ought to be determined with the help of his general remarks on
the subject. To begin with, he emphatically says that women can
never possess complete independence.  ^ He remarks that they are
ignorant and-to speak in the terminology of a modern educational-
(2)
ist - that they have a very low intelligence quotient. He
further states that chaste women are by themselves incapable of
even instituting judicial proceedings on their behalf as they have
(3)a dependant position. Even in his vehement argument to prove
that women are incapable of acquiring and owning property he
meekly concedes that acquirement of property does not affect the
(4)dependent status of women. He even goes to the extent of
(5)admitting that the husband has ownership of his wife. As he
subjugates woman to the overall authority of her husband it is 
hard to believe that he ever intended to confer upon women absolute 
right of disposing of their strTdhana. Therefore it is reasonable 
to conclude that Vijnanesvara who is quite liberal in interpreting
(1) ,fAtah kvachidapi strTnain naiva svatantryam" - Mit.on Yaj. 1.85.
(2) ’’StrTnamajnanadapragalbhyachcha.M - Mit.on Yaj .II.2,5.
(3) "ICulastrTnam patisu jTvatsu tatpartantryadanadeyo vyavahara 
iti vyakhyeyam.M - Mit.on Yaj.II.32.
(4) "Yattu paratantryavachanam 'na strT svatantryamarhati' ityadi 
tadastu paratantryam dhanasvTkare tu ko virodhah." - Mit. on 
Yaj.II.135-36.
(5) Bee infra ppJfcSi-S^ *
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the word strxdhana is totally against granting right of free dis­
position to women.
However, on this point he is not followed by the other 
commentators of his school. Mitra Misra who is next in importance 
in the Benares school holds that saudayika is at the absolute 
disposal of a woman However, he refers to Katyayana's verse
about wealth earned by women etc. and remarks : "Here there is no 
repudiation of (these categories) being strxdhana. But there is 
a repudiation of its partition etc. which is (otherwise) possible. 
It is for that reason that in the next line it has been laid down
that the husband has dominion over them. The meaning is that the
(2)husband and not the woman has freedom to utilise the same." 
Following Narada1s verse Mitra Misra states that women have in­
dependence only with regard to moveable property given by the 
husband and that as regards the immoveable property given by him 
she has only a right to enjoy the same and not a right to dispose 
of it by gift or sale.^^
(1) Vi.Mi.544. As usual Mitra Misra has followed Madanasimha in
laying down this and the other following provisions concern­
ing disposal of strxdhana. - See Mad.Rat.376-77. The only 
difference between the two is that according to Madanasimha 
wealth earned by women and property given to them by strangers 
is not strxdhana - Mad.Rat.376. Dalapatiraja follows 
Madanasimha - Nri.Pra•237.
(2) Vi.Mi.542. Mitra Misra admits that there can be no partition
of strxdhana during the life-time of its owner. So when he
says that there is a repudiation of partition etc. of these 
categories what he probably means is that the property cannot 
be inherited by the heirs of the woman after her death but by 
the husband or his heirs. Or probably he wants to say that 
the woman cannot distribute or give away these particular 
categories of strxdhana without the permission of the husband.
(3) Vi.Mi.544.
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Kamalakara does not make any comment on Katyayana's
(1)text about wealth earned by women etc. He does not, however,
give complete freedom (svatantrya) to women in immoveable property
(2)
given by the husband, irhereas he specifically says that in the
(3)case of other immoveable property women have an absolute right.
(4)
From the opinion of Laksmidhara which he cites with approbation 
it appears that the words "other immoveable property1' in this 
context refer only to immoveable property which is saudayika.
Therefore it seems that the later authors of the Benares 
school discarded Vijnanesvara*s,idea about complete dependence of 
women and allowed them an unfettered right to dispose of their 
saudayika with the exception of immoveable property given by the 
husband.
NTlakantha holds that wealth earned by women and gifts
(5)obtained by them from strangers are not stridhana. To support
(6)his stand he adduces Manu's provisions about women's complete
incapacity to own property and sayd that this provision applies
—  —  (7)to these categories mentioned by Katyayana to be not stridhana.
This is, of course, the usual explanation given by the commentators













Manu VIII.416 supra p.£0- <*1-376 .
Vya.Ma. 154-55. See also Smr.Cha.653-54-; Vi.Mi.54-3,
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strxdhana. But Nxlakantha further adds : "It is proper (to hoAd)
that the text also indicates lack of freedom in respect of gifts
(1)on supersession etc.’1 Now it is certain that the words 'gifts
on supersession etc.' do not refer to all the categories of
property which Nxlakanta recognises as strxdhana; for in that
case he would have referred to them in the words 'gifts before
the nuptial fire etc.* (i.e. adhyagnyadi}. It is also evident
that by the words *et cetera' (adi) he does not mean to refer to
the categories included by Vijnanesvara in the term 'adya'; for
in that case like Vijnanesvara Nxlakantha also would have admitted
them into the fold of strxdhana. Here it must be remembered that
adhivedanika or gift on supersession is also a kind of bhartrid-
atta or gift given by the husband. And so it seems quite likely
that Nxlakantha wanted to extend the restriction on alienation of * *
immoveable property given by the husband to both moveable and
immoveable property given by him and probably to all property
which, together with bhartridatta, has, according to him, a special
(2)
line of succession. Incidentally it must be noted that by this
remark Nxlakantha openly suggests that the husband retains 
dominion even over the superseded wife.
(1) "j§dhivedanikadisu api as vat ant ry apar am iti tu yuktam" . -
Vya.Ma.155.
(2) See infra p.3^ *3.
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Balambhatta specifically repudiates the idea that
strxdhana denotes only that property which is at the free disposal
of a woman^^ and states that saudayika itself does not denote the
(2)sum total of strxdhana* To support his argument he states that
the two verses of Eatyayana about inheritance immediately follow
(3 )his verse about saudayika. What he means to say probably is
that although inherited property discussed in those two verses is 
stridhana it is not at the free disposal of the woman inheriting
it* It is important to note in this context that the word
. - (4) (5)
1bhartrxdaya’ found in Katyayana*s verse and Narada's verse
has been interpreted by him to mean inheritance and not gift from
—  (6) the husband as xs the interpretation of Jxmuta and others. As
Balambhatta gives detailed illustrations about the extended list of
stridhana categories found in the Mitaksara vizi property obtained
(7)
by inheritance, purchase, partition etc* one would expect him 
to make a detailed statement as to whether each of these cate­
gories is saudayika or not. Unfortunately he does not appear to
be very helpful. However, he says : "Sudaya itself is saudayika 
h
the suffix 'stan' being one which augments the original meaning
6 A
of the word. Or it means that which is obtained from one's own
(1) Bal. on Yaj.II.144 p.256 Lines 6-9.
(2) Ibid p.255 line 21 : "Etena saudayikam iti stridhanamatro-
palaksanam iti bhrantoktam apastam".
(3) Ibid p.255 line 19. For the two verses see supra p.//g.
(4) Supra p.//#.
(5) Supra p.63*
(6) Da•Bha.4.1.8; Smr.Cha. 655 etc.
(7) Bal. on Yaj.II.143.
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inheritance. The eastern layers, however, explain it as that
which is obtained from the kindred. The category of inheritance
(riktha) which has been mentioned before is to be taken as
(1)different from this.11
Prom this it is clear that according to him inherited 
property is not saudayika. By inference it may be stated that 
according to him all the categories of stridhana which have been 
included by Vijnanesvara in the term 'adya* are not saudayika.
He actually regards Katyayana's verse about wealth 
earned by women to be spurious. Alternatively he accepts that the 
husband has dominion over the two categories mentioned in the verse
but allows women to freely dispose of such property in case the
(2) (3)husband does not exist. He also quotes the text of Katyayana
leading us to the inference that immoveable property given to a
woman by any person except her husband is her saudayika.
In conclusion it may be stated that the provisions of 
the BalambhattT may be considered to be the law for that part of 
the Bombay province which is governed by the Mitaksara in prefer­
ence to the Mayukha. However, in the part where the Mayukha is 
predominent a woman has right to dispose of property given to her 
by any of her relatives except any kind of property given to her
(1) "Sudaya eva saudayikam, svarthikasthan* Svadayato labdhamiti 
va. Svadayasambandhibhyo labdhamiti tu pranchah. Purvam 
rikthapadarthastu etadanyo grahyah." #Bal. onYaj.II.143
p.254 lines 7-8. But at another place he admits that in 
the absence of other heirs like daughter etc. the widow can 
freely dispose of property inherited from the husband.
(2) Ibid p.255 lines 1-3.
(3) Ibid lines 24-27. See supra p.^oA.
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by her husband. It must also be noted here that property obtained
by a woman by inheritance, purchase, partition etc. being not
strxdhana according to the Mayukha the question about the extent
of woman's right to dispose of such property does not arise at all
in considering the sastric law of this part of the^  province* But
the provisions of the Balambhatti should be considered as a
supplement to the law of the Benares school on account of the
analogy of the basic stand adopted by Balambhatta and Mitra Misra.
Amongst the authorities of the Southern school the
Smritichandrika presents a very conservative view. According to
Qevanna the text declaring total incapacity of a wife, son and
slave to own any property is to be interpreted to mean that they
have a right to hold property but not the right to alienate it
without the consent of the person to whom they b e l o n g . B u t  on
the authority of Katyayana he admits that saudayika is an excep-
(2)
tion to the above rule. " But he restricts the word saudayika
to property, 'yautaka and the like1, which a \voman has received
during the time beginning with the betrothal ceremony and ending
with the conclusion of the ceremony of entering her husband's
( 3)
house after marriage. From the textual point of view such a
restricted meaning can hardly be justified; for although the 
first time-limit can be inferred from the literal interpretation
(1) Smr.Cha. 653-54.
(2) Ibid 655.
(3) Ibid. For yautaka see infra•Pf?28l~~63'
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(1)of Vyasa's text, the second time-limit is not capable of being 
inferred from either of the above texts of Katyayana and Vyasa.
Like the authors of the Bengal school jlevanna interprets the word
— (2)1bhartridaya' in Katyayana's verse to mean gift from the
husband and co-relates this verse with Narada's verse to exclude
(3)
from saudayika the immoveable property given by the husband.
Madhava prefers not elaborately to comment upon saud­
ayika as defined by Katyayana, and he accepts that immoveable
(4)property given by the husband is an exception from saudayika.
It is important to remember that wealth earned by women and gifts
given to them by strangers are not stridhana at all according to
(5)Devanna and Madhava. So the question of women’s right to
dispose of such property does not arise in their digests. But
Madhava does not appear to restrict the word saudayika comparably
with his predecessor Devanna.
A • *
Pratapa Rudra also appears to follow the general view 
of Madhava allowing absolute right to women over their saudayika 
excluding immoveable property given by the husband. Like
Balambhatta he explains that 'sudaya* itself is 'saudayika' the 









suffix 'thak* which does not change the connotation of the term.
The objection that, women being incapable of 'daya* (inheritance),
such an etymological explanation does not stand to reason, is met
with by Pratapa Rudra by simply stating that women are entitled
(2)
to inheritance from their husbands. It is also important to
note that he is one of the authors who clearly admit as part of
their scheme the extension of strxdhana to include property
(3)acquired by inheritance, partition etc. It would not be wise,
however, to jump to the conclusion that Pratapa Rudra includes
inheritance within saudayika itself; for at another place he
refers to saudayika as symbolical of that which is given by the
(4)husband. He does not refer to Katyayana*s verse about wealth
earned by women etc. and therefore he is of no help in deterrain- 
ing whether such property should be treated as saudayika or not.
Varadaraja is usually of little use in determining such 
intricate questions; but commenting on Narada's provision about 
immoveable property given by the husband he expressly states that 
according to the opinion of some people such property becomes, in 
the absence of a person capable of giving consent to an aliena-
i
(5)tion by a woman, incapable of being given (adeyam). This means
(1) Ibid. For different kinds of svarthika pratyayas see the 
Siddhantakaumudx of Bhattoji Dxksita edited by firxsa Chandra 
Vasu and Vamana Basa Vasu, chapter XXXVIII.
(2) "Nanvetadanupapannani.. . . strxnam dayanarhatvat iti chet,
maivam, strxnam bhartridayarhatvat" - Sa.Vi.378. For the 
discussion about the concept of daya see I.S.Pawat: 
Dayavifohage pp.7, 12, 58, 66-68, 92 etc,
(3) Supra p.0|.
(4) "Saudayikam bhartridattopalaksanam11 - Sa.Vi.377.
(5) Vya.Ni. ; For the various provisions about deya and 
adeya see the Dharmakosa pp.791-808.
\
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that according to this opinion a woman has nothing more than a 
right to enjoy such property and such a view is quite consistent 
with the general tendency of Vijnanesvara and Devanna. Indeed 
this opinion may to contradistinguished from that of Balambhatta 
who gives absolute freedom to woman as regards wealth earned by 
her in case her husband does not exist, and as regards property 
inherited from him in case his heirs do not exist.
Thus it may be concluded that according to the law of 
the Southern school property which is given to a woman by her 
relatives with the exception of immoveable property given to her 
by her husband is at her absolute disposal. The rest of her pro- 
perty is not, and can never be, at her absolute disposal. In 
considering the law of this school the question whether a woman 
is entitled to freely dispose of wealth earned by her does not 
arise at all as such property is not her strxdhana according to 
this school.
The law of the Mithila school has been laid down by 
Vachaspati Misra in a much simpler manner. Having enumerated and 
explained all the categories of the so-called technical strxdhana
he further remarks : "Such are the categories of strxdhana. This
™  .  (1) alone is the saudayxka of a woman." After having mentioned
Katyayana*s verse about saudayika he declares that even in the
immoveable property given by the family of the husband the woman
(2)





verse about immoveable property* given by the husband with Katyay-
ana's verses about inheritance and comes to a conclusion that
moveable property, whether given by the husband or inherited from
him, is at the absolute disposal of a woman whereas immoveable
(1)acquired by either of the ways is not. From the way he
identifies inheritance with gifted property he appears to hold 
that even after the death of her husband a woman has no freedom 
to dispose of the immoveable property given to her by her husband.
In giving all these provisions Vachaspati has obviously
* (2)followed Chandesvara, the author of the Vivadaratnakara. How-
• « 1
ever, there is a slight difference of opinion between the two
authors. After referring to the categories mentioned in the
smritis Chandesvara refers to Katyayana*s verse about wealth earned
by women etc. and explains : "The husband alone has dominion over
stridhana acquired by a woman apart from the above categories :
this is the meaning." As the husband alone is mentioned as
having dominion over the two categories mentioned by Katyayana
(which ard stridhana only according to Chandesvara amongst the
v (4)authors of the Mithila school) it is reasonable to suppose that 
according to him the woman would gain absolute control over such 
property after the death of her husband. However, it has been 
shown that according to other authors of the Mithila school these
(1) Vi.Chi. 140-41.
(2) See Vi.Rat. 511.
(o) "Uktaprakaratiriktam yatstridhanam, tatra bhartureva 
svainy amity art hah. " - Vi. Rat. 524.
(4) See supra.
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categories do not form stridhana of a woman. Therefore the
question whether a woman is entitled to dispose of such property
or not cannot arise in considering the law of the Mithila school
which must be more authoritatively accepted from Vachaspati, its
later and better commentator.
According to the authors of the Bengal school the question
of a woman’s right to dispose of her stridhana need not arise at
all because of their very definition of stridhana which, accord-
ing to them, consists only of that property which a woman can free-
(1)ly dispose of without being controlled by her husband. To lead
to this conclusion such great emphasis has been laid by JTmuta 
upon Katyayana1s verse about wealth earned by women etc. that some
of the later authors of the Bengal school begin their enumeration
_ (2) 
of stridhana with a reference to the provisions of this verse.
In such a case as this one might reasonably have exjject-
ed JTmuta to explain what saudayika is and to identify it with
stridhana itself. However, he has produced a mere confusion of
ideas. He explains saudayika : "Whatever is obtained from kind
(3)relations is the gift of the affectionate kindred." But he
does not say that saudayika alone is at ti\e disposal of a woman; 
on the other hand, he says that all property except that of two 
kinds mentioned by Katyayana is at the absolute disposal of a
(1) See supra p./OC).
(2) See Da.Ta. 40; Vya.Sa.Sam. of Narayana f.32(a); Sma.Vya.
of Raghunatha Sarvabhauma f.56(a) etc.
(3) Da.Bha. 4.1.22.
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(1)woman. But we have already seen in the last chapter that he
excludes from stridhana property which has not been expressly 
included therein by the smritis, namely, property acquired by 
inheritance etc. Therefore it is difficult to state correctly 
whic|i property is at the absolute disposal of a woman according 
to JTmuta,
The difficulty has been noticed by the later authors of
the Bengal school like Achyuta and &riiq?isna who remark that sulka,
though it is not saudayika, is at the absolute disposal of a
woman since it has been expressly mentioned as stridhana in the
(2)smritis. Some of the later authors of this school are contentft
merely with stating that, excluding wealth earned by women and
property given to them by strangers all property which is received
(3)by a woman from both of her families is her saudayika.
As it has been admitted by the authors of the Bengal
( A )
school that woman has some kind of ownership in the two cate­
gories mentioned above and as only the husband is mentioned to 
have a dominion over them it would have been reasonable to suppose 
that such property, on the death of the husband, becomes stridhana 
of a woman and remains at her absolute disposal. By analogy the 
same rule should have been made applicable to immoveable property 
given by the husband. The leading authors, JTmuta and
(1) Da.Bha. 4.1.21.
(2) Supra pfc///-!/£.
(3) Vya.Sa.Sam. f.32(a); Da.Vya.Sam.f.1(b).
(4) See Supra p.JJ6*
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Eaghunandana, do not consider this contingency at all. However,
according to Vidyaratna Smartabhattacharya the two categories
mentioned by Katyayana are succeeded to by the husband1s heirs
after his d e a t h . T o  the same effect is the provision given
by Raghurama Siromani who treats the above three categories as
(2)non-technical stridhana. This provision is obviously not
compatible with the position adopted by JTmuta etc. who clearly 
state that the woman has ownership (svatva) in such property; 
for no explanation is given as to why the woman's interest in the 
property, instead of getting enlarged, altogetherly lapses after 
her husband's death. From a logical and a Mimamsa point of view 
the heirs of the husband have nothing except his 'dominion' 
(svamya) to inherit; to imagine that they are entitled to inherit 
also ownership (svatva) in the property appears to be utterly 
unjustifiable.
However, accepting the law as laid down by the authors 
of this school it may be concluded that according to this school 
all the stridhana of a woman is at her absolute disposal with a 
corollary that property which is not stridhana is not capable of 
becoming stridhana at any time so as to be at the independent 
disposal of a woman.
Many of the older commentators such as Medhaththi, 
Visvarupa and Vijnanesvara, do not make any provision for keeping
(1) Smr.Sa.Vya. f.42(a).
(2) Da.Bha.Di.verses Nos. 54-55.
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some specific property at the absolute disposal of women. The law 
which has just been stated was a later development. However, even 
as late as in the 18th century two viev^one conversative and the 
other a liberal one, persisted amongst the commentators. Durgayya, 
the author and the commentator of the DayadasaslokT adheresto the 
conservative school and remarks : nThe freedom which has been 
spoken about here as pertaining even to the immoveable property 
consisting of saudayika does not exist in the Kaliyuga."^^ On 
the other hand, Vachaspati Misra, the author of the Smritisara- 
sangraha, divides strxdhana into saudayika and non-saudayika, 
gives absolute freedom to women in their saudayika and as regards 
the non-saudayika category which, according to him, includes the 
two kinds mentioned by Katyayana he remarks : "The husband has 
dominion over the second category (and) his dissent creates an 
impediment to a transaction by the woman; the transaction, how-
(2)ever, remains valid as she alone has ownership in the property."
The author of the Dayarahasya also supports him.^^ Thus both 
authors apply the doctrine of factum valet to transactions
(1) Yattvatra saudayikavisaye sthavaresvapi svatantryamuktam 
tat Kaliyuge na bhavati." - Da.Da.Slo.f.39(a).
(2) "Tatradyam striya tatsvacchandato vyavaharyam ... dvitxye
cha bhartuh prabhutvam tadvimatau striya vyavahare 
pratyavayah vyavaharastu siddhyatyeva svamatrasatvat 
tadubhaye adhikara kalpyate". - Smr.Sa.Sam.f.44(a).
The underlined word should be really read as 'svamatras- 
vatvat1.
(3) Da.Ra. X .O.L.Microfilm Wo.366 f.8. See suprafc])£
For the doctrine of factum valet reliance is usually placed 
upon Da.Bha.2.30 - See Mayne p.39; Gupt e p.50 etc.
But the above two authors give a more direct illustration 
of the application of the maxim.
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concerning non-saudayika property of women and this is definitely 
a more reasonable and an equitable view. For originally the
&astra did not allow even men to alienate to their immoveable
(1) * —property but the later sastric writers removed this impediment
and held that this restriction did not apply to self-acquired
(2)property. There is no reason therefore why the restriction as
regards property of women should not be set aside in favour of 
women.'But other S«Strie Waiters *tv<r s e w  fa betve thf* UUral
View*
Coming to the nature of the restriction placed upon
alienation by women one must look to the concept of dependence as
it prevailed in the minds of the smriti writers. Narada declares
that only three persons, namely, the king, the preceptor and the
head of the family in each house, are independent in this world
whereas the subjects, the student and the wife, the son, etc.
(3)respectively are not independent. As a result of this woman
(1) See Narada cited in Mit. on Yaj.II.114 p.199; Apa. on Yaj. 
11.123; Vi.Mi.413 etc.
(2) See the comment of Vijnanesvara upon the above verse of 
Narada. See also Mayne p.739. However, Mayne1s statement 
on pp.738-39 to the effect that wealth earned by women and 
property given to them by strangers is stridhana according 
to the Smritichandrika and the Mayukha, obviously proceeds 
from complete ignorance about the proviisions of these 
treatises. On this point the Southern school is on all 
fours with the Bengal school. See supra.
(3) Trayah svatantra loke1sminrajacharyastathaiva cha/
Prativarnam cha sarvesam varnanam sve grihe grihi// - Na.ee • • « a v—1 A i i *
Smr.1.32, Asahaya remarks 1 Yathoktastrayopi svatantra 
uttaradharavisesapeksaya.1 Haradatta on Apa.Dha.Su. says 
MNa cha patyussvayamarjitasya viniyoge jayay‘a anumatyapeksa, 
svatantratvat. Svatantro hyasau grihe yatha raja rastre."
See also Bal.on Yaj.II.52 p.70 which contains a remark to the 
same effect. In resorting to this analogy both these authors 
probably had in their mind the above-mentioned verse of 
Narada.
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was not supposed to have the freedom of dealing with her own pro­
perty, Thus Narada declares : "The wise call transactions by 
women as unauthoritative, especially the transactions of gift, 
mortgage and sale of house and land. These very transactions 
become authoritative if the husband, or in the absence of the
husband the son, or in the absence of the husband and the son the
(1) -king, consents." Bhavasvami says that the intention of this
(2)restriction is to show that women are perpetually dependent.
To avert a possible objection that this provision of Narada refers
only to the husband's property Maskari quotes Vyaghra and Lokaksi
who assert that she cannot deal with her own property with absolute 
(3)freedom. Commenting on Manu's text declaring women's complete
incapacity to own property, Medhatithi and Kulluka take the same
(4)stand.
In laying down the restriction on alienation by women 
the commentators of the different schools, however, rely upon the 
text of Manu which is as follows : "Women should not, without the 
consent of their husband, expend anything from the funds which are 
common to many persons or from (one's or the husband's ?) own
(1) Na.Smr.I.26-27; Na.Sam.I.22-23, Bhavasvami who reads
'anapadi' instead of 'manisinah* as read by Asahaya adds 
"Anapadi, apatpratikarartham kritani pramananyuktam bhavati. 
... Apadyapi grihaksetram na pramanam."
(2) Ibid "Etatpratipaditam bhavati asvatantra sarvada striti."
(3) Maskari on Gau.18.1. Medhatithi also appears to have 
accepted the implication of Narada's text as comprehending 
all kinds of woman's property - see Medh. on Manu VIII.163.
(4) Manu VIII.416.
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property.1 ^ ^ Of the three commentators of Manu who try to explain 
the underlined words in the verse (svakat vittat) Kulluka and 
Raghavananda take them as referring to the husband's property 
whereas Sarvajnanarayana says that these words refers to her own 
separate property excluding stridhana. It is noteworthy that none 
of Manu's commentators except Nandana exlains this verse as refer-X A
(2)ing to stridhana.
Other commentators like Devannabhatta, Nxlakantha and
Mitra Misra, however, take this verse as establishing a general
prohibition restricting women's right to deal with their own
property subject only to the exception of saudayika which has
already been discussed.Devanna who usually adopts an extremely
conservative attitude applies the above text to the common property
of husband and wife and to the separate property of women and goes
to the length of asserting that a woman cannot even enjoy (bhoga)
(4)property without the consent of the controlling person. How­
ever, on this point he has not been supported by any other commen­
tator. In fact Mitra Misra who himself does not allow an absolute 
interest to a woman in immoveable property given to her by her 
husband says that she has a right to enjoy such property but not
(5)
the right to sell or give it away.
(1) Manu XX.199.
(2) Chandesvara also seems to have adopted the same stand - see 
Vi.Ra.509.
(3) Smr.Cha.654; Vya.Ma.155; Vi.Mi*544.
(4) "Svatantrananujhaya paratantrabjstriyah stripumsasadhai’ana-
vittat atmiyavittadva tyagbhogadikam na kuryurityarthah." - 
Smr.Cha.654 Medh. on Manu VIII.416 contains the same 




Therefore as a conclusion it may be stated that where a 
woman does not possess an absolute interest in her property she 
has a right to enjoy that property but not a right to sell, give 
away or mortgage that property or to do anything which might 
encumber its corpus. However, she can do any of these things 
provided her husband consents to the respective transaction. In 
interpreting qnd applying this restriction to individual cases it 
must not be forgotten that the motive behind this restriction is 
not to hinder women's progress but to protect them and their own 
interest. This is the probable reason why Vijhanesvara who is 
quite eager to increase the proprietory capacity of women does not 
say a word against such restriction.
Coming to our third question, while examining the rights 
of persons other than the woman herself in stridhana it must be 
ascertained whether any other person has right of ownership in 
stridhana and if not whether any other person has any right other 
than that of ownership in stridhana.
As regards the first facet of this question the &astra 
has been uniform in denying to any person other than the woman 
herself any kind of ownership in stridhana. Manu declares an 
otherworldly punishment for those who deprive women of their own 
p r o pertyand  also inflicts a judicial fine on them. lie says ;
(1) See Manu.II1.52 and Medhatithi's explanation of the word 
'stridhanani'. See also Manu IX.200.
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"A just king should punish the relatives of women, who try to
deprive them of their property during their life, with a sentence
which is imposed for theft, Medhatithi explains that their
property is to be protected especially from their relatives since,
knowing the woman to be utterly dependent they try to usurp the
(2)property upon various pretexts. The jjrovisxon makes it amply
clear that the position of a person usurping strcfihana is equal
to that of a thief thereby suggesting that no relative has any
right of ownership in strxdhana. The Sastra also declares that
living upon woman1s strxdhana constitutes a second-grade sin on
the part of the male who does it and prescribes that he should
(3)undergo an expiation for that.
The point has been made absolutely cleqr by Katyayana
who says : "Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor
the brothers have power to take or dispose of strxdhana. If any one
of these forcibly consumes strxdhana he must repay it together with
interest and shall also incur a fine. However, if he consumes
the same after he has been permitted, out of affection (by the
woman) he may repay the capital only whenever he becomes rich 
(4 )
(again)." He makes a further concession : "Whatever has been
given (to the husband) by a woman, out of affection, knowing him 
to be afflicted by a disease or suffering from distress or
(1) Manu VIII.29. For the punishment to be inflicted for theft 
see Manu VIII.321.
(2) "Te hi bahubhirupayairapaharanti, asvatantraisa strx him
dadati kirn bhunkte vayamatra svamina iti" - Medh.on Manu 
VIII.29.
(3) See infra p. ST3o.
(4) Katyayana quoted in Vi.Mi.545 etc. See the appendix texts kos. 
No.
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harrassed by creditors, he should repay of his own accord.1*
Considering the position of the superseded wife of a polygamous
person he adds a proviso : ,fIf, however, he has two wives and he
does not love that one (who gave him stridhana) he should forcibly
be compelled to retui^ n even that which was given to him out of 
(2 )affection."
After giving the enumeration of stridhana Devala also
declares : "The woman herself alone can enjoy such property; the
husband has no right to it except in distress. If he utilises or
disposes of the same without reason he should repay it to the
(3)woman together with interest."
The verses are quite simple, not to say eloquent, and do
not need any comment. A meticulous attempt to safeguard the
interest of a woman from all possible dangers is clearly visible.
Commenting on Devala*s verse Devanna and Mitra Misra says that the
prohibition against the husband includes also a prohibition against
(4.)
the brother etc. by the dandapupanyaya. Together with Nilak-
antha and Pratapa Rudra they also affirm that Katyayana*s verse 
*Neither the husband etc.* clearly shows that men always suffer
(1) If atyayana quoted in Smr.Cha.658 etc. See the appendix text 
No. 61*
(2) Katyayana quoted in Vi,Mi.545 etc. See the appendix text 
No. £9.
(3) Devala quoted in Vi.Mi.545 etc. See the appendix text No .79.
(4) Smr.Cha.657; Vi.Mi.545-46• For the dandapupayyaya see 
infra p.7,97. • Really speaking the Kaimutikanyaya should 
have been resorted to.
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(1) _from lack of freedom (asvatantrya) in strxdhana. This ’asvat­
antrya’ denotes lack of ownership as well as lack of right to 
dispose of property; for Devanna specifically says that it is not 
merely dependence (paratantrya), which denotes existence of owner­
ship hut non-existence of the right to dispose of the property 
which is the object of that ownership. This is clear, as Devanna 
points out, from the fact that the husband, even if he consumes 
strxdhana with the permission of the woman, has to return at least
(2) rthe capital. So jealous indeed is the Sastra of the husband1s
consuming his wife’s strxdhana that Katyayana allows a woman even
forcibly to recover any strxdhana given by her to the husband in
case he does not maintain her p r o p e r l y . T h u s  it is obvious
that under no circumstances may a husband or any other person
utilise the corpus of strxdhana without incurring a liability to
repay it, the only exception being that of a husband who has
utilised it with the permission of his wife but has no funds to
(4)repay xt.
(1) ’’Purusanam tu strxdhane sarvatrasvatantryameva ...
svamitvabhavadityabhiprayah.” - Smr.Cha.S56; see also 
Vya.Ma.155; Sa.Yi.3 7  8  and *Vi.Mi.544.
(2.) ”Anujhapya bhaksane 1 pi millyapra danabhidhanat bhartradxnania- 
svatantryamavagamyate, na punah paratantryamatram.” - 
Smr.Cha.656; see also $a.Vi.380. 
(3) ICatyayana quoted in Vi.Mi.545 etc. See the appendix tesit 
No .60
(4) ’’Dhanavanyadi bhavedityabhidhanat rnulyamatramapi nirdhano
na dapya ityarthat gamyate.” - Smr.Chq.656; see also
Sa.Vi.380.
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Incidentally Devanna and Pratapa Rudra take the oppor­
tunity of discussing the relative position of the husband and wife 
concerning their proprietory interest in each other*s property*
It is well-known that the wife, upon her marriage, acquires owner-
(1)ship in her husband*s property. This ownership relates to
(2)property acquired by him before as well as after marriage.
However, the position of a wife as an owner of his property is a 
subordinate one : her rights are subject to the predominant author­
ity of the husband. However, if she consumes some of his property
(3)she cannot be called a thief. Her position in this respect may
correctly be expressed by the word *paratantrya* or dependence.
On the other hand the husband, if he takes the stridhana of his 
wife without sufficient reason or her permission, becomes liable 
not only to repay it with interest but to pay a fine which is 
imposed for theft. Thus although he gains dominion over the two 
kinds of property acquired by the woman and, according to some 
authors, over some non-saudayika categories of stridhana he has 
no kind of right at all over the bulk of stridhana called saudayika 
and no right of ownership at all in any kind of stridhana. From a 
proprietory point of view therefore the oastra is more favourable
(1) See supra p^ .Z/£,
(2) See Bal.on Yaj.II.52. Balambhatta compares the wife1s 
acquisition of ownership in her husband's property upon her 
marriage with a son's acquirement of ownership in property 
whiejy his father has already acquired before the son's birth.
(3) See Apa.Bha.Su.II.6.14.20 and Haradatta's commentary on it.
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(1)to the wife than the husband.
However, Hindu law was never so individualistic as to 
allow a complete segregation of property in favour of one person.
The family was considered as an important component of the society 
and as possessing a common interest in looking after its own 
welfare. The needs of the family were, therefore, always consid­
ered to transcend, in importance, the individual interest. StrTd- 
hana could not possibly be an escception to this general rule. 
Although the members of the family had no legal right in the 
stridhana of the female members of the family, in case of distress 
the husband of any such female member could always look forward to 
relieving himself and the family of their trouble with the help of 
her stridhana in case they had no funds of their own. Thus Yajna­
val ky a declares : "The husband need not repay to his wife1
stridhana which he has taken during a famine, or for the performance
(2)of a religious duty, or during illness or forcible restraint."
Devala also authorises the husband to utilise the stridhana of
(3 )his wife to relieve a son in distress.
Devanna and Mitra Misra specifically add that only the 
husband has a right to take the stridhana of a woman and nobody
(1) "Evahcha vivahena bharyayah bhartridhane nityaparatantryam
svamitvam sampadyate, na punarbhartuh bhai%yadhane tadrisama- 
pityavagantavyam. Ata eva bhartuh stridhanabhoge'pyanarha- 
tamaha Devalah . .. ". - Smr.Cha.656; see also Sa.Vi.380.
But for husband's right to dispose of his wife's stridhana 
see infra.
(2) Yaj.IXJ.47.
(3) Devala quoted in Vi.Mi.546 etc. See appendix text Mo •73.
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(X) felse may do that. Vijnanesvara adds that even the husband, if
he takes stridhana under any circumstances other than those mention
( 2)ed by Yajnavalkya, has to repay the same. Mitra Misra says that
even if the husband takes his wife’s stridhana under the circum­
stances mentioned by Yajnavalkya he must repay it if he has the
capacity to do s o , A p a r a r k a  also appears to have a similar
(4)opinion. Apararka, Mitra Misra etc. make it clear that the
husband can take stridhana only in case he does not possess funds
(5)of his own. In the words of Devanna he can do so only 'in case
( 6)he is left with no other alternative'.
The word 'famine1 in Ya jhavalkyd'fe verse is easy enough
to understand. According to Visvarupa, Vijnanesvara, Apararka and 
- (7)Nilakantha only obligatory duty is meant by the words 'perform­
ance of religious duty* (dharmakarya) whereas Devanna intends to
include in them performance even of optional religious duties 
— (8)(kamya). The second interpretation is evidently going too far;
for the tenor of the text appears to give the right to the husband 
with great reluctance and only under exceptional circumstances,
(1) Smr.Cha.657; Vi.Mi.546; Sa.Vi.581 etc.
( 2 ) Mit.on Yaj.II.147. It is to be noted that although Vijnane­
svara does not allow the wife to institute judicial proceed­
ing against the husband he makes an exception to the rule in 
case the husband utilises the stridhana of his wife in the 
absence of any calamity - Mit.on Yaj.II.32.  ^ ^
(3) "Sati tu samarthye durbhiksadigrahitamapyavasyam -
Vi.Mi.546.
(4) "Pratidanasamarthadhanabhave cha tattasyai na dadyat.n -
Apa.on Yaj.II.147.
(5) "SvakTyadhanabhave" - Apa.on Yaj.II.147; Vi.Mi.(tika) on
Yaj.II.147.




and the number of the optional religious duties being unlimited
this interpretation would allow the husband ample pretext for
utilising his wife1s strxdhana.
The word 'restraint1 (sampratirodhaka) in Yajnavalkya1s
verse has been taken by Visvarupa, Vijnanesvara, Devanna etc. as
(1)restraxnt by a creditor in case of non-payment of debt.
Vachaspati Misra, however, takes that word as an adjective of the
word 'illness* (vyadhi) allowing the husband thereby to take
stridhana of his wife in case he is suffering from illness which
(2)
precludes him from following his normal avocation in life. 
Commenting on Devala*s verse Devanna points out that the word 'son* 
therein stands symbolically for the whole of the family and says 
that the husband has a right to take stridhana in any case of
ST*
extreme mis hap (mahasankata) which cannot be avoided because of
(3)want of funds. This indeed appears to be the crux of all the
provisions given above, namely, that when the family is caught in 
an unusual calamity and the funds of the family are insufficient 
to relieve it the members of the family should be in a position 
to look to stridhana in the last resort for help. This is the 
curious way in which stridhana, which was originally meant to be 
only a provision for the maintenance of women themselves in case





of need, serves, in exceptional cases, also the purpose of main­
taining the existence of the family itself.
Apparently it appears that the provision of such excep­
tional use of strTdhana which is given by Yajnavalkya is an
exception to the general rul e *Neither the husband, nor the son
(1)...etc.* as given by Katyayana which specifically forbids the
husband, the son and other relatives to utilise strTdhana; so the
question which inevitably presents itself is whether all of these
relatives are empowered by this exception to lay their hands upon
strTdhana in the above-mentioned circumstances. Relying on the
fact that only the husband has been mentioned in Yajnavalkya1s
and Devala1s verses as being capable of taking strTdhana the
commentators emphatically repudiate the idea that anybody except
the husband should be able to take strTdhana in circumstances
like famine etc.
It is not difficult to understand why the husband alone
should be selected as the perspn capable of exercising this
exceptional right. The explanation may be found in the answer
offered by Bevanna and Pratapa Rudra to a question which is as
follows. It has already been admitted that the husband has no
ownership (svatva) in strTdhana nor has he freedom to dispose of
(2)or to utilise it generally for his own purposes. In such a
(1) See supra p.a.3.5.
(2) See s u p r a V * 4 n  his chapter on the !,dattapradanikan 
JDevanna also remarks : flAnvahitvat strTdhanamapyadeyam 
svat vabhavat11.
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case as this, that the husband should be allowed to utilise 
strTdhana - albeit in exceptional circumstances - appears to be 
incompatible with the already accepted position.(1) Devanna re- 
solves this incongruity by saying that although the woman has 
dominion over her property the husband has dominion over the woman 
herself; hence the husband also has a right to utilise, in excep­
tional circumstances, the property of the person over whom he can
(2)
exercise dominion. The explanation obviously relies upon the
provision of Manu whereby he declares that the wife, the son and
a slave are incapable of owning property and that the property
which they acquire belongs to the person to whom they themselves 
/ \
belong. ° It can therefore easily be seen why, according to the
(1) The incongruity arises because of the MTmamsa principle that 
the owner of the property alone is entitled to dispose of that 
property. See infra
(2) Smr.Cha.657-58 : "Nairn paradhanatyagabhoge parasya svamyanu- 
njhaya vina kathamartha ? Uchyate : svamyanujnabhave'pi 
purvoktavisaye svadhTnajanasvamyake tu strTdhane yathesta- 
viniyoganarhe1pyapadapanodakatyagabhogadavarhatastTtyasmadeva 
vachanat kalpyata ityadosah." Devanna appears to use the 
words 1svamya' and 'svatva* as denoting ownership and property 
in its abstract sense - See Smr.Cha.600-2. The reading of the 
above passage in Mr.Gharpure's edition p.283 is slightly 
different in the case of some words and evidently faulty at 
one place. He reads 1yathestaviniyogarhe api' instead of
'yathestaviniyoganarhe api1 ignoring thereby the very essence 
of the question that is confronting Devanna. The word * api* 
(although) balances two antithetical statements about 
strTdhana being incapable of being spent at pleasure by the 
husband, and about strTdhana being capable of being spent, 
on certain occasions, without the conseht of the owner.




commentators, the husband gets an exceptional latitude of utilis­
ing his wife's strTdhana in certain circumstances.
Whether this position is tenable from a MTmamsa point
(1) .of view or not will be discussed below. It would be sufficient
to observe at this stage that the protection given to strTdhana 
has been itself introduced as an exception to the overall author­
ity of the husband as expressed by Manu: such being the case the 
explanation hardly sounds as convincing. As a shrews, commentator 
and an honest MXmamsaka Devanna does not forget to mention that 
ultimately the scripture itself is the authority behind such a
( 2) r <proposition and reasoning. Mitra Misra also expresses a
(3 )similar opinion.
(1) Infra pp.a.47
(2) Smr .Cha. 657-58 quoted supra.
(3) Vi.Mi.546. Mitra Misra says : "Vachanabalattadrisavisaye 
vyaye svatmeva tasya tatretyadosah.M Thus he confers upon 
the husband a kind of ownership in the property to be dis­
posed by him. The word of scripture is an authority for 
itself and, for its validity, does not require any other 
means of proof like direct perception, inference etc. This 
strength of the scriptural word is called vachanabala. 
Jaimini's sutra which is the basis of this vachanabala runs : 
"Autpattilcastu sabdasyarthena sambandhah, tasya jnanamupa- 
desah, avyatirekascharthe'nupalabdhe tatpramanam Badaraya- 
nasyanapeksatvat." - Jai•Su•I.¥.5. Sahara comments 'Dharme 
chodanapramanyam'. The following comments are found in the 
other commentaries : "Dharme vidhipramanyam" - the Nyaya- 
malavistara and the Saddarsana; "dharme vedasya svatah 
pramanyam" - SubhodhinT of Ramesvara Suri; "sabdasya 
svatah pramanyam" - Vaidyanatha1s Nyayabindu; - all referred 
to in the MTmamsak0|d. t, of Kevalananda Sarasvati p.2.
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Although such a technical reasoning is given by the 
commentators for such an incongruous provision the real reason 
behind it appears, as has been already stated above, to be the 
intention of preserving the safety of the family as a whole -- a 
goal which was never lost sight of by the Sastra, notwithstanding 
its increasing inclination towards individualisation of property. 
Usual laws were inapplicable if a particular person weht outside 
the scope of his own authority and did something which was con­
sidered indispensable for the benefit of the family in distress. 
Thus the wife or any other dependent including even a slave, who 
was ordinarily not entitled to burden the family with a debt,
could certainly do so if the debt was incurred for the family's
—  (1)necessity (kutumbartha lit. for the sake of the family).
Similarly according to Bliavasvami, Narada's total prohibition on
alienations by women was applicable only in the absence of
"calamity", certain rights of alienation being granted to women
(2)in case of calamity. In case of calamity even the religious
laws were suspended and the Sastra authorised people to adox^ t for
* — ( 3)the time being a non-sastric behaviouJ? called apaddharma.
(1) See Brihaspati quoted in Vi.Mi.272 etc; Katyayana quoted by 
Apararka on Yaj.II.145; Na.Smr.IV.18 & Na.Sam,II.15; Na.Smr. 
IV.12 Be Na.Sam.II.10 referred to in the Dharmakosa pp.708, 
712; 698 and 696.
(2) See Na.Smr.IV.18 supra.
(3) See the a]?addharmapralcarana of the Mitaksara (on Yaj.
III.35-44). In case of calamity the usual religious laws 
about achara are relaxed even in the case of a b r a h m a n a v 
See also Brihaspati referred to in Mad.Rat.326. The famous 
story of the sage Visvamitra who could, in days of famine, 
successfully offer in sacrifice and eat the leg of a dog is 
referred to in Vi.Mi.425.
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It is no wonder therefore that the Sastra allows the husband to 
utilise his wife's strxdhana in distressing circumstances.
Here Banerjee correctly points out a difference between
 , (i)
the attitude of Vijnanesvara and Jxmutavahana♦ According to
the former any kind of strxdhana comes under the disposing power
of the husband only in case a calamity like famine etc. mentioned
(2)by Yajnavalkya exists; this rule applies even to wealth earned
by women and gifts given to them by strangers which come under the
omnibus definition of strxdhana given in the Mitaksara. According
to Jxmuta, however, these two categories of property are at the
(3)disposal of the husband even in the absence of famine etc.
From this point of view the husband's position is slightly less
advantageous under the Mitaksara provisions. But on the other
hand whereas Jxmuta declares saudayika to be at the absolute dis-
(4 )  ,
posal of a woman Vijnanesvara abstains from doing so apparently
(1) Banerjee p.376.
(2) For Vijnanesvara says "prakarantarenapaharan dadyat". - Mit. 
on Yaj.II.147. He also authorises the wife to sue her 
husband in case he takes her strxdhana without sufficient 
cause - see supra.
(3) Da.Bha.4.1, 20; 11 . .latra bhartuh svamyam svatantryam, 
anapadyapi bharta grahxtumarhati,...". This shows that 
according to Jxmuta 'svamya' is the same thing as 'svatantrya*. 
See also Da.Ta.40; Da.Kra.Sam.18. In his own treatise 
Srxkrisna explains that the husband possesses 'svatantrya*
in the 'strxsvamikadhana' only because of the vachanabala.
For vachanabala see supra p.,$3*1.
(4) Da.Bha.4.1*21.
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suggesting thereby that the validity of any alienation by a woman
is subject to the ratification by her husband who avowedly
(1)
possesses a dominant position with respect to his wife.
Banerjee rightly points out also that there is hardly any differ­
ence between the Benares school and the Bengal school on this 
point since Mitra Mijsra adopts a position very similar to that of 
Jxmutavahana.  ^2 ^
The question about the anomalous right of the husband 
to dispose of the property of someone else becomes all the more 
pertinent here as both according to the Benares school and the 
Ben<g)sA'l> school woman has ownership in wealth earned by her and in 
property given to her by her strangers. The right given to the 
husband over these two kinds of property is much wider than the 
right given over the so-called technical strTdhana. Mitra Misra 
especially has taken a position creating a self-contradiction; 
for he admits these two kinds of property to be strxdhana, which 
means that they come under the general rule accepted by Mitra Misra
himself, namely, that men do not have freedom of disposing of any
( 3)kind of strTdhana.
Thus Vijnanesvara seems to be holding the most balanced 
outlook: he appears to restrain capricious and foolish aliena­
tions of property by women by impliedly making them valid subject
(1) Supra p.<a*as.
(2) Vi.Mi.542. Mitra Misra also interprets ’svamya1 as 
'svatantrya'.
(3) Vi.Mi.544 : "Purusanamapi kasminnapi dhane na svatantryam”.
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only to ratification by the husband in ail cases whereas he 
shrewdly averts a possible abuse of the husband's power to utilise 
strTdhana by making that power exercisable with regard to any kind 
of strTdhana, only in the case of extreme distress like famine etc. 
At the time and the place - and this was definitely the South where 
women had comparatively more freedom than they had in the North - 
the Mitaksara was written this check and the countercheck probably 
offered the best possible device to promote with sufficient 
security the growth of the proprietory capacity of women.
There is a text of Devala. which ought to be considered 
here. It runs : "The sons should give the strTdhana promised by 
the husband as if it were (their) debt.11 Apparently this means
nothing less than the fact that a mere promise of gift by the 
husband to his wife creates her ownership in the pi'omised gift 
and that if the property concerned is not actually handed over to 
her it remains in the hands of the husband on trust for his wife.
If this deduction is correct this provision appears to be an 
exception to the general rule that in case of gift transfer of 
possession by donor to donee is essential to bring about the 
transfer of ownership.
(1) Devala quoted in Vya.Ma.153. See p p.:Sl7-3r73 -
(2) The smritis mention acceptance (pratigraha) and not gift 
(dana) as one of'the modes of acquisition - Manu X.1I5;
Na.Smr.TV.52 & Na.Sam.II.48. But see Dr.J.D.M.Derrett :
An Indian Contribution to the Study of Propex’ty
B.S.0.A.S. 1956 ix.4-75 at pp.492,-95.
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Commentators, however, disappointingly make irrelevent 
comments on this text just to reaffirm the points which they have 
repeatedly iterated elsewhere. Thus devanna says that this shows 
that the sons etc. have no dominion over strxdhana and that there 
can be no partition of strxdhana during the life-time of the 
female owner as she alone has ownership in the same.(1) He, how- 
ever, correctly points out that from the use of the word 'debt'
(2)it appears that the word 'son* represents the grandson as well.
Mitra Misra makes a similar comment adding, however, that this
shows that although the sons have a right by birth in the strxdhana
of their mother there cannot be any partition of it during the
(3)life-time of the mother. It is certain that with regard to
strxdhana there is nothing corelative to the coparcenary system
(4)
as applicable to male’s property; hence, partition of strxdhana
during the life-time of the owner is not conceivable. But in any 
case the import of Devala's text cannot be stretched, as has been 
done by the commentators, to establish this point. The reference 
made by Mitra Misra to the theory of right by birth is especially 
irrelevant and paranthetical.
(1) "Anenapi strxdhane sutadxnam nasti svamyamiti gamyate.
Tatascha strxdhane jxvadvibhago nastyeva stryaikasvamika- 
tvat.,! - Smr .Cha.659. Set W ' C h q .
(2) Smr.Cha.659; Vi.Mi.546. The idea seems to have^taken 
from the debts of the father which are payable by the sons, 
grandsons and great-grandsons'.
(3) Vi.Mi.546 - "Anena strxdhane jxvantyam tasyam sutanam 
janmana svatve* pi nasti vibhaga iti gamyate.u
(4) But see infra pp.£'66-69*
i
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The next question to be considered is whether the status
of a woman affects her right of disposing of her strxdhana* There
can be two types of distinctions amongst women : firstly, that
between chaste women on the one hand and unchaste women including
prostitutes and other profligate women oil the other; secondly,
between unmarried women, married women under coverture, and widows*
Legal provisions concerning unchaste women and their strxdhana will
be discussed below. Our immediate task is to examine the effects
of the distinction of the second type.
According to Harada's text^1  ^ it appears that a woman
does not possess complete control over her property during any of
the three stages of her life, that during each of these stages
there would be some relative who would be entitled to supervise
over her alienations and that in the absence of any such relative
the King has a right to control her alienations. Manu also
(2)
declares her position to be perpetually subservient. But it is
reasonable to hold that the father is allowed to control his
\ a t e r  p i - o v i o f  the 
daughter, only during her minority since he is enjoined by the A
Sastra to dispose of the girl in marriage before she attains the
(3)age of puberty. The girl is allowed to choose her own husband
(1) Na.Smr. 1.32 and Na*Smr.1.26-27 referred to supra pp.j2£/~43l.
(2) Manu V.14S supra (Jha's edition V.146).
(3) See supra P-39.
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(svayamvara) upon the termination of three years after she has
attained the age of puberty which, according to Medhatithi,, is
(1)twelve. Incidentally it may be noted, that Kautilya says that
a woman becomes capable of looking after her duties (vyavahara- 
yogya) at the age of twelve - actually four years earlier titian 
man - after which age she is to be fined for non-performance of 
her duties. It is therefore proper to hold that the girl
can become capable of managing her own property at the same age 
at which she is theoretically allowed a svayamvara. The very fact 
that Manu orders the girl wishing to choose her own husband to
(3)return all the ornaments given by the father, mother or brother
shows that at that time she is to assert her own position free
from the symbols of her dependence. She is not allowed both to
assert her own freedom and also to take the ornaments which are
given probably under an expectation that they would pass under the
control of some person whom the parents etc. would approve as a
(4)husband for her.
(1) Medhatithi on Manu IX.91.
(2) Kau.lII.3 Shama Shastri's edition p. 154 , and Ganapati 
fiastri 1 s edition yol-TH P-i9-
(3) Manu IX.92. Medhatithi adds that if they have given the 
ornaments with notice of her intention to make a svayamvara 
she need not return them.
(4) This mentality on the part of the parents is aptly expressed 
by Medhatithi on Manu IX.92 : ,f ... asmai na vayamenam 
dasyama ityevamabhiprayam yadbhusanam . . . " . The svayamvara
- is evidently an assertion of the daughter’s own independence. 
Raghavananda commenting on the verse says : "Grahane 
stenatvam yatah svayamvara svadehamatramadaya varam patim 
vrinTte tasyah pitridhane nadhikarah.” From the underlinedo o v # -'■ « »
words it appears that the daughter 'recovers herself only' 
from the father.
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There is also the authority of the commentators for
holding that the father loses his dominion over his daughter after
she attains majority. Commenting upon another verse of Manu,
Medhatithi observes that after she has attained majority the
(1)father loses his dominion. Raghavananda commenting on the
same verse says that the daughter’s state of being a daughter
(kanyatva) and the father's ownership (svatva) in her determine
after the age of puberty as the daughter, after having "taken
possession of herself" marries the bridegroom when she wants to
(2 )marry of her own accord. So he considers the age of puberty
of the daughter as the cause which puts an end to the ownership 
(svatvanivartakahetu) of the father. ICulluka also makes a similar 
comment upon the verse. Thus it is clear that according to the 
&astra an unmarried woman becomes fully independent in case she 
is not married at puberty. There is no reason, therefore, why 
she should be hindered in the disposal of her own property at her 
own,pleasure. So long as she chooses to remain unmarried the
(1) Manu IX.93. Here he refers to Manu V.148 and remarks : 
"Vayontarapraptau vedayituh pituh svamyani nasti...".
(2) "Rituparyantam kanyayah ftanyatvam pituh svatvam cha yatah
svayamvara svadehamatramadaya varam var*ayatTti pitradya- 
nadhTnatvam balye piturnirdese tisthedityukteh dasavarsa- 
dikalasya svatvanivartakatvadritukalasyapi svatvanivar- 
takatvat." It is to be noted that Medhatithi uses the 
word ’svamya’ whereas Raghavananda uses 1svatva’. Kulluka 
says : "..svamitvat hiyate". But see the argument of 
Jagannatha noted in Banerjee pp.372-73. However, Banerjee 
does not try to meet that argument with the above-mentioned 
authorities.
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,§astra clearly does not intend to put her under anyone's control.
During coverture, however, the woman is placed by the 
Sastra under her husband's control and we have seen that accord­
ing to the Benares school, the Bombay school, and the Southern 
school her right of disposition of her non-saudayika is subject 
to the control of the husband. Her saudayika, however, is always 
at her absolute disposal. According to the Bengal school whatever 
property can be regarded as her strxdhana is at her absolute 
disposal. This is, of course, subject to the husband's right to 
take possession of strTdhana in case of famine etc. No instance 
of provision is to be found in the commentaries regarding the 
consequences of an alienation by a woman of her sqydayika strTdhana 
when the husband has taken possession of the property under the 
allowable exceptional circumstances but has not already utilised
the same. But since Mitra Misra asks the husband to repay the
.  .  —  .  . (1) utilised stridhana if he is capable of doing so, it appears
that what the husband gains under such circumstances is simply
the disposing power in such strTdhana and not the right of owner-
(2)ship in it. " Since the wife's right of ownership in saudayika 
and her disposing power over it are antecedent in time to the 
acquirement of disposing power by the husband an alienation by 
the wife effected before the exercise of this disposing power of
(1) Supra p.A,30.
(2) But Mitra Misra thinks that the husband gets also owner­
ship in such property - see supra p.<£3*1.
244
the husband must be held to be valid. This proposition, of course, 
proceeds upon an assumption that at that time the disposing powers 
of both the husband and wife are concurrent as there is nothing 
in the &astra to suggest a position to the contrary.
During widowhood a woman returns to her original position 
before marriage. As the leading commentators of all the Mitaksara 
sub-schools do not mention any except the husband as having a 
controlling power over woman’s alienations, and since they 
mention the husband alone as being capable of utilising strTdhana 
in case of calamity it is obvious that the son etc. are not en­
titled to the dominant position which the husband possesses. 
Consequently the woman is free to dispose of her strTdhana at her 
own pleasure during her widowhood. Devanna particularly mentions 
that the son etc. have no right of dominion over strxdhana.^
As a result of this^tfealth earned by women and gifts given to them 
by strangers - whether such property is acquired by the woman 
before or after her widowhood - will be at the absolute disposal 
of a widow according to the Benares school and that part of the
Bombay province which is governed by the Mitaksara in preference
(2)to the Mayukha. J According to the Beng'al school, the Southern
(1) Smr.Cha.659 supra p.4,^ 6-
(2) Balambhatta on Yaj.II.144 p.255 actually makes a 
suggestion to that effect. See supra.
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school, the Mithila school and the Mayukha such property is not
(1)strTdhana at all and therefore the question whether such 
property if acquired during coverture, can be freely disposed of 
by a woman during her widowhood or not does not arise at all.^^ 
However, it appears that even according to these schools if such 
property is acquired by a woman during her widowhood it would 
remain at her absolute disposal as there is none who can exercise 
dominion over it at that stage.
The relationship between ownership and the right of dis­
position being very complicated we have already seen that the 
commentators are not able to explain satisfactorily why the husband
gets the right to dispose of property which is not owned by him.
But to examine whether such a provision is consistent with the 
cannons of the Sastra or j|ot we have to turn to MTmamsa which 
admittedly constitutes one of the basis of Dharma.
Although the law-givers of the Hindus do not define pro­
perty they define the modes of acquisition of w e a l t h . C o m m e n ­
tators like Vijnanesvara and others, however, maintain that the 
modes of acquisition as given by the &astra are not exhaustive
(1) See supra pp*.9o,.97.
(2) Banerjee, however, boldly assefcts that according to all
schools the two categories of property becomes strxdhana of
a woman during her widowhood. But we have already seen that
those categories constitute the husband1s property according
to the later authors of the Bengal school. The position of
Madanasimha, Devanna and Nxlakantha is not much different• • • • •
from them. See supra R&og.
(o) See supra p p . 36*
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and that they are to be supplemented by the modes of acquisition
(1)which are accepted and practised by the people themselves.
Bhavanatha who is quoted in the Madanaratna and other treatises
clearly states that like treatises on grammer etc. modes of acqui
sition have, for their authority, the usage of the people them-
(2)
selves (lokasiddha). Here again it ought to be noted that
Prabhakara as quoted in the Mitaksara and other treatises enunci­
ates that it is the acquirement of the property which gives the
(3 )acquirer an ownership in the acquired property.
(1) Vijnanesvara maintains that 'svatva' (ownership) is laukika 
(secular) and not '&astraikasamadhigamya' (to be determined 
with the help of the Sastra alone) - see the Mitaksara intro­
duction to the chapter on inheritance p.197; see also Mad. 
Rat.324; Nri.Pra.212; Sa.Vi.396; Vi.Mi.418 etc. Thus 
Vijnanesvara and Pratapa Rudra, for instance, add 'adhi1 and 
'kutta' as additional modes of acquisition - see above
(2) "Lokasiddham varjanam janmadi, ata evanidampratheunalokadh- 
l vis ay at ay a sthite n i b a n d h an ar t ha smr i t i r vy akar a~‘nad i- 
smritivat iti," - Mad.Rat.324; see also Vi.Mi.420 where the 
reading is slightly different; "Ata evanindyam prathamalo- 
kadhTvisayavyavasthitam...." Madanasimha concludes 'arjanam 
svatvahetuh'. The point is that just as grammer comes into 
existence after the rules of the language have been fairly 
ascertained and settled by the usage of the people speaking 
that language the Sastra gives nothing but a mere paraphrase 
of what has been accepted by the public as a correct mode of 
acquisition.
(3) "Pralapitamidam kenapi 'arjanam svatvain napadayati' iti
vipratisiddham" - quoted in the Mitaksara introduction to the
chaptei* on inheritance p.198; Vi.Mi.427 etc. The words in
the single inverted commas are quoted by Medhatithi also -
Medh.on Manu VIII.416. From the way Vijnanesvara refers to
Prabhakara as 'guru' it appears that he was of the Prabhakara
and not of the Bhatta school. On the point of 'laukikatva'• * A
of the modes of acquisition, however, there was no difference 
of opinion between the two schools - see Vi.Mi.422.
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The right of disposition also has been considered by
the MTmamsa and Jaimini lays down the following rule in respect
of it : ifOne has the disposing power of that only of which one is
(1)the owner, other things not being within one’s competency.11
This sho\ys that ownership in a thing is an essential pre"requisite
(2) ^for its disposal. Bhavanatha also points out that a thing which 
is acquired by a person is capable of being freely disposed of by 
him.^^ Madanasimha and Devanna point out that this right of free 
disposition is, of course, subject to the precepts and restric­
tions of the Sastra which makes some expenditure obligatory and 
declares some property to be inalienable so that property (svam), 
according to these authors, does not mean something which is freely
to be disposed of but indicates that which is capable of being
(4 )freely disposed of by the owner. Devanna and Mitra Misra say
(1) ”Yasya va prabhuh syadi tarasyaskyatvat." - Jai.Su.VI.7.2.
For references to this sutra see also Sarkar's T.L.L.(1905) 
p.344 and Dr.Kane’s Notes to the Vya.Ma.92. In writing these 
few pages on the MTmamsa view about ownership Dr.Kane's notes 
to the Mayukha have been of valuable assistance to the present 
writer.
(2) Sahara comments on the above sutra as follows : "Yasya 
prabhutvayogena svatvam tadeva deyam, netarat. Kasmat? 
Prabhutvayoginah sakyatvat, itarasya cha asakyatvat." Sarkar 
mentions many other inferences derived by later authors from 
the above sutra. Many of them appear to be debatable. - Bee 
T.L.L.(1905)p.345.
(3) ’’Tachcha tasya tadarham yadyenarjitam” Bhavanatha quoted in 
Smr.Cha. 602; Mad.Rat.325; Vi.Mi.422.
(4) Madanasimha says : ”Na cha yathestaviniyojyatvam svatvamiti 
brumah kim tarhi yathestaviniyogayogyatvam." He says that 
the Sastra controls the way of expenditure when, for instance, 
it makes it an obligatory duty for one to provide maintenance 
for one's own family. - Mad.Rat.325. Similar remarks appear 
in Smr.Cha.602 and Vi.Mi.422. Madanasimha and Devanna depend
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that although the husband has no ownership in his wife's strTdhana
he gets an exceptional right of disposing of it because he has
(1)ownership in the wife herself. Whether such position is tenable
or not must be examined with the help of the Mimamsa.^
I ^
Sabarasvami takes the opportunity of discussing this point
,  —  (3
while commenting on the Visvajityadhikarana of the Jaimini-sutras.
The point which is considered is whether in a Visvajit sacrifice,
in which the Vedas enjoin a person to give away all his property
(sarvasva lit. all one's own), a person can give away his own
twother, father etc. The prima facie view is that they can be given
away as the mother etc. are also denoted by the word 'sva' (one's
t (4)own); but the conclusive view is that they cannot be given
away since a person has 110 ownership (prabhutva) in them.
MTlakantha and Pratapa Rudra esx3ecially take this adhika-
rana into consideration while discussing the question under consider
ation. It is necessary to follow KTlakantha's discussion in detail.u i l
upon the authority of Parthasarathi Misra (Tantraratna, 
Sarasvati Bhavan Series part X p.19) and Dharesvara respect­
ively to establish this point. Devanna says that there is 
actually nothing, therefore, which is freely alienable - 
"...yathestaviniyojyam kimapi nastiti." - Smr.Cha.602. See 
also Dr.J.D.M.Derrett : An Indian Contribution to the Study 
of Property B.S.0.A.S.(1956)475 at 481.
(1) See supra.
(2) Because MTmamsa is one of the fourteen authorities of Dharma - 
see supra pp.4-7.
(3) On Jai .Su. VI. 7 .1: "Svadane sarvainavisesat1' Sahara says 
"Idamamananti Visvajiti sarvasvam dadatTti. Tatra sandehah 
kim yavatkinchit svasabdenochyate yatha mata pita ityevama- 
dyapi sarvam deyam, uta yatra prabhutvayogena svasabdah 
taddeyamiti."
(4) See supra p.ah7- note no. I.
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Elucidating his point that a mode of acquisition has for its
authority the sanction of the public and not of the Sastra Nxlafca-
ntha says that this is how ownership is acquired in a calf born of
a cow belonging to oneself although the Sastra does not mention
this kind of acquisition at all.^  ^
The objector says that if one gets ownership in a calf
get
born of one's own cow, to be sure one would ownership in a son,
A
daughter etc. born of one's own wife and one would be obliged to
j> ( 2)give them away in the Visvajit sacrifice. The same objector,
this
however, further points out that position is untenable since itA
would be in conflict with another Mimamsa-sutra which forbids aa
(3)person to give away his son, daughter etc. Nxlakantha cuts
the root of this argument by saying that a person has no ownership
in a wife as he has in his cow. He further adds that the cause of
ownership in a particular thing is known in this world to arise
from the fact that it is a produce of something which has already
(4)been an object (aspada) of ownership.
(1) "Evancha svxyagavadi jatavatsadau &vatvavyavaharah sangachch- 
ate. Upayanam sastragamyatve tu na syat. Svxyagavadijana- 
narupopayasya sastrenabodhanat." - Vya.Ma.92.
. (2) According to the &ruti passage referred to by Sahara - see
P.249 note no.4 continued :
subject it means ' ownership* • 'ilspada* means receptacle or abode • Mo1 
the cow in this illustration is the object of 1svatva* whereas its 
owner would be considered as the subject of 'svatva'.
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The objector goes on to say that a person has ownership
even in the wife because in a marriage ceremony there is an ’accept-
(1)ance1 (pratigraha) of the wife. Nxlakantha points out that these
words of gift (dana) and acceptance are used in the case of adoption
(2)also. ' He further argues that as the Ksatriyas also follow the
-  (b)Brahma form of marriage and as they are also entitled to adopt
and to be given in adoption, the words gift and acceptance will
have their primary meaning in the case of the Brahmanas (who alone
are entitled to acquire property by ’acceptance1) and a secondary
meaning in the case of the Ksatriyas etc. And this is undesirable
since an injunction cannot have two conflicting senses at the same
(4)
time (yugapadvrittidvayavirodha). He concludes therefore on
(1) See Asvalayana*s Gri.Su.1.6.1 and 1.7.3 for gift and accept­
ance of the bride in the brahma form of marriage - referred
to by Dr.Kane in his Notes to the Yya.Ma.92.
(2) Yaj.II.133 referred to in Vya.Ma.92.
(3) Vya.Ma.92-93.
(4) The whole discussion arises because according to Gautama only 
Brahmanas are capable of acquiring ownership by 'acceptance* -
. see supra p. 35. So the same words cannot be taken to have 
a primary sense in the case of the brahmanas and a secondary
sense in the case of the Ksatriyas etc. A word is supposed 
to have three possible functions (vritti), namely, abhidha, 
laksana, and vyanjana. The first conveys the primary sense 
of the word. The second function conveys the secondary or 
the metaphorical sense of the word but this is possible only 
in a case where the primary sense of a word becomes understand­
able. The third vritti conveys a suggestive sense of the word 
which, in any given case, may be present in addition to either 
of the first two vrittis. For different functions and meanings 
of words see Mammata’s Kavyaprakasa Milaso. isvniTI'hq’s,5£h.
vc|(vrp<*Dft ?. 7- . See also Dr .Kane’s noces to Yya.ma.92. As
the conflict exists between the first two senses the same word 
cannot have both the senses at the same time. See Sabara on 
Jai.Su.Ill.2.1, 1.4.8 etc. as quoted by Dr.Kane in his notes 
to Vya.Ma.92. See also Sarkars T.L.L.(1905)p.354 for the 
maxim : "Sakriduchcharitah sabdah sakridevartham gamayati”
(a word uttered only once conveys only one meaning) . f) Iso ivifr*
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the authority of the Amarakosa that the adjective ’own' as found in 
the words like one’s ’own father’ etc. denotes nothing but relation­
ship and that this idiom (sabdavyavahara lit. linguistic usage)
does not convey an idea of ownership
NTlakantha unfortunately appears to be the only author 
who repudiates the idea that a person has ownership in his wife. 
Almost all other authors are of the unanimous opinion that a person 
has ownership in his wife and such authors include Vijnanesvara, 
Devanna, Madanasimha, Pratapa Rudra, Mitra Misra etc. though none 
except Pratapa Rudra discusses the purport of the Visvajityadhik- 
arana.
Thus Vijnanesvara commenting on the smritis which forbid
a person from giving away his wife or son says : ’’The purport of
this is to convey the 'incapability of being given1 but not to state
(2)
an absence of ownership in them.” Moreover at another place he
treats the wife herself as 'wealth' on the authority of a smriti 
passage "One who snatches away the wife of a person (in fact)
(1) See Amarakosa III.3.212 referred to in Vya.Ma,93. The read­
ing 1svo striyam dhane' as found in Dr.Kane's edition is a
misprint which is terribly misleading. It should be 'svo' 
striyam dhane'; for according to the Amarakosa 'sva', when 
not of the feminine gender, denotes projperty. See Mr.
Gharpure's edi.p.41 which reads correctly.
(2) Mit.on Yaj . II. 170". Here the author.refers to Narada's verse
containing the list of things which are inalienable and 
remarks '"Etadadeyatvamatrabhiprayena na punah s'vatvabhavafeh- 
ipraydna. Putradar&sarvasvapratisrutesu svatvasya sadfohavat." 
"Svam dadyadityanena darasutaderapi svatvavisesena deyatvapra- 
sange pratisedhamaha ft darasutadrite 1 ."
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(1)
snatches away his wealth,” Thus according to the Mitaksara
the wife is the property of her husband.
Devanna quotes Brihaspati who declares that joint family
property, mortgaged property, son, wife etc. are incapable of being
(2)given. J Devanna, however, admits that though the other things
declared by Brihaspati like mortgaged property etc. are incapable
of being given on account of the absence of ownership in them the
wife etc. are ’adeya1 only because of a smriti text to that effect
(i.e. vachanabala). He clearly states that a person has ownership
(3)in his wife. He adds that as penance is prescribed for, and
a fine is imposed upon, a person who gives adeya, the act of giving 
does not create a valid gift and that the ownership of the alienee
(1) Mit.on Taj.II.51 : ’’Rikthasabdena yosidevochyate. ’Saiva 
chasya dhanam smritamiti' smaranat, 'Yo yasya harate daransa 
tasya harate dhanam1 iti cha. The first quotation is Na.Smr.
IV".22 & Na.Sam.II. 19, The second quotation is not found in 
the smriti of Narada as known either to Asahaya or Bhavasvami. 
But see the Dharmakosa p.704 wherein it is quoted as of Narada 
apparently on the authority of VT.Ta.52G.
(2) Brihaspati cited in Smr.Cha.442.
(3) ”. . . . putradarasarvasvani svabhutanyapi ' deyam darasutadrite, 
nanvaye sati sarvasvam' ityadidananisedhakasmritibalat 
adeyani. Adhinyasayachitakesu tu adeyatvam svatvabhavaditi 
mantavyam." - Smr.Cha.442. However, .Devanna, though he admits 
husband’s ownership in his wife, does not admit that the husband 
has ownership in his wife’s strTdhana : ’ ’ St rXdhanamapi adeyam 
svatvabhavat.11 - Smr.Cha.443. He quotes Daksa who declares 
both wife and her property to be alienable : ". ..darascha 
taddhanam .,.yo dadati sa mudhatma prayaschittTyate narah.” 
Therefore, as seen above, Devanna shrewdly depends upon the
'vachanabala’ as an ultimate authority for the husband‘s right 
to dispose of his wife's strTdhana.
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does not arise in the case of such property* He also says that
(1)
the acceptance of an 'adeya1 should be reversed by the King. If
we follow Devanna's logic we may conclude that if the wife herself
is 'adeya' her property of which she herself is the cause (karana)}
(2)would be equally inalienable by her husband.
While considering the topic of the Visvajit sacrifice,
Pratapa Rudra admits that a person has ownership in his wife, son
etc. but argues that they are not to be given; for they are 'adeya'
and hence there can be no cessation of ownership in them and the
( 3)gift does not bring about an ownership of the alienee. He
emphatically states, moreover that such ownership is manifested by 
the relation of an acquirer and the thing acquired which exists
(1) "Grihitasya cha paravartanamapi mahfksita karyamityadattadeya™ 
grahanat gamyate, adattenadeyena cha danasiddhyabhavat paras- 
vatvanutpatteh." - ibid. Pratapa Rudra quotes this opinion of 
Devanna and agrees with him. However, as against Vijnanesvara, 
Kularka (Apararka ?) and Devanna he agrees with LaksmTdhara
in holding that the prohition against alienation of all pro­
perty (sarvasva) is texual and obligatory (vaidha) - See 
Sa.Vi.281.
(2) Incidentally it may be noted that if we cast a casual glance 
at the chapter on the * dattapradanika' in any of the digests 
it a£>pears that the list of ' adeyas' include categories of 
property which is inalienable by men only; this is probably 
so because the &astra, as pointed out by Narada, hardly 
expected women to indulge in any kind of transactions con­
cerning property.
(3) tSupra p.SlR. notes'. • See also 3a.Vi.278 "Putradaradidra- 
vyasya tu dane krite api svatvasyanapayat. Svatvam manasika 
kriya sankalparupataya napaiti. Kintu rnahapatakadina 
tadgatam svatvamapaitTti dhanarjananayasiddham." This view 
and the one quoted in the next note have been introduced by 
Pratapa Rudra as being adopted by 1 some people1 but as he does 




between a person and his wife, son etc.U) HTlakantha has very
successfully rebutted this argument, it being inconsistent with
—  (2) the rules of the &astra itself.
Although most of these commentators accept the position
that the wife, the son etc. are inalienable Katyayana who has been
quoted by a number of commentators states that they are not to be
( 3 )  -  ( 4 )given away if they are unwilling. Moreover, as against Narada,
he also authorises a person to give away his wife and son in case
(5)
of calamity. Quoting the first verse Vachaspati Misra says
that according to Katyayana the wife, the son and other dependents
(1) !l Put radar adau iu ar j yar j aka s arnb a n d h a b h ava r u p a sya svat vasya 
vidyamanatvat. Putradaradikam svameva. Tachcha mahapata- 
kadina nivartata ityuktam prak - Sa.Vi.280. But he then 
remarks : "Prakrite tu danavieharo danavisaya iti tatrasmaka- 
manastha.M
(2) iSee supra.
(3) ’’Vikrayam chaiva danam cha na neyah syuranichchhavah/
Barah putrascha svarvasvamatmanaiva tu yojayet//1' - Katyayana 
quoted in Vi.Mi.307 etc. See The Dharmakosa p.804; Kane’s 
edi.no.638.
(4) Na .Smr .VII .4™5 8s Na.Sam.4-5 wherein Narada forbids alienation 
of wife etc. even during distress. See Mit.on Yaj.II.175 for 
a discussion about this verse.
(5) "Ipatkale tu kartavyam danam vileraya eva va/ Anyatha na 
pravartanta iti sastravinischayah//" » Katyayana quoted in 
Smr.Cha.307 etc. See The Dharmakosa p.804. Devanna notes
a •
the contradiction between this text and the above-mentioned 
text of Narada but does not try to resolve the contradiction 
as regards the alleged alienability of the wife. He and 
Mitra Misra compare the two quotations of Katyayana just 
referred to and say that the epithet 'unwilling’ in the first 
verse refers only to circumstances where no calamity exists; 
for in case of calamity the sale or gift is authorised - Smr. 
Cha.446; Vi.Mi.307; see also Pa.Ma.226.
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. (1) TJL •could be given away in case they are willing. It is more
probable therefore that in the beginning the wife was considered 
as an alienable property of the husband though it appears that
this right was in fact not exercised very frequently even in the
(2) _ 
remote past. With the advent of the concept of strxdhana, it
seems that this right to alienate the wife herself in calamity 
was eventally curtailed so that all that remained was a right to 
alienate the wife’s strTdhana in case of calamity. So although the 
idea of the alienability of the wife had been disc arded the idea 
of ownership in one's own wife lingered as has been evidenced by 
the opinion of Vijnanesvara and others. The stand taken by these 
commentators is, however, self-contradictory for these very 
commentators declare women themselves to be entitled to own pro­
perty and logically speaking it is impossible to imagine that a 
thing could be both a subject and an object of ownership.
(1) "Kpatkale api putradaradyanvayanam vimatau putradarasarvas- 
vanamadeyatetyarthah. Tatsanimatau deyatamaha Katyayanah
'Vikrayam chaiva ...' 'Spatkale tu kartavyam ...’. Tesam 
trayanam vimatavet at t rayam svayamevo pabhokt avyam, 
etesamanumatau param tesam danamityarthah." - Vi.Chi.36.
(2) In the legendary history of India two instances are very 
spectacular on this point. In the Mahabharata the king 
Bharmaraja is shown to have successfully offered his wife as 
a gamb1ing-stake notwithstanding the opinion of his brothers 
to the contrary. In the puranas King Harischandra who gave 
all his property to the sage Visvamitra is told to have lost 
his ownership in his wife as well. Such instances, however, 
can hardly be treated as representative of general social 
practice; for in the puranas even lord Krisna is stated to 
have been gifted away to the sage Narada by his wife though 
in fact no other instance of such 'patidana’ has been found 
either in literature orm the inscriptions.
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From a MTmamsa point of view we may conclude that the
husband has no right at all to dispose of his wife's strTdhana
because he has no right of ownership in it. From the MTmamsa
standpoint therefore the explanation given by Devanna, namely, that
the husband gets this exceptional right because he has ownership in
the wife herself, is without any foundation. This also reveals the
self-contradiction involved in the stand adopted by Mitra Misra
and Jimutavahana, namely, that a woman has ownership in wealth
acquired by her and property given to her by strangers but that her
husband has full freedom to dispose of such property. Jaimini
emphatically states the right to dispose of a particular property
cannot exist by itself and as apart from the ownership in that
(1)property. It is unlikely that the commentators were, while
segregating the right of disposition from the right of owning 
strTdhana, unaware of the fact that they thereby were violating 
the basic MTmamsa principles. We are therefore driven to the infer 
ence that they deliberately acted against Mxmamsa only to incorpor­
ate into their treatises the provisions which were more consistent
i „
with the usage which existed in derogation of the Sastra itself.
(1) Similarly the stand of the Bengal school, namely, that such 
property devolves upon the heirs of the husband is also 
without any footing. To borrow the argument of Mitra Misra 
arising in another context : "Vastutastu jatasvatve svamini 
mrite tatpratyasannanatneva taddhanagrahanamuchitam. H - Vi .Mi. 
4 9 2 .
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After-this review of the Dharmasastra1s provisions on 
the subject of a female * s disposing power over her peculiar 
property** we may now turn to the current text-books and judicial 
decisions given during the British period and thereafter endeavour 
to ascertain whether, and if at all, to what extent, they have 
faithfully reproduced these provisions, or any of them.
In the first quarter of the nineteenth century women were, 
on account of their supposed perpetual dependence, always consider­
ed by the Courts as a privileged class which, as against designing 
relatives, required the protection of the Court. They were not con­
sidered to be alieni juris and were viewed as hardly capable of 
acting on their behalf. The attitude adopted by the Courts in those 
days may be illustrated by the following remark of the Supreme Court 
of Madras in Narasummal v. Luchmana :-
ltIt is a distinguishing feature in the case, that the 
complainant is a Native woman1. As such there can be 110 hesi­
tation in declaring her to be under the special protection of the 
Court, entitled to the benefit of that principle which, in equity, 
subjects to be regarded with peculiar jealousy, all transactions 
with persons, whom the policy of law considers to be, at the time, 
incompetent to maintain their own rights, and to exact justice for 
themselves. A native woman can never be deemed to be sufficiently 
sui juris, to be held bound by her personal acts, if there exists 
the slightest reason to apprehend that an advantage may have been 
taken of her.n(1)
This doctrine of the dependence of women, Jtowever, proved 
to be a double-edged weapon in the Courts : it served to protect
(1) (1809) Notes of Cases by Strange II.15. For similar remarks
see also jLatchemy v. Lewcock (1800) Notes of Cases by Strange
I.30 at 35 and Chellumal v. Garrow (1812) Notes of Cases
i
II.153. The statement that women can scarcely be called sui 
juris is contrary to the provisions of the Sastra. See below.
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women from being deceived by vicious people; but it also had the
(1)effect of limiting the estate which women took m  their property.
It was this principle that, at least for the time , misled
the Court into believing that women could not have an absolute
— — (2 ) power of disposing of even their saudayika stridhana.
The subject of women*s right of disposal of their strid­
hana received a somewhat neglectful treatment at the hands of the 
early text-book writers. To take the example of the three earliest 
authors, Sir Francis W a x d e n o t e s  only a couple of pages to 
the whole topic of stridhana. After having dealt with the meaning 
of stridhana and the line of devolution prescribed for the same, he 
tries to account for his haste by saying HThe subject is one more
of curiosity than of use, for it rarely happens that women die
(3)possessed of wealth.” It is not surprising therefore that he
deals^with the question of the right of disposition within a single 
sentence.
i (4)Sir William Macnaghireni fares no better. It may, at
the outset, be mentioned here that this author had strange juridical 
theory of his own. In his opinion the question as to what the lav/
(1) This was one of the reasons why women were declared to be 
entitled only to limited estate in inherited property.
(2) See below pp.<£,65 —6 If.
(3) Consideration on the Hindoo Law (1S24) p.9. Although Sir 
Francis limits the title of his book by adding a clause Mas 
it is current in Bengal” it must be remembered that the Court; 
at Fort William, in those days, had to deal with appeals from 
many districts governed by the Mithila and the Benares schools 
as well. So the author can hardly be excused for having 
neglected to treat- at length the law of the Mitaksara sub- 
schools on this point.
(4) Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law (1829).
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is is not as much important as the question whether the law is
(1)certain or not. In haste to make the law certain Macnaghtev? «
has made many statements which are unsupported either by the
™ (2)Sastra or by custom. He devotes one paragraph to the woman's
right of disposition which is as follows : ,TIt may here be observed, 
that the Hindu law recognises the absolute dominion of a married 
woman over her separate and peculiar property, except land given 
to her by her husband, of which she is at liberty to make any dis­
position at pleasure. He has nevertheless power to use woman's 
peculium, and consume it in case of distress; and she is subject
to his control, even in regard to her separate and peculiar pro- 
(3)perty." The statements made in the underlined two sentences
are obviously self-contradictory, and defeat the very purpose of 
the treatise, namely, to make Hindu law certain and precise.
(1) "It has been my object in this work, to fix doubtful points 
regarding which a contrariety of opinion has hitherto prevail­
ed;... . Though I have satisfied myself, I am aware it by no 
means follows that others should be convinced with the same 
facility : but it is certainly true, that questions of highest 
importance, and which are of everyday occurence, should be 
finally determined in one way or the other. The mode is 
nothing:- the determination is everything. 11 matters little, 
for instance, to a community at large, whether a father shall 
be held to have the right of conferring his ancestral real 
property on one son, to the exclusion of the rest; but it is 
of highest importance to every member of the community that the 
rights and the privileges of each should, as far as practicable 
be defined as established - Introduction to mcnaughten's 
Hindu Law pp.III-IV. He further states that the Hindu law
"in its pure and original state does not furnish many instances 
of uncertainty or confusion. The speculations of the commen­
tators have done much to unsettle it and the venality of tfce 
pundits has done more."
(2) See supra p. qnotliev
(o) Mac.H.L.vol„I.p.40.
Mr.Gupte, a modern author, also makes a similar mistake.
After having stated that stridhana is the absolute property
c ovd1 ovt Hi t e, ^
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Sir Thomas Strange devotes more space to women’s right
(1)of disposition. He is the first author who, for the purpose of
disposition, distinguishes between wealth earned by women and gifts
given to them by strangers (which he mistakenly includes in strxd™
hana on the alleged authority of the Smr i t i chan dr i ka) on the one
(2)
hand and the rest of stridhana on the other. As regards the
former division of woman’s property he states that according to
’’the most general understanding” such property is at the disposal
(3)
of- the husband 1’without reserve.” As regards the latter he says
that the husband ’’has universally with her so far a con-current 
power over it, that he may use it in any exigency, for which he
of a woman and having affirmed that absolute property is that 
which is at the free disposal of the owner Mr. Gupte sets out 
the limitations put upon women’s power of disposition of 
stridhana as exceptions to the above rule. But an exception 
cannot exclude the very differentia of stridhana which the 
author has created for the purpose of his definition of strid­
hana. See Gupte’s Hindu Law pp.565-66 and compare them with 
the later pages. The author is probably impressed by the
apparent construction of Gour's Hindu Code s.341 - Compare
s.341 of the code with Gour's remark on p.1565.
(1) Sir Thomas Strange : Hindoo Law (1830) pp.26-28.
(2) See ibid vol.I pp.29-31 wherein the enumeration of stridhana
is given wholly on the authority of the Smritichandrika which, 
according to Strange, includes all kinds of women’s property 
in stridhana. The statement that 'silpaprapta etc.' is 
stridhana according to the Smritichandrika is of course not 
correct. See supra p It seems Mayne has followed
Strange in making a similar statement - see ■
infra p.&7£. Strange1s full reliance on the Smritich-
yandrika shows that both Macnaughten and Strange borrowed their 
ideas about Hindu law from the schools of the territory where 
the Courts which they presided over were situated viz.
Calcutta and Madras respectively.
(3) Ibid p.26.
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(1)has not the other means of providing . and refers to the
(2)texts about famine etc. which, according to the Sastra, create
such an exig^cy/. It is not certain whether even Strange had a
definite idea about the extent of women*s right of disposing of
their own stridhana. For after having stated that, women being
uneducated, "gross abuse” is to be controlled by the father, the
husband or the guardian etc. he adds a clause : "such interference
being itself subject to revision by the judicial power, since
( 3 )otherwise the idea of stridhana would be but a mockery." The
last clause suggests that even according to Strange women have in 
their stridhana some special right of disposition which they do 
not possess in other property. His statement that even the father 
and the guardian etc. are able to control alienations by women is 
misleading; for none except the husband has a right to do so.
His suggestion about judicial revision is, however, important 
though it does not appear to have been taken notice of by any other 
text-book writer or by a Court of law.
Thus none of these writers seems to contemplate woman's 
absolute right of disposition in any kind of stridhana - a policy 
which, amongst the commentators of the different schools, has been 
adopted by none except Vijhanesvara. The fact that according to 
Vijhanesvara women cannot dispose of any property independently 
has been admitted as a matter of unavoidable inference by West. J.
(1) Ibid.
(2) For these texts see supra pp.4,3,90
(3) Strange H.L. Vo.Xj.p.28.
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in Vijiarangam's case, by Messrs. West and Buhler and by Jolly. 
Though West and Buhler give the distinction between saudayika and 
non-saudayika as developed by the later authors of the Mitaksara 
school they confirm the attitude of Vi jnanesvara stated just above, 
on the authority of the judgement of West J . who discusses the 
subject at great length and rightly concludes : "It is clear, there­
fore, that a right of absolute disposal did not enter into Vijhan-
(1)esvara*s conception of the essentials of ownership." Jolly also
thinks that as regards disposition Vi j hane svara wants to give the
same rights to women over their stridhana as to men over their
ancestral property. He thinks in fact that the widening of the
term stridhana in the Mitaksara was neutralised by the want of
(2)independence for women - a suggestion which at once compels
assent - for it sVi^ ws the perfect balance of the scheme which existed
in Vijhanesvara's mind. Jolly adds however, that the ’successors'
of Vi,inane iS vara have, from the point of view of woman's dominion,
removed the identification of stridhana with female's property in
general by admitting the distinction between saudayika and non-
(3)
s a u d a y i k a .
This has been stated incidentally in order to show that
(1) A piece from the judgement of Vijiarangam's case (supra 
p ^ . q u o t e d  with approval in W. & B. p.303.
(2) Jolly's f.L.Xi.1883 p.252. The analogy suggested by Jolly 
is really interesting for it throws some light on the fact 
that Manu's text (IX.199) forbidding women to expend has been 
applied to joint family property by some commentators and to 
stridhana by some others. See supra
(3) T.L.L.(1883) p.259.
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the narrow concept of woman's dominion over her stridhana as stated
by MacnagH’teir:■ or Strange coincides with the idea of Fijhanesvara
alone. But the later writers such as Sirkar, Grady, Banerjee,
Jolly etc. give many of the texts on disposition which have been
(1)discussed above.
We may now turn to the case-law on the topic. It will be
noticed that the law concerning woman's right of disposition has
been discussed more elaborately by the judges of the Bombay High
Court than of any other High Court. Incidentally it was in the
Bombay province itself that woman's absolute right of disposal in
at least one kind of her property was recognised for the first time
Even in Bombay the theory of dependence of women hampered
at first the assertion of their absolute right of disposing of
(2 )their saudayika. In Ichha Lukshumee v. Anandram it was decided
by the Bombay sudur Udalut Court that a widow is entitled to the 
possession of her dower ( p u l l a ) b u t  that she cannot imperatively
(1) Shamachurn Sircar's Vyavastha-Darpana (1867)p.687 onwards.
This was 'a digest of Hindoo law as current in Bengal'. This 
may be considered as the first book in which all the law of 
the Bengal school was given at great length with fairly ex­
haustive sastric notes**ref erences * Standish Grove Grady : A 
Manual of Hindoo law (1871)p.116. The later authors need not
be considered here except for controvertial points as almost 
all of them accept the conclusions of Banerjee on vital points 
- see for instance Trevelyan's Hindu Lav/ (1913)p.429;
Gharpure's Hindu Law (1931)p.462.
(2) (1814) Borr.1.114. For palla see infra pp.^A7 ~ 4LS.
(3) It seems that the amount of palla is fixed in each particular
caste though variable on account of some special reasons - see 
the facts of Dhoollubdas v. Brijbhookandas (1818)Borr.II.423. 
See also infra .
demand it from her father-in-lav/ before she attains the age of
thirty because "wealth intoxicateth youth11 and because she is en-
(1)titled also to maintenance from her father-in-law. In Bhooll-
(2)ubhdas v. Brijbhookandas the Provincial Court admitted that a
woman has 'full power over her pulla, whether in cash or ornaments' 
but decided that if after the death of her husband any person who 
is an heir of her husband claims to maintain her he should deposit 
the pulla with some trustee after having given the necessary orna­
ments to her. Borradaile rightly points out in a foot-note that 
although a woman can demand maintenance from the heir of the 
husband it cannot be forced upon her so as to create a state of 
dependence.^  ^
But the trend of the decisions soon changed and in Manu-
(4)kchand v. Premkoonwar it was decided that where the husband and 
the wife live separately by mutual agreement the husband cannot 
oblige his wife to furnish a security against waste of her own
( 5 )
dower. In Wulubhram v. Bijlee the husband who had deserted his
(1) In a foot-note to this case Borradaile gives an English trans­
lation of a supposed Vyavastha viz. * child under 16' and 1 a 
woman under 30* 'being under the dominion of passion* are 
supposed to be unfit to take charge of their property. He, 
however, adds : "I find no direct authority for this vyuvustha 
which would virtually annul the right a woman possesses over 
her property and exercises too, as everyday's practice proves.
(2) (1818) Borr.11.423.
(3) He also points out the contradiction between the opinion of
the sastris in this case and those in the case mentioned just
above. For his remark see supra p.oL£ • In Muyaram v. Govind
(!#&*>) Borr.II.245 the sastris admitted that the ornaments 
given to the wife at the time of her marriage "belong to her




wife was asked to give maintenance to his wife and also to return 
the dower*
Although the above cases do not contain any discussion as 
to whether the property was saudayika or not it is evident that it 
was saudayika in each of these cases and that it was fulfilling the
purpose for which it is usually given by the relatives, namely, to
' (1) provide maintenance during distress. It is to be noted that the
women in all these cases were either widows or deserted wives.
After these cases the so-called technical stridhana was
soon recognised by the Courts as saudayika and women's absolute
power of disposal of it was admitted unhesitatingly. In Gosaien
(2 )Chund v. Kishenmunnee J the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut Court of Bengal
decided that the property which a woman receives from her brother
as a gift is her 'soudayica' and that she can alienate such proper-
(3)ty by gift inter vivos. The text of Narada prohibiting any
-  -  ( 4 )  ™ .alienation by a woman and ICatyayana's text about saudayika were
discussed for the first time in this case• However, as this case
was of the Bengal school once it was accepted that such property
was stridhana the woman's right of free and unfettered alienation
should have been accepted as an inevitable corrollary.
( 5)In Hull animal v. Kuppu the Madras High Court held that
(1) See supra p*7/* for ICatyayana's verse .
(2) (1836) Mac.Rep.VI.77. Incidentally it may be noted that
Hal he d, who t published the translation of the Vivad-
arnavasetu under the name 'The Code of Gentoo Laws1 , tted
uncft o } : M o i lW x c J  J  , t u t h * e ~ ; y » t  at o U 1. Cl k v  Ir i p  i t r / 7 .
(3) Supra p.441-A4* !
(4) Supra ptf5.7/.
(5) (1862) 1 M . H .C.R .85•
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where there is no proof as to how a woman came into possession of 
a particular item of property, it is to be considered to be her 
stridhana and to be at her absolute disposal* The ratio of this 
case is indeed a very broad one, namely, a woman's stridhana is 
"hex’ absolute property and at her independent disposal", "with, 
perhaps, .... the exception of land, the gift of her husband ..." 
and that no distinction is to be made between moveable and immove­
able property held by a woman. Scotland C*J* did not consider any
of the texts of the Southern school such as the Smritichandrika
«
etc.; if he had taken into consideration any such text he would
.  (i)
never have ventured to lay down such a wide proposition.
(2)
In Luchman v* Kalli Churn it was laid down that a 
woman is entitled to dispose of moveable and also immoveable pro­
perty purchased out of her own stridhana. In Venkata Rama v .
Venkata Suriya °^^Mayne, as counsel for the appellant, raised a 
strange distinction befox*e their Lordships of Privy Council, namely 
that the widow who has pux’chased immoveable property with the help 
of moveable property given by the husband, cannot dispose of such 
immoveable property by will and that such property follows the line 
of succession prescribed for her husband's property. He had, how­
ever , conceded in his arguments that the testamentary power of a
(1) All the authors of the Southern school admit, for the purpose 
of deciding women's right of disposition, the difference be­
tween saydayika and non-saudayika. See supra.
(2) (1073) 19 W.R.292 P.C.
(3) (1880) 2 Mad.333 P.C.; for detailed facts see 1 Mad.281
wherein the Madx’as High Court judgement is reported.
/
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woman is equal to her power of disposition by gift inter vivos. 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council followed Luchman1s case and 
rejected Mayne1s contention in the following words : "Their Lord­
ships can see no ground for establishing this subtle distinction, 
or for thus arbitrarily interfering with the power of investment 
and application and disposition which the general law gives to a 
Hindu female over her stridhanam,11 ^ ^ Here it ought to be remem­
bered that Narada's restriction on alienation of immoveable pro­
perty given by the husband has been interpreted by the commentators
as introducing an exception (apavada) to the general rule declaring
_  (2)absolute power of women over their saudayika. 1 According to the
Mimamsa as well as western jurisprudence an exception cannot be
(3)extended by analogy (atidesa). So when a thing does not come
under the express provisions of an exception the general rule must 
be applied. That is why Devanna and Balambhatta interpret a text
of Katyayana (which is not very clear by itself) to mean that
immoveable property given to a woman by any relative except the
(4)
husband is freely alienable by her.
(5)In Ne11aikumaru v . Marakathammal it was decided that
(1) 2 Mad.333 P.C. at 335.
(2) ’'Svat ant ryapavadam darsayati." - Smr.Cha.
(3) f'Apavadabhavadu tsar gas t h i t i iti nyayan." - Kyaya Nirnaya
quoted in the Mimamsakosa part I  p.503. See also the Purus-
arthachintaraani quoted on the same page of the kosa.
(4) Supra pp.
(5) (1876)1 Mad.166. The two judges gave two different judgements
and the trend of each has been slightly different• Innes J.
followed Haja Chandranath Roy v. Ramjai Mazumdar ()S70 )6 B.L.R 
303, a Bengal case, wherein it was held that such property can 
be disposed of by gift inter vivos. The property seems to hav 
been considered by him as stridhana. According to Kindersley
the property, 'whether it was stridhana or not', was to be
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a woman can, by will or otherwise, dispose of any property given to
her in quit of her maintenance. Similarly ornaments given by the
(3 )husband were considered as a woman's saudayika. In Munia v.
(?)Puran the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court decided that
immoveable property obtained by a woman from her brother is under 
her absolute and unimpeachable control and disposal. The widow in 
this case came into possession of the property after the death of 
a brother. There was no evidence as to how she came into possess­
ion although it was conceded that it could not be by inheritance.
It is impossible to state the exact ratio of this case as the re­
port is somewhat cryptic and as their Lordships do not refer in 
their judgement to any text or previous case.
considered to be at the absolute disposal of the woman as 
'she was acquitted of giving any account.1 - see report at 
p.167.
(1) Ornaments constitute stridhana only if they are given to a 
woman unreservedly - see supra p.|93. If they are given
by the relatives of a woman they would constitute her saud­
ayika. In Emperor v. Sat Narain A.I.R.(1931)A11.265 the wife 
whom her husband had accused of stealing golden ornaments was 
convicted together with a person who helped her in disposing 
of those ornaments. The other person had pleaded guilty under 
S .680 I.P.C. and therefore had no right of appeal under S .412 
Cr.P.C. Similarly the wife had admitted that the property 
belonged to her husband. But the High Court he Id that a' , 
person pleading guilty owing to an erroneous conception of 
one's right has a right to appeal and referring to the wife's 
statement their Lordships remarked: "Here again the wife 
commits the popular blunder as to the right of ownership in 
stridhan property. The articles were given to her by the 
husband or by her mother and they constituted saydayika 
stridhan under the Hindu law." If the ornaments were given 
conditionally they could not be regarded as stridhana even 
according to Katyayana - See supra p.7 Moreover this is 
another striking instance wherein no text or previous case is 
quoted. Reliance has been placed solely on Mulla's Hindu Law 
edi.5 p.139.
(2) (1883)5 All.310 F.B.
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In the later cases it was always admitted that gifts from
relatives as distinguished from gifts by strangers constitute sa(Ud-
ayika which is at the absolute disposal of a w o m a n . B y  an
analogy between gift and bequest it was also admitted that property
(2)obtained through a bequest also is saudayika. J Thus all the so- 
called technical stridhana was soon recognised as being saudayika. 
Madavarayya v . Tirtha Sami^^ was a peculiar case in which property 
was jointly gifted to husband and wife and this property was later 
on added to the property jointly purchased by them. It was held 
that after the husband’s death his interest in the property devol­
ved on his brother but the wife’s interest therein was her saudayikc 
so as to be at her absolute disposal.
The Smritichandrika which gives a restricted meaning of
’saudayika’ once created a difficulty before the Madras High Court
(4)in Muthukaruppa v. Sellathammal wherein the learned judge 
Seshagiri Ayyar J. fully discussed the problem. Giving the restric' 
ed interpretation put upon the Mitaksara definition of stridhana as 
laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council he said : "If we
(1) See the later cases infra. Rajamma v. Varadarajulu A.I.R. 
(195?)Mad.198, a latest case on this point, this rule has been 
stated as an accepted position of the law.
(2) Venkareddi v. Hanmantgouda (1953)57 Bom.85; Fakirgouda v. 
Dyamua (1933)57 Bom.488.
(3) (1877)1 Mad.307. As regards the first part of the decision it
must be stated that in the first place, the interest of the
husband should have been held to have devolved upon his widow 
as the survivor between the two owners. In the second place,
the brother of the husband, it appears, was a divided brother
of the husband as a result of izhich the widow should have been 
held entitled at least to a limited interest in the other moie 
as her husband’s heir.
(4) (1914) 39 Mad.298.
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regard this restricted class as stridhanam property at the absolute
disposal of woman, we can steer clear of many difficulties."^^
Admitting that the commentators frequently incorporated into their
treatises a body of usages not strictly in accordance with the
smritis he said that the interpretation of Devanna shows that there
was an attempt in the 13th century to put restrictions upon women*s
(2)
power of alienation. But he further pointed out that as the
Madhavxya of the 14th century and the Sarasvativilasa of the 16th
century do not accept the views of the Smritichandrika, the set
back in favour of the husband's "larger power of interference over
(3)his wife’s property was only temporary." Be also referred to th(
texts of the other schools which are unanimous on this point and ar<
. . . (4)opposed to the Smritichandrika.
(5)Referring to Dantuluri v. Mallapudi, wherein it was 
observed that a woman's independent power over her stridhana during 
coverture was doubtful he remarked that the judges in that case did 
not consider the relevant texts and that the pronouncement pro­
ceeded upon the general theory of dependence of women in India.
(1) Ibid at p.299.
(2) Ibid at p.301. He, however, remarks that the conclusion in
the Smritichandrika has been stated hesitatingly. The remark
is entirely unfounded. See supra.
(3) Report at p.301.
(4) Ibid at p.302. Texts of all the schools have been referred to
For women's unfettered right of disposing of their saudayika
the learned judge relied upon Shamachurn Sirkar, Banerjee and 
'fatvas' of the pandits published in the Vyavasthachandrika.
(5) (1863) 2 M.H.C.R. 360/
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He further observed : "With all respect, the learned judges have
not realised, that the power of disposition over property given to
women under the Hindu law was greatly in advance of the views held
regarding it by other civilized communities. The Hindu law deals
with the dependence of women more as a right inhering in them for
protection and as a duty resting upon men than as a disqualifica-
tion for dealing with property."^1)
From the reasoning of the learned judge it seems that if
he had before himself the text of the Dayadasaslokx which forbids
_ (2)
during the Kaliyuga even alienation of saudayika, the decision 
of the case would have taken a different turn; for this treatise 
which is very clear and emphatic throughout was compiled at the 
very beginning of the British period and so well up-to-date.
The case-law concerning a woman's right to alienate imm­
oveable property given to her by her husband has been discussed in 
the last chapter as decisions on this point were genei'ally given on 
the basis of the question whether such property was stridhana or 
not.^^ The gist of the finally developed law may be summed up 
here. Notwithstanding the restrictive precept of the Sastra the 
husband can clothe big wife with full rights of ownership in immove* 
able property given by himself and can thus make the gifted immove­
ables freely alienable by her. Secondly, if it appears from a
(1) Beport at p.303.
(2) See supra p.«3&0*
(3) Supra pp. j fa 6 9.
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document that the husband intended to transfer to his wife full 
right of ownership in such property it will be presumed that the 
right of alienation was also intended to be conferred upon her al­
though it has not been expressly mentioned.
It is at once evident that the restriction which the 
&astra put upon alienation of immoveable property and the liberal 
interpretation put upon the restriction by the modern Courts are 
both reasonable each in its own way. According to Hindu law gift 
even of immoveable property could be effected verbally. Taking 
benefit of this situation a dishonest wife could at any time say 
that her deceased husband had gifted such and such property to her; 
or she could pretend that the husband, while, on his death-bed, 
promised to give certain portion of land to her and the sons could
be compelled to transfer the land as fulfilment of their father's 
(1)promise. Moreover m  case of gift of immoveable property like
agricultural land an immediate and actual transfer of possession to 
a female donee would not be invariable. Thus a designing woman 
could snatch the family property from the rightful claimant and 
could place it in the hands of her relatives in her parents' house. 
In the case of moveable property such a contingency could be least 
expected; for gift of moveable property would usually be accom­
panied by a transfer of possession froai the husband to the wife.
Such transfer of possession could be applied as a crucial test in 
determining whether ox' not a particular property is given to the
(1) See Bevala's text supra
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wife by her husband. Since the passing of the Transfer of Property
Act, however, no transfer of immoveable property is valid unless it
(1)is evidenced by a document which is registered and attested.
When a husband makes a transfer of property to his wife under an 
attested document there is always a greater chance of ascertaining 
or inferring his intentions as to the quantum of interest he wished 
to confer upon his wife. Naturally when it was found that the 
husband could expressly relinquish his right of resumption of gift 
or his right to retain control over such gifted immoveables it was 
deemed to be necessary to amend the rule providing total denial of 
the right of alienation to women.
Coming to the non-te clinical stridhana, wealth earned by 
women with their own exertions and property given to them by stran­
gers should be considered first. Actually these two categories are
not stridhana according to the Bengal school, the Mithila school,
- (2)the Southern school and the Mayukha; but it has been declared
(3)
to be stridhana in all the Courts in India. Unfortunately there
i
does not appear to be a single case wherein the woman’s power of
disposition over such stridhana was directly called in question.
According to both Jimuta and Mitra Misra such property is at the
(4)absolute disposal of the husband. Strange endorses their
(5) „opinion. in dealing with the law of the Bengal school Grady
(1) A gift of immoveable property which is not registered and 
attested is void under s.123 of the T.P.Act of 1882.
(2) See supra.
(3) Supra pp. 163•*'7*3-; *
(4) Supra pp. | o S cukJL #<9. " V ^  vJL — ^  *
(5) See supra p.^lGo-
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suggests that such property is considered to be the husband's pro-
(1)perty unless acquired during widowhood. Mr. Gharpure states that
the woman becomes absolute owner of such property after the husband' 
f 2)death which means that according to him during coverture she does 
not possess absolute right of disposal over them. The property 
being not saudayika according to the &astra their Lordships of the 
Bombay High Court would definitely have adopted the same view if a 
case on this point had come before them.
However, Mayne observes : "The restrictions in these texts 
cannot be more than moral precepts any more than the restrictions 
on the father's power in respect of his self-acquired immoveable 
property. Neither the husband nor her issue have any joint interest 
in the property along with her. And restrictions on her powers can 
only be on the ground of the presumed incapacity of woman to act 
without her husband's permission whilst he is alive. But this in­
capacity is not recognised by the texts in respect of most of the 
species of stridhana. ¥/here a woman is the sole owner and nobody 
else has any vested interest in it, her absolute dominion is a 
necessary legal result. There can be no doubt that a husband would 
always be able to exercise a very strong pressure upon his wife, 
but cases may occur where they live apart or where she is a super­
seded wife, or where her husband may unreasonably withhold his 
assent to a proper use of her property, for instance, in favour of
(1) Manual of Hindu Law p.114.
(2) Gharpure's Hindu Law pp.462-63. But for the two inconsistent 
alternatives put forward by him see infra
2? 5
her children. Very probably, the Sanskrit authorities did not
. . (1)intend these rules to be legal prohibitions.”
(2)Muthu Ramakrishna v. Marimuthu was a case in which the 
suit-property belonged to a woman who was a member of the XJadayachi 
community amongst whom women work and earn jointly with their 
husbands, The defendant claimed to be a purchaser from the alleged 
heir of the woman whereas the plaintiff who claimed through the 
woman’s husband maintained that the defendant had no locus standi 
as the property, being earned during coverture, was not stridhana 
at all and that the property being the joint property of the husbanc 
and wife, it devolved upon the husband by survivorship. The Distric 
Munsiff, the subordinate judge and the Madras High Court in second 
appeal accepted the plaintiff's contention and dismissed the suit. 
When the case in its third appellant stage came before the division- 
al bench of the High Court, Sankaran Nair J. held, on the alleged 
authority of the Mitaksara, the Dayabhaga, the Bayakramasangraha 
and the Viramitrodaya, that such property is stridhana and passed 
an order to restore the suit to the file of the District Munsiff 
and to make the daughter of the woman a party to the suit. Admit­
ting, however, that the question of the woman's right of dispositioi 
did not arise at all in that case Nair J. went on to quote and 
approve Mayne's remark to the effect that such property is held by 
a woman independently of her husband and that it devolves upon her
(1) Mayne 11th edi.p.739.
(2) (1915) 38 Mad. 1036.
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heirs. As the woman in this case belonged to the Padayachi commu­
nity amongst whom the husband and the wife usually work and earn 
together the learned judge could have treated her as one of those
privileged women whom the sastra segregates from the rest of the
(1)female society and gives full independence.
Unfortunately Mayne, upon whom the learned judge relies
for his dictum, has made several incorrect statements. Firstly, he
prodeeds on an incorrect assumption that such property is stridhana
(2)according to the Smritichandrika and the Mayukha. Secondly, that
a woman is the sole owner of a particular property and none else has 
any vested right in such property does not by itself mean that the 
woman has absolute dominion over such property; for that is exactly 
where in Mitaksara school differs from the Dayabhaga school in hold­
ing that saudayika iift. property which is at the absolute disposal of 
a woman does not form the sum total of her stridhana i.e. property 
in which she has exclusive oivnership. Thirdly, the argument that 
the incapacity of the woman has not been recognised in respect of 
"the most of the species of stridhana" is misleading. A 'more correc 
statement, adopting a somewhat different approach, would be that 
saudayika comprises that property which can be denominated as pro­
perty acquired only by one of the several modes of acquisition 
mentioned by Gautama viz. by the acceptance of gifts. Several
commentators belonging to the Benares school, the Bombay school
(1) See infra chapter V typd 5 u.
(2) See Mayne pp .738-39. See supra p.^&o-
(3) Supra p. 3S'.
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or the Southern school include in stridhana property acquired by a 
woman by many other modes of acquisition mentioned by Gautama such 
as inheritance, partition etc.^^ But none of them ventures to say 
that such property is saudayika. In ascertaining the proportion 
between the stridhana which is kept at the absolute disposal of a 
woman and the stridhana which is not kept at her absolute disposal,
it is better to count the modes of acquisition rather than the
_ (2) categories of stridhana coming under these two separate heads.
Fourthly, when Mayne calls this restriction on alienation by women
as a moral £>recept he probably wants to refer to the distinction
between the mandatory rules (kratvarthavidhi) and recommendatory
rules (purusarthavidhi) and to include the restriction in the latter
category. But the distinction between the mandatory rules and
the recommendatory rules is not the same as the distinction between
the rules of religious behaviour and the rules of positive law - a
distinction which has, for instance, been usefully utilised by
Vi;j name svara in holding that according to the positive law the
nature of ownership being secular the inodes of acquisition are to
be determined not with the help of the &astra but in accordance
(4)with the established usage. However, for, the purpose of relying
upon the former kind of distinction Mayne could either resort to 
the Muhamsa logic itself or could adduce any sastric text in his 
favour, but he does not do so. In this connection he could have
(1) Supra p. ,
(2) For these categories are not logically arranged and therefore 
they constitute overlapping divisions - see supra
(3) For this distinction see supra pp.lO'-U-
(4) Supra p. 3S'*
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profitably referred to the doctrine of factum valet as propounded
by the authors of the Smritisarasangraha and the Dayarahasya but
even then the authority of Durgayya, which would have carried more
weight in this Madras case Muthu Ramakrishna v. Mari Muthu, would
(1)have gone against him. Fifthly, it seems that Mayne treats the
possibility of the capricious or malicious exercise of the husband’s
power as a basis for inferring that the sastric writers treated
these restrictions as being merely recommendatory; but in doing
this he is merely superimposing the view of a modern sociologist
upon that of the sastric writers. We have already seen that the
latter considered ivoman’s position to be comparable to that of a
(2)minor and therefore there is little possibility that they treat­
ed this restriction on alienation by women as merely recommendatory.
In conclusion it may well be asserted that the restriction 
on alienation may be totally inconsistent with prevailing senti­
ments and requirements of the Hindu community at present. But the 
task of bridging the gap between the existing law and public opinion 
might more properly be left in the hands of the legislature than 
in those of the High Courts, whose judges are frequently and not 
unnaturally prone to rely upon recent editions of the established 
text-books. A text-book writer is at liberty to express what the 
law should be but it is normally understood to be his duty clearly 
to maintain the distinction between the law as it is and the law 
as it ought to be so that the Court will normally be quick to
(1) For the opinion of these three authors see supra pp.«&JS —Ad,
(2) Supra p.37.
279
detect the boundary between expressions which belong to the res- 
pect ive cate gorie s .
So it must be reaffirmed here that wealth earned by a
woman, whether it is, for other purposes, treated as stridhana or
not, is, according to the Sastra, not freely alienable by her
during coverture. As regards gifts from strangers, however, al-
though the same rule might have been expected to have been applied
judicial decisions have treated them as stridhana on the basis that
(1)they form the absolute property of a woman. Such property being
absolute property of a woman it is freely alienable by her at any 
time. The point is thus covered by a judicial authority which 
happens to be repugnant to the sastric authority on this point*
Passing to the other species of non-technical stridhana 
it may foe stated as a general rule that where a particular kind of
property such as an acquisition by inheritance, by adverse possess­
ion etc. has been recognised to be stridhana it has been recognised 
as such usually on the ground that such property becomes the abso­
lute property of a woman. There have been very few cases in which
a question as to the woman’s power of disposition over her non­
technical stridhana was directly called in question. All of them 
come from the Bombay school and relate to the property inherited 
by a female which, in a particular class of cases, is regarded as 
stridhana according to the Bombay school.
Before we consider the relevant authorities on this point
(1) Supra pp ,| & 9 j S B  .
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it is necessary to recapitulate that according to the frsithila school 
and the Mayukha moveable property which a woman inherited from her 
husband was always considered to be at her absolute disposal, and 
hence stridhana till the full bench of the Bombay High Court over­
ruled its previous decision and held, in Gadadhar v. Chandrabhag- 
abi, ^  ^ that a widow’s power of alienating moveables inherited from 
the husband tfoes not include the power of disposing of them by will. 
The mischief was further aggravated in a later decision of the same 
High Court wherein it was held that by analogy with the decision in
Gadadhar’s case the widow cannot have the right to dispose of such
(2)
moveables even by gift inter vivos. " A Jain widow, however, gets 
an absolute interest in both moveable and immoveable property inhe­
rited by her from her husband provided it is non-fimetsfcral,. This
rule is based upon custom and is thus exceptional.
In Bombay property inherited by a female from a person borj 
in her own family or from any other female is considered to be her 
stridhana. In the beginning at least such property was, on the 
basis of the Sastra and custom, considered to be woman’s absolute 
property and descendible to her own heirs ’’whether or not it be 
strictly entitled to the name of stridhan or peculium.” Being 
an absolute property of a woman such property ought always to have 
been declared to be at the absolute and unfettered disposal of the
(1) 0S93U) 17 Bom. 690 F.B.
(2)' Pandharinath v. Govind (1908 ) 32 Bom.59. For the whole case- 
law on this point see supra pp«/56~£,9*
(3) Supra ppCJ/18.
(4) Navalixim v. Nandikishore (1861) 1 B.H.C.R. 209, see supra 
p. / g 0 .
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(1)woman. But, as we shall presently see, the judicial law took
a different turn in this matter.
(2)In Bhau v. Raghunath a question arose as to whether
property inherited by a daughter from her mother can be validly
bequeathed by her without the husband1s consent to her will. Jenkin;
( 3)C .J . referred to the remarks of West J. in Vijiarangam*s case,
namely, that according to V i j hane svara a right of free disposition
was not one of the essentials of ownership and that a woman was
always subject to the control of her husbant btc. with regards to
the disposition of her immoveable property. He referred to the
Mayukha stating that the woman has no independent power over adhive-
( 4 )danika etc. and held that the property is not saudayika and hence
a woman is not entitled to dispose of the same by a testament if the
husband does not signify his consent thereto. He admitted, however,
that such property is her absolute property according to Vinayek's
( 5 ) ecase and Pranjivandas1s case. From a sastric point of view the
decision is correct. For Nxlankantha expressly said that woman has
no freedom in 1adhivedanika etc.1. Firstly, Nilankantha does not
(6)include in stridhana property inherited by a woman ♦ so he could 
not have thought of keeping such property at the disposal of a 
woman. Secondly, even if it is presumed - erroneously, of course,
(1) The words 1 absolute owner' necessarily imply the right to sell 
or lease the owned property - see Stroud*s Judicial Dictionary 
vol.L.p*13; see also Gupte1s Hindu Law p.585.
(2) (1905) 30 Bom.229.
(3) Vijiarangam v . Lakshaman (1871)8 3•H •C•&•244 at 264. See 
supra.
(4) For the text see supra p  .
(5) See supra pp. ] - S' J •
(6) Supra
as all scholars and judges have done^^ - that NXIakantha includes
in strxdhana all the categories of the so-called non-technical
strXdhana it must be taken for granted that he includes, as Jolly 
(2)points out, all those categories in the words ' et cetera' when 
he says that *adhivedanika etc*' should not be considered to be at 
the absolute disposal of a woman. From the point of view of the 
precedents, however, the decision does not appear to have been en­
tirely sound since in the previous decisions such property was de­
clared to be the absolute property of a woman irrespective of the 
question whether it is strXdhana or not.
In Bhagvanlal v. Bai Diwali^^ the same question arose, 
but the wife, in this case, had been deserted by the husband for 
about 30 to 40 years. Macleod C.J. observed that the texts refer­
red to in Bhau's case "contemplate quite a different state of facts
(4)
from those which have been proved to exist in this case." and 
held that the woman in this case was entitled to bequeath her in­
herited property without the consent of her husband. Apparently 
the learned Chief Justice accepted the ratio decidendi adopted by 
the lower appellate court, namely, that where the obligation of the 
husband to maintain his wife ceases to be discharged his right to. 
control his wife also determines. The reasoning is very appropri­
ate, as well as rational, since the Sastra makes it a bounden duty
(1) Supra p.gS .
(2) Jolly's T,L.L.(1883)p.253. Jolly relies upon this word 'adi' 
here to show that the enlargement of the concept of strxdhana 
in the Mayukha is the same as that in the Mitaksara.
(3) A.I.R. (1925) Bom.445.
(4) Ibid at p.446.
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(1)of the husband to maintain even his profligate wife * So not-
withstanding the fact that NXIakantha gives the husband a right to
control even his superseded wife it is equitable to suppose that he
loses his rights where he does not discharge his duties.
The same question occurred before Sir John Beaumont C.J.
(2)sitting as single judge in Sarubai v. Narayandas. "* The wife in 
this case had lived separate from the husband for about 27-28 years 
but was staying in a temple belonging to the husband. Quoting
Mulla’s Hindu Law, ° wherein it is stated that a woman under cov­
erture cannot alienate her non-saudayika property, Sir John obser­
ved ... coverture under English law is synonymous with marriage
and a woman under coverture is simply a married woman ... But in
English law a woman does not cease to be under coverture because
(4)she ceases to live with her husband.11 Distinguishing Bhagwan-
lal’s case he remarked that desertion in that case was treated al­
most as ’a de, facto divorce’ and added that divorce is not allowed 
by Hindu law and that therefore the doctrine is somewhat dangerouif 
Admitting that the decision in Bhagwanlal’s case bound him, he 
refused to give a liberal interpretation to the same and observed 
that though the emancipation of women in India has proceeded some 
way ”it is still a long way short of the point reached by women 
in England at the time when the Married Women’s Property Act was
(1) See infra p.537 .
(2) I.L.R. (19413) Bom. 314.
(3) Mulla's Hindu Law 9th edi. p.143.
(4) Report at p.317.
(5) Ibid at p.318.
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passed sixty years ago.11 He maintained that the bulk of the
female population of India was, at the time of the decision, still 
illiterate and that the limitations on their power of disposal were 
for their own benefit and protection.
Although the decision, being in accordance with its pre­
cedent, is justifiable and correct the reasoning is question­
able, In the first place, coverture even under the English law 
does primarily mean the state of a woman wherein she is presumed 
to be under the protection of the husband. But this presumption is 
a rebuttable one and it is only with the intention of giving the
gist that coverture is usually explained as the condition of a
(2)
woman during marriage. Therefore a woman under coverture denotes,
as rightly pointed out by the subordinate judge in this case, only
a woman who is under the power and protection of the husband.
\
Secondly, it is incorrect to say that Hindu law does not recognise
(1) Ibid at. p.319.
(2) Byrne's Dictionary of English Law p.262 : "A married woman, 
during the continuance of the marriage, is called in Norman 
French a feme covert, because she is under the protection of 
her husband. Coverture means - (1) the condition of a married 
woman, or the fact of her being married, and (2) the continu­
ance of the marriage. If she becomes, and while she remains, 
a widow, she is said to be discovert." See also vVharton's 
Law Lexicon pp.278-79 wherein coverture is described as "the 
condition of a woman during marriage, because she was then 
presumed to be under the influence of her husband, so as to 
excused from punishment for crimes committed in his presence,
except treason, murder and manslaughter (see Reg. v Manning
Addition to p.284 note 2 : The bove comments against the decision in ~
Sarubai's have now been at least partially justified by*the recent
decision of the divisional bench of the Bombay High Court in Shantabai>n 
v .Ramachandra (1959) 61 Bom.L.R.627.
the offence was committed in the presenpe of, and under the
coercion of the husband." SC£ <,l4. PT,st;f,K.„ a„4 tv
ft 0J- l-w ftf-.KS-CS; Ef„Y| ; ft
o f  b ^ l . ' s k  U v~i ( ‘ 9 5 3 )  V o l *  I  p .  5 3 3 .
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passed sixty years ago."^"^ He maintained that the bulk of the
female population of India was, at the time of the decision, still 
illiterate and that the limitations on their power of disposal were
able. In the first place, coverture even under the English law
does primarily mean the state of a woman wherein she is presumed
to be under the protection of the husband. But this presumption is
a rebuttable one and it is only with the intention of giving the
gist that coverture is usually explained as the condition of a
(2)
woman during marriage. " Therefore a woman under coverture denotes, 
as rightly pointed out by the subordinate judge in this case, only 
a woman who is under the power and protection of the husband. 
Secondly, it is incorrect to say that Hindu law does not recognise
(1) Ibid at. p.319.
(2) Byrne's Dictionary of English Law p.262 : "A married woman, 
during the continuance of the marriage, is called in Norman 
French a feme covert, because she is under the protection of 
her husband. Coverture means - (1) the condition of a married 
woman, or the fact of her being married, and (2) the continu­
ance of the marriage. If she becomes, and while she remains, 
a widow, she is said to be discovert." See also Wharton's 
Law Lexicon pp.278-79 wherein coverture is described as "the 
condition of a woman during marriage, because she was then 
presumed to be under the influence of her husband, so as to 
excused from punishment for crimes committed in his presence, 
except treason, murder and manslaughter (see Reg. v Manning 
(1849)2 C.& K. at p.903); but the presumption may be rebutted 
($eg. v Torpey (1871)12 Cos.C.C.4o). The Criminal Justice
't, 1925 (c.86) s.47, abolishes this presumption of coercion 
the husband, but on a charge for any offence other than 
treason or murder, it shall be a^good defence to prove that 
the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the
for their own benefit and protection.
Although the decision, being in accordance with its pre
cedent, is justifiable and correct the reasoning is question-
coercion of the husband." Sce qlSo PTost’»K«h 
° f t h I^i s l» Uw (l9 Ss ) Vol * I p. 5 3 3 .
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divorce at all. Kautilya in his does recognise divorce and makes
6 A
C l ) /provisions for it. It is also quote common amongst the sudras
and the aborigines of India and is known as ’pat1 and ’natra* in
( 2)the Maharashtra and Gujrat respectively. The decision in this
particular case, however, was correct as the woman was actually 
living under the protection of the husband.
(3)The Nagpur High Court held in Vithu v. Maruthi - a case
under the law of the Bombay school - that the property inherited
by a daughter from her father is her non-saudayika strxdhana and
that therefore she cannot alienate the same without her husband's
consent. But the same High Court considering the same problem in
(4)Dhondappa v. Kasabai came to the opposite conclusion, namely,
that such property is saudayika strTdhana of a woman and that she
can freely alienate it by gift inter vivos or by will. The learned
judges considered all the cases mentioned above but depended more
(5)
upon the opinion of Mayne and Mr. Gupte to the contrary. They
(6)also considered all the texts of Katyayana on this point and
(?)drew support from the case of Venkatareddi v. Hanmantgouda where­
in it was decided that property bequeathed to a woman is her sau­
dayika stridhana and that it is at her free disposal. However, 
they hesitatingly stated tlieir conclusion as follows : "It is
(1) See supra pp.
(2) See infra/p. ^ 3UV•
(3) A.I.R.(1928) Nag.92.
(4) A.I.R.(1949) Nag.206.
(5) Ibid at pp.209-10. Mayne 10th edi.p.749 and Gupte 2nd edi. 
p.572 were referred to.
(6) For Katyayana’s verses see supra. In this case verses nos. 
899-901 and 904-907 from Kane’s edition were referred to.
(7) (1932) 57 Bom,85. See supra p.'JtCj.
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saudayika strxdhana within the meaning of the verse 901 of Katyay- 
ancc Smriti. ... The property in suit was saudayika property. Even 
if it was not saudayika, it was at any rate strxdhana over which 
Radhabai had absolute power of disposal without the consent of her 
husband.** As the decision in this case relies upon the same mis­
taken reasoning as the later full bench decision of the Bombay High 
Court does the inaccuracies of both will be analysed in consider­
ing the latter.
(1)Qajanan v. Randurang, the above-mentioned Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the question "Whether 
property inherited by a woman from her parent is saudayika or non- 
saudayika strxdhana?*1 Gajendragadkar J. who delivered the judge­
ment answered the question in the affirmative and gave the follow­
ing rationes for his decision.
(1) Considering the Mayukha on this point he x^ eferred 
to the different texts of Katyayana and Manu and also referred to 
the remark of Nxlakantha, namely, ’It would, however, foe proper
to interpret the text as showing an absence of absolute dominion
(2)in strxdhana such as Adhivedanika and the like.* However, the
learned judge did not make any comment on Nxlakantha*s remark and 
came to a strange conclusion : "Thus it will be seen that Nxlak­
antha does not express any definite opinion of his own but refers 
to the relevant texts from different smritis."^^
o
(1) A.I.R.(1950) Bom.178. It is surprising that the decision 
in Dhondappa’s case has not at all been refei'red to in 
Gajanan's case.
(2) See supi-a p.&03 for the text.
(3) A.I.R. (1950) Bom.178 at. 181.
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(2) The word 'Jabdham' or its variant reading 'praptam' 
(i.e. ‘obtained* or 'received* respectively) include property ob­
tained by gift, bequest or succession. The word appears in the 
definition of saudayika given by Katyayana another version of which
reads ’dattani* instead of 'labdani*. But *dattam', though it really
(1)includes only gift inter vivos, was interpreted in Faki r g o u d a * s 
case to include even property obtained through a legacy which was 
declared to be saudayika in that case. On principle, therefore, 
property obtained by succession should also be treated as saudayika; 
for the failure of a person to make a will "would obviously be con­
sistent with his desire that the said female relation should obtain 
’* (2)his property. In any case 'labdham* includes gift, bequest and
inheritance.
(3) The Vivadachintamani reads : "Thus the result is 
whatever is obtained by a maiden or a married woman from her parents 
or from the relations of her parents' family or from the family of 
her husband, all that is her saudayika strxdhana." Quoting this
the learned judge remarked : "It is thus quite clear that Vivada
_  (3)
Chintamani construes the word Saudayika literally" and includes
therein property acquired by gift, bequest and succession.
(4) As regards the texts imposing limitations it was 
remarked "The restrictions contained in these texts are no more 
than moral precepts or ’laudatory statements' (Arthavada) and
(1) (1933) 57 Bom. 488.
(2) Report at pp. 182-83.
(3) Report at p. 183.
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they must now be treated as obsolete. We have no doubt that these
(1)texts do not at all agree with the sense of the community today.”
(5) As regards property obtained by a daughter etc. in 
Bombay the title of the female heir is 1 otherwise absolute1. She 
is the sole owner and hone felse has a vested interest in the same, 
"and looked at from this point of view the limitations imposed upon 
her ... seem ... to be quite inconsistent with her undoubted title 
over it."
Upon the basis of this reasoning the Full Bench of the 
Bombay High Court overruled its previous decisions in Bhau*s and 
Sarubai1s cases. Considering the original precedents of the Bombay
High Court which declared property inherited by a daughter etc. to 
be their absolute property there can be no doubt that the decision 
of the Full Bench is quite consistent with the original position of 
the Bombay law which the Full Bench merely revived from a different 
point of view. But instead of adopting this perfectly justifiable 
ratio decidendi alone Gajendragadkar J. unfortunately chose to 
rely on the Sastra. But in his seal to derive support from the 
Sastra he has made several statements which derive no support what­
ever from any of the Sanskrit commentaries and contradict many. It 
is necessary, therefore, to make the following comments upon his 
reasoning.
(1) In the first place, Gajendragadkar J. does not try
(1) Ibid. Incidentally it may be noted that an arthavada does 
not necessarily mean a laudatory statement. It may contain 
either 1prasamsa* (praise) or 1ninda* (censure). See supra.
to throw any light on Nxlakasitha* s remark about 'adhivedanika etc,1 
and still ventures to state that Nxlakantha does not express anyo •
ojpinion of his own. Nxlakantha does not include in strxdhana pro­
perty inherited by a woman and even assuming that he does it is 
certain that he does not include it in saudayika.
(2) Secondly, the distinction between *labdham* and
'dattam* appears to have been artificially introduced by him to
create an impression that the Court had already disregarded the
restricted sense of the word dattam, which does not include a be-6 7
quest. Really speaking the reading 'dattam* has been accepted only 
in the Sukranxtisara - a treatise which comparatively wields very 
little authority in the sphere of vyavahara. Moreover though the 
analogy between a gift and bequest has always been admitted in Hindu 
law^^ the analogy between a bequest and inheritance has never been 
established. Indeed the whole distinction which positive law makes 
between testamentary and intestate succession depends upon the dis­
tinction between volitional and unvolitional devolution of the 
property of the propositus. Hence the equation laid down by the 
learned judge may fail to convince.
(3) Thirdly, when he is quoting the Vivadachintamani as 
an authority for his decision he is surely doing injustice to its 
author. The sentence which he quotes is torn from its context.
In fact, after having explained the eight categories of the so-calle 
technical strxdhana mentioned in the smritis, Vachaspati says
(1) See supra p. ^ 03 .
(2) See the .Dharmakosa p./lj fl^t^See also the appendix.-t-dxi. h o . 50•
(3) See supra pp*\i>b i)}
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’’These are the categories of strxdhana. This alone is the saudayika
(1) ™ . of women.11 After this he refers to the definition of saudayika
given by Katyayana and makes the remark cited by the learned judge.
(4) Fourthly, in the (supposed) absence of any guidance 
from the Mayukha on this point the learned judge ought, it is sub­
mitted, to have relied upon the view of Vijhanesvara pointed by
(2)Jest J. and referred to in Bhau1s case as well as in this case.
He could have referred also to the opinion of Balambhatta, which is
(6)contrary to the decision given m  this case.
(5) Fifthly, the learned judge does not give his reasons 
why he regards the restriction upon alienation by women as merely 4 
moral precept and why it should be treated as obsolete. If main­
taining one’s own wife is considered a mandatory provision of the 
law the provision setting up the husband’s control, a corrollary
to the above provision, must also be considered as a mandatory pro­
vision. Moreover whether the mere sense of the community may cause 
a rule of positive law to become obsolete is a highly controversial 
question. Judicial pronouncements in either direction are available 
According to the better view an attempt on the part of the Court to 
declare a positive rule obsolete is a usurpation of the function of 
the legislature.
Nevertheless the decision in this case was itself in 
cosonance with the early Bombay decisions declaring inherited
(1) ”Evam sti'Tdhanani bhavanti, etadeva strTnam saudayikam, tatha 
cha Katyayanah ’Udhaya kanyaya vapi ...’ .... Bhraturityupal-
aksanam, tena kanyaya va udhaya va pitrito va tatkulato va 
patikulato va yallabdham tatsarvam tasyah sau^ayikamityarthah.” 
- Vi.Chi.139. ° *
(2) See supra
(3) Supra p.AM*______ _ _ _ _ _ ________________ ___
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property, in a particular class of cases, to be the absolute pro­
perty of women. As the obiter dicta and some of the rationes of 
Gajendragadkar J. tend to make it appear that the &astra is in 
accord with the modern conditions it is not surprising that the 
medieval commentators themselves interpreted the smritis to suit 
the conditions prevailing in their own days.
The above decisions refer only to the rights of a woman 
during coverture. But as the husband alone has been mentioned as 
having control over the alienations made by a woman it follows as 
a logical result that a widow can freely dispose of all her strxd- 
hana whether acquired during coverture or subsequently. The questioi 
about the two categories of projoerty, namely, property earned by 
women and gifts given to them by strangers comes into prominence 
here. Trevelyan suggests that a woman can dispose of her self­
acquisitions ’whensoever acquired.1 But Grady seems to treat
self-acquisitions acquired during coverture as being husband*s
(2) , property. It has been shown that notwithstanding the sastric
position that such property is not strxdhana according to the Bengal
school, the Mithila school, the Southern school and the Mayukha^^
™ (4)it has uniformly been declared by all the Courts to be strxdhana. 
Supplementing these decisions with that part of the sastric law
(1) Trevelyan*s Hindu Law p.429. For support Trevelyan relies 
upon Banerjee. But Banerjee refers to property acquired dur­
ing widowhood alone as being freely alienable by a woman -
Banerjee pp.380 and 383. He does not say anything about the
property acquired by a woman during coverture.
(2 ) Supra p. 171+.
(3) Supra.-
(4) Supra pp. ] 6^ 7 ^ 31 % 3 .
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which remains unabrogated we find as a necessary consequence that 
even these two kinds of property may freely be alienated by a 
widow. Mr. Gharpure, however, makes a novel suggestion. He says 
that if the wife predeceases the husband the property should go to 
the husband and his heirs but if the husband predeceases the wife 
she should become the absolute owner. The suggestion obviously
confuses the idea of ownership in, and the right of disposition 
over such property, and the first part of the suggestion is contra- 
ry to the decisions which declare such property to be strxdhana*
The woman’s right to dispose of her strxdhana is eviden­
ced, by implication, in other provisions of the Sastra* Thus 
Yajnavalkya and Katyayana declare that a woman is bound to pay her
own debts and debts contracted by her in conjunction with her 
(2)husband. The second part of the above provision has been intro­
duced as an exception to the general rule that the husband, wife, 
a son etc. are not to be held responsible for the repayment of 
debts contracted by each o t h e r . B u t  Katyayana somewhat obscure­
ly warns that a person should not lend money to women, infants and
( 4 )slaves as the credxtor is not in a position to recover that money; 
Bevanna explains that the reason is that women etc. are always in
(1) See Gharpure’s Hindu Law pp.462-63* Supra .
(2) Yaj.II.49 and Mit. on it; Katyayana cited in Smr.Cha.411 etc., 
Kane’s edi. no.
(3) Yaj.11.46.
(4) ”Na strxbhyo baladasebhyo prayaclichhet kvachidudhritam/
Bata na labhate tattu tebhyo dattam tu yadvasu // - Katyayana 
quoted in the Smr.Cha.321 and other treatises. This edition 
of Smr.Cha. reads *dadyat1 for 'dattam' given above. But see 
the Dharmakosa p.631. . . ! ■ ' . ' .
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(1)a dependent position. In any case this text does not declare
women etc. to be incapable of contracting a debt. It merely warns
the creditors of the risk they might undergo if they lend any sum
to wmmen etc. For instance, knowing that a particular woman owns
large property as her strxdhana but not knowing that it is only
her non-saudayika a creditor may advance a large sum to that woman
and may, in the absence of the consent of the woman's husband, fail
to recover it from her. Similarly in the case of a debtor who is
a minor the creditor would not be in a position to recover his
money without the consent of the guardian of the minor.
Visvarupa, the earliest commentator on the Yajnavalkya
smriti, raises the question how women can independently contract
a debt and repay it* In answer to it he points out that Narada
describes moveable property given by the husband to be at the free
disposal of women. He also states that women can contract debts
(2)for the purpose of their own maintenance etc. Thus a woman
evidently has both a capacity to contract a debt and an independent 
responsibility to repay it.
The position stated above relates to the civil law. Even 
according to the criminal law a woman's strTdhana was to be utilised
(1) Smr.Cha.311. The authors of Vi.Ra.(p.G) and Vi.Se.(f.14b) 
appear to acquiesce in the admonition given by Katyayana in 
this verse.
(2) Kutah punah strinam svatantryenarnaprasangah, kuto va danamiti. 
StrTnamapi hi svatantryena dhanam vaksyati bhartra pritena 
yaddattam' ityatra. Svasariropabhogartham strinamr,inaprasango 
apyaviruddhah." - Vis.on Yaj. 11.49.
for the purpose of discharging financial obligations which she may 
incur in a Court of law. Thus Katyayana states that where a woman 
is to be punished, her strxdhana should be utilised by the king for 
the recovery of the fine to be imposed; if she is penniless a 
corporal punishment is to be i n f l i c t e d . T h u s  it is clear that a 
woman cannot absolve herself of her financial responsibilities by 
claiming that no one except herself has a right to take her strxd­
hana. From the rules about debts and punishment it is also evident 
that the Sastra does not, in this respect, intend to distinguish 
between a woman under coverture and a woman not under coverture.
But the right of the creditors etc. to lay their hands upon the 
strxdhana of the female debtor must be considered as proceeding upon 
a presumption that a woman is at liberty to deal with her property
as she likes and so a creditor can proceed against only saudayika 5
of a woman under coverture. The illustration given by Visvarupa
enables us to infer that a woman's contractual liabilities are
{%)
limited only to the property which is at her free disposal. As
regards the non-saudayika of a woman under coverture her ownership 
can determine only by her death or by an alienation made by her with 
the consent of her husband. It is his right to see that the wife's 
non-saudayika property goes, in the absence of any necessity to the 
contrary, intact into the hands of her heirs. The husband may agree 
to his wife's non-saudayika being attached and sold in execution of
(1) "Strxdhanam tiapayeddandam dharmikah prithivxpatih/
Nirdhana praptadosa strx tadanam dandamarhati // - Katyayana 
cited in Vi.Ra.659; Vi.Se.112a etc. .. ’ ...
(2 ) See supra p.&L33 wherein Visvarupa quotes Narada's verse 
declaring women's independent right to dispose of the moveable 
property given by the husband.
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a money-decree against his wife. But the creditor cannot compel
him to signify his assent; for when a creditor has independent
transactions with a woman he does not thereby put her husband under
any kind of contractual obligation. However, a creditor can proceed
against both saudayika and non-saudayika of a maiden or a widow
because a maiden or a widoiv hasr an unfettered right to dispose of
all her strxdhana.
But in Nanubhai v. Javher^1'* a woman who had, without any
(2)
justifying circumstances, voluntarily separated from her husband 
pleaded that she was not responsible for a debt which she contract­
ed during coverture without the husband's consent. The High Court
referred to some of the texts of Katyayana ciboiti- saudayika etc. and
(4)following two unreported cases held that a woman, in such a case, 
is liable for her debts though her liability is limited only to her 
strxdhana.
Haridas J. observed ffA Hindu female is not, on account of 
her sex, absolutely disqualified from entering into a contract. In
(1) (1876) 1 Bom.121.
(2) For circumstances when a woman can justifiably leave her 
husband see•Manu IX.79; Na.Smr.XV.97 and Na.Sam.lo.99;
Katyayana cited in Vi.Ra.447 etc., the Dharmakosa p.1112,
* - '. *  * «
(3) 1 saud'ayike sada strxnam ...etc.1 and 'Na bharta naiva cha 
sutah ...etc.* referred to supra pp. 71,1X5.
(4) S.A. no.261 of 1861 decided by Sir M.Sausse C.J.', Hebhert and 
Forber J.J. on 2-3-1863; S.A.no.467 of 1869 decided by Sir C. 
Seargent and Melvill JJ. on 17-1-1870. The point decided in 
both these cases appears to have been that a Hindu married 
woman's strxdhana could be proceeded against for the recovery 
of debt due under a bond executed by her without her husband's 
consent.
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the enumerations of persons incompetent to contract given by Manu,
Yajnyalkya, Katyayana and Gotama a woman as such is not included;
and marriage, whatever other effect it may have, does not take away
or destroy any capacity possessed by her in that respect* She is
capable of acquiring and holding property in her own right; and
(1)when she holds any such, her power over it is absolute.f 1
Stating that a husband is liable for the debts of his
wife contracted by her with his consent or contracted even without
his consent in ‘certain circumstances1 ‘empowering her to pledge her
husband’s credit1, his Lordship remarked, “If, however, she enters
into a contract in the absence of such consent or circumstances,
she fails to bind her husband by her act. But the law does not say
that she herself shall not be bound by it. On the contrary, we find
it expressly laid down, that she shall pay amongst others debts con-
(2)tracted by herself.1’ The learned judge abruptly concluded, how­
ever, that the woman’s “liability is limited to the extent of any
(3 )
stridhan which she may have.“
The decisions involves two inaccuracies. Firstly it is
wrong to hold that the creditor has a right to proceed against all
the strxdhana of his female debtor. But the learned judge seems to 
have committed this mistake on the basis of another mistake of 
supposing that a woman has absolute power over all the property
(1) 1 Bom.121 supra at 123. The last underlined sentence contains 
an incorrect enunciation. The learned judge has, of course, 
forgotten that a woman under coverture owns her non-saudayika 
in her own right but that her power over it is not absolute.
(2) Ibid pp.123-24.
(3) Report at p.125.
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which she acquires in her own right. Secondly, the learned judge 
was not justified in refusing to proceed against the person of the 
female debtor in this case. According to the Sastra the analogy 
between a man and woman is complete and a woman is not exempt from 
being arrested in execution of a decree against her. From Katyay­
ana’ s statements it appears that a king can proceed against the
person of a woman for the purpose of inflicting punishment upon
(1)her. There is no reason, therefore, why the Royal edict cannot
(;
persue the person of a female debtor as a result of a civil action.
Depending upon the presumed analogy of English law it was
(3)
held in Govindji v. Lakmidas that a wife who contracts a debt 
jointly with her husband is liable for repayment to the extent of 
her strxdhana. Sargent C.J. observed, "English authorities are of 
much assistance as laying down the general principle which governs 
the analogous case of married women in England in respect of their 
separate estate. Mr. Spence, in discussing the liability of a wife 
said that 'by reason that her dealings cannot be considered as exi- 
tered into in respect of any personal responsibility, the course of 
modern authority has been in favour of holding that all her dealings
(1) Supra p.^9^.
(2) Under s.132 of the present Civil Procedure Code women not 
appearing in public are exempt from personal appearance in 
Court; but this does not "exempt such women from arrest in 
execution of civil process in any case ...” Under s.56, how­
ever, a woman cannot be arrested in execution of a money decree. 
Under the previous codes there was no such prohibition. Under 
Order XXI rule 32(1) of the present Code as it stood originally 
a woman could be arrested in execution of a decree -fof the 
restitution of conjugal rights. But the Code of Civil Pro­
cedure (Second Amendment) Act (XXIX of 1923) repealed this 
provision.
(3) (1880) 4- Bom.318.
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must be considered as entered into in reference to her separate pro-
perty,1"^1  ^ The learned Chief Justice further observed : "In India,
the strxdhana of a married woman is, as regards her power over it,
analogous to the separate property of a married woman in England,
and there is no reason why it should not be similarly dealt with so
(2)as to give effects to her contracts.'1 Although the decision in
this case is solely based upon a very debatable analogy between the
( 3 )English law and Hindu law and although it is given without refer­
ring to any of the sastric texts on this point it is correct only i 
to the extent of the non-saudayika of a woman under coverture. It 
is, of course, entirely correct as regards the strxdhana of a woman 
who is not under coverture.
the
It must, however, be remembered that according to Mitak-
A
sara a woman in such a case is liable only on the failure of the
(4)husband and in the absence of a son. This xs quxte understand­
able . The joint debt of husband and wife must be considered
primarily to be that of the husband; for the wife has little reason 
to incur debt for herself so long as her husband is able to main­
tain her. Moreover from the way strxdhana is declared to be immune
(5)from claims by way of adverse possession or escheat it is clear
(1) 4 Bom.318 supra at 320.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Probably this supposed analogy between the English law and 
Hindu law induced their Lordships in this case and in Nanubhai’s 
case to give their decisions without distinguishing between a 
woman's saudayika and non-saudayika. The same analogy appears 
to have misled the Courts in believing that only the property 
and not the persoii of a married woman could be proceeded against 
in a suit for recovery of debt.
(4) Mit.on Yaj.II.49 : "Yachcha patya saha bharyaya rinam kritam 
tadapi bhartrabhave bharyaya aputraya deyam."
(5) Supra ppS'iT-5't-
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that Hindu law wants to give it a special protection and to retain 
it as far as possible in the hands of the original owner, Even the
husband himself can lay his hands upon the strxdhana of his wife
(1) . . . .  only as a last resort. Therefore where husband and wife are joxmt
debtors their creditor must proceed first against the property of the
husband and then, if his claim still remains unsatisfied, he may
proceed against the strxdhana of the wife. This preferential order
between the husband’s property and the wife’s strxdhana for the
purpose of discharge of joint debts of both is a point which was not
(2)noticed at all in Govindji's case. In Narotam v. Nanka the learn­
ed subordinate judge discussed this point very ably with the help 
of the texts but on appeal the High Court simply followed the pre­
vious decisions without feeling obliged to discuss the merits of the 
reasoning of the subordinate judge.
(3)•^n Nahalchand v .JBai Shiva the Bombay High Court con­
firmed the decision of the subordinate judge of Borsad which was to 
the effect that both the person and the property of a remarried 
widow can be proceeded against in a decree for a debt contracted by 
her during her widowhood. The learned subordinate judge referred
to many texts and cases on this point and set out the following
(4)reasons for hxs decision.
(1) Supra p.<£3 0 .
(2) (1882)6 Bom.473. This case and Nahalchand1s case (see below),
are glaring instances which show that sometimes an intricate 
point of Hindu law is discussed much more radically and 
thoroughly in the mofussil Court than in the High Court which 
either meekly accepts the reasoning of the Lower Court or 
blindly rejects it.
(3) (1882) 6 Bom.4-70.
.(4) As the Bombay High Court simply confirmed in one sentence the
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(X( That the &astra does not make any difference between
(1)
male and female for the purpose of repayment of debt.
(2) That the decision in Nathubai’s case was based upon
two unreported cases the authority and the reasons of which the sub-
(2)ordinate judge was unable to discern.
(3) That the Courts in Borsad district usually gave de-
( 3)cree both against the person and the property of Hindu widows.
(4) That though from the analogy of English law the lia­
bility of a married woman may be limited to her own strTdhana only, 
the case of a widow remarrying after contracting a debt was differ­
ent as *the creditor had .... no means of knowing that she would
. , (4)marry again.1
Once the analogy between English law and Hindu law is
accepted there can hardly be any difference between a married woman
/
and a remarried widow and the latter would be under coverture equal-
( 5)ly with the former. If equality between men and women as regards
repayment of debts is accepted as a principle in the judicial law
( decision of the subordinate judge in this case the reasoning of 
the latter is important for our purpose. Haridas J* who gave 
the judgement in Nanubhai's case was also a judge in this case 
and Narotam(s case.
(1) But see Narotam v. Nanka (1883)6 Bom.473 wherein the subordinate 
judge who submitted the case for the opinion of the High Court 
himself observed on the authority of Katyayana (supra p.otfMj,’) 
that women are incompetent to contract and hence they have no 
liability at all to repay their debts.
(2) But Nathubhai's case was a conclusive authority for the sub­
ordinate judge - a point which he seems to have quietly slipped
over.
(3) The subordinate judge quoted the following Sudder Court cases 
in support of his rule - Ootamram v. Mt.Bhanee Borr.II.185; 
Oootamram v. Hargovindas Borr.IX.127.
(4) 6 Bom.470 supra at 472.
(5) See Byrne p.262 quoted supra p.&S-M- , "If ^he becomes, and
while she remains, a widow,she is said to be discovert.”
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as it has been in the sastric lav/ then all women would foe liable to
the extent of their property and person; therefore widows, whether
remarried or not, cannot, for this purpose, be segregated from other
women® But we have already seen that the sastric equality has been
flouted by the case-law so far as women under coverture are concern-
(1)ed. There is no reason, therefore, why it should be resorted to
only for the purpose of proceeding against the widows.
The question of the repayment of the debts of a remarried
widow has been dealt with, though ambiguously and inadequately, in
the Sastric law^Bhavasvami commenting on Narada says that a widow
who remarries against the wishes of her son loses all her strxdhana
(2)and that her previous debts are to be paxd by the second husband. 
Mxtra Misra suggests that the debt of such indigent remarried women 
is to be paid by the son by her previous marriage. The comrnenta-
(4)
tors differ in interpreting this verse. Eor instance, Chandesvara
(1) See Nathubhai's case and Govindjx's case supra.
(2) Na.Smr.XV.20 and Na. Sam.11.17 (the. Dharmakosa p •699). Bhava- 
svami says that the son takes even her technical strxdhana and 
that she ceases to be^debtor. "Putravatx ya nari putramutsri- 
jyanichchhaya putrasyanyam patimasrayet, tasyah svatn dhanam 
haret sarvamSarvagrahanam sadvidhasyapyupasangrahanartham. 
Evasabdannarnfti gamyate. Tatascha sa nissvaxva bhavati 
tasyax dattam hxyate, tasmanna dataygamxti vidhih." On the 
other hand, Asahaya commenting on the same verse says that her 
second husband takes her strxdhana whereas the property of her 
first husband is taken by her son by her first marriage. It 
seems that 'taking', in the case of the second husband, has 
been used in the sense of 'acquiring dominion over.'
(3) Vi.Mi.275.
(4) Devanna and Kamalakara do not interpret this verse as pertain­
ing to the case of a remarried widow - see Smr.Gha.407 and
V i .Ta.506.
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takes this verse as referring to the repayment of the debts of the
(J )previous husband. ' So the £astra has left this point obscure.
In the absence of any definite precept of the Sastra it must be 
assumed that a remarried woman possessing strxdhana is as much 
answerable to the claims of her creditors as any other woman under 
coverture is.
However, the provision of Bhavasvamx coupled with a pro­
vision of ICautilya to the same effect, namely, that the ?/idow who
remarries without her son's consent loses all her strxdhana; is an
(2)interesting one. No scholar appears to have taken a special
notice of this strange provision of divesting. Apparently it would 
appear that by remarriage the widow goes under the control of the 
second husband. It was probably because of this that she was di­
vested of all her strxdhana in favour of her children by the first 
marriage. But the provision may reasonably apply only to the strxd­
hana which was given to the woman by her first husband or his family 
As regards her other strxdhana it is more reasonable to hold that 
she was not divested of the same but that she continued to own it 
subject to the control of her second husband whose rights would have 
been exactly similar to those of the first husband.
So much for the woman's right to dispose of her strxdhana,
(1) Vi.Ra.65. This appears to be a better interpretation as a
similar verse of Narada which is immediately next to this verse 
refers specifically to payment of the debts of the previous 
husband - see Na.Snir. IV. 21 and Na.Sam.II. 18 .
(2) Kau.Ill.2• : "Putravatx vindamana strxdhanam jxyeta. Tattu
strxdhanam putra hareyuh. Putrabharanartham va vindamana 
putrartham sphatxkuryat. See Shamashastri’s edi.pp.152-53; 
Ganapati Sastri's edi.Voi.II.p.15.
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her right to contract debts, and her independent liability which 
a
proceeds as corrollary to the latter. Turning now to the husband’s 
A
right to take and utilise his wife’s strxdhana it was decided as
(1)early as 1808 A.D. in Hammuckah v. Rungapah * that this right of
the husband is entirely personal and that the creditor of the
husband cannot compel him to utilise his wife's strxdhana even in
case of adverse circumstances like restraint etc. It was held that
the wife’s strxdhana. cannot be seized under a writ of execution
passed against the husband’s property. The case was followed by
(2)the Bombay High Court in Tutearam v. Gunaji. In Radha v, Bishe-
     niiifTM'i i I 'IM ' 1,1 1 n,.mi|iniiwn»iini miwimiwMfw*''— iwmiinmiw t
shur^^ their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court appeal'’ to have
Correct
taken for granted that this is the position. The point has not
A
arisen in the form of an issue since 1874 and is thus firmly estab­
lished .
We may proceed to consider the husband's right to take
(graha) his wife's strxdhana. It was held in Namma1war v . ??erun-
(4) _devi that the word ’taking’ as used by Yajnavalkya and interpret-
( 5 )ed in the Smritichandrika means ’taking and using’', and if the 
husband dies after taking the strxdhana but without using it, the 
wife remains the owner of the property and can recover the same from 
anyone into whose possession it has fallen. So far as the principle 
of the decision is concerned there can be no disagreement; for even







when the husband uses his wife’s strxdhana he is supposed, as Mitra 
Misra points out,^"^ to repay it to his wife as soon as he becomes 
able to do so. In any case the wife's ownership does not become 
extinct. But the facts of the case unfortunately do not appear to 
come within the rule and the decision is therefore probably unfound­
ed. The husband of the plaintiff in this case was ordered by a 
Court in previous litigation to pay Rs.!200 to the defendant, who 
was plaintiff in the previous case. The husband agreed to sell the 
jewels of his wife - the plaintiff in the present case - and handed 
them over to a 'mediater'. He had also applied for the sanction of 
the Court as the defendant was to receive them on behalf of a minor. 
Before the sanction of the Court was obtained the husband died but 
the defendant maintained that the husband had taken his wife's 
strxdhana in distress and so she had no right to recover it. The 
Court in this case, as we have seen, found for the plaintiff wife. 
The husband had taken the strxdhana in 'sampratirodhaka* which,
according to Devanna, means any kind of attachment (asedha) by the
(2)creditor which cannot be avoided except by repayment of debt.
Ksedha denotes any kind of restrictions imposed in the name of, or
(3)injunction issued by the king. It is evident that the husband
otherwise,
avoided the attachment upon his property which would have been theA
consequence of the Court's decision. This was done with the help 
of the agreement to sell the jewels - an agreement a breach of which
■ 1 1
(1) Supra p . *
(2) "Sampratirodhake dhanadanam vina nivarayitumasakye dhanikase- 
dhadau." - Smr.Cha.658.
(3) "2\s’edho rajajnayavarodhah. " - Mit.on Yaj.II.5. See the 
different kinds of asedha mentioned.therein. See also 
Dr.Rocher's Vya.Ch.pp.48 and 183-84.
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would have made him personally liable for damages as well. In such 
circumstances it is hard to believe that the husband did not use 
the ornaments hut simply took them.
From the foregoing discussion it seems that the case-law 
on the subject of disposition of strxdhana has been much more uni­
form than that relating to acquisition of strxdhana. Although the 
former is based on a mistaken appraisal of the Gastric law on this 
subject it incidentally produced one salutary effect, namely, the 
law of all the schools has tended to be substantially similar. 
Having* surveyed the law about the acquisition and disposition of 
strxdhana we now turn to the devolution of strxdhana which a woman 
leaves undisposed of at the time of her death.
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The development of the meaning of the word strxdhana and
of the rights of a woman over her strxdhana had also its counterpart
in the rules of succession to the same. The diversity is also
similar. The order of succession "varies according as the intestate
was married or unmarried and according as she was married in an
approved form or in an unapproved forgi; it also varies according to
the source from which the strxdhana came and above all the rules of
(1)descent vary from school to school.11 The diversity and the in­
tricacies as they are seen today are, however, due to the later growt 
of the law as stated in the commentaries and digests. Originally the 
law relating to succession to strxdhana was as simple as the law re­
lating to the meaning of the word strxdhana itself. It is interest-
(2 }ing to see how the original succinct statements of law have been 
widened into the enormous size of the law on the subject as it exists 
today.
It is notable that the earliest sutra referring expressly
to the word strxdhana contains not a definition of the word but the
order of succession applicable to strxdhana. Gautama declares :
(3)"Strxdhana devolves upon unmarried and unstabilised daughters."
(1) *The Law Relating to Hindu Succession*p.3 - a pamphlet pub­
lished by the Ministry of Law, Government of India. See also 
Mayne pp•740-41.
(2) The term has been used here to denote the provisions as con­
tained in the sutras alone. The brevity of these provisions 
is partly due to the very nature of the sutra literature and 
partly due to the inchoate development of the law as it existed 
at that time. For salient features of the sutra literature see
(3) Gau.Su.28.25, appendix text no.J .
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It must be stated here that by following the translation given by 
Colebrooke all the authors and judges have translated the word
-for-
'apratisthita* as 'unprovided^ instead of 'unestablished* (i.e. not
(1)set up in life)* Colebrooke appears to have relied upon Vijna-
esvara who, at one place, explains the word as meaning poor or
(2)indigent (nirdhana). The word originally denotes only lack of
(3 )stability in life and hence absence of respectability as well.
The point would be amply clear if we consider the explana­
tion given by some of the early commentators. Apararka gives the 
most correct though inconveniently wide explanation of the word say­
ing that *pratisthita' denotes one who is childless, indigent or un-
(4)fortunate. The last alternative gives the best explanation of the 
word 'apratisthita* though it must be admitted that neither this ex­
planatory word nor the word explained is precise in its meaning. A 
daughter who has no stability in life on account of . circum­
stances may also be called an unfortunate daughter.
(1) See Colebrooke*s translation of the Mitaksara I.i.ll and 
I.ix.13. OV||y
(2) Mit.on 11.117 contains A'indigent' . as the explanation of 
the word 'apratisthita' whereas Mit.on Yaj.II.145 contains 
'indigent or childless* as the explanation of the same word 
in the sutra.
(3) In this sense it is used also in some of the modern Indian 
languages like Marathi, Gujrati etc.
(4) "Anapatya, nirdhana, durbhaga va." - Apa.on Yaj.II.117. The 
word 'durbhaga' may also denote a widow. In Maharastra even 
today a married woman is, in contradistinction with a widow, 
called ♦saubhagyavatx1. Medhatithi on Manu IX.131 explains 
'apratisthita* as childless or having no 'pratistha' (stability 
or respectability). The alternatives childless, indigent, un­
fortunate, widowed have been also g*iven in the Vya.Ka.;
VilRa.; Di.Ka.; Vi.Cha.; Vi.Mi. (tlka) on Yaj.II.117; Vi.Mi.; 
Vi.Sa.etc. See infra.
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Similarly the other explanation via. Childless* given by
Medhatithi, Apararka, Vijnanesvara, Maskari and other authors is not
(1)without its significance. For a childless woman always stood xn
the danger of being superseded by another wife. All the authorities
giving rules of supersession almost uniformly give the husband a
right to remarry in case the wife does not bear any children or gives
(2)birth only to female progeny. So a barren woman could never
possess stability in life and hence was always unfortunate and 
* unestablished1• j&ven in the present century a childless woman al­
ways stood in the danger of being superseded. So this explanation 
is of vital importance in determining the meaning of the term 
1apratisthita*.
It is not surprising that an unmarried daughter has also 
been included in this preferential list of heirs to mother’s pro­
perty. An unmarried daughter was, and has always been throughout 
these years, a heavy responsibility for the family. On the deceased 
mother’s property, therefore, there could not be a better claim than 
that of her unmarried daughter who could be dowered and disposed of 
in marriage with the help of her inherited property.
Taking into consideration the purpose which strxdhana was
(3 )meant to serve, namely, of being useful in case of calamity or
(1) Apa.on Yaj.II.117; Mit.on Yaj.11.145; Mas.on Gau.28.25. See 
also above. The Gautamasutra 28.25 is in Haradatta’s Mitaks- 
ara no.28.22.
(2) Bau.II.2,65; Kau.III.2 ’ -y . p.
'■-‘.'-I, ?
(3) Kautilya III.2 supra ’apadartham hi strxdhanam*, fio*I9
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(X)for maintenance, it is not surprising that Gautama laid down an 
order of succession to the same \?ith a view to make it devolve on 
the females who were most in need of it. For if an unmarried dau­
ghter inherited some money therd was a greater possibility of her 
getting married; in the case of a married childless daughter the 
inheritance constituted a reserve fund to fall back upon in case of 
supersession. The Sutra therefore shows two salient features of the 
earliest provisions of the law on succession to strxdhana. Firstly, 
the absolute property of females was to devolve upon female heirs in
       '■■■■>■■■ 1 II I I >   .1. ^ .   J    ■■■-■- !! ! W— WIHW- I I, T L  I ,| ■ „   ,................. . . .     « W — WH
\ ( 2 )| preference to male heirs; secondly, the policy of the law was 
j more to subsidise the unfortunate heirs than to benefit all the heirs
I
who would otherwise claim by propinquity or religious efficacy.
It is quite possible that Gautama intended that both un­
married and unfortunate daughters should succeed simultaneously to
the strxdhana of their mother. The first explanation given by
Maskarx does not contain the order of succession between these two
(3)classes and supports, by implication, the above conjecture.
Haradatta, however, specifically states the order of succession as
unmarried daughter, *unstabilised* daughter, and stabilised*
(4)daughter. Maskari gives also an alternative explanation of the
“   —  — —      — -----   —   ----------
(1) 'Tairdattam taprajTvanam.1 - Katyayana quoted supra.
(2) See also infra pp.3 1 ^ , ^ 1 7 3 ^ ^ 3 3 - ^ if*
(3) ** ... duhitrxnamadattanaraanapatyanam cha bhavati."
(4) Haradatta*s Mit.on Gau.2B.22. Haradatta interprets this sutra, 
however, as referring only to property obtained by a woman from 
her father*s family. He appears to interpret a sutra of Sankha 
and Likhita to mean that unmarried daughters, married daughters 
and sons share equally the property which their mother obtained 
from her husband’s family. For this sutra see infra pp„ 318-19.
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same sutra whereby he gives another intex*pretation of 1 apratisth.-
(1)
itanam1 as denoting unmarried or indigent sons. According to
this second interpretation which he states as being the opinion of 
'some others* he chalks out the following order : unmarried daughter, 
indigent sons, unmarried sons, childless daughters, and the husband* 
The very artificiality of the interpretation of the word 'apratis- 
thitanam* as referring to sons denotes an ingenious attempt to super­
impose upon this sutra the theory of simultenous succession of sons 
and daughters, which was definitely of a later origin. It is to be 
noted with satisfaction, however, that none of these later authors 
who propound the simultenous succession of sons and daughters with 
respect to certain categories of strxdhana pretends to find a support
or authority for his provisions in the above-mentioned sutra of
(2)
Gautama. The law expounded by these authors will be stated below.
Gautama lays down another order for the class of strxdhana
known as sulka. He says : "The sulka of a sister goes to her
uterine brothers and to the mother in default of them", and adds
( 3)"others say that (the mother should foe) the first (heir)."
(1) Such an interpretation is grammatically possible as the 
genitive plural of both the masculine and the feminine adjec­
tives viz. apratisthita and apratisthita is the same. But
this interpretation requires the supposition of an addition­
al word *putranam* as the noun which the above adjective is 
supposed to qualify.
(2) For instance Jimuta and Devanna prescribe joint succession for 
sons and daughters in anvadheya but they take this Gautama™ 
sutra as referring only to yautaka in which they give a pre­
ferential right to the daughters. See infra.
(3) Gau.Su.28.26 and 28.27.
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The natural construction of these two sutras would show that accord­
ing to Gautama sulka goes by succession to uterine brothers first and 
then to the mother. He also appears to give the opposite order of 
succession in the next sutra as being the opinion of some other 
authors. It is surprising, however, to find that both the commenta­
tors of Gautama viz. Maskari and Haradatta, interpret the sHtras in­
versely and give the order according to the first sutra as first the 
mother and then uterine brothers. Though such an interpretation is
not grammatically impossible it is improbable in view of the con-
(1)struction of the sutra as a sentence. Maskarx xn fact maintaxns
(2)that even the mother succeeds only in default of the father himself. 
Both these commentators point out that sulka means the bride-price 
which is given in the unapproved forms of marriage as a consideration 
for giving the daughter in marriage. It is not surprising therefore 
that the heirs to such property are to be from the proposita's par­
ental family and not from her husband's family. This also explains 
why Maskari considers the father as being the first preferential 
heir. In fact at least in the earlier days the property could hard­
ly be called daughter's strxdhana; for it was handed over to the
(1) For if this was the meaning intended to be conveyed by Gautama 
he might more appropriately have said 'matururdhavam' instead 
of 'urdhvam matuh*. Moreover he would have put both these 
words in the beginning of the sutra. The comma which appears 
after the word 'matuh' in the Mysore edition of the Maskari- 
bhasya is unwarranted and tends to distort the explanation 
given by the author. See the bhasya on Gau.28.26.
(2) "Evahcha piturabhave mataiva tasyesta ityuktam bhavati.” - 
Mas.on Gau.2S.26.
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father of the bride himself. The order of succession represents,
however, a period of transition when the father started giving hack 
the bride-price to the bride herself so as to constitute her own 
strxdhana. The law perhaps in recognition of this sacrifice of the 
father, created an order of succession in his favour. The prefer­
ence in favour of the uterine brothers also indicates that from 
ancient times the law of succession to strxdhana preferred persons 
related through the mother to persons not related to the mother. 
Consequentially the relation through males which is so important in 
determining a preferential right of an heir to a male's property 
appears to have been insignificant in determining succession to a.
female's property. Indeed some of the later authors prefer relations
( 2)through females to relation through males in some cases.
Baudhayana gives the following provisions for succession to
the ornaments of a woman : "The daughter shall get the ornaments
( 3 )which their mother received through tradition or otherwise." The
word 'sampradayika* (handed over in succession or a continuous
(1) Haradatta actually states that it is received by the father.
(2) For instance Vijhanesvara prefers the daughter's daughter to 
the son and son's son. See below p}>'&39-M5
(3) Bau.Su.II.2.49, appendix text no.5- Pratapa Rudra, however,
quotes another sutra of Baudhayana : "Strxdhana goes to the
mother and in defadlt of the mother to the uterine brothers." - 
Sa.Vi.384. But he interprets the sutra to refer only to sulka - 
apparently an arbitrary interpretation but for the fact that 
the order mentioned in this sutra is similar to the order of 
succession to sulka as given by Gautama and by Baudhayana in 
another sutra. The sutra is not found in the extant work of 
Baudhayana nor is it quoted in any of the reputed commenta- 
tories.
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tradition) suggests that every family had some set of ornaments which
traditionally passed on from the mother to the daughter and then to
the daughter1s daughter and so on from generation to generation*
Incidentally this provision also goes to disprove the theory of the
Bengal school, namely, strxdhana once devolved ceases to he strxd-
(1)hana. The word 1anyat* seems to refer to any other ornaments
which a woman may acquire as a gift from her husband, father-in-law
etc* The sutra was probably written at a time when the strxdhana of
( 2a woman could hardly consist of anything else except her ornaments* J
Hence in this sutra they stand virtually as representative of all
her strxdhana.
In a separate sutra Baudhayana also gives the order of
( 3 )succession applicable to strxdhana of a maiden. It is as follows
the uterine brothers, mother, and father. The words being very clear 
it is not possible to force two different interpretations upon this 
sutra as has been done in the case of Gautamasutra applicable to 
sulka. It might be urged that this sutra tends to disprove the in­
terpretation put upon the Gautamasutra by Maskari and Haradatta. As 
an exception to the general rule that females are preferred to males 
in succession to strxdhana we find that amongst the collaterals 
males are preferred to females: not only that the brothers are
(1) This theory of the Bengal school was made applicable to all 
the -schools by Macnaughten and others and the judicial law 
blindly accepted this analogy* See supra.
(2) Apa.Su.II.14.9 gives ornaments to be the property of the wife. 
See supra p.S3.
(3) Baud.Su.as referred to in Mit.on Yaj.II.146; Apa.on Yaj.II.145 
and many other treatises, see appendix text no. £ , However the 
text is not found in the extant dharmasutras of Baudhayana.
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preferred to sisters but the latter are not at all mentioned as heirs
Vasistha declares : "That which was acquired by the mother
(1)at her nuptial ceremony should be partitioned by women." The word
'women* in relation to the word * mother* naturally denotes her dau­
ghters. This sutra confirms the proposition that at least original­
ly female heirs were preferred to male heirs in succession to strXd- 
hana. The famous doctrine of spiritual benefit has thus no applica­
tion whatsoever to strXdhana though, as we shall see later on, it 
managed to creep in afterwards in some of the commentaries and 
digests. The other inference to be drawn from this sutra is that 
nuptial presents like sulka formed in very early days an important 
category of strXdhana. A cursory glance at the sutras just preced­
ing this sutra, wherein the different shares for the eldest, the 
middle and the youngest sons in the paternal property are given,
proves that succession to strXdhana was also a supplementary pro-
(2)cess to the partition of paternal property. Especially m  a case
where the paternal property was divided by the sons after the death 
of their mother this partition of father's property and succession 
to mother's strxdhana must have been effected as supplementary pro­
ceedings •
Another important variant reading of the same sutra gives 
'parinahya* or 'parinahya* instead of 'parineya* or 'parinayya*.
(1) Vas.Smr.17.48, appendix text no.S.
(2) See also infra pp.31K5*53.9 Ghose says that it was 
in connection with partition that the law of strXdhana de­
veloped - see T.L.L.(1904)pp.311-13. See also Vishnu v. 
Krishnan (1909)25 T.L.R. 196 at 217.
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The former denotes the household utensils of the kitchen or the ex­
clusively personal property of a woman like her set of cosmetics
etc. The latter denotes nuptial presents. The first reading has
(1)
been accepted by Apararka, Laksmxdhara, Balambhatta etc. On the
other hand Jxmuta, Haradatta, Mitra Misra and others accept 'parin-
(2)
ayya* or its nearer form having the same meaning. The former form
viz. fparinahya* is found in the old vedic literature as well, where-
—  ( 3)in the wife is declared to be the mistress of the parinahya.
Looking after the parinahya was, according to Manu, a task reserved
(4)for women. Therefore it appears that this reading is older and
probably original. It is more likely, however, that by the time 
Vasistha wrote his smriti the concept of strxdhana had grown much 
wider and that strxdhana of a woman included not only her household 
property but also property which was given to her by way of marriage- 
settlement. The importance of the latter reading would become ap­
parent when we come to examine the different lines laid down by the 
different commentators who accept this reading. As Vasistha does 
not give a line of succession for any other kind of woman*s property 
it may be concluded that this parineya or parinahya constituted 
almost the whole of women’s exclusive property in the days of 
Basistha.
(1) Apa on Yaj.II.117; Vya.Ka.689; Bal.on Yaj.II.145. The
variations amongst these readings are very slight and un­
important .
(2) See infra.
(3) MPatnx hi parinahyasyese .** ^ Tai.Samhita VI.2.2.1. See also 




Yisnu adds a few more details to the above provisions - a 
fact which apparently suggests that his sroriti was written later than 
the above sutras. This inference is also fortified by the fact that 
Visnu gives many additional categories of strxdhana not mentioned by
any of his predecessors and mentions almost all the categories men-
(1) —tioned by those who wrote after him. About succession to strxd­
hana he declares : "In a case where a childless deceased woman was 
married in one of the four forms of marriage, viz. the Brahma etc.,
the strxdhana devolves upon the husband. The father succeeds to the
(2)
same in case she was married in any one of the other forms.,f He
adds : "If she has given birth to children whatever property she had
(*3)devolves upon the daughter in all forms of marriage." The word 
* Brahma etc.1 denotes the four approved forms of marriage viz. the 
Brahma, Daiva, Srsa and the Prajapatya. The rest of the forms are
(4)
the Gandharva, Ksura, the Raksasa and the Paisacha. It can
easily be seen why a distinction between approved and unapproved 
forms of marriage was set out for the purpose of prescribing two 
different lines of succession. In the approved form the father him­
self used to offer his daughter to a suitable husband worthy of her. 
In the unapproved forms except the Asura the girl was married to her 
husband without the consent of her parents etc* Even in the Ksura,
(1) Supra p £3 -^  -
(2) Vi.Smr.17. 19-20, appendix text no .10-
(3) Vi.Sinr.17.21, appendix text no.'ll,
(4) For the eight forms of marriage see Gau.IV.6-15; Bau.I.11.20; 
Manu III.27-34; Yaj.I.58-61; Vis,24.17-37 etc. For approved 
and unapproved forms of marriage see Apa.II.5.12.3; Bau. 
1*11.20.10-11; Manu 111.24,39,41,42 etc. See Mayne pp.120-136, 
Banerjee pp.ft 6-3 5-
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the marriage being more of the form of a sale there was always a 
danger of the girl being offered to an unsuitable person* Such being 
the case the &astra treated a girl married in an approved form as 
having become the sapinda of the husband whereas it treated a girl 
married in an unapproved form as having remained a sapinda of the 
father alone* So while an approved marriage brought about a complete 
fusion of the girl with the new family, an unapproved marriage was
v.
not strong enough to sever her religious and legal bonds with her
father’s family* Hence the difference between the two lines of
succession. This fundamental cause of difference is helpful in
understanding the detailed lines of succession which arose later on.
By making all the property of a woman to devolve upon her daughters
Visnu confirms our former conjecture that originally in succession
(1)to strxdhana females were preferred to males.
Pratapa Rudra in his usual habit of concoction gives two
more sutras of Visnu which cannot be traced in the extant work of• •
the latter or in any one of the reputed commentaries or digests.
They are as follows : MThe sulka of a sister goes to the mother and
(2)(in her default) to her uterine brothers*11 "The yautaka of the
( 3)mother is inherited by the unmarried daughters alone.11 It will 
be seen later on how these fabrications lend an apparent support to 
the different lines of succession propounded in the Sarasvativilasa.
(1) See supra p.3 ° %
(2) "Bhaginxsulkam matuh sodaranameva." - Visnu quoted in Sa.Vi.384.
(3) "Yautakam matuh kumarxdaya eva." - Visnu quoted in Sa.Vi.382.
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A few sutras attributed to Sankha or to Sankha and Likhita
give supplementary provisions concerning succession to strfdhana.
Sankha declares : ,fWhen an inheritance etc* is being partitioned the
(1)daughter should get the ornaments and the nuptial strXdhana."
The word *et cetera' in 'inheritance etc*' (dayadye) seem to have
been intentionally used since in the opinion of some authors women
(2)
were incapable of having any inheritance (daya). This sutra
lends support to our theory that distribution of the paternal and 
maternal property ran on parallel and supplemental lines. The 
nuptial strXdhana referred to in his sutra appears to denote the 
strXdhana to be handed over to, or on behalf of, the daughter at the 
time of her nuptials. This will support our conjecture that an un­
married daughter was preferred in succession to her mother's property
(3 )because she was to be dowered with the help of such property. But 
it is quite likely that this nuptial strXdhana denoted the nuptial 
property of the mother which was also to be the nuptial property of 
the daughter; in this sense it was, in Baudhayana*® words, the 
'sampradayika* property of the descendants in the direct female line.
Another sutra attributed to Sankha reads : "All the 
uterine brothers deserve to get the inheritance from their mother
(1) Sankha quoted in Vi.Mi.456 etc., appendix text no.f5-
The reading accepted in the Dharmakosa pp.1428-29 gives the 
word 'kanya* twice which makes the meaning slightly confused.
(2) Supra pp. So> St 
{3) Supra p.^Og.
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(1)equally, and so also all the unmarried daughters.11 As the whole 
of the smriti of Sankha is not available it is very difficult to 
say whether the adverb fequally1 applies cumulatively or severally 
to the two classes of heirs.
Another sutra reads as follows : ’’The husband of a child­
less deceased daughter who had been treated as a son (putrika) does
(2)
not deserve to take (her) property. ” This is quite natural since
the daughter who has been made a putrika retains her proximity with
(3 )her father’s family; hence the line of succession excludes the
husband in the first instance and prefers her parental family. This
rule obviously applies to a putrika married in approved or unapproved
it
form for the reason behindAwould be equally applicable to both these 
cases.
Another sutra lays down that the bridegroom should take
(4)his own sulka. From the use of the word ’bridegroom* it is clear
that this provision refers not to succession to sulka but to re­
traction of sulka by the bridegroom in case the bride dies before 
the marriage takes place. The provision evidently applies to sulka 
in the sense of bride-price, and it is similar to the one laid down
(1) Sankha quoted in Bal.on Yaj.II.145 etc., appendix text no.If.
But the word 'matrikam* has been dropped in Da.Bha.XV.2.4 and 
Vi.Ta.452 which implies that it does not necessarily apply to 
the property of the mother only.
(2) Sankha quoted by Apa.on Yaj.II.145 etc., appendix text no.lfc- 
See also "Tadapatyasya cha dhanam kanyabhaga eva.” - quoted 
in Vya.Ka.726 which is somehow connected by ItaksmTdhara to 
succession to the property of an after-born brother of a 
putrika. t
(3) See Va.Smr.17.15; Sankha quoted in Vya.Ka.724.
(4) Sankha quoted in Sa.Vi.385 etc., appendix text no.17.
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(1)toy Yajnavalkya.
In striking contrast with the above authors Kautilya 
appears to toe much in favour of the sons in succession to strxdhana. 
After having stated that a woman should only enjoy her strxdhana 
during her life-time and that she should give to her sons all the 
property which is at her absolute disposal he proceeds to provide 
that the strxdhana of a mother should toe partitioned, after her death* 
toy tooth her sons and daughters, in default of the sons toy the dau­
ghters alone, and that in default of tooth it should be taken toy the
(2)
husband* Here the simulteneous right of sons and daughters is
stated very unambiguously* This is not surprising in view of the
fact that Kautilya has special predilection for male issue in 
(3 )general. After giving the above provisions he adds : f,^ ulka,
anvadheyaka as well as any other (strxdhana) given by the toandhus
/ . \ (4)(lxt. relatxves) should toe taken by the toandhus.H The statement
is ambiguous. The explanation given the modern Srxmula is that in
case of the woman married in one of the unapproved forms the strxd-
(5)liana goes to the parents etc. Obviously the author of the Srxmula
(1) Yaj.II.146 infra.
(2) See the passage "Itamakaranxyamapi tadabhave bharta.1* -
Kau.III.2, Ganapati Sastri*s edi.vol*J[ p. 16 ; Shama Sastri*s
edi.p.J53.
(3) For instance according to him only sons are entitled to take 
the strxdhana of a remarried woman - supra p. 3 OX* - Moreover 
observing that women are meant merely to produce male progeny 
|je authorises men to have any number of wives for this purpose.
"Putrartha hi striyah.'* - Kau.III.2, Shama Sastri*s edi.p.
(4) "Sulkamanvadheyakameinyadva bandhubhirdattam bandhava hareyuh.*1 - 
Kau.III.2 Ganapati Sastri*s edi.vol •H P* 16 , Shama Sastri * s
edi.p.I 5*3.
(5) iSrxmula (lit. the root of wealth) is an elaborate commentary
on Kautiljrafs Arthasastra. It is written in this century by
Ganapati Sastri who is the first person to carry on an exten­
sive research on Kautilya.
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was impressed by the provisions found in other treatises where such 
distinction between approved and unapproved forms of marriage has 
been made for the purpose of determining the lines of succession, 
if that was Kautilya*s intention he would not have sorted out only 
a few categories of strxdhana for his provision nor tvould he have 
added the unnecessary words Mas well as any other (strxdhana) given 
by the bandhus.M In view of the fact that in an immediately preced­
ing passage Kautilya deals with strxdhana given by the husband or 
the father-in-law (from another point of view viz. divestment) it is 
probable that this latter provision refers to the property given by 
the paternal family of the woman and to sulka which, by common con­
sent, devolves upon the parents of the proposita. If this foe the 
'<©Treci meaning of the above sentence it appears that according to 
Kautilya strxdhana of a childless woman devolves simultaneously upon 
two lines of heirs depending upon the source whence it came. The 
husband and his side took what they gave to the proposita whereas 
the father and his side took all they had given to her. That the 
inherent rights of both the families were retained in the strxdhana 
which they gave to the woman is more clearly shown by the fact that
Kautilya authorises a woman only to enjoy her strxdhana during her
(1)Ixfe-txme and treats it as a kind of reserve fund to be used in 
case of calamity




appear practically to be variant readings of the three sutras of
Sankha quoted above, namely, those referring to succession to nuptial
(1)
strxdhana and ornaments, to sulka, and to the strxdhana of a putrika. 
Hence they need not be discussed in detail.
Manu makes the following provisions for succession to 
strxdhana. He says : "However, whatever is the yautaka of the
(2)
mother devolves by succession upon the unmarried daughter alone."
The word 1 however* has been introduced because in the previous verse
succession to a male*s property has been discussed and the daughter’s
(3)right thereto has been enunciated. The interpretation of the word
’yautaka* is very important in understanding other verses of Manu, 
Medhatithi, Sarvajnanarayana, Kulluka and Ramachandra take the word 
yautaka as simply equal to strxdhana or the mother’s property. 
Medhatithi and Kulluka also refer to Gautama*s sutra mentioned above 
to equate the provisions in that verse with that contained in this
(4) _
verse. Raghavananda and Nandana, however, interpret ’yautaka*
as meaning property which a woman gets from her father or his familfcy. 
The etymological explanation of the word can suit neither of these 
meanings. But Medhatithi*s comment makes it amply clear that at 
least in the earlier days yautaka which was the sum total of all 
strxdhana devolved upon an unmarried daughter in preference to all 
other heirs.
(1) See appendix text nos.8 5  86 j T h ^ / P e i i i n




Another verse of Manu has been a source of prolonged con­
troversies amongst the authors of the different schools* It is as 
follows : "After the death of the mother let all the uterine brothers
divide the maternal wealth equally; and so let the uterine sisters
(1)do." In the next verse he adds : "If they have any daughters
they should, in accordance with their need, be given something out
(2)
of their grandmother's property with affection." The word 'they*
(tasam) refers only to sisters and not brothers. That the son's son 
or the son's daughter should not get any share simulteneously with 
the son or the daughter but that the daughter's daughter should get 
one is an indication of the fact that succession to stridhana is
more favourable to females and heirs related through the female des-
(3) • (4)cendants. As in the case of the Sankhasutra the question is
whether the word 'equally' applies simulteneously to both the classes
of heirs so that both the sons and daughters should take equal shares
simulteneously. But, against such a suggestion, there is another
verse in the Manusmriti wherein a similar provision is stated in
almost identical words. Manu there states that the wealth of a
reunited brother should be shared equally by the uterine brothers,
( 5)reunited step-brothers and by the uterine sisters. Leaving aside
the interpretation of the commentators it cannot reasonably be 
supposed that Manu could have intended to give the sisters an equal
(1) Manu IX. 192, appendix text no.^.
(2) Manu IX.193, appendix text no. a.if. For a similar provision of 
Brihaspati see infra.
(3) Supra p. 1 0 3 , 31 ^  1 1 7.
(4) Supra p. *JI9 .
(5) Manu IX.212.
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192nd verse referred to above the above three commentators have de­
finitely borrowed the qualification *unmarried* from Manu*s verse 
about *yautaka*• Otherwise there can be no reason why the phrase 
futerine sisters* should be further qualified by the word * unmarried*• 
In the next two verses Manu describes stridhana and in 
the second line of the second verse states a general rule that such
property devolves upon the progeny of the woman notwithstanding the
(2)
existence of her husband. The general rule applies, of course,
to stridhana as described in both the verses. In the next two verses
Manu gives the succession to stridhana of a childless woman. He
states that in case the woman was married in one the five forms of
marriage viz. the Brahma, Daiva, Srsa, Gandharva and the Prajapatya
her stridhana devolves upon her husband alone while if she was
married in any one of the remaining forms her stridhana devolves
( 3 )upon her father and mother. The provision differs from that of
(4)Kautilya and resembles the one given by Visnu, the only altera­
tion being that Manu includes Gandharva also in the approved forms 
and gives the right of succession to both father and mother in un­
approved forms of marriage. Manu does not give detailed line of 
succession in these two cases and; none of his commentators is help­
ful in determining them. They have almost paraphrased Manu*s pro­
visions. But it is reasonable to suppose that according to Manu
(1) Manu IX. 194-95, appendix texts nos.l3L5~&^'
Supra p.61'
(2) Manu IX.195.
(3) Manu IX.196-97, appendix texts nos. .
(4) Supra p. 'M<6*
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and simultaneous right with their brothers in the reunited brother's 
property; because in succession to males property a sister is not 
considered to share equally with her brother. Moreover the above 
verse appears to apply to coparcenary property in which females had 
no share at all. So in all probability Manu intended to give the
order of succession amongst these three classes, providing for an
. . • , ( 1 ) equal distribution per capita amongst each class in turn. The
same interpretation is presumably applicable to Manu's provision
concerning stridhana also.
The comment of Medhatithi on this verse appears to have
been lost to us. Sarvajnanarayana, Kulluka and Raghavananda state
that the unmarried sisters and uterine brothers share equally
(2)
whereas on the authority of Brihaspati they recommend to give
(3)some gift to the married sister. But the former two commentators
appear to take here a position contrary to the one which they have
adopted in interpreting Manu's verse about yautaka as applicable to
(4)all stridhana. They do not even try to reconcile their two po­
sitions. It is quite probable that Manu intended to give stridhana 
equally to the unmarried daughters in the first instance, then to 
the married ones, and then to the brothers. In interpreting the
(1) Similar interpretation is given by Sarvajnanarayana.
(2) See infra.
(3) With the analogy of sister getting one-fourth share out of 
paternal property Kulluka suggests that the married sister 
also should get a comparable share in the mother's property.
(4) See their comments on Manu IX.131 supra.
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strxdhana in the case of ajDproved and unapproved forms respectively
should devolve upon the next nearest sapinda of the woman in her
husband's or the father's family respectively* The general rule of
succession to male's property which he has stated just a few verses
before the above verses, namely, the inheritance belongs to the next
nearest sapinda,^^ should be held equally applicable to strxdhana
as well by the principle of analogy (atidesa).
Manu also gives two other peculiar cases of succession.
In one verse he says that whatever wealth has been given to a woman
(2)by her father devolves upon her brahmin daughter or her issue.
(3 )All the commentators of Manu interpret this to mean that such pro­
perty of a woman who is of a lower caste like Ksatriya etc. should 
devolve upon her step-daughter who is a brahmin girl and not upon
other step-daughters born from the mothers of the lower rank. This
(4)xs obvxously xn the absence of her own issue. Thus it seems that
although a brahmin can marry a wife from any of the four castes his
issue from a brahmin wife has a special privilege and has greater
(5)rights according to the Sastra. The rule should apply by analogy
(1) Manu IX*187 : "Anantarah sapindadyastasya tasya dhanam bhavet." 
The rule is to be followed in default of the heirs whom Manu 
has expressly mentioned.
(2) Manu IX.198, appendix text no.^19. See also Sangrahakaja quoted 
in Ba.on Taj.IX.145.
(3) These, of course, do not include Medhatithi whose comment is 
lost to us.
(4) Ramachandra is the only commentator who strangely appears to 
suggest alternative provisions (vikalpa), namely, that such 
property should go either to the issue of the woman or to the 
brahmin step-daughter.
(5) A person can marry a girl of his own caste or of any of the 
lower castes - Manu III.13. But preferably he should marry a 
girl of his own caste - Manu III.12. But in any case a brahmin 
should not marry a sudra girl - Manu III.15-16; Yaj.I.56.
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to the issue of the wives of other caste® inter se as well according
(1)to the descending order of importance of the wives themselves.
But none of Manu*s commentators appears to suggest anything to that 
effect. The provision proves that in the absence of an heir claim­
ing proximity with the proposita by blood-relationship an attempt is 
to be made to find out an heir who is superior from the point of 
view of religious efficacy. It is inexplicable, however, why only 
property given by the father should alone have this peculiar kind 
of succession,
Manu who rarely gives details of provisions mentions 
another minute point in stridhana succession. He says that in case 
two sons born of the same woman from two fathers fight for her strid- 
hana each of them shall get only his father1s property which came to 
his mother*s hand and not the property of the father of the other
(2) (3)
son. Kautilya gives a similar provision. This should natura-
lly be held to apply. toAproperty of the woman which was given to her 
by her husband only and not to all her stridhana since in the case of 
other stridhana both the sons have equal claim by proximity. This 
shows that remarriage was quite common or at least not unknown in 
the days of Kautilya and Manu. The provision is, however, contrary 
to the provision of Kautilya and Bhavasvami to the effect that a re­
married woman loses all her rights to stridhana given by her first
(1) See the order of preference mentioned in Manu III.12.
(2) Manu s apt«.»in|»Tr f
(3) Kau. III.2, Shama Sastri* s edi .p. I S 3 , Gran a pat* Sdstn s tfo/* JI f>. /<f .
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(1)
husband; for the former provision contemplates a situation where-
her
in the stridhana of the proposita is partitioned by her sons afterA 
death. This and the previous provision of Manu provide examples of 
distinction between lines of succession as depending upon the source 
of the stridhana.
Proceeding to Yajnavalkya we find that, like Manu, he des-
- (2) cribes stridhana in two verses and in the second line of the
second verse gives a general line of succession : "In case the woman
(3)dies childless the relatives (bandhavas) should take it." There 
can be two interpretation of this verse and both are equally likely. 
According to the first the word ’bandhavas* denotes all relatives 
and the word *it* (tad) denotes all the stridhana in the two verses. 
The rule thus is merely a general statement that woman*s stridhana 
goes to her relatives. On the other hand it could be jflTguej^  that 
the word ’bandhavas* denotes primarily brothers and in a secondary 
sense all the heirs from the paternal family and that the word ’it’
i
denotes only property mentioned in the first line of the second 
verse viz. sulka, anvadheyaka and bandhudatta. According to this 
latter interpretation the rule makes the distinction of a line of 
succession dependable upon the source or the kind of property. These 
three are exactly the same categories of property as are mentioned 
by Kautilya as devolving upon the bandhavas who, as we have already 
seen, mean in Kautilya*s provision the relatives from the paternal
(1) Supra p . A c c o r d i n g  to Bharasvami this provision applies, 
however, only to a widow remarrying against the wishes of 
her son.
(2) Yaj. 11.143-44 supra pjf.65-
(3) "Atitayamaprajasi bandhavastadavapnuyuh.M - Yaj. 11.144.
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side of the proposita,
Yajhavalkya gives a single verse for a general rule of 
succession to both raale!s and female*s property. He says : ,fLet 
sons divide equally, after the death of their parents, both the pro­
perty and debts; let the daughters share the residue of their 
mother1© property after the payment of (her) debts; the issue 
succeeds in their default."^"^ Here Yajnavalkya obviously reserves 
all the property of the mother in favour of the daughters alone in 
the first instance. Here an analogy between the son's right in his 
father's property and the daughter's right in her mother's property 
is clearly seen. The word 'anvaya' literally denotes one who follows 
or comes afterwards. Metaphorically it denotes 'issue*. Now this 
word would naturally include both the sons of a deceased woman and 
their progeny as well as the progeny of her daughters because all 
these constitute her 'anvaya'. But there is no clue as to whether 
there is to be an order of preference amongst the sons, the daughter'
sons and the daughter's daughters. Very probably by virtue of prox­
imo.
imity the son would have been preferred toAdaughter*s son as least.
As regards the property of childless woman, Yajnavalkya
says that the property devolves upon the daughters in case the woman
has given birth to children; if she has no children it goes to the
husband in case she was married in one of the four approved forms
and to the father in case she was married in any one of the others
(2)vis. the Gandharva, Asura, Raksasa and the Paisacha. The
(1) Vibhajeran sutah pitrorurdhvamrilcthamrinam samam/
Maturduhitarah sesamrinattabhya rite'nvayah // - Yaj.II.117.
(2) Yaj.II.145, appendix text no.35-
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inclusion of the Gandharva form in one of the unapproved forms de­
notes that probably the Gandharva had lost its popularity amongst 
the higher castes by the time Yajhavalkya wrote his smriti. The word 
1 daughter1 in this verse obviously denotes the daughter of the
deceased woman and not her daughter's daughter as it is followed by
(1)the words 'in case (the woman) has given birth to children.'
Narada gives a general rule of preference in favour of the
daughter very much in the same way as Yajhavalkya when the latter
states succession to both male's and female's property. Narada says :
"The property of the mother devolves upon the daughters! and in de-
(2)fault of the daughter upon her issue." He also confirms Yajhav­
alkya' s rule that in default of any issue strxdhana devolves upon 
the husband in the four approved forms of marriage and upon the 
father in case of the rest.^3  ^ Comments made on analogical provisions 
of Yajhavalkya are applicable mutatis mutandis to Narada*s provisions 
as well.
Brihaspati gives three verses on succession to strxdhana.
He says : "Strxdhana devolves upon the issue, and the daughter, if
she is unmarried, receives a share; but a married one receives
(4)something xn token of honour." Here the word used for the issue
is 'apatya' which ordinarily would include both male and female
(1) As Yajhavalkya specifically lays down succession to the pro­
perty of a childless woman words about delivery or absence of 
any delivery naturally refer to the proposita herself.
(2) Na.Smr.16.2 & Na.Sam.14.2, appendix text no.*f|. The verse is
very similar to Yaj.XI.117.
(3) Na.Smr.16.9 8c Na.Sam. 14.9, appendix text no.Ml*
(4) Brihaspati quoted in Vi.Mi.54-7 etc., appendix text no.^3-
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issue; but a specific mention of the daughter seems to suggest a
preference in her favour* The distinction between the married and
the unmarried ones inevitably establishes a close connection between
this verse and the Gautamasutra and fortifies the above conclusion.
Probably Brdhaspati wanted the sons denoted by the word ’apatya' to
share with the married d a u g h t e r s . V i e w e d  in this light it seems
that the first half of the first line in this verse states the
general rule of succession; the second half states the preferential
heirs and the second line gives a clue to determine the order of
preference amongst these preferential heirs inter se.
Brihaspati also gives a line of heirs who are wrongly
described as ultimate heirs by some scholars. He says : "The
mother’s sister, maternal uncle’s wife, paternal uncle’s wife,
father’s sister, mother-in-law, and the elder brother’s wife are
declared to be equal to (one’s own) mother. When these women do not
have either a ©on, a daughter's son or a ©on of either of these
(2)
their property should be taken by the sister's son etc." The first
'suta' (son) has been taken in the above translation as being a 
nounv. qualified by the adjective ’aurasa* (legitimate) - this would 
be the natural construction of the sentence. The second 'suta* may 
reasonably be connected to both the son and the daughter’s son. As 
not many verses of Brihaspati are available it is impossible to say 
whether he wanted these heirs to succeed before or after the husband
(1) See below Katyayana's provision to the same effect.
(2) Brihaspati quoted by Apa. on Yaj. 11.145; Vya.Ka.693 etc., 
appendix text no.l*5L
332
etc. It is also not clear whether he wanted them to succeed in the
order in which they are mentioned or according to their respective
capacity of bestowing spiritual benefit upon the proposita, which
appears to have been one of the prominent motives in mentioning 
it is
them. But if supposed that, because of their analogy to the sons,ft
these heirs are to succeed to the stridhana of a woman immediately 
after her progeny and before her husband etc. then a number of com­
plications would arise. For if she was married in an approved form 
there would be an undesirable contingency (anavasthaprasanga) of the 
husband1s younger brother succeeding before the husband himself. 
Moreover this ivould also create an unsurmountable difficulty in 
fixing the positions of these heirs in case the woman was married in 
one of the unapproved forms in which case the succession devolves 
upon the father and his heirs. Therefore it is best to conclude 
that, at least in the system of the Mitaksara wherein there is a 
very little possibility of the exercise of the doctrine of spiritual 
benefit, this list of heirs denotes merely an enumeration of a few 
prominent relations who are entitled to succeed to a childless 
woman * s stridhana.
Itatyayana recommends in one verse that stridhana should go 
to sons in default of daughters; that whatever is given by the
bandhus goes to the bandhus and in their default it goes to the
(1)husband. The first provision confirms the general preference in
favour of the female heirs and the second one is very similar to the
(1) ICatyayana quoted by Apa.on Yaj.II.117 etc., appendix text 
no. €S-
333
provision given by ICautilya and to the second interpretation of
Yajhavalkya*s verse referred to above. One important addition is to
be noted here, namely, that the lines of succession are not mutually
exclusive and that when one line of heirs is exhausted the succession
turns towards the other line as shown by the inclusion of the husband
also. By analogy the principle may be applied to all other cases.
In another verse Katyayana states that the married sisters
(1)share equally with their brothers the strXdhana of their mother.
He also mentions that the wealth gained by a woman from her father
in a marriage in one of the forms like the Isura etc., goes to the
(2)
parents in default of the progeny. With the help of the above- 
mentioned analogy it seems that it should also go to the husband in 
default of the parents and their heirs. The words used in this verse 
can be literally translated as ‘whatever is gained by a woman in the
GL
£sura form etc.1 (asuradisu yallbdham). This may denote the usual 
distinction between the lines of heirs as depending upon the form in 
which the woman was married so that the rule merely lays down the 
general rule of succession to all the property of a woman married in 
one of the unapproved forms. But these words are also capable of 
denoting particular kinds of property like sulka etc. which is 
obtained by a woman in Ssura marriage in contradistinction with the
(1) Katyayana quoted in Vi.Ta.452 etc., appendix text no.69.
(2) Katyayana quoted in Bal.on Yaj.II.145 p.257, appendix text 
no.70,From it combination of all the three verses just cited it 
would appear that the order of succession according to Katyay­
ana was unmarried daughters in the first place, and married 
daughters and sons together in the second place.
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approved forms of marriage. According to this interpretation the 
rule would be applicable only to property which is thus directly 
connected with her marriage. But the word ’paitrika* seems to be 
hanging aimlessly in either of these interpretations because in the 
case of the former all the property of a woman married in an unapp­
roved form would devolve upon her parents whereas in the case of the 
latter interpretation, the wealth received by the bride in an Isura 
form i.e. sulka etc. comes mainly from the bridegroom’s party and 
not from her parents. The words used in this verse enable the 
commentators to enter into the controvertial question as to whether 
the line of succession depends upon the form of the marriage in which 
the proposita was married or upon the kind or the source of the 
wealth received in a particular type of marriage. A verse of Yama
which is very similar to the above verse more distinctly supports
(1)the latter xnterpretation.
There is another text of Vriddha Katyayana which says that
whatever immoveable property is given to a daughter by her father
(2)
devolves upon her brothers in case she dies childless. This, of
1HW
course, appears to be very reasonable. For even according to customA
amongst many communities immoveable property is given to a daughter
with an implied condition that it is to revert to the father’s
(3)family in case she dies childless. j
Devala gives a verse which emphatically states the equal
(1) Yama quoted in Bal.on Yaj.II.145 p.264, appendix text no.^i.
(2) Katyayana quoted in Vi.Ta.4*54 etc., appendix text no.71.
(3) This was, for instance, a custom in Kathiawar. See Bhagwanji 
v. Wala Godad III K.L.R. (1892)p.l05. See also v. IWicti.appq
C\SHi) H  m-L-J.
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and the simultaneous right of sons and daughters. He declares : ’'On
the death of a woman her stridhana is shared in common by the sons
and the unmarried daughters* If she died childless the husband,
(1)mother, brother or father succeed to the same.” The first pro­
vision is very clear and unambiguous so that unlike Brihaspatifs 
provision no room is left for any doubt as to its meaning and effect. 
The second line is apparently not a statement of the order of heirs 
mentioned therein but merely an enunciation of many heirs*
We have now placed under review the sutras and the smriti 
texts. Some of them Strike us as ambiguous or unmeaningful. The 
public for whom they were written probably held the key to their 
meaning which was afterwards lost perhaps through break of the trad­
ition (sainpradaya). It is quite unlikely that all these provisions 
formed a homogeneous system. But we may proceed to observe how 
each commentator selects a few of them to foe his literal guides 
while submitting others to far-fetched readings and interpretations 
in order to present the symmetry of his own concept of the subject. 
The skill of a commentator lies in securing the support of the max­
imum number of the important texts and in so neatly aecommodating 
the debatable elements in the incongruant ones that the effect is 
to create an impression that all the texts are in harmony notiimerely 
with themselves but with just the system which that particular com­
mentator is propounding.
Before entering into a detailed discussion of the law of
(1) Bevala quoted in Vi.Mi.547 etc., appendix text no.B®*
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the different schools on succession to sirTdhana it would be worth­
while especially to consider the opinion of the two early commenta­
tors of Yajnavalkya viz. Visvarupa and Apararka. Both of them appear 
to be in favour of daughters as being the most preferential class of 
heirs and succession, according to both of them, devolves upon the 
sons only in default of the daughters.
Observing that there is a similarity between sons' succes-
S*4C£«,S$I bn
sion to the father's property and daughters'Ato their mother's pro­
perty^ ^  Visvarupa remarks that in default of daughters the sons who
are comprehended by the word 'anvaya' succeed. He refers to one of
(2)
the oldest verses of the Rigveda to assert the right of the sons
and specifically repudiates the interpretation that in default of
(3 )the daughters the succession devolves upon daughter's daughters.
(4)
On the authority of the Gautamasutra, however, he states the line 
of heirs as uterine brothers, and then the mother for all the pro­
perty contained in the second line of the second verse of the enu­
meration of stridhana given by Yajnavalkya viz. bandhudatta, anvad-
* (5)
heyaka and sulka. This brings him nearer to Kautilya's opinion
(1) "Yatha cha pituh putrah samamsato dhanabnaginah tathaiva 
maturduhitarah." - Vis.on Yaj.II.121 i.e. Yaj.11.117 accord­
ing to the Mit. or Apa.
(2) "Na jamaye tanvo rikthamaraik chakara garbham saniturnidhanam / 
YadT mataro janayanta vanhimanyah karta sukritoranya rindhan//11 
- Rigveda III,2.5.2. Visvarupa quotes the first two halves of 
the two lines. However, notwithstanding the authority of this 
Vedic verse in the son's favour he gives a preference to the j 
daughter on the authority of the smriti provision of Yajnavalkya I 
which is contrary to the Vedic provision. He has obviously 
broken the rule of giving preference to Sruti over smriti. j
(3) Vis. on Yaj. 121. j
(4) Supra p.^lb* I
(5) Vis. on Yaj.II.148 i.e. 11.144 in Mit. !
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making a distinction between lines of succession to depend upon the
kind or the source of stridhana* But he also confirms Yajnavalkya1s
(1)distinction based upon the form of marriage. His comments at both
these places being very succinct it is not possible to see how he 
wants to reconcile these two provisions of his own.
Apararka in general gives the order of succession as dau­
ghters and, in their default, sons. For this statement he refers
(2) ™to Katyayana as his authority. Like Medhatithi he takes yautaka
(3)to mean all the exclusive property of women and on the authority
of Gautama lays down the order of succession as unmarried daughter,
(4)and then married 1 unstabilised1 daughters. Here he makes a
singular, though from the point of view of the interpretation of the
Gautamasutra a correct, suggestion that notwithstanding the presence
of married and stabilised daughters the sons succeed to their mother*s
stridhana. Obviously there is no provision for such daughters in the
Gautamasutra; but Katyayana whose verse Apararka has twice relied
(5)upon gives the right to the sons in default of * daughters* and
9
there is no reason why Apararka should not include in these 'daughters 
married stabilised daughters.
Apararka comfirms the distinction between the lines of 
succession depending upon the form of marriage in which the deceased
(1) Vis. on Yaj. 11.149 i.e. 11.145 in the Mit.
(2) Apa. on Yaj.II.117 and 11.145. For Katyayana*s text see 
supra. But see 11 Duhitr inam tadanvayasya vabhave putra eva 
matridhanam vibhajeran." - Apa. on Yaj. 11.117.
(3) Apa. on Yaj. 11.117 and Medhatithi on Manu IX.131.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Apa. on Yaj. 11.117 and 11.145.
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( 1 )woman was married. Excepting sulka (in the sense of bride-price)
Apararka wants to avoid any kind of distinction in the line of succes­
sion based upon the kind or the source of the property of a married
(2)
woman - a policy which, we shall see, is similar to that of Vi j-
nanesvara. For sulka he gives the order given by Visvarupa which is
(3)followed by almost all other authors. As regards the stridhana of
a putrika he gives the right to the husband in case she was made a
putrika with an understanding that her son should be the son of his
grandparents; on the other hand, he gives the right to the mother etc.
(4)m  case the putrika was herself treated as a son. He mentions the
verse of Brihaspati about the so-called ultimate heirs but does not
(5)make any useful comment on it. So he appears to have left the order
of succession after the husband and the father respectively in appro­
ved and unapproved forms of marriage respectively to the reader1© 
imagination.
(1) Apa. on Yaj.II.145. Talcing into consideration the contradiction 
between Manu and Yajnavalkya on the number of the approved forms 
of marriage Apararka suggests that in case the woman was married 
in the Gandharva the property should by option (vikalpa) go to 
the husband.
(2) See Apa. on Yaj.II. 144 : 11 ... ityanena sarvain strTdhanamupakal- 
pitam.’1 Apararka regards even the word *paitrika* in Manu
IX.198 (supra) as representative of all the stridhana of the 
step-mother.
(3) Apa* on Yaj. 11.145.
(4) For the former alternative he gives the authority of Manu and 
for the latter of Sankha and Likhita. From the reasoning itself 
the reading of the Faithinasi should be *svasra* instead of 
fsvasva* thereby denoting the rig^t of the sister rather than 
that of the mother-in-law. For the suggested reading and the 
same alternative explanation see Bal. on Yaj. 11.145.
(5) The same thing is done by Chandesvara and Milakantha as well, 
see infra.
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Vijnanesvara who is peculiarly favourable to female heirs
gives a popular reasoning for the cardinal principle followed in
succession to stridhana. He says : "Stridhana devolves upon the
daughters because the particles of a woman1s body are abundant in
her daughters; the father’s property devolves upon the sons because
(1)the particles of the father’s body are abundant in his sons."
(2 )
Interpreting the word ’anvaya* used by Yajnavalkya as ’sons* he
( 3 )declares at one place that sons succeed in default of daughters 
who amongst themselves have an order of succession as unmarried, 
married but unstabilised, and married stabilised daughters^. He in­
cludes in unstabilised daughters a daughter who is childless or
(4)indigent•
By unduly distorting the verse of Yajnavalkya he gives a
right of succession to the daughter's daughter in default of all 
( 5 )the daughters. He gives them shares per stirpes as representing
(1) Mit.on Yaj.II.117 : "Yulctam chaitat. ’puman pumso * dhike 
sukre stri bhavatyadhike striya' iti stryavayavanara duhitresu 
bahulyatstr1dhanam duhitrigami. Pitridhanam putragami pitryav- 
ayavanam putresu bahulyaditi."
(2) Mit. on Yaj.II1117.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Mit. on Yaj.11.145. But see Mit. on Yaj.II.117 referred to 
supra. Bal. on Yaj.II.117 and Vi.Ta.452 give/ only ’indigent*. 
But the word should be held to include childless, unfortunate 
and widowed daughters as well. See supra.
(5) Commenting on Yaj*11.145 he says that as daughters are already 
referred to as ’duhitri' in 11.117 the same word in 11.145 de~ 
notes the daughter’s daughter. This is done to avoid the fault 
of redundenee (punarukti) according to Ma.Pa.665-66; Vi.Mi.549 
and Ba. on Yaj.II.145. The reason is obviously very artificial 
for Vi j hane s vara himself, says that the adjective 'prasuta* 
applies to the proposita herself. Moreover there is no reason 
why the sons who are stated to follow the ’duhitri' in 11.117 
should also follow the 'duhitri' in 11.145 when Vijnanesvara 
gives two different meanings to the same word occurring at two 
different places.
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their mothers. Here he distorts the text of Narada also and says
that in default of the daughter*s daughters the daughter's sons
succeed to their grandmother's property and that in default of the
( 2)daughter's sons the sons of the proposita succeed. This is most
unconvincing. For the word 'anvaya' in Yajnavalkya*s and Narada*s
verses probably had a similar meaning, as the purport of the provi-
(3 )sions of the both appears to be similar. Moreover Vijnanesvara
does not avoid the imputation of inconsistency in as much as he
admits at one place that sons succeed in default of the daughters
and at another place depresses son's position even below that of a
(4)daughter's son. Again there is no reason why a daughter's son
should, whether on the principle of propinquity or spiritual effica­
cy, be preferred to a son of the proposita herself. There is not a 
single smriti text which, expressly or by implication, prefers a 
daughter's son to a son. However, to resume the order laid down in
(1) Mit.on Yaj.II.143. The authority for this rule is Gau.Su. 
28.17. The per stirpes succession has been accepted by all 
the commentators - see Smr.Cha.664; Vi.Mi.552; Vi.Ta.453 etc. 
The specific mention of this provision is necessary in view of 
the Jai.Su.X.3.53 'Samam syadasrutatvat* according to which all 
heirs succeeding simultaneously take equally. - See Vi.Mi.548. 
JTrauta applies this maxim to Manu IX.192 thus giving equal 
shares to both sons and daughters together - see Da.Bha.4.2,8.
(2) Kamalakara and others quote Manu IX.139 for the right of the 
daughter's son here - see Vi.Ta.454. But Manu IX.139 which 
refers to succession to male's property gives the right to the 
daughter's son after the son's son and because of the former's 
similarity to the latter. The rule cannot be applied when the 
order of succession is the reverse since the daughter's son and 
the son's son are 'upameya' and the 'upamana' respectively. In 
a Sanskrit simile the latter is always stronger in excellence 
than the former. For 'upamana* and 'upameya* see the Kavyapra- 
kasa pp. i f a n d  the Sahityadarpana p$f. 17.
(3) Supra Yaj.II.117 and Na.Smr.16.2.
(4) Compare Mit.on Yaj.II.117 and 11.145.
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the Mitaksara, the son's son succeeds in default of the son. Follow-
ing Yajnavalkya Vijnanesvara declares that in default of all these
heirs up to the son's sons there is a bifurcation of the lines of
heirs depending upon the form of marriage of the woman : if she was
married in one of the four approved forms her estate goes to her
(1)husband and in hxs default to his nearest heirs; in other cases
it devolves upon the mother and then upon the father and in default
(2 )of both upon their nearest sapindas. With this provision ends
the line of succession given in the Mitaksara for a married woman's 
stridhana.
Vijnanesvara takes special pains to interpret Manu's verse
about the sons and daughters equally dividing their mother's proper-
(3)ty. He observes that as both these classes are not referred to
(4)with an 'ekasesa' compound the word 'equally* does not denote a 
cumulative equal division amongst the heirs of both these classes 
but a several division amongst these two classes though equal inter 
se, so that each member of each class takes equally only when that 
class succeeds. In the opinion of Vijnanesvara words such as 
'brothers should share equally and so should the daughters' convey 
a meaning similar to that conveyed by words such as 'John should
(1) Mit.on Yaj.II.145. But on Manu's authority Gandharva also has
been included into approved forms by Mitra Misra, Kamalakara 
and others. See infra. But Vi.Mi.(tika) on the same verse 
prescribes equal division between the husband and the father 
in case the woman was married in the Gandharva.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.II.145. The promoun 'tat' used in the compound
'tatpratyasannanam* should, by context, refer to both the
father and mother. But in Vi.Ta.467 only the father's heirs
are admitted. Bee infra.
(3) Manu IX. 192 supra. **■ „ _ _ _ . i ^
(4) For 'ekasesa' compound see T^n- $«*• S - 9--£ qs „
£ fok team *
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plough the fields and so should Tom.'(1)
He understands Manu's provision about a brahmin step-
(2)daughter as referring to all her stridhana and to any step­
daughter born of a co-wife of a superior caste. For sulka he adopts
(1) "Sarve sahodarah samam bhajeran sanabhayo bhaginyascha samam 
bhajeranniti itaretarayogasya dvandvaikasesabhavadapratipatteh. 
Vibhagakartritvanvayenapi chasabdasyopapatteh. Yatha Bevada- 
ttah krisim kuryat Yajnadattascheti." - Mit.on Yaj.II.145. The 
argument proceeding from the absence of the 'ekasesa* is un­
convincing; for Vijnanesvara himself sets out the order of 
preference between the parents as first the mother and then the 
father in succession both to a male's property and to a female's 
property although he admits that at both these places they have 
been referred to with an ekasesa compound. See the words 
'pitarau* and 'pitrigami* in Yaj.II.137 and 11.145 respectively 
and Vi j nane svara's comments on them. The conjunction 'cha*
(and) is used in four senses : Community (of reference), colla­
teralness (of reference), mutual conjunction, and aggregation. 
The Siddhantakaumudi says : "Anekam subantam charthe vartama- 
nam va samsyante sa dvandvah. Samuchchayanvachayetaretara-
yogasamaharascharthah." 'Itaretarayoga* is explained as 'mili- 
tanamanvayah' as in 'dhavakhadirapalasah'. Vijnanesvara prob­
ably means here that *cha* denotes here only 1samuchchaya* which 
is explained as *parasparanirapeksasyanekasya ekasminnanvayah* 
as in 'Tsvaram gurum cha yajasva*. - See Mr.Gharpure♦s notes to 
the SubodhinI on Mit.on Yaj.11.145. But Vijnanesvara is self­
contradictory here since commenting on another verse of Manu 
which contains almost identical verse (Manu IX.212 supra) he 
interprets 'cha* in the sense of 'itaretarayoga* to give uterine 
brothers and sisters a concurrent right to succeed equally to 
reunited brother's property - See the Mit.on Yaj.II.139. But 
the motive behind Vi j nane svara1s twisting of the texts which 
are opposed to the daughter's exclusive right is best expressed 
by Mitra Misra who says, "Samanyatah strldhanamatrasya duhitri- 
gr ah.y a t ab o dhakanamanany a t has i d dh a va c h ananu r o dhe na sankochah
kartavyo.....  Na cha chasafodadvandvabhyam sahadikarah.
Vibhagakartritvanvayenapi tadupapatteh." - Vi.Mi*550.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.II.145; Vi.Mi.550; Vi.Ta.453. Mitra Misra mentions 
the order as the daughter of a superior rival wife and then the 
progeny of that daughter. Kamalakara takes this verse as refer­
ring only to 'paitrika' whereas Balambhatta says that it denotes 
all the stridhana of a woman howsoever acquired - Bal.on Mit.
on Yaj.II.145. The preponderence of the authorities of the 
Benares school is in favour of the latter view.
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the order given toy Gautama via* uterine brother and then mother.
Thus the two prominent characteristics of Vijnanesvara*s 
provisions are the favourable treatment to the female heirs and
heirs taking through them and secondly, an absence of any distinc­
tion in the line of succession depending upon the kind or the source
of stridhana. Sulka alone forms an exception to the latter rule.
(1) « *Consistently with the name of his treatise Vijnanesvara deals with 
the line of heirs very briefly and after giving a short special line
of succession to stridhana he allows that line to merge into the line
a
of succession to^male's property.Con$^H*^after the husband and the 
father in approved and unapproved forms respectively the property of 
a childless woman practically devolves like male's property. Thus 
Vi j nane svara1s scheme of succession to stridhana is as simple as his 
interpretation of the word stridhana.
It is surprising to find that the two commentaries on the 
Mitaksara viz. the Subodhini and the Balambhatti do not contain any 
elaboration of the line of succession as stated in the Mitaksara.
In the case of the Subodhini it is understandable because it is a 
very concise commentary. But the case of the Balambhatti is other­
wise. Its author indulges in a long and elaborate discussion to 
show that a correct reconciliation of the smriti texts gives provi­
sions which are exactly in conformity with the Mitaksara. He also 
takes great pains to refute the reasoning of the authors of the 
Bengal school who interpret the iSSstric texts in a manner entirely
(1) ’Mitaksara1 i.e.^consisting of few syllables'. The title 
was adopted also by Haradatta for his commentary on the 
sutras of Gautama.
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different from that of Vijnanesvara. The whole discussion is very 
interesting for a Mxmamsaka hut unfortunately not very helpful to a 
lawyer who requires a detailed, systematic and precise order of 
succession. However, both the commentaries support the general rules 
in the Mitaksara. This is quite in consonance with the principle
(1)that a commentary must explain and support the .original work itself.
The other two commentaries on Yajhavalkya’s smriti are the 
Dxpakalika of &ulapani and the V1 r amitrodaya of Mitra Misra. It is 
important to note that Sulapani in his brief commentary mentions the 
son as an heir coming immediately after the daughter and not after
(2)the daughter*s daughter and daughter*s son as given by Vijnanesvara.
* (3)Mitra Misra in his Vxramitrodaya seems to thinfc likewise. This
shows that amongst the commentators of Yajnavalkya Vijnanesvara was
solitarily endeavouring to give a preference to the daughter*s dau-
(4 )ghter and daughter’s son over the son of the proposxta herself.
The next important authority in the Benares school, the 
Vriamitrodaya, is ambiguous on the point of initial order of succes- 
sion* Mitra Misra first gives three different lines of success­
ion to yautaka, anvadheya and prxtidatta together, and finally to 
the rest of strxdhana. The provisions mentioned here appear to be
(1) A txlca is like a bhasya which is defined as :
(Suytrartho varnyate yatra vakyaih sutranusaribhih /
&vapadani cha varnyante bhasyam bhasyavido viduh //
(2) Bi.ICa.on Yaj^II.117 interprets ’anvaya’ as son, son’s son etc.
(3) See Vi.Mi.(tika) on Yaj.II.145 : ”Yadi tu pratta bhavati
putraduhitrivina cha tada duhitrxnam cha taddhanam svam        * • « •
bhavati. Tadabhave cha dauhitrah.... '*
(4) See also Visvarupa and Apararka supra.
(5) This refers to the order amongst the progeny itself.
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almost an exact reproduction of the provisions of the Smritiehand-
„  (1) _
rika. He then gives also a detailed extract from the Mitaksara
(2 )
on the same topic* After mentioning both these views he gives
the best possible explanations for both these views but does not
(3)state his own preference* However as he takes much more pains to
advocate Vijnanesvara*s view it is reasonable to hold that he is in-
(4)clined to accept it. He then suddenly mentions that the order of
succession viz. daughter, daughterfs daughter, daughterfs son, and
son is accepted in the Mitaksara, Smr itichandrika, Madanaratna and
(5)the Madhaviya. He then mentions JTmuta' s view and with pungent
comments contradicts the same.^^
For succession to a childless woman*s stridhana he accepts 
the provision of the Mitaksara with the following changes, namely,
(1) See Vi .Mi. 54-6-49. For Smr. Cha* see infra. Like Bevanna Mitra,, • •
Misra also refers to an unknown author, Bevasvami, whose inter­
pretation of yautaka is quoted and contradicted in the same way 
as is done in Smr*Cha.662 - see Vi.Mi.548.
(2) Ibid pp.549-50.
(3) Ibid pp.550-51.
(4) Ibid. See also Ibid p.552 where he parenthetically mentions 
the daughter’s daughter as succeeding after the daughter accord­
ing to Yaj.II.145. However, referring to the Gautamasutra for 
preference amongst the daughters Mitra Misra quotes^apparently 
with approval, the explanation of *apratisthita* as given in 
Vya.Ka.etc., namely, childless, unfortunate, widowed etc. But 
in actually laying down the order of succession he says that 
the stridhana excluding the three categories devolves !fupon
the unstabilised daughters and in their default upon the 
stabilised daughters : upon the married daughters and in their 
default upon the widowed ones.*1 The remark is hardly consist­
ent with the explanation of ’apratisthita*. For a similar 
remark see Vi.Ta.452. The provision is reminiscent of the lav/ 
of the Bengal school. The same is the case with the explana­
tion of Brihaspati*s text. See infra.
(5) This is, of course, wrong unless he means to refer to the strid­
hana excluding anvadheya, pritidatta and yautaka.
(6) Vi.Mi.551. See his remarks ’tanmandam* and ’Tasmat sabdavyu- 
tpattyajnanamevedam•.
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that the Gandhsrva is included in the approved forms of marriage on
(1)the authority of Manu; the succession in the case of approved
forms goes to the husband's nearest heirs in default of the husband
himself. The reason for the second provision, says Mitra Misra, is
that nearness (pratyasatti) to the woman herself is included in the
nearness to the husband alone
After having severely critisised JTmuta's interpretation
of the verse of Yajnavalkya giving succession to a childless woman's
stridhana Mitra Misra refers to the ultimate heirs mentioned by
Brihaspati and gives the following order of heirs in accordance with 
( 3)it: the daughter's son, son, son's son, son's son's son, step-
I IT)
son, step-son's son, and^default of these heirs mentioned in the text 
viz. the sister's son etc. in accordance with their proximity. He 
mentions that these ultimate heirs succeed notwithstanding the exist­
ence of the other sapindas like father-in-law etc. because they have
(4)
in their favour the strength of the textual authority. The need
for such an explanation lies in the fact that the heirs mentioned by 
Brihaspati are not necessarily in order of closest proximity to the 
husband which forms the basic test both according to Vijnanesvara
(1) Manu XII.196 supra.
(2) Vi.Mi,552 : "Svamipratyasatterbhartraivantaraye bhartriprat- 
yasatteraiva puraskaranTyatvat."
(o) Vi.Mi.554. The first 'suta' according to Vi.Mi. includes step­
son amongst the heirs; the second 'suta* includes the son's 
son and the step-son's son but does not include daughter's son's 
son as he does not offer any pindas to his father's mother's 
mother. The doctrine of spiritual efficacy is thus engraved 
upon the doctrine of propinquity. On the same principle and 
to avoid the breach of ancient custom (anadivyavaharavirodha) 
step-son and his son have been placed before the sister's son 
etc.
(4) Vachanabala for which see supra p.SViM. The explanation denotes 
that these heirs succeed after the husband.
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and Mitra Misra for determining the order of succession to stridhana
I
of a childless female married in one of the approved forms. Thus 
these heirs are nominated only as an exception to the general rule 
of proximity. Another exception to this rule arises in the case of 
females, who are generally declared to be incapable of having any 
inheritance.^1  ^ So only those females who are expressly mentioned
in the smriti texts are to be accepted as heirs under the rule of
. (2) proximity.
With this Mitra Misra*s chapter on stridhana comes to an 
end. It is to be noticed that though he generally accepts the Mit­
aksara view on this point his interpretation of Brihaspati*s text 
bears a great resemblance to that of the Bengal school and is direct 
ly contradictory to the simple rule of the Mitaksara. He also in­
terprets it in such a way as to include, on the basis of spiritual
(3)efficacy, a few heirs even before the ultimate heirs. The same
is the case with his preference to married daughters as against the 
widowed ones. But so far as the Courts are concerned the VTramitro- 
daya does not mitigate the authority of the Mitaksara but only 
supplements it wherever the latter is silent; so from a judicial
point of view only those provisions of the Viramitrodaya which are
_  ( 4 )
in conformity with the Mitaksara can be accepted.
(1) But see Vi.Ta. and Vya.Ni. infra.
(2) .V/ith a typically eloquent phrase Mitra Misra says : "6rihgagr- 
ahikaya yatra kanthoktah 'patnT duhitara* ityadau yasam 
strTnan^hanadhikarastasameva.u - ^A.Bi.554. What he means to 
say is that the widow, daughter and the mother who are mention­
ed as heirs in Yaj.II.135-36 are to be accepted as heirs only 
because one is cornered by the smriti text in their favour.
(3) See Vi.Mi.554 for the reason of including step-son and step}* 
son's son and excluding the daughter's son's son.
(4) See infra.
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Kamalakara seems to be in favour of giving a joint succes­
sion to unmarried daughters and sons in all kinds of strxdhana ex-
(1)cept yautaka* He does not mentxon the further order of success­
ion. He holds succession as given in the Mitaksara to be applicable
(2)
to yautaka alone and gives the following order for the same : un- *■ 
married daughter, married daughter indigent daughter, married dau­
ghter who possesses wealth and has sons, barren or widowed daughters}
daughter’s daughters taking per stirpes, daughter’s son, son, son’s
(4)son, son's son's son, step-daughter, step-dahghter*s son, and
(1) Vi.Ta.452. The provision is similar to the one found in 
Vi.Ra. ; Vi.Chi. etc. See infra.lt \ s T1i t*
(2) Kamalakara holds all the smriti texts giving preference to a 
daughter over a son and all the opinions of authors like Vij- 
nanesvara to the same effect to be referring to yautaka - see 
the remark 'etadyautakaparam' occurring in Vi.Ta.451 and 452.
(3) Vi.Ta.452. The preference of the wealthyand the ’saputra* 
daughters is unjustifiable. Kamalakara probably follows Mitra 
Misra.
(4) The reason for the preference of step-daughter and step-daught­
er's son is based upon Manu IX.183 which declares that all wives 
of a person become the mothers of a son in case one of them 
gives birth to a son. The reason could have been better applied 
to the step-son and not to the step-daughter, as has been done 
in Vi.Mi.554. But the right of a step-son is based, according 
to ICamalakara, upon his capacity to offer pindas in default of 
the secondary sons like the ksetraja etc. - See Brihaspati and 
Katyayana quoted in Vi.Ta.454 and 467 respectively. The former 
text is cryptic and is not found in other standard commentaries. 
The latter puts both secondary sons and step-sons together. It 
is significant that although on the authority of this latter 
text Kamalakara gives a right of succession to the step-sons he 
does not express anything about the right of the secondary sons 
who could have been accepted by him under the authority of the 
same text. As he does not do what one would have naturally ex­
pected him to do in this context it appears that his abstention 
is wilful; and this obliges us to conclude that according to 
him secondary sons are not entitled to succeed to their second­
ary mother's strxdhana. The application of the doctrine of 
spiritual efficacy, therefore, does not proceed any further 
than giving the right of succession to step-children. But
see the next note.
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step-son. But he adds that the husband succeeds in default of the 
step-daughter)s son which means he succeeds before the step-son.
The inclusion of the step-children before the husband does not stand 
to reason in view of the fact that the system of succession to strid­
hana prefers heirs of one*s own body. The word *sodara* (uterine) 
which is used in the smritis quite often bears an eloquent testimony 
of this principle. Therefore step-children should logically come in 
only in default of the husband himself and only as his nearest heirs. 
Moreover the very fact that ICamalakara mentions the provision of the 
devolution of the stridhana of a lower caste woman upon her step­
daughter or step-son of a superior caste as an exception to the rule 
that a childless woman's strxdhana devolves upon the husband/2* 
proves that in other cases the husband succeeds in preference to them. 
This in its turn proves that the woman xvould be regarded as childless 
notwithstanding the existence of the step-children. Again, as he 
includes the step-son on account of his capability to offer pindas 
to the woman in default of the secondary sons like ksetraja etc. it
is incomprehensible why he should not include along with the step­
son the secondary sons as well.^^ Although unlike Vijnanesvara^4^
(1) For the order see Vi.Ta*453-54. However, ICamalakara mentions 
brother and his children before the step-daughter etc. which
means that they succeed even before the husband. Their claim
is based on their capacity to confer spiritual benefit. But 
see Vi.Ta.467 where these heirs are mentioned after the husband 
and along with the ultimate heirs mentioned by Brihaspati. The
position allocated to these heirs in Vi.Ta.454 therefore
appears to be a slip of the pen.
(2) Vi.Ta.453. For a similar statement see Vi.Mi.549.
(3) See supra Vi.Ta.454. In succession to a male's property Manu 
recognises the right of 6 out of the 12 kinds of secondary sons; 
Narada recognises the right of three; but Yajnavalkya and 
Vriddha Iiarita recognise the right of all these sons. See 
Manu IX.159-60; Na.Smr.16.17 & Na.Sam.14.16; Yaj.II.132; Vri.
Ha.VII.265-66. (4) See Mit.on Yaj.11.132.______
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(l)
and following Hemadri and Madhava etc. he declares only aurasa 
and dattaka to be heirs to a male's property he amends his proposi­
tion by admitting into the list of heirs krxta, svayamdatta and
(2) , ,kritrima on account of thexr resemblance to a dattaka. They could
equally be held to be entitled to succeed to a femalefs property as 
well. But he does not appear to be prepared to admit this. Hence 
his provisions about the position of the step-children as heirs to 
their step-mother* strxdhana sound to be self-contradictory.
In the next passage he again refers to many different texts 
and opinions of authors and settles the order as the husband and then
other heirs who are nearest to the husband in the compact series of
«* (3 )heirs given by Yajnavalkya i.e. the co-wife, step-daughter etc.
Apparently he gives this provision as the opinion of Vijnanesvara.
The whole discussion is highly confusing and unworthy of an erudite
- (4)author like Kamalakara. But after mentionxng the text of Brxhas-
pati about ultimate heirs he gives the final order as follows : Step­
daughter, step-daughter*s daughter, step-daughter1s son, step-son, 
step-son's son, husband, husband's brother, husband's brother's son, 
sister's daughter or son, husband's sister's son, husband's younger
(1) Vi.Ta.364. See Dr.J.D.M.Berrett : Adoption in Hindu Law, 
Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Teehtswissenschaft (1957) 34 at 
p.42-43. See also Saunaka cited in Apa.on Yaj.II.132 etc.
(2) Vi.Ta.364.
(3) Vi.Ta.462. The order mentioned in Yaj.II.135-36 refers to the
property of a sonless deceased male.
(4) See the discussion in Vi.Ta.454-55 continued on p.462. Probably 
this refers to the opinions of different authors and is given
by Kamalakara only to exemplify his introductory remark that
the topic of strxdhana is full of controversies amongst the 
different authors. - See Vi.Ta.437.
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brother’s son, brotherfs son, son-in-law, and husband’s younger
(1)brother* He seems to extend the same rule to the cases where the
succession goes to the mother, and then to the father so that after
the father it devolves upon his nearest heirs as determined by the
compact series of heirs viz* the step-mother, sister, step-sister 
(2)
etc. He, however, mentions that sister’s sons etc. succeed only
in default of the sister herself* As he mentions the sister and
sister’s daughter as heirs it would have been reasonable on his part
to have accepted all the female heirs corresponding to the males in
(3 )the line of ultimate heirs.
ICamalakara being the author who gives probably the most 
detailed line of succession according to the Mitaksara school it is 
lamentable that his clumsy way of stating his provisions has dis­
torted what otherwise would have been a smooth and a harmonious 
system.
(1) Vi.Ta.467. Here again ICamalakara inserts the husband's 
brother and his brother’s son before the sister’s son and 
daughter. This is again a slip of the pen as these heirs 
occur much below in the text of Brihaspati and as Kamalakara 
holds that the heirs mentioned in this text succeed in the
order of their enumeration.
(2) One interesting point ought to be noted here. In case the pro­
posita was married in an approved form it is quite reasonable
to hold, as Mitra Misra suggests, that succession devolves; in 
default of the husband, upon the nearest heirs of the husband; 
for the nearest sapindas of the woman and her husband would be 
the same. But in case the proposita was married in an unapp- 
rpved form it would be more reasonable to hold that succession 
devolves, in default of the father, upon the nearest heirs of 
the,mother and then upon the nearest heirs of the father; for 
it is quite possible that the mother of the proposita was also 
married in an unapproved form and in such case the mother’s 
nearest heirs would be her heirs in her parental family and 
not necessarily the nearest heirs of the father.
(3) Vi.Ta.467. See Varadaraja’s suggestion to this effect infra.
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As regards succession to sulka and to strxdhana of a maiden
he accepts the standard provisions of Gautama and Baudhayana respect-
. . (1) x ve ly •
The Bhagaviveka of Bhatta Ramajit who avowedly and closely 
* (2)follows Vihanesvara may be considered to be authority of the
Benares and the Bombay school* It is remarkable that this author
almost religiously follows the Mitaksara provisions about succession
to strxdhana. His affinity towards Vijnanesvara is indeed so great
that like Vijnanesvara and unlike almost all his followers Bhatta
Ramajit includes Gandharva, for the purpose of succession, into un-
( 3)approved forms. This is probably representative of the trend : j-
amongst the later authors to revert to the position of the Mitaksara 
itself by taking a leap over all the improvements, amendments and 
additions made by the intervening authors. The very fact that even 
Balambhatta who gives a detailed discussion in favour of the Mitak­
sara order of succession does not try to add a single provision him­
self supports such a conjecture.
Nxlakantha and Vijnanesvara differ from each other in 
setting out the order of succession to strxdhana in the same way in 
which they differ in interpreting the word strxdhand itself.
(1) For sulka see Vi.Ta.463; for maiden's property see Vi.Ta.
453 & 455.
(2) Like Kavikantasarasvati and Durgayya Bhatta Ramajit was one 
of those peculiar authors who wrote both their own verses and 
commentaries on such verses. They probably did so to simplify 
the enunciation of the law and to facilitate the explanation. 
The practice was, however, more common in the sphere of poetics 
rather than of law. The ms.in I.O.L. appears to have been j£ro~
£>y Colebrooke^T£fT Baroda.
(3) For provision on succession to strxdhana see Bha.Vi.f.9(b) - 
10(a). They are almost the same as those in the Mitaksara.
3^ 3
Discarding Vijnanesvara*s interpretation of Manu's verse^*^ Nxlak- 
antha gives a simultaneous right of succession to the unmarried dau­
ghters and sons in anvadheya (post-nuptial gifts) and prxtidatta
(2)(gifts from the husband). On the failure of the unmarried daughters
( 3)the married daughters ©hare equally with the sons. The author
does not mention any further order in these two categories.
As regards the rest of strxdhana NTlakantha appears to 
have accepted the Mitaksara order of succession with the following 
few amendments
(1) He accepts only indigent daughters under the word
- (4)*apratisthita*.* I •
(2) He appears to give a simultaneous succession to 
daughter*s daughters and daughter's sons and gives them a right of
+ ■ (5)succession per stirpes.
(3) He considers the Gandharva form to be an approved one
( 6 )in the case of ICsatriyas etc* to whom the j&astra allows this form.
(4) The nearest heirs of a woman in default of the husband 
and the father in approved and unapproved forms respectively are
(1) Manu IX.192 supra.
(2) Vya.Ma.157-58* He relies on Manu IX.195 supra. Although he
introduces this opinion as the one held by some others (pare) 
it is definitely followed by NTlakantha himself since his 
further provisions are based upon the acceptance of this alone.
(3) Vya.Ma.158.
(4) Vya.Ma. 159. This is identical with Mit.on Yaj.II.117 but not
on Yaj,II.145. See supra.
(5) Vya.Ma.159. Commenting on Narada's *anvaya' he says,
r’Duhitrxnamabhave duhitrisantatih." He then appears to apply
simultaneously the rule of succession per stirpes to both
daughter's daughters and daughter's sons.
(9) Vya.Ma.161.
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those who are related to the woman through these two persons and are 
in their respective families.(1)
(5) As regards the right of a brahmin step-daughter to
succeed to her step-mother1s strxdhana NxXakantha is reluctant to
(2)extend the same right to daughters of all superxor castes.
The statement made in (4) above is more &{:. the nature of
an explanation of, than an amendment to the Mitaksara provisions and
(3 )appears to be similar to the interpretation given by Kamalakara.
The above-mentioned order refers only to the so-called technical
(paribhasika) strxdhana. It would be quite appropriate, therefore,
to consider the Mitaksara order of succession in conjunction with
the above amendments as being applicable according to Nxlanantha to
all the technical property of a woman excluding her anvadheya and
prxtidatta. The same order should be made applicable to the last-
mentioned two categories in default of the married daughters and sons
(4)However, for the so-called non-technical strxdhana which 
is not strXdhana at all according to Nxlakantha, and which is
(1) Vya.Ma.161. He says that according to Manu IX.187 the nearest 
heirs of the proposita succeed. To establish the identity of 
this with the Mitaksara provision in this respect he says :
” ... tatrapi tenasyah pratyasannastatpratyasannastaddvara 
tatkule pratyasanna iti yavaditi vyakhyeyam.11 Although he 
mentions the verse of Brihaspati giving the ultimate heirs it 
is hardly of any significance in view of the above clear-cut 
explanation and because of the absence of any attempt at co­
ordination between the two provisions.
(2) Vya.Ma.159. See ’manam tu tatra chintyam” But since hs is
not flatly opposed to the Mitaksara provision he may be con­
sidered to have acquiesced in it.
(3) See supra. Kamalakara applies Yaj.II.135-36 in determining




referred to by him only as mother1s property a different order xs
(2)specified. The author says that all the above texts of Gautama
etc. which refer to succession to strxdhana and also all the texts
(3)of Manu etc. which do not directly refer to strxdhana but which
have a similar purport (i.e. those which in some way or the other
accept daughters as the first preferential heirs) are to be taken as
(4)referring to the technical property of a woman. As regards the
non-technical property of a woman the relevant text is that of 
Yajnavalkya which confers upon the sons a general rig|it of dividing
(5)
their parents1 property; hence, he says, the non-technical pro­
perty of a woman such as that acquired by labour, partition etc. is 
succeeded to only by the sons etc. notwithstanding the existence of
//i \
the daughters. The provision for 'the sons etc. only' (putradaya
eva) as being heirs is similar to that of authors of the Bengal
school who consider such property to be the husband's property and
prescribe the same order of succession to such property as to the
(7)property of a male. Moreover it has been conclusively proved that
property acquired by a woman with her own labour and gifts given to
(1) Vya.Ma. 160 : 11 Matrisvamikadhanamatran and "ParibhasikatiriktaKi ** • .
matridhanam1'.
(2) Gau.Su.28.22 supra.
(3) Manu IX.192 and IX.131 supra in which the word strxdhana does 
not occur but according to which the daughter succeeds as the 
most preferential heir and in preference to or along with the 
son.
(4) "... Gautamadivachanani paribhasikaparanyeva. Yani tu strxd- 
hanapadabhave'pi ekarthakani •••• tanyapetatparanyeva. 
Ekamulakalpanalaghavat." - Vya.Ma.160.
(5) Yaj.II.117 - Vya.Ma.160.
(6) "Tena paribhasikatiriktam matridhanam duhitrisattve putradaya 
eva lafoheran." - Vya.Ma.160. He explains non-technical pro­
perty as *vibhagakartanadilabdhaparam."
(7) See Da.Bha.Di. of Raghurama SupraII5.See also Vi.Sa.infra
ik*Ft64 p.^ 'yg,
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her by strangers constitute, according to NTlakantha, her husband's 
property. As in the above provision property acquired by a woman 
with her own labour is classified by NTlakantha with property ac­
quired by a woman by partition etc. it is clear that he wants all 
such non-technical property to devolve as if it were the husband's 
property. The inference that NTlakantha wants to treat, for the 
purpose of succession, the non-technical property of a woman as if 
it were a male1s property is supported by the fact that after giving 
the above-mentioned lines for the technical and non-technical proper­
ty of a deceased woman leaving children NTlakantha continues to 
state the line of succession to the technical property of a child- 
less woman but not to her non-technical property.^
Coming to the law of the Mithila school we find that the 
Krityakalpataru of LaksmTdhara does not help us much in ascertaining
the order of succession though it contains many of the smriti-verses 
(2)on the topic. Two suggestions are, however, to be considered
from this ancient treatise for the purpose of fixing the line of 
succession according to the Mithila school and by analogy, accord­
ing to all other Mitaksara shb-schools. The word 'apratisthita* is 
explained in this treatise as including indigent, widowed, unfortunate
(1) See Vya.Ma.160 where succession to non-technical property of 
a woman has been parenthitically introduced between the lines 
of succession to the strTdhana of a woman leaving children 
and to that of a childless woman.
(2) Vya.Ka.690-92.
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and childless daughters. The suggestion has been accepted in
the Ratnakara and the Vivadachintamani as well. Secondly, pertain­
ing to the provision about a brahmin step-daughter LaksmTdhara says
(2)
that she succeeds in default of the husband himself. This pro­
vision is given also in the Ratnakara but not in the Chintaraani and
* (3)is also contrary to the suggestion of Mitra Misra and Kamalakara.
Hence it should be discarded in favour of the latter. Moreover it
would also create a conflict in cases wherein succession devolves
(4)upon the father and his sapindas.
Visvesvarabhatta, the author of the Madanaparijata, accepts
(5)the same order as given in the Mitaksara adding the following 
particulars:-
(1) For the purpose of explaining the line of succession
in default of the husband or the father he gives the same explana-
(6)tion as the one given by Nilakantha.
(1) Vya.Ka. : "... vivahitapi nirdhanabhartrika durbhaga anapat- 
yascha.'1 The same explanation appears in Vi.Ra.517; Vi.Chi.142; 
Vi.Cha.74; Vi.Sa.f.69(a) all of which belong to the Mithila 
school. The word 1nirdhanabhartrika1 is a compound which can 
also be solved so as to mean one whose husband is poor. But 
the above translation is given in accordance with the opinion 
of Smr.Cha.; the Subhodhini; Vi.Mi.etc. However, Ma.Pa.664-65 
gives only 1 indigent*.
(2) Vya.Ka.690.
(3) See supra. They say that this is an exception to the provision 
that the property of a childless female devolves, in case she j
was married in an approved form, upon the husband i.e. such 
step-daughter succeeds before the husband. 1
(4) For, she would, by analogy, succeed after the father. But then
this would come in conflict with the provision that the father*s ;
nearest heirs succeed after him.
(5) See Ma.Pa.664-68. Although it is better to treat Visvesvara
as an authority of the Benares school he has been accepted by
their Lordships of the Privy Council as an authority of the 
Mithila school. See infra.
(6) Ma.Pa.665-67.
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(2) After the sons (which must include son's sons also)
he gives succession to the s t e p - s o n s a n d  as an exception to this
order he states that in a case where the only heirs of a woman are
her step-daughter by a co-wife of a superior caste or such daughter's
son, and a step-son by a co-wife of an inferior caste, the former
(2)
succeeds in preference to the latter. He also mentions as a
corrollary that where both the step-daughter and the step-son are 
born of the co-wives of higher caste the latter succeeds in prefer­
ence to the former. Apparently he seems to put the stepchildren
before the husband probably considering them as 'apatya* (progeny)
(4)of the woman.
Chandesvara is not very helpful in determining the order
of succession according to this school. He briefly mentions that
on the authority of Manu and Brihaspati only unmarried sisters share
(5)their mother's strXdhana with their brothers. He interprets the
sutra of Gautama as not denying the right of the sons but as admit­
ting the right of the daughters to succeed to their mother's strXd-
(1) To follow the whole point the following sequence ought to be 
noted. "Ityanvayasabdopattah putrapautraday3h kramena dhana-
bhajah...... Ya bhaginyah saksats vamatriduhitarah tadabhave
taddauhitraparyantah tadabhave sahodarah. Mritayah saksat- 
putra na sapatnXputrah... . Svaputrabhave sapatnXputradayah." 
Ma.Pa. 6€1. The word 'adayah* underlined above suggests that 
step-children also come under the term 'anvaya* so that they 
are entitled to succeed before the husband.
(2) Ma.Pa.667.
(3) Ma.Pa.668. The body-particles of the proposita can be found 
neither in the step-son nor the step-daughter; therefore 
apparently the former appears to have been given a preference 




hana.^^ This comment makes it amply clear that the sons have a 
privileged place in the mind of this author* Only as regards prXt-
idatta i.e. gifts given by the father and yautaka i.e. nuptial gifts
_ . (2) he seems to adopt the Mitaksara order of succession. Like
Vijlianesvara he also appears to regard the words ’given by the
father’ appearing in the provision about a brahmin step-daughter a©
being representative of all strXdhana. Like LaksmTdhara, however,
he puts such step-daughter after the husband. As regards succession
to the strXdhana of a childless woman he accepts almost the exact
Mitaksara order and there is nothing notable in the same. Though
( 3 )he mentions Brihaspati’s text about the ultimate heirs, he does
not make any noteworthy comment which might help us to determine the 
order of succession amongst these heirs and the heirs determined by 
the general rule of proximity to the husband or the father as the 
case may be.
Vachaspati gives almost the same provisions as given by 
* (4)Chandesvara. He does not, however, refer to the text of Brihas-• * 9 9  4
pati at all. This brings him nearer to the Mitaksara so far as 
succession to strXdhana is concerned. The Vivadachandra of Misru 
Misra and the Vivadasararnava of Sarvoru barman divide strXdhana
(1) This is, of course, perverse since the sutra, to whatever pro­
perty it may be held to apply, gives a right to the daughters 
obviously to the exclusion of the sons. It is true that it 
does not negative the right of the sons totally but does not 
anticipate the concurrent right of the sons with the daughters. 
But see Maskari1s comments supra.
(2) Vi.Ra.517-18.




into the same two categories, namely, yautaka and the rest of strxd­
hana, However, unlike the Ratnakara Prxtidatta is not, for the
(2)purpose of successxon, paxred wxth yautaka xn these two treatxses.
Most of these digests of the Mithila school mention that
in the strxdhana except yautaka the unmarried daughters and the sons
share equally with only a small portion to be given to a married
(3)daughter for the sake of maintaining her prestige. It may be
concluded, therefore, that the married daughters also should share 
with the sons in default of the unmarried ones. Such being the case,
the order of succession to this strxdhana appears to be similar to
- (4)the one given by NTlakantha in respect of anvadheya and prxtidatta.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that according to the Mithila
school the order of succession applicable to Yautaka and Prxtidatta
is the order given in respect of general strxdhana in the Mitaksara,
whereas the order applicable to the rest of the strxdhana is the
order applicable, according to the Mayukha, to anvadheya and prxti-
(5 ) *datta. About sulka and maiden1s property there is hardly any
difference in the Mitaksara sub-schools, hence the order given in
the Mitaksara may be considered as standard according to all the sub­
(1) Vi.Cha.74; Vi.Sa.f.69(b). Although in both these treatises 
only sons have been mentioned as being capable of dividing the 
strxdhana except yautaka it is evident by the context of Manu 
IX. 192 that the authors mean to give|6>an equal right to both 
the sons and daughters in it.
(2) Vi.Sa.69(a) contains an explanation of Yautaka as property given
to a woman at the time of nuptials by the father etc. The same 
explanation is given also in Vi.Chi,142. But Pitridatta is a 
more comprehensive term.
(3) Vi.Ra.516; Vi.Chi.143; Vi.Clia.75.
(4) See supra.
(5) See supra. Brihaspati*s text may be neglected here also as in 
the case of the Benares and the Bombay schools.
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schools. But although property acquired by inheritance etc. is, in
f ( 1 )this school, admitted as strxdhana by Sarvoru barman he lays down
like Nxlakantha that wealth earned by a woman with labour and gifts
given to her by strangers, belong to the husband and are divisible
( 2)by the sons alone*
Amongst the authors of the Southern School the earliest viz. 
Bharuehi is not very helpful in ascertaining the detailed order of 
succession according to this school. Apparently he does not appear 
to divide strxdhana into several categories for the purpose of pre­
scribing different lines of succession amongst the progeny them-
/ r-y \ f A  \
selves. Commenting on Manufs verse he says that both married
See supra p.Sf.
Vi*Sa.f.71(a).."Sampodhikam (?) sukausalaganasilpadito c.nyair-
yaddattam svato vanijyaya kartanadina va labdham tat patyureva.
PutraniatravifohajanXyam cha.ft (Whatever is acquired by a woman
by her good skill or by singing or with the help of any of her
arts, whatever is given to her by strangers, and whatever she
gains in business or by spinning belongs to the husband alone.
It can be partitioned by the sons only). This provision throws
some light on NXlanantha's provision as regards succession to
the so-called non-technical strxdhana. See supra.
Although he refers to Manu 9*131 and 9.195 he does not say that
the oi'der of succession given in them is limited to the kinds of
strxdhana mentioned in them, namely, yautaka in the former and
anvadheya andpritidatta in the latter. See ms.f
Manu 9.192. He also considers 9.193 to determine the order of
succession in default of the daughter, but after having quoted
the verse he simply says : ”udhanamanudhanam cheti kritaviehar-
ametat" and adds that a gift to a daughter's daughter is not
compulsory. But such a gift depends upon the quantum of the
wealth to be divided and the needs and merits of the daughter's
daughter according to Vya.Ka.688, Smr.Cha.661. Devanna and
Mitra Misra say that a daughter's daughter is entitled to a one- j
fourth share in the same way in which a daughter is entitled to j
a one-fourth share in her father's property; but they say that I
the only difference is that in the former case the share is not
compulsory whereas in the latter it is compulsory on accouht of
the sentence of denunciation (dosalcXrtana). - Smr.Cha.661-62,
Vi.Mi.547. Devanna adds that whereas in the latter case there \
#• •







and unmarried daughters succeed, though in the opinion of some
(kechit) only unmarried ones succeed; but he does not refer to the
son's right at all, implying thereby that the sons can succeed only
in default of all the daughters.
His comments on other verses are neither elaborate nor
clear. In dealing with succession to the stridhana of a childless
woman, however, he affirms the position characteristic of the Mit-
(1)aksara and he also confirms in toto the provisions we find in the
- (2)Mitaksara about a brahmin step-daughter. The very fact that
Bharuchi refrains from dividing stridhana, for the purpose of succe­
ssion, into different kinds brings him nearer to Vijnanesvara and 
his system of stridhana succession.
Another early author who may be considered to be of the
Southern School is Kavikantasarasvati• Unlike Bharuchi he is quite
unambiguous though sometimes inconveniently cryptic; but he devotes 
to this topic of stridhana succession a few lines which SnfK*
show that his provisions are in complete accord with those of the
Mitaksara.
The leading author of this school viz. Devanna, however, 
developes a system of succession quite inconsistent with that of the 
Mitaksara. He divides stridhana into three different categories :
(1) Manu IX.196-7. But he includes Gandharva in approved forms.
(2) Manu 9.198. See ms. f. *S ■ P- *
(3) Visvadarsa S.O.A.S.ms.f.5%T This author who writes both verses 
and(Els)own commentary has cleared up all the muddle created by 
the word 'anvaya1: he uses a genitive of *matri* in a long 
compound: "Maturduhitridauhitridauhitresu dhanam bhavet/ 
furvabhave parah paschat putrapautrapatisvapi// - Vis.f.57b.
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anvadheya and prxtidatta together, yautaka, and the rest of strxd­
hana. He specifies a different order of succession for each of them.
(1)Depending upon Manu and Brihaspati he declares that an­
vadheya and prxtidatta strxdhana devolve simultaneously upon the sons 
and the daughters excluding the widowed ones.(2) In yautaka, which
he interprets as nuptial gifts, he recognises the right of the un-
(3)married daughters alone. As regards the rest of strxdhana he
gives a detailed order of succession which tallies with the general
- (4)order of succession ivhich is given in the Mitaksara, except for
(1) Manu 9.192 & 195. Brihaspati : "Strxdhanam syadapatyanam 
etc.n supra. - Smr.Cha.660-1. 1Cha' is taken in the sense of
1itaretarayoga*, for the explanation of which see supra p.3^2.*
(2) Commenting upon the word fsabhartrikah1 in Katyayana1s verse 
Devanna says : "Sabhrtrika iti visesanam vidhavanivrityartham.
Na punah kanyanivrityartham, purvoktavachanavirodhat.M Smr.Cha. 
661, The reference here is to the preceding text of Brihaspati. 
Incidentally from Manu 9.195 Devanna concludes that the sheer 
existence of the children after the death of the proposita is 
the cause of their acquirement of ownership : "Evahcha asmadi- 
damavagamyate - dhanasvamina urdhvam dhanagamane dhanasvamima- 
ranant araks an a j T vanakr iy a i va dh ana grahanad i kar i t aya dharmasa- 
Btrapratipadi taj anasya svatvapattikaranamiti.11 Smr.Cha.660.
But he describes the kinds of stridhana coming under this verse 
as 'riktha* (Sma.Cha.661-662) which he himself explains, at 
another place, as property in which a person has right by birth - 
Smr.Cha.603. Compare also his remark about the right of 
daughter*s daughter supra.
(3) After having referred to the succession to the above categories } 
of strxdhana Devanna introduces Manu 9.131 by saying : f,Anyat j 
kinchit matrikam riktham apprattanameva na punah sarvasam |
duhitrisodaraprajanam bhavatxtyaha sa eva." Smr.Cha.662. J
(4) Smr.Cha.663. He introduces succession to the third category by 
saying : ‘’Evamuktam trividhavyatirxktam matrikam riktham kumarx- 5 
namakumarxnamapyapratisthitanameva, na punah sarvasam duhitrx- I 
nam ityaha Gautamah.'* - ibid 662. The words *na punah sarvas­
am1 denote only this much that all daughters do not succeed
in the first instance to the respective category of strxdhana. ; 
Otherwise there will be no heir to yautaka in default of an 
unmarried daughter - a contingency least expected by any comm­
entator. Moreover after making the same remark Devanna gives 
a detailed order of succession to the third category in default 
of unmarried and unstabilised daughters. - Smr.Cha.663-4.
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the fact that both unmarried and unstabilised daughters succeed 
together.^ ^
As regards anvadheya and prxtidatta as well as yautaka he 
does not mention the heirs next to those who have already been men­
tioned above. It is evident that the provisions mentioned above 
refer only to the first preferential heirs in the three divisions of 
strxdhana; for after having stated that only unmarried and unstabil- 
ised daughters succeed to the third division of property, i.e. the
rest of stridhana, Devanna gives a further line of succession in re-
(2)spect of such property. Accordingly, although he expressly ex­
cludes widowed daughters from sharing with brothers in succession to 
anvadheya and pritidatta such exclusion must not be taken, as most
of the leading scholars seem to think, as laying down a total denial
( 3)of a widowed daughter’s right to such property. The exclusion
denotes only a denial of her right of becoming an heir of first
(4)preference in the first division. The same is the case with
married and widowed daughters in the second division, i.e. yautaka,
and of married stabilised daughters in the third division of strld-
(5)hana. It may be suggested here that the order which is applicable
(1) Smr.Cha.663. Apparently Devanna takes ’cha* as denoting ’itare­
tarayoga1 - an interpretation put forward by the oldest commenta­
tor on the Gautamasutras i.e. Maskari and probably also by 
Bharuchi.
(2) See supra for the words ’na punah sarvasam* occuring twice in 
Smr.Cha. For including daughter’s daughter in the word ’anvaya* 
used by Yajnavalkya and Narada Devanna remarks: ’’Strigamidha- 
natvat strTrupanvaya iti cha gamyate.” The explanation brings 
him nearer to Vijnanesvara.
(3) See for instance Banerjee p.451.
(4) i.e. Anvadheya and pritdatta.
(5) It may be mentioned here that a widowed daughter is an heir of 
first preference in the third category as Devanna, following 
Apararka, includes her in *apratisthita*.
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to the third division, i.e. rest of the strXdhana, should also he 
considered as applicable to yautaka but for the exception that the 
unmarried daughters succeed in preference to the unstabilised dau­
ghters! ^ In thecase of the first division, however, it is reasonable 
to admit widowed daughters after the sons and married daughters
and in their default the succession should jointly devolve, by parity 
(9l)
of reasoning, T upon both the male and female issue of both sons and
(1) JXmutagives a right of succession to the barren and widowed
daughters in default of other daughters in yautaka andrin de­
fault of stepson's son in other/categories. See infra. But
only first alternative must be accepted in interpreting Smr.Cha. 
as unlike, Hmuta Devanna does not admit spiritual /fficacy as 
the guiding principle of determining the preferential right of
* an heir/ Moreover his interpretation of the worn 'parja* , in
Manu 9yl95 as including bp bn male and female progeny coupled
with his explanation thatyxhe existence of thy heir after the 
deatli of the proposita isr the only cause of heir's ownership 
conclusively proves /thajea widowed daughtermx&it be admitted in 
the above-mentioned1? position as praja of the proposita.
(i) The authors of the Bengal School give a right of succession to
barren and widowed daughters in default of other daughters in
yautaka and in default of a step-son's son's son in other cate­
gories. See infra; Only the first part must be accepted in 
interpreting Smr.Cha. as Devanna, unlike JXmuta, does not admit 
the principle of spiritual efficacy as iiis guiding principle. 
Moreover his interpretation of the word 'praja', in Manu IX.195; 
as including both male and female progeny of a woman, as coupled 
with his explanation that the existence of an heir after the 
death of the proposita is the only cause of ownership conclusive­
ly proves that a widowed daughter must be admitted in the above- 
mentioned position as 'praja' af a woman.
(SI) For such parity of reasoning aee Da.Bha.4.2.11 wherein Jimuta
prefers son's sons to daughter's sons because initially a son
is preferred to a married daughter; Thus the relative strength 
of tvsro heirs can be traced by judging the relative strength of 
the two nearer heirs in whose footsteps the former ones tread 
(sthanapatitva). See also Ba*Bha*4.3.37 and the commentaries 
of §finatha and Mahesvara on the same. In the present case as 
Devanna accepts the simultaneous right of sons and daughters it 
is reasonable to hold that both male and female progeny of both 
these heirs should succeed simultaneously.
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(1)daughters i.e. son's sons, daughter's daughters and daughter's sons. 
After these the order should be the same as in the case of the third 
category•
In the third category Devanna admits the Mitaksara order 
of succession with the following amendments or additions:
(a) He gives both unmarried and unstabilised daughters a 
joint right of succession.
(3)(b) lie extends per stirpes succession even to son's sons.
For this he depends upon the analogy of succession to the property
of the paternal grandfather. The analogy is, of course, hopeless,
since unlike the other case, in stridhana succession the sons and
the son's sons do not have a simultaneous right of succession and the
existence of the former completely excludes the latter. Moreover as,
according to Devanna, the physical existence of an heir after the
death of the proposita is the only cause of his or her ownership in
(4 )
such property the doctrine of representation becomes immaterial 
here since it is applicable with greater propriety to children 
succeeding simultaneously with the progeny of a pre-deceased child
(1) Son's daughter has not been included in this group as she 
appears to have been excluded in all the commentaries: this is 
striking and the reason may be that females were expected to 
inherit only sampradayika for which see supra
(2) Smr.Cha.663. This is quite in consonance with the natural con­
struction of Gau.Su.28.22. Both Vi j nanes vara and JTmuta arti­
ficially interpret 'cha' so as to include stabilised and married 
daughters respectively. See Mit.on Yaj.2.143, Da.Bha.3.2.23 
and the explanation of j§rxkrisna. Achyuta commenting on the 
passage specifically repudiates a suggestion that 'cha' denotes
'samuchchaya': he incorrectly ascribes this opinion to Chand-






(1)upon a fiction that such pre-deceased child exists at the time of
the death of its parents and takes its own share.
forms of marriage
(c) He includes the Gandharva form among the approved
(2)
(d) Depending on Katyayana and Yama, he says that where a
woman is married in one of the three unapproved forms property which 
is given to her by her father, mother, brother, etc. (and not all
of these heirs even this property goes to the husband himself in
reasoning that stridhana should preferentially devolve upon those
(5)who have given the same.
(1) Thus in succession to the paternal grandfather1s property 
notwithstanding the existence of the sons, the sons of a pre­
deceased son come in simultaneously with the sons as heirs.
(2) Smr.Cha.664, Pa.Ma.673, Sa.Vi.385, Da.Slo.f,40(b). Durgayya 
however says that the Gandharva form is included in the case 
of Ksatriyas etc.
(3) Smr.Cha.664-5. For this conclusion Devanna depends upon the 
verses of Katyayana and Yama and explains the word *pradiyate * 
in the latter*s verse as : ’’pitreti seso dristavyah." Durgayya 
supports this conclusion (Da.Slo.f.42a 8c b) and gives the order 
as the father and then the mother. Alternatively he suggests 
that the father and mother are individually preferential heirs 
in that part of the property which is given by them individual­
ly. He emphatically suggests that even in the case of unappro­
ved forms the parents get nothing except property given by their 
family. - Da.Slo.42b-43a.
(4) Smr.Cha.665 : ”Evam pitrivyabhratrimatuladibandhudattam stri- 
dhanam sati sambhave pitrivyadibandhunam, anyatha bharturevet- 
yasuradisu avagantavyam.,f This is a unique statement for it 
suggests that even in unapproved forms the wife does acquire 
some kind of *sapindya* with the husband. See infra.
(5) See supra also Smr.Cha.667 : !,Sesesu dhanadataiva. ** Seecdjo
(3)her property) devolves upon the mother, father, etc. In default




(e) He explains Brihaspati1s texts as giving heirs who
are entitled to succeed, in order of enumeration, to the property 6f>
their secondary mothers (gaunamatri). He then remarks : "In the
same way alone (evameva), the progeny of a co-wife should succeed to
the property of their subordinate mother in default of her own
progeny or h u s b a n d . T h e  analogy shows that the above heirs also
(2)succeed only in default of the husband.
(f) As an exception to the above rule the Brahmin step­
daughter and her issue (santati) succeed to the property of their
(3)
step-mother before the husband etc. But the rule is not applic­
able to a case where both the co-wives are equal, namely, in Devanna1s 
words, of the same caste as that of^the husband. In such case the
husband is the heir in approved forms and the giver of the property
(4)(dhanadata) in the rest of the forms.
The provision about the sisterfs son etc. and the step­
children raises an interesting question as to whether an adopted 
son also is entitled to inherit. Moreover the authors of the 
Mitaksara School have left uncertain the exact relative location of
(1) Smr.Cha.666; Almost the same words repeated in Sa.Vi.386; 
that they succeed in order of enumeration is accepted also in 
Pa.Ma.374-75. But see Varadaraja and Durgayya infra.
(2) But see the Bengal law which puts step-son etc. before the 
husband.
(3) Smr.Cha.666.
(4) Smr.Cha.666-67. The rule that in unapproved forms the giver 
of property is the heir has only one exception: in laying 
down succession to sulka Devanna says : "Taddataro varadayah, 
tesam datritve1 pi taddhanam na bhavati." - Smr.Cha.665. See 
also’Pa.Ma.373 etc.
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all these Subsidiary1 sons^^ in the line of succession. An
attempt to fix their relative positions will be made below. However,
it must be noted here that according to all the authors of this
School these subsidiary sons succeed after the husband - a fact which
shows that they do not treat these sons as the issue (praja) of the 
(3)woman herself. Secondly, it ought to be noted that the adopted
son who holds an important place in succession to the male’s pro­
perty has no place whatsoever as a son in succession to strxdhana.
For the word ’sahodara’ (uterine) as used by Manu and as explained
by all the commentators would preclude anybody except the woman’s
(4)own natural descendants from being included in her ’progeny*.
Moreover while discussing the order of succession to strxdhana none
of the commentators of the Mitaksara School except Durgayya appears
(5)to have condescended to consider the position of an adopted son. 
Therefore so far as the law of the Mitaksara School is concerned the 
adopted son could come in as an heir only after the husband, if at
u t i p M W i  'T in  I I . ,  ii . i i r t i  iii m  m i n i      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
all.
(1) The expression has been comprehensively used here to include 
the twelve kinds of sons mentioned by Manu etc., the secondary 
sons of a woman mentioned by Brihaspati and step-son as well.
(2) The only probable exception is thqt of Varadaraja and Durgayya, 
see infra.
(3) This is quite in consonance with the etymological meaning of 
the word ’praja’ which can denote only natural children. As 
against this see the useful but fanciful etymological explana­
tion of the word ’putra' which carries a spiritual tint : 
’’Punnamno nar akat t ray at a iti. .. ” - See Vis .Smr. 15.43; Manu IX. 
138; the Ramayana 11.107.12; Brihaspati quoted in Vi.Ra.584.
(4) Manu 9.192. ’Sodara* is intentionally used by other authors 
also to denote heirs by blood-relationship - Gau.Su•28 .26 , 
Baudhayana quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.146, &ankha quoted by 
Haradatta on Gau.Su.28.22, Visnu quoted in Sa.Vi.384.
(5) But see Dugayya infra.
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Varadaraja is not helpful in ascertaining the general line
of succession as he quotes all the diverse texts without developing
(1)any apparent systematic connection amongst them. But his explana­
tion of Brihaspati*s text about ultimate heirs cites several opinions 
which show the diverse attempts made by several authors to incorpor­
ate in some way or the other the provisions of Brihaspati*s text 
into the Mitaksara order. Varadaraja himself says that these heirs
(2)
do not succeed so long as a sapinda up to the fourth degree exists.
By implication he means to suggest that they succeed in the order 
of enumeration after the sapindas of the husband or father. On the 
other hand, he expresses an opinion of * others* that the husband*s 
younger brother, husband*s brother's son and the husband's sister's 
son should succeed after the husband in cases wherein the succession^ 
devolve uppn the husband or his heirs and that the woman's own 
sister's son, her brother's son and her son-in-law should succeed 
after the father in cases wherein the succession^devolve upon him 
or his heirs; these are to succeed not in the order of enumeration 
in the text but in the order mentioned above which depends upon
their relative superiority in the form of proximity (pratyasattyat-
/• (3)isaya) to the proposita.
(1) See Vya.Ni.462-468.
(2) Vya.Ni.472, This means that an adopted son as well as a step­
son and many other heirs succeed before the secondary sons.
By implication, of course, the word 'sapinda* denotes sapindas 
of the husband in approved forms and of the father in unapproved 
forms. But then in the latter case the husband's younger 
brother etc. would succeed before the husband himself. Were 
it not for the doctrine of spiritual efficacy this is most 
unreasonable; but Varadaraja does not adopt that doctrine as 
his guiding principle in determining succession to stridhana.
(3) Vya.Ni.472.
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The second interpretation appears to be the most attractive
attempt to solve the problem. Unfortunately it is supported by none
-  (1)else except Durgayya. In the Southern School itself Devanna,
Madhava and Fratapa Rudra hold that these peculiar heirs succeed in
(2 )the order of enumeration. The authors of the Benares and the
Bombay Schools hold likewise. Therefore the explanation given by 
the majority of the influential authors must be held, from a practi­
cal standpoint, to be more acceptable than an intelligent explana­
tion given by a non-influential minority.
Another bright suggestion made by Varadaraja is that the 
word *svasrxyadyah1 occurring in Brihaspati*s text should denote 
both male and female heirs like the sister*s son and daughter etc.
though Varadaraja is by no means solitary in making suggestions to
(3 )include ’extra1 female heirs. He mentions, however, the opinion
of ‘others’ who depend on the Vedic declaration of women being
(1) See infra.
(2) Smr.Cha.666, Pa.Ma.374, Sa.Vi.386; Vi.Mi. Sc Vi.Ta. supra.
(3) Vya.Ni.472 ; "Svasrxyadya ityapatyamatrapratyayena apatya- 
matrapratxteh strxnam purusanam cha day as amb an dh o yukta iti 
(kefehit)." The word 'kechit* occurs in some of the mss.of 
Vya.Ni. But it is definitely not the opinion of others but 
of Varadaraja himself as the text : "Women,being devoid of 
organs,are incapable of having any inheritance" which some 
others cite against the above opinion (see infra) has been 
rendered latterly harmless by Varadaraja by interpreting the 
word ’indrya* as ’soma* (see supra). So this progressive op­
inion is of the author himself; otherwise, both the views 
would be of some persons other than the author himself. In 
later times there appears to have been a tendency to include 
more female heirs. The tendency is definitely more common in 
the South. See Da.Slo.4-3a wherein the Purvapaksin suggests 
that in succession to sulka the word ’sodaryanam* should in­
clude both uterine sisters and brothers - an objection fehieh 
is very meekly met with in the same way in which Varadaraja*s 
opinion has been countered by his opponents (see below).
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incapable of inheritance and conclude that only males could be in-
Cl)eluded as heirs.
Incidentally the commentary of Durgayya on this text may
be considered from another point of view. It probably is the most
extensive and the logical amongst the available commentaries on the
texts of Brihaspati; Durgayya discusses the implications of the
texts in a typically Mxmamsaka way of giving both the prima facie
(2)
and conclusive views. The commentary is on the eighth verse of
the Dayadasas1okx which makes it amply clear that these two sets of 
heirs mentioned in the intelligent explanation given above succeed 
according to that order after the husband or father. Durgayya inter­
prets this verse in conformity with Brihaspati*s text. But the
Puravapaksin, referring to this latter text, says that notwithstand-
(3 )ing this text the general rule of Apastamba in connexion with 
succession to males viz. in the absence of son the next nearest 
sapinda should succeed should be made applicable to strxdhana succes­
sion as well; for in the first place, he points out that the
daughter, husband or father are not mentioned in Brihaspati*s text
(&)at all so that if the order given in the text is followed the
sister * s son etc. would succeed directly in default of the son and
(1) Vya.Ni.463 : *'Anye tu strxpumsasadharanatidese? pi pumsy^va 
prathamam pratxtyudayat tasmat striyo nirindriya iti arthavad- 
adarsanachcha purusanameva daysambandho na strxnam iti 
manyante. *’
(2) The standard definition of an adhikarana is:- 
Visayo visaya^chaiva purvapaksastatho11arah/
Nirnayascheti panchangam sastre*dhikaranam smritam//.
(3) Apa.Dha.Su.2.14.2 : ,fPutrabhave yah pratyasannah sapindah.”
(4) 1Yathasrutharthagrahana* - see infra.
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daughter's son and that such an arrangement would contradict the 
provisions of Gautama and Yajhavalkya in the daughter's favour; 
secondly, he says that the adopted son etc. would not be comprehend­
ed by the word 'aurasa' which occurs in the text. So to avoid the 
logical absurdity of following the order as mentioned in the text
(yathasrutharthagrahanasya anupapannataya) the succession should de-
(2)volve upon the next nearest sapinda (of the husband or the father 
as the case may be). So much for the imaginery Purvapaksin's case.
Durgayya replies that the rule given by Apastamba as well 
as the one given by Manu applies only to a male's property and has 
no connection whatsoever with stridhana, since the daughter succeeds 
to the latter despite the existence of an aurasa son himself. As 
for the second argument of the Purvapaksin, he says that the word 
'aurasa* in Brihaspati's verse should be taken as denoting the im­
portance of the aurasa son in the first instance but also as includ­
es)ing other sons as well. Apparently, therefore, he seems to under
(4)stand the adopted son as comprehended within the word aurasa. 
Durgayya adds that these secondary sons viz. Sister's sons etc. have
(1) Gau.Su.28.22, Yaj.2,117 etc.
(2) For the whole prima facie view see Da.Slo.f.40a-41a.
(3) Aurasa, he says, is for 'pradhanyakhyapanartha'.
(4) It may be stated here that, according to the Mitaksara sub­
schools, at least for the purpose of succession, a woman's st< 
son cannot be included in this list of 'gaunaputras' who are 
usually referred to by the earlier author as 'ksetrajadi* and 
by the later as 'dattakadi'; for a man's brother's son, al­
though declared by Manu and others to be equal to a son, does 
not succeed to his uncle's property as a son. The provisions 
by which a step-son and a brother's son are declared to be
equal to a son of a woman and a man respectively are very
similar. See infra.
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been specifically mentioned as heirs in succession to stridhana, and
that therefore it is better to determine the order of succession
amongst them only by examining their relative proximity rather than
to choose the next heir from the sapindas by depending upon the
principle given by Manu and Xpastamba. ^ ^^
All this discussion shows that there was a trend amongst
some of the authors to create for a female a cadre of secondary sons
similar to those created for a male. But whereas secondary sons of
(2)a male owed their existence to the doctrine of spiritual benefit 
secondary sons of a female could claim a special right merely on 
account of their proximity to the proposita. On account of lack of 
unanimity amongst the different authors, however, Brihaspati*s text 
has practically to be discarded in determining the order of success­
ion according to the Southern School or any other Mitaksara sub­
school. The valuable suggestion of Durgayya, therefore, cannot be
to
adopted in practice. His suggestion, however, admit ; the adopted
A
(3 )son within the word 'aurasa' is helpful in placing him before the 
step-children though after the husband.
Madhava and Pratapa Rudra on the whole follow the
(1) nAta strxdhanavisaye evahatya yesam dhanapraptirukta tesameva 
sannipate pratyasattivasena paurvaparyakalpana nyayya.*' Da. 
Slo.41a. See also 42a. The words *tesameva* are not intended 
to exclude the secondary sons * dattakadi' but to ward off the 
suggestion of the Purvapaksin that after the husband etc. the 
nearest sapinda should succeed. Bee also JXmuta repudiating 
the same suggestion, infra. For complete arguments of Durgayya 
against the prima facie view see Da.Slo.f.43a*42a.
(2) See Manu XX.180 etc.
(3) For an exactly similar suggestion see Raghunandana and 
&rxkrisna infra.
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Mitaksara provisions'1  ^ though the latter notes that the opinion of
Vijnanesvara is contradictory to that of Somesvara, Apararka and 
(2) «Bharuchi. Durgayya gives a system of succession which largely
resembles the order given in the Mayukha or the Smritichandrika.
He prescribes the Mitaksara order of succession for yautaka which,
( 3 )according to him means property obtained from the parents* family;
but he gives a joint right of succession to sons and unmarried
daughters in stridhana obtained from the husband's family. He divides
(4)stridhana into these two categories only and gives these two lines
of succession. Like Devanna he confirms that even in a case where a
woman is married in an unapproved form, only that property which was
obtained from the parents' family goes to them; in the cases of
approved forms the husband takes all stridhana irrespective of the
(5)source from which it came. Like NTlakantha he regards self-
( 6 )
acquired property as not stridhana and states that sons alone
(7)succeed to that property. The similarity between the words of
the provisions of Durgayya and NTlakantha tends to fortify our
(1) Pa.Ma.370-74, Sa.Vi.383-86.
(2) Sa.Vi.383.
(3) Da.Slo.f.39a : "Evambhutam pitrikulapraptam stridhanam sauday- 
ikasabdena yautakasabdena chochyate." See also 38b. The same 
interpretation is given by some of the authors of the Mithila 
School and by Madhava - Pa.Ma.372. See also supra.
(4) An inclination to divide stridhana into categories viz. that 
obtained from the father's family and that obtained from the 
husband's family, is clearly seen amongst the Southern authors. 
They prescribe the Mitaksara succession for the first category 
and give a joint succession to sons and daughters in the latter. 
See Vya.Ni.463; Pa.Ma.372; Da.Slo.37a-39b. In Pa.Ma. such 
arrangement is introduced as an alternative interpretation.
(5) Da.Slo.38a & b.
(6) Da.Slo.38a-38b.
(7) Da.Slo.f.39fo : "Matuh silpapraptam dhanam putra eva grihniyuh.n 
For similar wording of the Bengali authors see supra.'P-’&SS-
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previous conclusion that according to the Mayulcha such property has 
the same succession as the one prescribed for male's property, since 
it is possible that Durgayya had NTlakantha before him and understood 
him in this sense.
After having referred to all these authors and their di­
verse opinions one cannot exactly establish the sastric law of what 
is known as the Southern School. In the absence of a conscensus of 
opinion among them one cannot but turn to the celebrated commentary 
of Vijnanesvara in order to ascertain, for practical purposes, the 
law of the 'Southern School'.
By contrast the authors of the Bengal School are outstand­
ing in giving a detailed line of succession and in substantiating 
the details with the help of MImamsa and the doctrine of spiritual 
efficacy. But for any textual authority to the contrary, JTmuta 
depends entirely upon the doctrine of spiritual efficacy and his 
technique is carried to perfection by his followers who support or 
supplement his conclusions with the help of additional mimamsaka 
arguments. Unfortunately JXmuta himself is ambiguous at some places 
and such obscurity has caused confusion amongst his followers making
the law of the Bengal School itself appear dubious at certain points.
-  (1)JTmuta mentions in the beginning the texts of Manu,
( 2 ) . ( 3 )Brihaspati and &ankha and concludes therefrom that the uterine
(T) Manu 9.192. — —  —  —  —
(2) ' StrTdhanam tadapatyanam etc.* supra. f5* "£30 -
(3) 'S amain sarve sodaryah etc.' supra. 3 18-J9-
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sons and maiden daughters succeed simultaneously and equally to their
(1)mother1s stridhana. This provision apparently refers to all
stridhana excepting yautaka and pitridatta for which JTmuta lays
(2)down different orders of succession. He explains that ’cha* in
( 3)Manufs verse denotes 'itaretarayoga* and then comments that the
(4)
same word *cha' in all the above quotations denotes 'samuchchaya1.
To satisfy a person who might object to such a comprehensive inter-
(5)pretation of * cha1 he quotes Devala who is more clear in giving
(q }
simultaneous succession to uterine sons and daughters. The word
(7'apatya* in Brihaspati*s text has been explained as *putraf or son. 
Achyuta and &rikrisna explain : as persons of doubtful sex are ex­
cluded and as the maiden daughter is mentioned separately in the text 
the word 'apatya' can mean son onlyd8  ^ Achyuta adds that on account 
of the word * uterine* (sahodara) ksetraja and other sons cannot share
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.1-5. See also Da.Ta.42; Da.Kra.Sam.24; in the 
latter treatise it is clearly mentioned that the order applies 
to ayautaka stridhana.
(2) See infra.
(3) Da.Bha.4.2.2 : "Dvandvasravane * pi tattulyarthakachakarena..."
(4) Bha.4.2.5 : "Chakarasrutischa sarvatranugata samuchchayavach- 
ika.u But itaretarayoga and samuchchaya are not the same 
thing. See supra.p.^hSL*
(5) For instance a person might say that 1cha* in Gau.Su.28.22
should give a simultaneous succession to unaffianced and be-
brothed daughters or that 'cha* in Yaj.2.135 should give a
simultaneous succession to a widow and daughter as well - See
Mahesvara and &rTkrisna on Da.Bha.4.2.5.
* • ♦
(6) Da.Bha.4.2.6 : "Samanyam putrakanyanam etc." supra.
(7) Da. Bha.4.2.4.
(8) The presumptuous way in which persons of doubtful sex (lit. 
impotent) are held to be excluded from stridhana succession 
shows that persons who are disqualified from getting a share
in joint family property or from inheriting male's property are 
also excluded from stridhana succession according to the Bengal 
school.
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equally with the daughter but get a one-fifth share as in the ease
of a malefs property. &rXkrisna refers to this as opinion of
'some people' and apparently suggests that a dattaka should share
(2)
equally with the maiden daughter. The opinion of Achyuta gives
(3)a right of succession even to illegitimate children The rights 
of an adopted son and illegitimate children will be discussed later 
on at an appropriate stage. But since the textual authority is in 
favour of a uterine brother only the introduction of an adopted son
(1) Achyuta : "Atra sahodarapadadyupadanat ksetrajadXnam na duhit- 
risamamsita kintu du h i t r ape k,fi <*y a pah c h am a dy am sab ha g i t a i va 
pumdhanavaditi bhavyam." For the rights of Ksetraja etc. in 
competition with an aurasa son wherein the former get, accord­
ing to their caste, one-third, one-fifth, or one-sixth share 
see Da.Bha.10.8-11.
(2) He repeats the remark of Achyuta with slight modification :
"Atra sahodarapadadyupadanat kanyasattve dattakadXnam nadhik- 
arah duhitrapeksaya pah c h amady am s a bha gi t a pumdhanavaditi 
kechit." The full-stop which occurs after the xvord 'adhikarah' 
in the Calcutta edition (1863) is wrong and confusing. The 
full-stop (danda) does not occur in the Calcutta DevanagarX 
edition (1827 Education Press p*128). The latter edition also 
is replete with misprints and arbitrarily gives a full-stop 
after the word 'upadanat' though this latter mistake is less 
confusing. Actually SrXkrisna finds himself unable to agree 
with Achyuta since in accordance with the later theory he feels 
that an adopted son is equal to a natural-born son : he in­
cludes the former in the word 'aurasa' - see infra Da.Bha. 
4.3.29-34. In this passage both Raghunandana and iSrikrisna 
expressly admit the right of an adopted son to inherit his 
adoptive mother's property. So it is impossible to maintain 
that the latter wants, in the passage above-mentioned, to deny 
the right of the adopted son - a suggestion which could be put 
forth only with the aforesaid misprint in the Calcutta 1863 
edition. In that he is really discussing a different point, 
namely, whether an adopted son has a right to succeed simultane­
ously with a daughter to his adoptive mother's strXdhana, and
if so, what could be his share.
(3) See the word 'ksetrajadi* used by Achyuta as against the word 
*dattakadi* used by orxkrisna. Compare also Da.Bha.10.8 with 
Da.Kra.Sam.52 (Setlur's translation 7.23,* the translation, how­
ever^ contains a mistake : read 'adopted son etc.' instead of 
'adopted sons' as given in the translation).
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must be regarded as an innovation by the later authors who probably
based their view on custom and public opinion,
JTmuta rejects the possibility that a maiden daughter
should have a preferential right in all of her mother's stridhana;
he says Manu's special provision^^ in that case would be useless.
On failure of both sons and maiden daughters the succession devolves
upon married daughters who have male issue or are likely to have male 
(3 )issue, because they are capable, according to his peculiar
theory, of conferring spiritual benefit through their sons. JTmuta
then confers the right of succession upon the son's son and the
daughter's son successively; the former excludes the latter since
the existence of a son excludes a married daughter and the above two
(4)heirs are sons of these two latter heirs.
He then mentions that in default of all heirs up to the
daughter's son barren and widowed daughters succeed because they
constitute the progeny (praja) of a woman and that other heirs like
the husband etc. hava a right to succeed only in default of the
(5)progeny of a woman. In short JTmuta who has postponed the right
(1) Manu 9.131 supra.
(2) Da.Bha.4.2.7.
(3) Da.Bha.4.2.9; Da.Ta.42; Da.Kra.Sam.25, &rTkrisna explains that 
the expression 'married daughter' (udha) gives both affianced 
and married daughters a simultaneous right. So the expression 
'maiden daughter' in Da.Bha.4.2.7 can include only unaffianced 
daughters.
(4) Da.Bha.4.2.10-11; Da.Ta.43; Da.Kra.Sam.25.
(5) Da.Bha.4.2.12 : "Uktanam tu sarvesam dauhitraparyantanamabhave 
vandhyavidhavayorapi matridhanadhikarita tayorapi tatprajatvat 
prajahhave cha anyesam adhikarat." See also ®a.i'a.42 and Da. 
Kra.Sam.26 for similar reasoning though some additional heirs 
are admitted before these daughters.
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of barren and widowed daughters by applying the test of spiritual
efficacy has at last to admit them as heirs only because the texts
£|re in their favour. Most scholars and judges have formed a
mistaken notion about this provision which, they vehemently maintain,
shows that JXmuta adds some heirs on the ground of natural affection
(2 )and does^invariably follow the test of religious efficacy.
Really speaking he admits them only because his hands are tied by 
the texts which he has followed, whereas he tries to damage the 
position of these daughters by admitting several other heirs before 
them on the ground of spiritual efficacy.
This is the progeny which JXmuta has described and in de­
fault of which the succession, according to Bevala’s text, is to de­
volve upon the husband etc. But the commentators &rXnatha, Rainabh- 
adra and 6rxkrisna add that the word 1 progeny1 (praja) includes son,
daughter, step-son, son’s son, daughter’s son, son’s grandson, step-
(3)son’s son and step-son’s grandson. This detailed enumeration has
obviously been brought about with the help of the doctrine of 
spiritual efficacy. JXmuta himself admits in a later passage the
(1) In the above passage he obviously refers to the text of Devala 
which appears in the immediately preceding context. See also 
Manu 9.196-97 and Yaj.2.143 supra.
(2) See for instance Banerjee p.476-77 which has been almost uni­
formly followed. See infra. ^
(3) SrXkrisna on Da.Bha.4.2.6 : ’’Aprjayamiti. Praja santatih. 
Putra-duhitri-sapatnxputra-pautradauhitra-prapautra-sapatnX- 
pautraprapautrarahitayamityarthah.” Srxnatha and Ramabhadra 
make the same remark but for the fact that the commentary of 
the former reads *dauhitrapautra’ instead of ’pautradauhitra’. 
That appears to be a misprint. The enumeration may fairly be 
considered to be in order of succession though it is not ex­
pressly stated to be so. But as regards the step-son's lo­
cation according to &rxkrisna see infra.
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(1)right of a step-son to succeed as a son of his step-mother. The
aforesaid detailed enumeration is quite remarkable since it mentions
the step-son before the daughter's son - an opinion expressed by
JXmuta and rejected by almost all his followers including SrXkrisna
himself. The point will be discussed later on. It may be mentioned
here that both Raghunandana and &rXkrisna mention that a son's son's
(2)son succeeds in preference to barren and widowed daughters and
SrXkrisna in his Dayakramasangraha puts the step-son, step-son's
( 3)sons, and steprson’s son's son before such daughters. The authors
have consistently followed their master's principle in supplementing
the line of succession given by him.
As regards the texts of Gautama, Manu, Yajnavalkya,
(4)Katyayana, Narada, etc. which prefer the daughter as the first
heir to strXdhana, JXmuta explains that these texts apply to the
(5)devolution only of the yautaka strXdhana of a woman. From the
etymological meaning of the root-verb 'yu* he interprets yautaka to
( 6 )mean property obtained by a woman during her nuptials. The verb
Da.Bha.4.3.32-33. Para.No.33 has been doubted by some 
scholars and judges as being spurious. See infra.
Da.Ta.43, Da.ICra.Sam.25.
See his summary in his commentary on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42, Da.ICra. 
Sam.25-26, &rXkrisnakanta &arma in his commentary on Da.Bha. 
4.3.40-42 admits this order. He is the last commentator on 
the Dayabhaga. But for other Bengali authors who have written 
independent treatises during the British era see infra.
Gau.su.28.22, Manu 9.131, Yaj.2.117, Katyayana: Maturduhit- 
aro'bhave ...etc.
Da.Bha.4.2.13 , Da.ICra.Sam.21, Da.Ta.43-44.










'yu' is actually used both in the sense of mixture and severence.
The older commentators like Medhatithi and others adopted the latter
meaning and interpreted yautaka to mean a woman*s separate property
(2)i.e. strxdhana. In one of the verses of Yajnavalkya » which
incidentally appears to be the only reference in smarta literature
(3 )to yautaka besides that made by Manu - the word appears to have been 
used with the same etymological sense viz. property which is kept
(4)
separate. A slightly different meaning has been attributed to
the same word by the very ancient author, Devasvami, who takes re­
sort to the same meaning of the root, but says that yautaka means 
property obtained by a woman from her father's family and kept
( 5)
separate from property obtained by her from the husband's family.
Some authors of the Mithila School as well as Madhava and Durgayya 
appear to have followed the lead of this author. JXmuta appears
to be almost the first author to adopt the first meaning of the root 
and to interpret yautaka as nuptial property. For further elucida-
(1) Vi.Mi.548 : "Yautakasabdasyamisranamapyarthah. Yumistanami- 
sranayoriti dhatupathat yutasiddjiaviti prayogachcha iti Devas- 
vamyaha." But see Nighantu quoted both in Smr.Cha.662 and Vi. 
Mi.548 which proves that the word yautaka was since then used 
to denote nuptial gifts. Another reading of yautaka is yautuka: 
see Amarakosa quoted in Vi.Mi.548.
(2) See Medhatithi and Sarvajnanarayana on Manu 9.131. Apparently 
Vijnanesvara also must have understood the word in the same way.
(3) Manu 9.131.
(4) Yaj.2.149. Mit.: H . . .yautakaih prithakkritaili . ..11
(5) Devasvami quoted and repudiated in Smr.Cha.662 and Vi.Mi.54-8.
The woi*k of this author does not appear to be available. The 
girl who brought property from her father's family must have 
been unwilling to mingle it either with her husband's joint 
family property or with the property given by him - in the 
former case she would have lost all her right to the property, 
in the latter she minimised her moral right to prevent her 
husband from misapplying her property.
(6) See supra p.'31*0 ^ Pa.Ma.372, Da.Da.Slo f.39a, see also Haradatta 
on Gau.su.28.22.
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tion he also quotes the mantras which are chanted at the time of the
marriage ceremony for the purpose of bringing about the physical
(1)union of the bride and bridegroom. It is remarkable to note that
almost all the authors of the Bengal as well as of the other schools
with the exceptions noted above have followed the lead of JXmuta in
interpreting yautaka as nuptial property. It may be noted that in
this latter sense it represents only that category of strxdhana
which is known as adhyagni although it includes in fact property
(2)given at any time during the nuptial ceremony.
JXmuta includes the text of Vasistha in the same group by
—  (3)preferring the reading parinayya instead of parinahya. During
(4)
the same discussion he refers to Manu*s provision about a brhhmin
daughter and says that the property given by the father, even if it 
is not given at the nuptials, devolves upon the daughter alone and 
that the word *brahmani* is a mere *anuvada'. Alternatively he 
suggests that lest the term ’brahmani* be rendered meaningless it 
may be held that the brahmin step-daughter should inherit the pro­
perty of the ksatriya and other step-mothers who have died childless
and that the succession should not directly devolve upon the husband
(1) See Da.Bha.4.2.14, Da.Ta.44, Vi.Mi.548.
(2) While explaining yautaka Kaghunandana in his Dayatattva says: 
’’Farinayanakalah parinayanapurvaparibhutakalah sa cha vriddh- 
israddharambhapatyabhivadananto Vivahatattve vivritah/ - 
Da.TaJik
(3) Da.Bha.Qf*. 2.15. But see Balambhatta on Mit.on Yaj.2.145 who 




(1)etc. From the context of the passage it xs obvious that he wants
to prescribe the same order of succession for such property as for 
yautaka. But the alternative interpretation as well as the reason­
ing given for this second alternative make the passage highly enig­
matical. The word *anuvada* has been translated by some as
( 2 )
* illustrative *. It actually means an arthavada (an explanatory
statement) which is a bare statement of fact that can be an object
( 3 )of direct perception. Hence in the Sastra it may denote some-
(4)thing which xs superfluous or useless*
The provisions contained in the Dayabhaga are simply re- 
(5)peated in the Dayatattva and it is not easy to determine whether
these provisions refer to all the property given by the father viz. 
to property whether given before the marriage, at the time of
11 " se.1 r ' '   * — - -
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.16. The whole, which has given rise to lengthy dis­
cussions amongst the commentators on Jxmuta is as follows:- 
t’Atra pitra dattamiti visesana.t vivahasamayadanyatrapi yat 
pitridattam tat kanyaya evetya*tadartham, brahmanxpadamnchanu- 
vadah. Yadva brahmanipadasyanarthakyabhayat ksatriyadistrin- 
amanapat yanam pitridattam dhanam sapatniduhita brahmani kanya 
haret na punaraprajastridhanam foharturiti vachanasyavakasa iti 
vachanarthah.
(2) See Setlurfs translation of Da.Bha.4.2.16 wherein the word
1 illustrative1 has been explained in the brackets as * indicating 
that a daughter of the same caste with the giver inherits* See 
also Da.Kra.Sam•(text p.27) translation 2.5.5. Banerjee (p.483) 
adopts the above translation.
(3) The arthavadas are of thcee kinds: ,!Virodhe gunavadassyat 
anuvado * vadharite/ B h u t ar t h avad a s t a d dli ana t art h ava das t r i dha 
m^tah//" The three kinds are illustrated by the following 
instances: ’’Agnirhimasya bhesajam” ; "Adityo yupah"; HVajrali­
as t ah Furandarah*1 respectively. The first one is prmanantar- 
agochara, the second is pramanantaraviruddha and the third is 
pr amanant arat T t a .
(4) For the utility of arthavada from the sastric point of view see 
Jai.su.supra. See Golapchandra Sarkar: Hindu Law sixth edition 
p.20 where the word anuvada has been taken to mean superfluous.
(5) Da.Ta.44-45
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marriage or after the marriage. In the Dayakramasangraha &rxkrisna
give© the order as maiden daughter, married daughter who has or is
likely to have male issue and then remarks that in default of all
the daughters the sons etc. succeed in the same order as to yautaka.
He also definitely states that this order applies to pitridatta
(I)whether it is yautaka or ayautaka. In their commentaries on the
Dayabhaga, however, Srxkrisna apparently, and Srxkrisnakanta de­
finitely, maintain that such special order of succession is applic­
able to pitridatta excluding property obtained at the time of
(2) __
marriage. Actually it appears that Jxmuta as properly understood
by *§rxnatha^^ did not want to create a special order of succession 
for pitridatta but simply wanted to give to the same a line of 
succession similar to that prescribed for yautaka.
But the initial passage in the Dayabhaga itself being 
ambiguous it is no wonder* that the commentators on Jxmuta are also 
not very clear on this point although they lavishly draw upon their 
knowledge of the Mxmamsa to interpret this passage. &rxnatha and 
Ramabhadra explain that only a brahmin step-daughter is entitled to 
inherit the property of her step-mothers of lower caste as she alone 
is capable of conferring spiritual benefit through her sons. Mahes-
vara interprets the word 1anuvada1 to mean that in cases of all
mothers of all castes their, own daughters of the same caste have a
(1) Da.Kra.Sam.26.
(2) See their commentaries on Da.Bha.4*3.40-42 wherein they 
summarise the different lines of succession. But see 6rxkrisna 
on Da.Bha.4.2.16 where he says that a 1kanya* succeeds to
pitridatta whether it is yautaka or ayautaka. He is thus self­
contradictory .
(3) &rxnatha : "Etena idamapi yautakatulyamityuktamiti,,. For other 
authors see infra.
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preferential right to succeed to their mother*s pitridatta strxd- 
(1)hana. In short he appears to carve out all pitridatta from the
non-yautaka property so as to prescribe for it an order of success­
ion similar to that of yautaka. The same appears to be the inter­
pretation of &rxkrisna and probably of Acliyuta. Raghunandana is as 
ambiguous as his master. But &rxkrisnakanta appears to adopt the 
Mitaksara explanation of Manu*s provision. Anyhow the commentators
seem to be unanimous in holding that in succession to pitridatta a
(2) _ daughter should be preferred to a son. Both &rxkrisna and &rxk-
risnakanta mention the order as follows:- Maiden daughter, son,
daughter who has a male issue or is likely to have a male issue,
daughter*s son, son's son, son's son's son, step-son, step-son's son,
step-son?s son's son, and barren and widowed daughters. The order
closely resembles the order prescribed for yautaka which, even if it
is pitridatta, has a special order of succession according to these 
( 3)two authors.
(1) This shoWs that Mahesvara paraphrases the first alternative 
given in the Dayabhaga whereas &rxnatha and Ramabhadra para­
phrase the second alternative. It is obvious that the opinion 
of Mahesvara has impressed the later commentators and also the 
translators. But it is forgotten by these people that the pro­
vision also refers to the right of the step-daughter. At other 
places not only &rxnatha but other commentators also maintain 
that wherever the step-son comes in the step-daughter also 
comes in as being included in the word step-son. See infra 
Da.Bha.4.3.32-33.
(2) The intricate discussions carried on by the commentators may be 
summarised as follows:- that the provision lays down that the 
daughter of a brahmin woman succeeds in preference to a son; 
but this should not be taken to form a 'parisaiikhya* to the 
effect that in the case of pitridatta of a woman who is ksatriya 
etc, her son succeeds notwithstanding the existence of her 
daughter.
(3) See their summaries given in their comments on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42.
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In fact considering the original passage in the Dayabhaga
there does not appear to be any reason for pitridatta to have even
a slightly different order than the one prescribed for yautaka*
To continue with the order of succession laid down for
yautaka in the Dayabhaga, in default of the daughters, the son
(I)  
succeeds and not the daughter's son; for Jimuta interprets the
word 'anvaya’ occurring in Warada's and Yajnavalkya1 s verses^ as
( 3 )denoting the issue of the mother and not of the daughter. He
points out that the same ivord 'duhitri* cannot possess two meanings
at the same time viz. 'issue* (janya) in relation to the mother and
(4)'mother* (janaka) in relation to her own issue (anvaya). What
he means to say is that such an interpretation would involve the
fault of attributing to the same word two functions or meanings viz.
(5)the 'abhidha' (direct) and the 'laksana1 (secondary). Secondly
he points out that both the word 'duhitri' and 'anvaya* convey the 
meaning 'progeny' and so it is more reasonable to connect both of 
them to the word mother, which they are in need of (akanksitatvat
/ Q \ |
lit. in expectancy of) for the purpose of completing their own sense. ;
—  —  ■     ■ — ............. | n -.....--nr-r i ii- ............ - T - i.rBUMTu.r-j   -- . _ i i .. f
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.21, Da.Ta.45, Da.Kra.Sam.22. !
(2) Yaj.2.117, Na.Smr.16.2 supra. - !
(3) Da.Bha.4.2.17-18, Da.Kra.Sam.22. j
(4) Da.Bha.4.2.19: "Na cha tadanvaya iti tachchhabdopattaya ?
duhituranvayayogyata vachya tachchhabdasy api prakritavachitaya 
duhitrirupenaivopapadakatvat."
(5) Srikrisna commenting on the above passage pedantically remarks:
"Tatha cha maturanvayartham mukhyasya duhitripadasya anvayapa- 
darthanvayartham na punarlaksana yugapadvrittidvayavirodhaditi 
bhavah." For the two functions and meanings of a word see 




Moreover he says that the word ' duhitri' in Yajnavalkya1s 
verse stands in the nominative case and the pronoun 'tad' in the
£ 9
ablative case; so the promoun tad cannot be taken to be referring to 
the word *duhitri* so as to put the latter word in a genitive case
for the purpose of extracting from the same the meaning * daughter*s
, (1)issue'.
Probably suspecting that all the above arguments could be
(2,)met with counter-arguments he quotes a text of Baudhayana to the
effect that if the heirs of one's own body exist property devolves
upon them and finally relies upon this quotation to prefer a son to
( 3)a daughter's son.
It need not be added that all the above arguments have
been countered by JTmuta's opponents like Mitra Misra and Balambh-
atta with equally forceful mimamsaka arguments. It must be borne in
mind that on account of Jimuta*s doctrine of spiritual efficacy a
son is the most important heir in his eyes whether in succession to
(4)a male's property or a female's property; so under the apparently 
brilliant Mimamsaka discussion lies the undercurrent of this doctrine 
which pervades the Dayabhaga.
For determining the order of succession to yautaka amongst 
the daughters inter se JTmuta depends upon the sutra of Gautama which
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.20. To understand this argument compare the two 
parts of Yaj.2.117 viz. 'Maturduhitarah* and 'tabhya rite
'anvayah*.
(2) See &rikrisna on Da.Bha.4.2.21. For counter-arguments see Vi. 
Mi.551, Baton Mit.on Yaj.2.145 etc.
(3) Da.Bha.4.2.21, Da.ICra .Sam. 22.
(4) See Da.Bha.4.1.5.
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he interprets as prescribing the order: unbetrothed daughter, be-
(1)
trothed daughter and married daughter. He includes married
daughter in the order because, in his opinion, the sutra makes such
stridhana devolve upon daughters generally and the word unbetrothed
etc. (aprattadi) are used simply to denote the order of precedence•
Such an interpretation, of course, cannot be had without doing
violence to the language of the sutra and to the probable intention 
(3)of its author. To ratify his position he further suggests that
the word * apratta* in Brihaspati1s verse suggests that the married 
daughter has also the right to succeed in the absence of an unbe­
trothed daughter etc. This justification is also highly objection­
able since, in the first place, the reading of the verse which has
( 4 )
been accepted in the Dayabhaga clearly suggests that the married 
daughter had no right to succeed at all, and in the second place, 
JTmuta has already utilised the text of Brihaspati in laying down 
the order of succession for ayautaka stridhana, as a result of which 
the text cannot be transplanted from its fixed position in the 
ayautaka order to the yautaka order so as to incur the fault of 
attributing a double meaning to a smriti text. &rikrisna states 
that a married daughter is included by the word 1cha1 in the sutra
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.23 and 25, Da.Ta.43-44, Da.Kra.Sam.21.
(2) Da.Bha.4.2.23, Ba.Ta.44, Da.Kra.3am.21.
(3) For the word *duhitrinara* is definitely qualified by the 
adjectives 'apratta etc.* so that there is no general provision 
in favour of all daughters.
(4) See Brihaspati quoted in Da.Bha.4.2.3. The reading which is 
accepted is 1samudha tu na labhenmatrikam dhanam1 instead of 
1 lab hate manainat r ikam * as accepted in many other treatises.
See supra.
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itself. This raises an important question, namely, why the word
♦cha1 in this sutra should not denote 1itaretarayoga1 so as to give
a simultaneous succession to all the daughters? Achyuta and Srxk-
risna repudiate such a conclusion by stating that according to Manu
(2)
yautaka devolves upon the unmarried daughters alone. The former 
states that the unbetrothed daughter is preferred to a married 
daughter because she belongs to the gotra of the mother. &rxkrisna ,
gives the same reason in preferring a betrothed daughter to a married I
, (3) !daughter. I
It is evident that Jxmuta interprets the word 1apratisthital
(4)to mean betrothed daughter although he does not expressly state so.
But none of the commentators on the Dayabhaga tries to explain how
such an interpretation can be arrived at. In the Dayatattva the
author explains that the negative prefix in the word denotes that
—  (5)the daughter has been slightly pratisthita. The enigma is solved
when Achyuta tells us that a pratisthita daughter is one who has male
(6)issue or is likely to have male issue.
In the Dayabhaga itself there is no mention of the right of
widowed or barren daughters. Jxmuta simply states that in default of
(1) &rxkrisna on Da.Bha.4.2.23, Da.Ta.44.t # • 7
(2) This is interpreted by Maskari and Devanna as giving a simulta­
neous right to both kinds of daughters. But see Achyuta and j 
&rxkrisna on Da.Bha.4.2.21-26. For itaretarayoga see supra.p-3if|
(3) Commentaries on Da.Bha.4.2.21-26. |
(4) Da.Ta.44, Da.Itra.Sam.21•
(5) Da.Xa.44 : 11. ..xsadarthe nan ..."
(6) Achyuta on Da.Bha.4.2.21-26.: "...putravatxsambhavitaputrayoh j
pratisthitayoh.." The Calcutta edition, however incorrectly j
reads ♦pratisthitayah*. This shows that the meaning of the word 
♦pratisthita1 is the same according to almost all commentators;
but on account of differences in understanding the negative
prefix ♦nan1 the meaning of the word ♦apratisthita1 is not the
same according to the Mitaksara and Bengal Schools.
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all the daughters the son succeeds. &rTnatha, however, includes both
of them in the word 'married daughter1 (parinTta) as found in the
Dayabhaga. Both Achyuta and &rXkrisna state that amongst the married
daughters one who has male issue or is likely to have male issue
succeeds in preference to the others. This is another instance of
the Dayabhaga being supplemented by the commentators with the help
(1)of an application of the doctrine of spiritual efficacy.
For succession amongst the progeny themselves JTmuta does
not give any more details. The commentators &rXkrisna and &rXkri~
snakanta give the detailed line as follows:- Unbetrothed daughter,
betrothed daughter, daughter who is having a male issue and/or
daughter who is likely to have male issue, barren and/or widowed
daughter, son, daughter's son, son's son, son's son's son, step-son,
(2)
step-son's son, and step-son's son's son. Incidentally, follow­
ing the theory 'inherited property is not strxdhana' §rxkrisna makes 
a remark that if a maiden or betrothed daughter having succeeded to 
her mother's strxdhana dies as a barren daughter or a widow the 
succession would devolve not upon her husband etc. but upon the 
daughter of her mother who has a male issue or is likely to have a
male issue, or in her default upon a barren or widowed daughter of
(3)her mother. The provision has obviously been added just to
emphasise the principle that inherited property is not strXdhanaJ
it has no connection with the doctrine of spiritual efficacy as the
(1) See commentaries on Da.Bha.4.2.21-26.
(2) Commentaries on Da.Bha.4.3.30-42.
(5) Da.Kra.Sam.21.
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husband of a deceased barren daughter is in a better position to 
confer spiritual benefit on his mother-in-law than her widowed 
daughter.^ ^
As regards succession to the property of a childless woman
Jxmuta correlates the relevant verses of Manu and Yajnavalkya and
interprets them to mean that the property which a woman secures
during one of the approved forms of marriages devolves upon her hus-
(2)band in default of her own children. and the property which she
obtained during one of the unapproved forms of marriage devolves, in
(3)default of her children, upon her parents. In short he rejects
the opinion of the Mitaksara School and holds that these provisions 
refer only to the yautaka property which is received by a woman 
during the continuance of the marriage ceremony and not to all her 
property. In order to reject the more natural interpretation that 
these provisions refer to all the property of a woman married in a 
particular form of marriage he adduces the following reasons.
(a) He points out that the words occurring in the second 
verse of Manu, namely, 'property which is given to her in the forms
(1) In fact a barren or widowed daughter cannot confer any benefit 
on the proposita whereas a son-in-law offers pindas to his 
parents-in-law. - See Da.Bha.4.3.37.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.3, Da.Ta.45, Da.Kra.Sam.23. See supra for Manu 
9.196 and Yaj.2.145. The way in \hich Jxmuta solves the com­
pound 'brahmadi* found in Yajnavalkya*s verse evidently shows 
that he treats it as an 'atatgunasamvijnanahahuvrxhi1 so as to 
include all the four forms besides brahma itself. See Ramabha- 
dra and Achyuta. This is really an intelligent attempt to cor­
relate both the above verses when there is an apparent contra­
diction between them as to the exact number of approved forms. 
Srinatha, however, says that it is 1tadgunasamvijnanabhuvrxhi'. 
Probably this is a misprint.
(3) Da.Bha.4.3.6, Da.Ta.44, Da.Kra.Sam.24.
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like Asura etc.' expressly denote that, these provisions being inter-
connected, * property1 refers only to nuptial property. This is a
(1)very sound point xndeed.
(b) Secondly he argues that if the word ’brahma’ etc. in 
the above verse, were to be connected with the word ’woman1 they 
ought to have been mentioned in singular number and genitive case; 
for the word woman (which under the above hypothesis would have been 
qualified by the word brahma etc. as adjectives) occurs in the singu­
lar number and genitive case.
(c) Moreover in connecting the word brahma etc. to the 
word ’property’ a laksana has to be resorted to i.e. these words are 
to be taken to represent the time of such marriage which is co-exist­
ent with the marriage itself; but in connecting these words to the
(1) Da.Bha.4.2.27• The second line of Manu 9.197 is : ’’Yastvasyah 
syaddhanam dattam vivahesu asuradisu”. Jxmuta connects verse 
Wo.197 with 196 so as to carry over the word ’dattam* to verse 
Wo.196 as well.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.4. : ’’Brahmadisviti kalarthatvat nirdesasya brah- 
mad ip a danam strxparatve ekatvena sasthya cha nirdesah syat.”
For the word ’asyah’ is genitive singular of * asau’ - a pro­
noun used for woman. For a reader who is not well conversant 
with the rules of Sanskrit grammar the remark as well as the 
discussion made by the commentators is very difficult to under­
stand. According to Panini words denoting action, if used in 
the locative case, really mean to show the time during which 
such action takes place. The standard illustration is ”Gosu 
duhyamanasu gatah, dugdhesu agatah” which all the commentators 
refer to. What Jxmuta means is that the word brahma etc., 
being used in the locative case, denote the time during lihich 
property is given to a woman. In any case he has to admit 
that they are used in a secondary sense. For details see 
Pa.Su.2.3.37 and the relevent comments in the Mahabhasya and 
the Siddhantakaumudx.
word ♦woman1 a longer laksana, namely, that these words denote a
(continued) connection of the woman with the ceremony of the marriage
(1)which has already become a thing of the past, ha© to be adopted.
So, he suggests, that the latter has to be sacrificed in favour of
the former which is a shorter one.
Jimuta1s interpretation is plainly arbitrary; for if the
two verses of Manu*2* are utilised only in laying down the order of
succession to yautaka then there would be no verse in the Manusmriti
which would apply to the ayautaka property of a childless woman.
Secondly the inadequateness of his interpretation is quite apparent
from the fact that some of the followers of Jimuta apply the same
(3)provisions to ayautaka of childless women.
As regards property which a woman receives during her
marriage celebrated in one of the unapproved forms Jimuta says that
the mother succeeds first and then the father. In determining this
relative priority he derives support from the analogical order of
succession prescribed for the stridhana of a maiden viz. the uterine
(4)
brother, mother and father. This is another instance wherein
JTmuta clumsily tries to intermix two independent texts which even
(5)according to himself apply to two different kinds of stridhana.
(1) Da.Bha.4.3.4.: "Vivahakale laksanayancha vartamanasambandhena 
laics ana syat strXparatve cha atikrantavivalxasambandhena laks­
ana jaghanya, sa cha ayukta." &rilcrisna explains: "Viva had- 
hikaraiiakalatvapeksaya tajjanyasamskaravattvasya gurutvaditi 
fa ha vah." Hoy IlS^ hoiu^  See. p. *3.
(2) i.e. Manu 9.196-97.
(3) See infra.
(4) Da.Bha.4.3.6-7, for the text of Baudhayana see supra.
(5) For admittedly he applies Baudhayana*s text to a maiden's pro­
perty. See also supra for Brihaspati*s text which he applies 
to yautaka after having already utilised it for ayautaka. The 
same provisions cannot be applied to two different things. See
Kumarila: "Sakriduchcharitah sabdah sakridevartham gamayati." 
supra sp p. 9 * & 5o\ ^  8 7 .
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He himself appears to be conscious of his clumsiness for he hastens
to explain that, by the analogy of succession to a maiden’s property,
the uterine brother is not to be given the first place in succession
to yautaka obtained during unapproved forms of marriage; for he is
(1)not mentioned in the text pertaining to the latter.
Jxmuta does not mention the detailed order of succession
in the case of yautaka received in these two different kinds of
marriages. But the commentators '£rikrisna and Srxkrisnakanta men-
( 2)tion the detailed order as follows
(a) For strxdhana received during marriage celebrated in 
one of the approved forms the heirs in order of preference are the 
husband, brother, mother, and father.
(b) For strxdhana received during marriage celebrated in
one of the unapproved forms the heirs in order of preference are the
( 3)mother, father, brother, and the husband. In the Dayatattva 
Raghunandana simply confirms the order given in the Daybhaga but in 
the Dayakramasaiigraha^^ Srxkrisna confirms the order given by him 
in his commentary on the Dayabhaga. The order which he has laid
down is very sensible indeed for even in an approved form of marriage,
(1) Da.Bha.4.3.9.
(2) See their commentaries on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42.
(3) Da.Ta.45.
(4) Da.Kra.Sam.23-24. It ought to be noted here that the texts of 
Vriddha Katyayana and Yajnavalkya (see infra) which Jxmuta 
utilises to lay down a separate order for bandhudatta, anvad- 
heyalca etc. have been utilised by &rxkrisna only to prove a 
brother’s right, in default of the husband, in yautaka obtained 
in one of the approved forms of marriage; for unlike Jxmuta, 
Srxkrisna believes that there is no separate order, apart from 
the one mentioned above, for bandhudatta etc. See infra.
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though there is a complete fusion of the wife with her husband's 
family, she can hardly be said to have been totally cut off from the 
family of her birth; similarly even in unapproved forms of marriage 
although the wife does not completely merge into her husband's 
family it cannot be said that she does not become a sapinda of her 
husband.^^^ So it is perfectly justifiable to say that in default 
of preferential heirs in one line the succession should devolve upon 
the heirs in the other line.
After mentioning the order of succession for yautaka 
Jxmuta turns to the order of succession to property received by a 
woman after marriage in which, according to him, the brother has the
first preferential right. At the outset he refers to Yajnavalkya*s
( 2) * text which lays down that bandhudatta, sulka and anvadheyaka of
a woman devolve upon her bandhavas. He then tries to elucidate the
right of a brother in all these kinds of strxdhana by referring to
different texts dealing with succession to these three categories.
The word 'bandhu' in the compound 'bahdhudatta1 has been
interpreted by him as denoting parents. To avoid an overlapping
division with yautaka or anvadheyaka he defines bandhudatta as
property given by parents to their daughter during her maidenhood.
^ ( 3)
He interprets the word 'bandhava* to mean a brother. To confirm
specifically Yajnavalkya*s general statement in relation to 'bandhu-
(1) Chandavarkar J. vigorously maintains this view which seems to
have been accepted by all the modern scholars. See infra.
(2) Yaj.2.144 referred to in Da.Bha.4.3.10. The whole discussion
in the Dayabhaga starts in this 10th para and concludes in the 
29th para.
(3) Da.Bha.4.3.11 & 15.
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-  (1)datta he refers to the text of Vriddha Katyayana which says that 
immoveable property which is given to a woman by her parents de­
volves, in default of her children, upon her brother. He maintains
(2)that the same rule is a fortiori applicable to moveable property 
which is given to a woman by her parents.
As regards sulka he refers to the fam< ous text of Gautama 
and lays doivn the order as uterine brother, mother, and husband. The 
husband has been included on the authority of Katyayana1s text which 
declares that bandhudatta devolves, in default of the bandhus them­
selves, upon the husband. Here again JTmuta exposes himself; for
according to his own definition of bandhudatta it cannot possibly
(4)
include sulka. The unsatisfactoriness of his system becomes
evident when we perceive that JTmuta can somehow or other quote 
verses for a brother1s preferential right in succession to bandhu­
datta and sulka but he fails to quote a single independent verse in
(1) Da.Bha.4.3.13-14. On the authority of Visvarupa he says that 
this rule is applicable to the property of a woman married in 
any one of the eight forms.
(2) Dandapupanyayat - Da.Bha.4.3.14. SrTkrisnakanta explains this 
nyaya : "Tannyayarthastu yatha jnusikanam apupaviddhadandabhak- 
Sjltham apupalaksananiyatam. 'kST on Da*Bha.4.3.29-34. See 
note to Setlur*s translation of Da.Bha.Ill.2.15:- 1A person who 
carries away a staff necessarily carries away with it the loaf 
which is inseparably attached to the staff. The expression 
therefore means "necessarily* or "aferli&ri!l. This expression 
is used in the same sense in other legal treatises.1 See also 
notes to Da.Bha.IV iii.14, Da.Kra.Sam.Ill 16 in Setlur*s trans­
lations .
(3) Gau.Su.28.23 - Da.Bha.4.3.27-28. In para no.28 JTmuta lays
down the order for usulka and in no.29 repeats the, same order
adding only the husband on the authority of Katyayana. So
this para appears to be a resum6 whereby he makes this order
applicable to all the categories mentioned in para no.10. See 
also para no.26: **..sarvatraiva bhratradhikaro vakyat vises- 
anavagamat.** &rTnatha, Mahesvara and &rTkrisna explain the 
underlined words as referring to the text of Yajnavalkya’ s 
mentioned in para no.10 above.
(4) Da.Bha.4.3. 11 & 15 supra.
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favour of his preferential right in anvadheyaka. According to him 
however, the order given applies to all the three categories men­
tioned in Yajnavalkya1s verse which he mentions at the outset of all 
this discussion, and which he treats as the basis of his further 
elucidation.
The whole attempt of JTmuta here is so unsatisfactory that 
even his own followers decline to follow this order for non-yautaka 
stridhana. In dealing with succession to general stridhana i.e. all 
excluding yautaka and pitridatta Raghunandana states that such strid­
hana devolves, in the absence of the progeny of the woman, upon her
(1) - husband. Upon the authority of Vriddha Katyayana he asserts'that
property given to a woman by her parents devolves upon her brother.
This is definitely a more reasonable provision; for there is no
apparent reason why a brother should have a preferential right in
all the post-nuptial stridhana. In all probability the bulk of the
latter might consist of gifts from the husband alone or from his
family. Both Srikrisna and Srikrisnskanta in their commentaries u • • • * • •
maintain that the order applicable to a childless woman*s non-
yautaka stridhaha (under which they seem to include all except
yautaka and pitridatta of a woman) is the same which is applicable
to her yautaka stridhana. The same order, according to these two
commentators, is applicable to the pitridatta of a childless woman.
(3 }&rikrisna makes his position amply clear in his Dayakramasangraha,
(1) Ba.Ta.43.
(2) On Da.Bha.4.3. 40-42.
(3) Da.Kra.Sam.26. For his reason he quotes *sandristikanyaya*.
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wherein, dealing with succession to ayautaka of a childless woman, 
he remarks: "On account of analogy from succession to yautaka the
husband, brother, mother, and father succeed to the property of a 
woman married in one of the five forms viz* brahma etc. and the 
brother, mother, father and the husband succeed in that order to the 
property of a woman married in one of the three forms i.e. the asura 
etc.." In short he comes close to the Mitalcsara position tbuugh by 
a roundabout way. The reason for the change brought about by the 
later authors of the Bengal School is obvious; they could easily 
see that even in an unapproved form of marriage like asura etc. the 
wife became, for practical purposes, a member of the husband's 
family, and so probably thought it inequitable to continue to allow 
the brother to succeed, in preference to the husband, to all non- 
yautaka property of the proposita. There can be no doubt that this 
interpretation is truly representative of the law of the Bengal 
School, as it naturally reflects the change in public opinion with­
out the authority and the backing of which these commentators would
(1)not have dared to contradict their own accepted master.
After stating the order of succession to bandhudatta etc.,
—  (2)JTmuta introduces the 'ultimate heirs' given by Brihaspati. Here j
(1) The importance of public opinion in interpreting the texts has j 
been admitted by Jxmuta also : see Da.Bha.4.3.36 wherein JTmuta j 
refuses to follow the textual order of ultimate heirs mentioned 
in Brihaspati's text and to put the husband's younger brother
in the end of that order because he might thereby oppose the 
opinion of the general public. See also Vi.Mi.554 where Mitra 
Misra, through fear of violating the established usage, does not 
allow the sister's son to succeed in preference to the step-son 
etc. See also Ramabhadra on Da.Bha.4.3.34-38 for including 
step-daughter and her son and son's son. For noh-observance of 
an unpopular precept of the sastra see supra/p. IfSu*
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.31, Da.Ta.45-46, Da.Kra.Sam.27. ;
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again is another ambiguity in the Dayabhaga which seems to have re-
heuVs
mained unnoticed: he introduces theseAwith a remark: "On failure
of (the line of) heirs ending in the husband, the following rule
has been laid down1*; he again confirms that the heirs mentioned
in the text of Brihaspati succeed in default of the line of heirs
(2)beginning with brother and ending with the husband. * Wow the order
which he mentions here is applicable only to bandhudatta etc, or pro-
( 3 )perty which is generally termed ayautaka by &rikrisna and others.
What about succession to yautaka then? Apparently there is no
answer to this in the Dayabhaga. Eaghunandana, who prescribes for
ayautaka a different order of succession (i.e. the one prescribed
in the verse of Devala), seems to apply Brihaspati’s verse to
ayautaka in default of heirs beginning with the husband and ending
with the father.^4 '* However Srlkrisna, who in his Dayakramasangraha
has given more systematic provisions for succession to yautaka and
ayautaka, says that this order of ultimate heirs is applicable to
both yautaka and ayautaka in default of the different heirs which
(5 )he has already mentioned for those two categories.
Jimuta admits the right of these ultimate heirs notwith­
standing the existence of nearer heirs like the father-in-law etc.
(6)only because there is a textual authority in their favour; but he
(1) Da.Bha.4.3.31.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.35: "Tadesam putradinam bhratradibhartriparyanta-
nanchabhave.."
(3) See supra &rikrisna on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42.
(4) Da.'fa.4-6. The proposition is, however, not free from doubt.
He refers to the ultimate heirs as coming after the heirs men­
tioned in Devala’s verse which he utilises in laying down 
succession fc© ayautaka.
(5) Da.Kra.Sam.27.
(6) Da.Bha.4.3• 35: "Ananyagatervachanat” , also in Da.Ta.47 .
* ana fcrnlq * jte. p. tL 3 H .
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does not forget to take resort to the principle of spiritual effi­
cacy for the purpose of deciding the order of succession inter se
(1)amongst these ultimate heirs and for elongating the list of hexrs 
who, in his opinion, should succeed before these ultimate heirs.
His followers are guided by the same principle.
To remind ourselves of Brihaspati1s intricate text the 
ultimate heirs succeed apparently in default of an *aurasa suta1 
(aurasa son), 'dauhitra* (daughter's son), and 'tatsuta' (his or 
their son).*21 But Jimuta derives thence the following meaning:- 
In the word 'aurasa' he includes both son and daughter because they 
exclude all other heirs. He interprets 'suta' as denoting a step­
son because it is useless to understand this word as qualified by 
the adjective 'aurasa', because Manu himself terms a step-son as a 
son of all the co-wives, and because an undesirable contingency of
sister's son etc. succeeding notwithstanding the existence of a
(3)step-son has in any case to be avoided. He then mentions that
in default of a son, daughter, and a step-son, the daughter's son 
(4)
succeeds. The word 'tatsuta* he interprets as denoting the son
of a son or of a step-son but not of the daughter's son as the latter
(5)does not offer any pindas. In default of these heirs and of the
heirs mentioned in the line beginning with brother and ending with
the husband the ultimate heirs succeed.
(1) See infra. ^
(2) See supra: Tadyasama/uraso na syat sutodauhitra eva va/
Tatsuto va dhanam tasa mi svasriyadyah samapnuyuh//.
(3) Da.Bha.4.3.32, Da.Ta.46*, Da.Kra.Sam.27.
(4) Da.Bha.4.3.33. This provision is unique. See infra.
(5) Da.Bha.4.3.34, Da.Ta.46, Da.Kra.Sam.27.
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The above comments of JTmuta have invited further explana­
tions as well as adverse comments from his followers. SrTnatha, 
Ramabhadra and SrTkrisna say that the word 'suta' denotes not only 
a step-son but also his sister ie. a step-daughter. Together with
Mahesvara and Achyuta they point out that a step-son's son also must
(1)be included by parity of reasoning.
Raghunandana goes a step further and says that by parity 
of reasoning the word 'step-son' in the Dayabhaga stands as symboli­
cal of all analogical sons (atides ikaputra), for "otherwise there
occurs an undesirable contingency of a sister's son etc. succeeding
(2)notwithstanding the presence of an adopted son etc." Srikrisna
goes still further and says that the word 'aurasa' itself symboli­
cally denotes the adopted son etc.^^ In all these comments a 
gradual elevation of the place of an adopted son is clearly discern- 
able. The secondary sons who were formerly described as "ksetrajadi" 
came to be known moi'e as "datrimadi" thus denoting that an adopted
(1) Their commentaries on Da.Bha.4.3.31-34. &rTkrisna in his
• • •
summary on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42 mentions also step-son's son's son 
before the husband etc. Ramabhadra on those very passages 
appears to be in favour also of a step-daughter and her son and 
son(s son. But his discussion is a bit ambiguous.
(2) His commentary: "Sapatniputrapadam atidesikaputropalaksanam 
tulyanyayachcha, anyatha dattrimadisattve1 pi svasriyadyadhik- 
arapatat."
(3) His commentary: "Aurasapadeneti. ... Etachcha dattrimaderapy- 
upalaksanam". See also Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: The relationship of
married woman to her husband's adopted son in Hindu theory 
and practice: a correction, (1959) Zeitchrift fur vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaft p.l wherein the author has, upon the informa­
tion brought to his attention by the present writer, <ammdcd ; 
his opinion expressed in Adoption in Hindu Law (1957) Zeits- 
chrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft p.34.
(4) For instance see Achyuta on Ba.Bha.4.2.5 supra.
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son had already captured the position of a ksetraja son who was de­
clared to be absolute in the Kaliyuga. Secondly, the fact that
&rikrisna includes an adopted son in the word •aurasa' leaves no
(1)room for doubt as regards his opinion in a previous passage where
he appears to contradict Achyuta1s opinion: there he definitely
means to assert that an adopted son could share his adoptive mother's
stridhana equally with an aurasa son or a daughter. The reasoning
appears to be that but for the exception mentioned by Vasistha an
adopted son is equal to an aurasa son in all respects. It may be
objected that an adopted son being really adopted to the father and
not to the mother he should not have any, or at least any important,
position in stridhana succession; but as the husband and wife stand,
in the eyes of law, as one person it is reasonable to presume that
the same act which affiliates an adopted son to his adoptive father
also affiliates him to his adoptive mother. This is how the right of
the wife, in some cases, to adopt a son to her husband after his
death can be properly understood; for this right is of the nature
more of a personal right than of a right by way of proxy. Because
of this unity of person between husband and wife even illegitimate
sons of a woman whether born as a result of adultery or fornication
(2)
are recognised as sons of the husband. Therefore these later
authors are perfectly justified in recognising to the fullest extent 
the right of an adopted son to inherit his adoptive mother's pro­
perty .
(1) Commentary on Ba.Bha.4.2.5 supra.
(2) For instance Kanina and Gudhaja. For illegitimate children 
and their right see infra.
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Jxmuta, we have seen, introduces the step-son as an heir
somewhat suddenly and gives him a right to succeed even before a
daughter1s son. &rxnatha and Ramabhadra appear to acquiesce in this
(1)
new addition. But all other commentators take a firm attitude
against Jxmuta on this point. Achyuta, Mahesvara, Raghunandana and
&rxkrisna expressly state that a step-son can succeed only after
( 2)the daughter's son. Achyuta and $rxkrisna state that a daughter's
son has a preferential right because he is 'progeny' (praja) of his 
(3)
grandmother. They also go to the extent of suggesting that the
word 'suta' need not be interpreted as denoting a step-son and that 
a denial of such an interpretation will not make sister's son etc. 
succeed notwithstanding the existence of step-son etc., because like 
the husband, father etc. who have not been expressly mentioned in 
Brihaspati*s text even a step-son can succeed before the sister's
son etc. &rxkrisna openly suggests that Jxmuta has been self-con-
(4)tradxctory here. Therefore xt appears that the doctrine of
spiritual efficacy which Jxmuta follows rigidly has in this special 
instance, been softened down to some extent by his commentators.
Some Bengali scholars and judges were inclined to believe
that this para (No.33) which places a step-son before a daughter's
(5) . . .son xs spurxous. Thxs xs evxdently a mxstake; for the earlier
(1) See supra their commentaries on Da.Bha.4.2 1-7.
(2) Commentaries on Da.Bha.4.3,33.
(3) But see Da.Bha.4.2.21 where a son is preferred to a daughter's 
son because the latter is not progeny (anahgaja).
(4) For his previous provisions state that he succeeds after the 
son and the son's son respectively to yautaka and ayautaka 
respectively.
(5) :
See Golapchandra 5arkar H.L.(1927)p.735, Mukherji J. in 
Purna v. Gopal infra.
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commentators like SrTnatha etc* appear to acquiesce in this arrange-
ment. Moreover none of the commentators suggests that this passage
was an interpolation. On the other hand they specifically state
(1)that this provision is a speciality of Jimuta. Even Mahesvara
who points out some spurious readings in paras 31 and 32 allows para*
No*33 to go unchallenged; and this fact is remarkable since he does
not agree with the opinion expressed in that paragraph.
Jimuta specifically repudiates a suggestion that these
ultimate heirs should succeed in the absence of the sapindas for, he
says, (sapindas like) the husband1s younger brother have already been
mentioned in this list of ultimate heirs whereas nearer sapindas
(2)like the father-in-law have been completely excluded. He further 
states that the order of succession amongst these heirs inter se is 
not in accordance with the order of actual enumeration but in accord­
ance with the order which is based upon their relative capacity to 
confer spiritual benefit (upon the proposita); because otherwise 
the husband's younger brother would succeed as the last amongst the 
six heirs mentioned in the text - an arrangement Miich is opposed to 
public opinion, and because the right of a secondary son to succeed
depends upon his relative capacity to replace, for the purpose of
(3)conferring spiritual benefit, an aurasa (mukhya) son. Jimuta*s
(1) For instance see Srikrisna on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42. See also' j • • •
Eaghurama Siromani etc. infra.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.40, Da.Ta.48-49. But see Varadaraja supra.
(3) Da.Bha.4.3.36, Da.Ta.47.
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followers wholly concur in his explanation. Jimuta and his followers,
therefore, state the order amongst these heirs as: husband's younger
brother, a son of the husband's elder or younger brother, sister's
(1)
son, husband's sister's son, brother's son and son-in-law.
JTmuta states that after these heirs the father-in-law, husband's
elder brother etc. succeed in order of their relative capacity to
confer spiritual b e n e f i t . & r i k r i s n a  enlarges the same order as:
father-in-law, husband's elder brother, then other sapindas, sakulyas
(3 )and samanodakas. It is quite remarkable that according to the
Bengal School succession never devolves upon the father's sapindas
but upon the husband's sapindas alone in all cases. The only heirs
to be admitted from a woman's parents' side are the father, mother,
brother, sister's son and brother's son.
In the absence of all the above heirs the property of a
brahmin woman devolves upon the brahmins of her own town; but the
property of a woman who is ksatriya etc. goes to the Crown by 
(4)escheat. The exception in the case of the property of brahmin
woman seems to be a counterpart to the same exception in regard to 
the property of a brahmin male. Taking into consideration the 
ambiguities of the Dayabhaga we feel that the more systematic and 
logical commentary of Srikrisna ought to stand as the correct pre­
sentation of the law of the Bengal School.
There are many other authors of minor importance who profess
(1) Da.Bha.4.3.37, Da.Ta.47-48, Da.Kra.Sam.28-29.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.39, Ba.Ta.48.
(3) Da.Kra.Sam.29. See also Vi.Se. f.34(b).
(4) Da.Kra,Sam.29, Vi.Se. f.34(b).
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to follow the lead of JTmutavahana. The works of most of these
authors are still in manuscript only and hence are inaccessible to
(1)the general public. Most of these works contain what is virtually
a copy of the provisions in the Bayabhaga with some slight varia-
(2)
tions. ‘ It will be helpful to consider the opinion of these
authors on controvertial or ambiguous provisions.
Thus according to Narayana and Ganesabhatta the order given
for pitridatta applies only to pitridatta which is not yautaka i.e.
given at the time of marriage. But according to Varesvara, Vidy-
aratna Smartabhattacliarya, and Kasirama - a commentator on the Day-
attva - the order applies to pitridatta whether given at the time of
(4)marriage or before or after the same. It need not be stressed
that the opinion of Varesvara deserves more respect than the opinion 
of Narayana.
With regard to succession to the ayautaka of a childless 
woman the opinion of Srikrisna to the effect that the order of 
succession depends upon the form of marriage in which the woman was
married, has been accepted by Varesvara, Narayana, Ganesabhatta,
—  —  (5)Anantarama and Raghurama §iromani. This acceptance leaves no
room for doubt that the later authors of the Bengal School preferred
(1) The Dayakaumudi of PTtamhara as well as the DayabhagarthadTpika 
of Raghurama &iromani, however, have been published. A trans­
lation of the Vivadarnavaseta compiled by Varesvara and others 
is available under the name: ,fThe Code of Gentoo Laws''.
(2) Vi.Se.f.32(b)-34(b), Smr.Sa.Vya.f.42(b), Smr.Rat,f.55(a-b), 
Vya.Sa.San.f.32(b)-33(a), Da.Vya.San.f.i(b), Sma.Vya.f.56(b), 
Da.Ta.Ti.f.27(b), Smr.Sa.Sam.f.44(b)-45(b), Ba.Bha.Nir.f.8(b)- 
10(a), Vi.Chandrika f.41(a)-44(b), Da.Kau.18-21, Ba.Bha.Di. 
verses 59-72.
(3) Vya.Sa.San.f.33(a), Da.Vya.San.1(b).
(4) Vi.Se.f.33(a), Smr.Sa.Vya.f.42(a), Da.Ta.Ti.f.27(b).
(5) Vi.Se.f.33(a), Vya.Sa.San.f.33(a), Da.Vya.San.f.1(b), Vi. 
Chandrika f.43(a), Ba.Bha.Di.p.18 verse 67.
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to follow SrXkrisna as against JTmuta on this matter. The order of 
succession is thus unanimously brought nearer to the Mitaksara 
School•
Similarly Varesvara, Narayana, Anantarama, SrTkara, Vach-
aspati Misra and Raghurama support SrTkrisna as against JTmuta in
(1)holding that a daughter's son succeeds before a step-son. The only
author who openly opposes such an amendment is Ramanatha the author
__ (2)of the Smritiratnavali.6
Ramanatha1s opinion on another point deserves special 
attention. Rigidly following the doctrine of spiritual efficacy he 
says that in default of an aurasa son or daughter the secondary eons 
like ksetraja etc. succeed and in default of these secondary sons 
only can a step-son succeed. He specifically adds that out of
( 3)forgetfulness JTmuta has failed to mention the secondary sons.
The opinion must be given due weight in determining the exact loca­
tion of secondary sons in strTdhana succession and in considering 
whether or not a woman's illegitimate children have a right to 
succeed to their mother's property.
It is now necessary to review the development of the case 
law in order to establish how far it conforms with, or departs from, 
the Gastric law on the subject.
(1) Vi.Se.f.33(a), Vya.Sa.San.f.32(b), Vi.Chandrika f.41(b),
Da.Bha.Nir.f.8(b), Smr.Sa.San.f.45(a), Ba.Bha.Di. verses 59 
and 66-67.
(2) Smr.Rat.f.55(a-b), the same view probably is found in Sma.
Vya.f.55(b). ^
(3) "StrXdhane tu aurasaputra kanyabhave 'nyesam putranam tadabhave 
sapatniputrasyeti. Tesain matriparvanakartritvena sapatnXputra- 
badhakatvat. JXmutasya tu vismritiratra..." Smr.Rat.55(a-b). 
But as against this see Kamalakara supra.
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Turning now to the development of the judicial law on strX-
dhana succession we find that the tendency of the development was to
close the ranks between the different authors of the same school.
Thus it has been held that the Mitaksara is of paramount authority
in southern India and that the authority of the Smritichandrika is
of no avail against that of the M i t a k s a r a ; t h a t  the law of the
Mitaksara school is the law of the Mithila school except a few
„ (2)instances in which the latter expressly differs from the Mitaksara,
that the Mitaksara and the Mayukha should, as far as possible, be
(3)interpreted in harmony with each other except in the case of de-
(4)volution of strXdhana on the progeny of the woman herself. In the
Bengal School this unification of the law was brought about by sub-
—  (5)duing the authority of all later authors to that of jXmuta. This f
process of integration makes the resum& easier to give, but renders
the mistakes in the law much more apparent. Indeed in the beginning
the law of the two leading schools was also unjustifiably inter- 
/ \
mixed and this confusion led to mischief which, though partly re­
paired, has cast permanent impressions upon the judicial law as it 
is current (in appropriate contexts) today.
The Mitaksara Succession:•
(1) Simmani Aramal v. Muthammal (1880)3 Mad.265, Bhujanga v. Rama- 
yamma (1884)7 Mad.387, Muthappudayan v. Amman! Animal (1898)21 
Mad. 58, Raja Grammani v. Aimnani (1908)29 Mad.358, Mahalalcshmi 
v. Suryalcanta A.I.R.1940 Mad.494.
(2) See infra See also p. 4 tj & .
(3) See infra PfcL\43,Lih7.
(4) See infra Ptf *
(5) See infra pp. 1*17-76
(6) See infra Pfc4to-H 4H6*
£
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According to the text of the Mitaksara a married woman’s
strxdhana other than sulka devolves upon maiden daughters, married
daughters who are indigent or childless, and married daughters who
are wealthy. The judicial law has accepted this order of preference
excepting the fact that the right of a childless daughter, to succeed
in preference to a daughter possessing children has been totally
(1)neglected. To understand the root of this error it is necessary
to know that according to the Mitaksara the same text of Gautama
which applies to strxdhana succession applies also to succession to a
(2)male’s property so that the order of preference stated above is 
applicable in both cases, whereas JTmuta admits in the line of succ­
ession to male's property only those married daughters who have or
(3 )are likely to have a male issue. Unfortunately the first Mitak­
sara case on this point came before their Lordships of the Calcutta 
High Court who may have been more conversant with the law of the 
Bengal school than that of the Mitaksara School. Distinguishing the 
law of the Benares from that of the Bengal school as regards success­
ion to strxdhana their Lordbhips remarked: ”By the lav/ of the
Benares School preference is given to the maiden daughter; failing 
her the succession devolves on the married daughters who are indigent, 
to the exclusion of the wealthy daughters who succeed in default of 
indigent daughters. But no preference is given to a daughter who 
has or is likely to have a male issue, over a daughter who is barren
(1) In Mysore the Smritichandrika is preferred to the Mitaksara in 
determining the order of succession to anvadheya - Nagamma v. 
Moodelliar (1881)4 Mty® .L.R.241.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.XI 135-36 Nirnayasagara Edit -p.221.
(3) Da.Bha.11.2.1-3; Da.Kra.Sam.4-5.
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(1)or a childless widow." There is no reference to any text in this
case but it is evident that their Lordships have taken into consider­
ation Vijnanesvara1s comment only at one place where he explains the
(2)word 'apratisthita* as meaning 'indigent1 and have neglected his
comment at another place where he explains the word as meaning
(3 )'indigent or childless'. On the authority of Macnaughten the same
negative proposition in favour of a childless widowed daughter was
confirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Uma Peyi v.
(4)
Gokoolanund wherein one of the contesting parties was a childless
widowed daughter. Instead of stating that indigent or childless
daughters have preference over daughters who have wealth or children
respectively their Lordships remained content with laying down that
a daughter who has or is likely to have a male issue cannot have
preference over a childless widow.
Both the above cases pertained to succession to father's
property, belonged to the Benares school and arose in the Calcutta
High Court, but the decisions have been followed by all the High
(5)Courts in laying down the law of the Benares, Southern or the
Bombay school for succession either to father's property or mother's 
(6)stridhana. Accordingly it has been held that the expression
(1) Binode Koomaree v. Purdhan Gopal (1865)2 W.R.176.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.II 135-36.
(3) Mit.on Yaj.II 145. See supra.
(4) (1875) 5 I.A.40.
(5) See below.
(6) Bakubai v. Manehabai (1864)2 B.II.C.R.5, Poli v. Narotam (1869)
6 B.H.C.R.183; Audh Kumari v. Chandra Pai (1880)2 All.561;
Simmani v. Muthammal (1880)3 Mad.265; Danno v. Darbo (1882)4 All. 
24-3; Totawa v. Basawa (1893)23 Bom.229; Manki ICumvar v. IChundan 
Kunwar (1922)A.I.R.1925 All.375; Parvathifoai v. Maruthi A.I.R. 
1945 Bom.69; Savitribai v. Sidu (1944)1.L.R.1945 Nag.871; Raj- 
ainma v. Padmavatamma A.I.E.1951 Mad.1047; Sheo Prasad v. Jank- 
ibai A.I.E.1953 Bom.321.
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'apratisthita1 means 'unprovided for', 'indigent' or 'unendowed' as
opposed to 'possessed of means', or 'endowed* and that comparative
poverty is the sole criterion for settling the rival claims of
(1)married daughters. A daughter whose husband is rich cannot be
included in the term 'unprovided for1, although her father did not
(2)
make any provision for her* "Though the Courts ought not to go
minutely into the question of comparative poverty, yet when the
difference in wealth is well-marked, the law requires that the whole
( 3)property should pass to the poorest sister." A poor sister is not
bound to prove a definite acquisition on the part of her rich sister;
it is enough if the surroundings are such that the latter would be
(4)
regarded as a rich woman. When all the daughters are equally
indigent they inherit equally whether any one of them is childless
(5)
or not. It has also been held in a recent case that the rule of
preference being limited to competition between unendowed and en­
dowed daughters, where all the daughters are endowed ones they shall
succeed simultaneously and equally notwithstanding the fact that the
(6)husband of one of them is eight times richer than that of the other. 
Though this decision is not directly opposed to the previous ones
(1) See the above cases after 2 All.561. According to the Mitak­
sara School a betrothed daughter must be treated as an unmarried 
daughter and not as a married one, for according to Yajnavalkya 
the strTdhana of a daughter who is betrothed but dies before the 
marriage does not go to the proposed husband but to the parents, 
see Yaj.IX 148; see also Banerjee p.403, Gupte 590.
(2) 4 All.243 supra.
(3) 23 Bom.229 at 232 supra.
(4) A.I.R.1925 All.375 supra.
(5) Rajamma v. Padmavatumma A.I.R.1951 Mad.1047.
(6) Sheo Prasad v. Jankibai A.I.R.1953 Bom.321.
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it seems that the trend of the previous cases was to lay down that
if there is a marked difference between the pecuniary circumstances
of the daughters the rule of preference comes into operation; for
even according to the test of comparative poverty, the preference
given to a more indigent daughter over a less indigent one is in fact
understandable only on the basis that the latter is more 1 endowed1
in comparison with the former; hence there is no reason why the
hat
'less endowed1 amongst the two 1 endowed* daughters should have a pre-
ference over the other, the former being 'unendowed* in comparison
with the latter.
It is clear that the judicial decisions have neglected the
rule of preference in favour of a childless daughter; the Courts
have never even referred to the opinion of many authors who maintain
that the term 'apratisthita* includes also widowed or unfortunate 
(2)
daughters. Banerjee suggests that the priority should be decided
firstly on the criterion whether a daughter is rich or indigent, 
that amongst the rich daughters a childless one should be preferred 
to one having children and that amongst the poor daughters distribu­
tion should be made in accordance with the circumstances of each case. 
He says that otherwise it would be difficult to decide the priority
( 3)between a childless rich daughter and poor daughter having children. 
The objection is without any foundation since both the qualifications
(1) See Manki Kunwar v. Kundan ICunwar (1922)A.I.R.1925 All.375; 
Savitribai v. Sidu I.L.R.1945 Wag.S71. Rajadhyksha J. in Sheo 
Prasad's case distinguished the previous cases, however, on the 
ground that none of them dealt with a contingency of two rich 
sisters competing with each other.
(2) See Laksijadhara, Apararka, Chandesvara, Mitra Misra etc. supra.
(3) Banerjee pp.403-4.
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(namely, childlessness and indigence) being equally important, both 
kinds of heirs should succeed e q u a l l y . T h e  real order ought to 
have been laid down as follows: that daughters who are either in­
digent or childless should succeed in preference to daughters who are 
neither indigent nor childless, that amongst the first class of heirs 
daughters who are both indigent and childless being doubly unfortunate 
should succeed equally in preference to those who are poor but poss­
essing children or rich but childless, that these latter two kinds of 
daughters should succeed equally, and that in default of all these
Hi >}c,
daughters who are neither childless nor indigent take equally.A
(2)
*•n (*anSa y » their Lordships of the Allahabad
High Court laid down that in the Mitaksara system a woman succeeds to
strxdhana by reason of her consanguinity and not because of her cap­
acity to confer spiritual benefit and that a profligate woman can 
neither be precluded from inheriting strxdhana nor be divested of
her inheritance merely on the ground of unchastity. It was also held 
- (3)that Narada’s text prohibiting degraded persons from sharing in-
- - (4)herxtance and Katyayana's text providing for the divesting of a
shameless or extravagent woman have become obsolete and unenforceable
in the Courts. No authority liras cited for this second proposition
(1) See p.
(2) (1875)1.L.R.1 All.46 F.B. A case in W.Macn.Vol.XI p.132 was 
distinguished as not pertaining to strxdhana.
(3) Narada cited in Mit.on Yaj.II 140 mentions *patita1 amongst 
the excluded heirs.
(4) Katyayana cited in Smr.Cha.659«Vi.Mi.545. The text is discussed 
in detail in the next chapter dealing with degraded persons and 
prostitutes. It is important to note here that according to 
Mitra Misra the text provides for both exclusion fromihheritance 
and divestion of an already vested property.
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which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. Since then 
the right of an incontinent daughter to succeed to her mother*s
stridhana has never been rejected by the Courts.^
(2)In Tara v. Krishna, however, Chandavarkar J. laid down
that a daughter who in maiden condition became a prostitute succeeds
only in default of both maiden and married daughters. He observed
thqt the order of succession according to the Mitaksara is unmarried
daughter and then married daughter and that a prostitute daughter is
neither the one nor the other. The decision was followed in Govind
v . Bhiku^ ^  wherein it was held that even an unmarried daughter who
becomes a concubine is excluded by a chaste married daughter. The
reasoning purporting to sustain these unjustifiable decisions has
been as follows: that according to the Mitaksara unmarried (anudha)
(4)
and married daughters succeed in that order; that for the word
1unmarried* Parasara and Devala use the words * virgin* (kumarX) and
(5)
•maiden* (kanya) respectively; that the essential test of
(6)maidenhood is eligibility for marriage which presupposes virginity
(1) Advappa v. Rudrava (1879)4 Bom.104, Angamma1 v. Venkata (1902)
25 Mad.509, Tara v. Krishna (1907)31 Bom.495, Govind v. Bhiku 
A.I.R.1945 Bom.55. The case was followed in Nogendra v. Biroy 
(1902)30 Cal.521 ariving at the decision that even according to 
the Bengal school an unchaste mother can succeed to her daughter 
stridhana.
(2) (1907)31 Bom.495.
(3) A.I.R.1945 Bom.55. But the status of a concubine is nearer to
that of a wife than a prostitute. See Mit.on Yaj.IX 290:
•'Paraparigriftxtatvena tasain paradaratulyatvat.11
(4) Mit.on Yaj.II 135 and 11.145 pertaining to paternal and maternal 
wealth respectively.
(5) See the text quoted in Da.Bha.11.2.4-5. In the Devanagari
edition (1829)p.271 the editor rightly points out that the
quotation attributed to Parasara is non-existent in his smriti 
and hence spurious.
(6) 31 Bom.495 at 506, A.I.R.1945 Bom.55 at 57(a) supra.
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of the b r i d e ; t h a t  a concubine or a prostitute being dispossessed 
of that state belongs neither to the married nor to the unmarried 
category; that such daughter has been recognised as an heir only 
recently as a result of which she comes in after the specified heirs 
in accordance with the maxim 'the intruders are to be included at 
the end' .
The whole discussion about the ^astra is misleading*
Firstly Vijhanesvara does not refer to Parasara or Devala and does
not use the words 'KumarT* or 'Kanya'. These two texts appear to
have been unnecessarily imported from the Dayabhaga. Secondly
virginity is not at all a desideratum for marriage; a non-virgin
girl could be given in inarriage^^ and even a widow could remarry.
Thirdly, once it is admitted that unchastity is no bar in succession
(5)to property except in the case of a widow succeeding to her
(1) Medhatithi on Manu IX 132 was cited as an authority. See also 
Mit.on Yaj.II 290.
(2) A.I.R.1945 Bom.55 at 58(a). The maxim was accepted from Vya. 
Ma.143 (Kane's notes p.248): "Agantunamante nivesah." Dr.ICane
gives several references where this maxim has been utilised.
See Sankara's fohasya on Bra.Su.IV 3.3 and the commentary Bhamati 
of Vachaspati Misra on the same. The maxim is more clearly ex­
plained in the commentary Vedantakalpataru on the same passage. 
See also Sahara on Jai.Su.10.5.1. An 'agantu' is a thing which 
has no 'sthana' or place amongst the enumerated things. So when 
it comes along with the enumerated things under a text it can 
come only after the enumerated things; for it does not possess 
any 'sthana' of its own. For 'sthana' see Jai.Su. referred to 
in the introduction p.jO.
(3) That is how 'Kanina* could become a son of the person who married 
his mother. See infra.
(4) See the introduction.
(5) Gunga v. Ghosita (1879)1 All.46 F.B., Advyappa v. Rudrava (1880)
4 Bom.104- (Daughter), ICojiyadu v. Lakshmi (1882)5 Mad.149 
(mother), Vadammal v. Vedanayaga (1908)31 Mad.100 (mother),
Dal singh v. Mt.Dini (1910)32 A11.155 (mother), Baldeo v.
£>w Kt. LtLh
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husband's estate it is impossible to conceive how, in the absence of 
any Sastric authority, an order of preferance amongst the same class 
of heirs can be set up on the basis of chastity and unchastity. In 
such a case like this the simple rule, namely, that the heirs of the 
same class succeed equally and simultaneously, ought to have been 
applied.^ ^
Even amongst the Jains, in the absence of a custom to the
contrary, an unmarried daughter succeeds in preference to a married
daughter and the authority of the Jaina texts like Bhadrabahusamhita
etc. is not sufficient to set aside the established rule of Hindu
(2)law. In Bombay the watan property which by inheritance becomes
the strXdhana of a woman devolves upon a male heir in preference to 
female heir on account of a specific enactment to that effect;
Mathura (1911)33 All.702 (mother), Annapurnamma v. Venkamma 
(1926)51 M.L.J.387 (daughter), Ham Pergash v. Mt. Dahan bibi 
(1924)3 Pat.152 (daughter), Akoba harman v. Sai Genn I.L.R.
1941 Bom.438. Especially in strxdhana succession unchastity 
is no ground for exclusion at all: 1 All.46 F.B. supra, 4 Bom.
104 supra, Angammai v. Venkata (1903)26 Mad.509, Nagendra v. 
Benoy (1903)30 Cal.521.
(1) Jai.Su.10. 3.13.53: 1Samain syadasrutatvat1 referred to in
Vi.Mi.548, Smr.Cha.647, Mit.on Yaj.II 265 and Ba.Bha. supra
P* sHo .
(2) Jaiwanti v. Annandi (1937) A.I.R.1938 Mag.62. According to
Bhadrabahusamhita (Champat Rai Jain: The Jaina Law p.117)
both unmarried and married daughters succeed equally. The text 
was noted with^remark of Dr.Gour: Hindu Code edi.3 p.1476:A.
"The Jains acknowledge the authority of a digest of their laws 
contained in a work known as 1Bhadrabahusamhita' stated to 
have been compiled in the third century B.C. .." Fallowing 
Chotaylall v. Channo Lall (supra.) it was held that Jains are 
governed by Hindu law in the absence of proof of a custom to 
the contrary.
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consequently a son or even the husband is preferred to a daughter.
According to a custom amongst the Nattukottai Chetti comm­
unity the 1strxdhanam’ which is given to a bridegroom by her father- 
in-law is meant for the benefit of the bride and the children of the
marriage(2) but the latter have no joint interest with their mother
(3)and succeed to the same only after her death. Therefore it appears 
that the same rule of preference would be applicable to succession 
to such property.
(1) Balai v. Subba (1926)29 Bom.L.R.243, Fakigauda v. Dyamva (1932)
57 Bom.488. In the former case the illegitimate son of the pro- 
posita was preferred to her illegitimate daughter; in the latter 
the husband was preferred to a daughter. Sec.2 of Bom.Act V of 
1886 which amends sec.4 of Bom.Act III of 1874 is as follows:- 
"Every female member of a watan family other than the widow, 
mother or paternal grandmother of the last male owner, and every 
person claiming through a female; shall be postponed in order
of succession to any watan, or part thereof, or interest therein, 
devolving by inheritance after the date when this Act comes into 
force to every male member of the family qualified to inherit 
such watan, or part thereof, or interest therein." When a 
female becomes an absolute owner of a watan, the watan family 
is her family and not the family of the original male watandar; 
the word 1 family’ in such case has ordinary dictionary meaning 
and includes the husband though not the daughter’s son - Bai 
Laxmi v. Magenlal 41 Bom.677, Balai v. Subba (supra.), Hanmant 
v. Secretary of State (1929) 54 Bom.125, Fakirgauda v. Dyamva 
(supra*. ) However, the Act is not applicable to Kathiawar and 
there the daughter succeeds to her father’s watan according to 
order of succession laid down by ordinary Hindu Law - Mazmudar 
Iayashankar v. Bai Krishna (1904)K.L.R.XIV.3 & 5.
(2) Palamappa v. Nachiappa (1941)11 M.L.J.558, Suforamania v. Siva- 
kami 1944 I.M.L.J.38.
(3) Official Receiver of South Arcot v. ICulandaxvelan A.I.R.1946 
Mad.519 confirmed by the P.C.in Kiklandaivelan v. Official 
Receiver of South Arcot A.I.R.1949 P.C.332, The Official Receiver 
of Rainnad v. Lalcshmanan I .L.R. 1947 Mad.325. In Palaniappa’ s 
case it was held that the person who accepts money as a deposit 
knowing it to be strxdhana becomes a trustee in favour of the 
children who are cestui que trusts and that under s.10 of the 
Limitation Act they could recover the money without being 
affected by the statutary period. The same case was followed
in Suforamania1s case wherein it was held that the receiver being 
trustee the liability arose under the Madras Act IV of 1938 and
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In the Madras High Court it was held that the provisions of
the Mitaksara being preferable to those of the Smritichandrika a
widowed daughter is entitled to succeed to her mother's strTdhana
and succeeds in preference to a daughter's daughter/^ though Dev-
anna does not give her right of succession at all. It may be added
that the Court came to the right conclusion by a wrong process; for
Devanna, though he disallows the right of a widowed daughter to
(2)succeed to her father's property, does not totally exclude her in 
succession to her mother's strTdhana. His opinion is very simi­
lar to that of JTmuta.
A daughter's daughter succeeds in default of daughter and 
even in a case where the succession once devolved upon the daughter
and reverts after her death to the heirs of her mother, daughter's
(4)daughter succeed^ in preference to son's son or daughter's son.
that the amount cannot be scaled down in accordance with the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act for payment during insolvency. 
But in A.I.R.1946 Mad.519 supra the Mad.H.C. overruled these 
previous decisions and overlooked or neglected, without giving 
special or additional reasons, the custom of joint interest of 
the bride and children which was implicitely recognised in the 
previous decisions: a glaring instance of how a rule of cus­
tomary lav/ can be more easily tampered with than a rule of 
Gastric lav/ recognised by the Courts.
(1) Mahalakshmi v. Suryakanta A.I.R.1940 Mad.494.
(2) See Smr.Cha.686. He specifically mentions that here the word 
' apr at is till ha' does not include a daughter who has become so 
by reason of her widowhood or barrenness. But he gives these 
latter alternatives in explaining the same v/ord while giving 
succession to strTdhana - see Smr.Cha.p.663.
(3) See supra.
(4) Subramania v. Arunachelam (1904)28 Mad.l F.B., Sham Bihari Lai 
v. Ramkali (1923)45 All.715, Ramkali v. Gopal Bei (1926)48 All. 
648, Amarjit v. Algu (1928)51 All.478, Matru Mai v. Mehri 
Kunwar A.I.R.1940 All.311, Venkateswaralu v. China Raghavala 1955 
Andh.W.R.39. In Sheoshanker v. Debi Sahai (1903)30 X.A.202 the 
apparent effect of the decision of their Lordships of the P.C. 
was preference in favour of the daughter's son as against the
Cc
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Daughter's daughters take per stirpes and not per capita. But this 
is only because of the textual provision to that effect and this re­
presentation is not so complete as to give a daughter of a pre­
deceased daughter a right to succeed along with another daughter of
(1)the proposita. In such a case she may receive only something
"out of affection11. It has been held in Ramkali v. Gopal Dei^3^
that the rule of preferring unmarried to married daughters cannot 
be extended to daughters' daughters. Their Lordships in this case
daughter's daughter. But the case was distinguished in Subramania's 
case which was followed by all the later cases and their Lordships of 
the Madras High Court relied upon the following points: that the de­
cision in Sheoshankar1s case was given ex parte: that the daughter's
daughter was not a party to the suit and .jus tertii in her favour was 
not pleaded; that decision was based on only one issue, namely, 
whether strxdhana inherited by a daughter becomes her own strxdhana 
or not; that the view of Macnaghten that such inherited strxdhana 
does not become strTdhana of the daughter was accepted but that his 
view that it devolves upon the heirs of the daughter was not accepted 
that according to Hari Dayal v. Grish Chunder (1890)17 Cal.911 and 
Sheo Pertab v. Allahabad Bank (1903)25 All•470 at 489 the property 
devolves upon the strTdhana heirs of the original proposita, in which 
case daughter's daughter shall succeed in preference to daughter's 
son. Mayne who was counsel in Sheoshankar's case states that he 
brought most of these points to the notice of their Lordships of the 
P.C. and that they did prefer daughter's son to daughter's daughter.
See Mayne 9th Ed: t/.p.993 and 11th Edit. p. 730. But see Ramkali1 s 
case 48 All.648 at 657-58 and other following cases wherein Mayne * s 
explanation has been disregarded under a reasoning that personal 
statement of counsel published anywhere except in a recognised law 
report is not to be taken into consideration in interpreting a 
judicial decision. See Mac.Vol.I p.38 which was the basis of the 
decision in She oshankar's case. It must be added that in this latter 
case there is a vague remark to the effect that strxdhana once de­
volved does not devolve again as strxdhana. For the ambiguity in 
this remark see infra. Surely when strxdhana of a mother has de­
volved upon her daughter, whether it becomes strxdhana of the 
daughter or not, it would devolve after the death of the daughter, 
upon strTdhana heirs either of the mother or of the daughter.
(1) See supra p«3>&& Mayne p.745. inf*-* |*p. .
(2) See Mayne supra p.745, Banerjee p.411. See Brihaspati's text 
supra.
( 3 ) 48 All.648 supra.
421
observed that the case of a daughter's daughter is to be distinguished 
from that of a daughter as a mother is under a legal obligation to 
provide for the maintenance or marriage expenses of daughters and 
held that both married and unmarried daughter's daughters succeed
simultaneously.(1) Although there appears to be nothing in the
(2)
Sastra to throw doubt upon the decision of their Lordships, their
reasoning is not invulnerable: it is a gratuitous presumption to
suppose that an unmarried daughter succeeds in preference to a
married daughter because the mother is under a legal obligation to
provide for her marriage expenses or maintenance. No commentator
(3 )gives such a reasoning; moreover, the mother is not under a legal 
obligation to provide out of her strxdhana, for the maintenance or
(4)
marriage expenses of her daughter.
In default of the daughter's son succession devolves upon 
the son and then upon son's son. This position as stated in the 
Mitaksara has never been challenged in the Courts.
(1) But their shares would be equal only in a case where all of
them have a common mother or different mothers each of whom
has equal number of daughters.
(2) But see Da.Da.Slo. f.38(a)., wherein Durgayya ambiguously pleads 
for such a preference with stronger reason amongst the 
daughter's daughters.
(3) On the other hand see $.Hj>ra p. ^ 9 0 . Achyuta and £rikrisna state
that an unmarried daughter is preferred as she belongs to the
same gotra.
(4) The responsibility is solely placed upon the males of the 
family. Devanna does adopt the reasoning of their Lordships 
and prefers, on the authority of Gautama's sutra, an unmarried 
daughter to a mai^ried daughter as the father of the former is 
bound to maintain her. - Smr.Cha.687. But he explains this in 
relation to paternal property. In dealing with the same sutra 
of Gautama in succession to maternal property he does not give 
this explanation at all. The reason is obvious.
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On the dubious authority of Sir Francis Macnaghten it was
held in Sengamalathammel v. Velayyudha^  ^ that daughters succeed to
their mother’s strTdhana jointly with rights of survivorship; the
ratio of this decision was that in Hindu law co-heirs usually succeed
(2 )with rights of survivorship. The correctness of this decision
( 3)
has been doubted by some scholars, and the ratio of the same has
been overruled in the later decisions even of the same High Court.
(4)
In Bai Parson v. Bax Somli Chandavarkar J. dealt with many ex­
tracts from the Mitaksara and the Mayukha and held that succession 
to strTdhana forms obstructed succession according to these two 
treatises; that co-heirs succeeding to the obstructed heritage take 
as tenants-in-common and that, therefore, sons succeeding to their 
mother’s property take as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.
(5)
In ICaruppai v . Sankaranarayanan their Lordships of the Madras
High Court distinguished the decision in Venkayamma v. Venkataraman-
(6)
ayamma and held that sons succeeding to the estate of their mother 
take as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Observing that 
it would be revolutionary to hold that all property which comes to
(1) (1867)3 M.H.C.R.312, see also Kattama Machiar v. Dorasinga
Tevar (1871)6 M.H.C.R.310 at 333.wherein the same observation 
has been made as regards the succession of daughters to
Addition to p.422 note 2 : See also Gunnam rapamma v. Valluri Kamaraju 
1955 Andh. ^.E.779.
s except
the Bombay school inherited property is not strTdhana; so 
whether daughters are held to succeed jointly or otherwise the 
course of further devolution of strTdhana would be the same. 
But in Bombay it would make a tremendous difference.
(4) (1912)36 Bom.424.
(5) (1903)27 Mad.300 F.B.
(Q) (1902)29 I.A.156.
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(1)joint members is taken jointly their Lordships pointed out that 
though there is some similarity between unobstructed heritage and 
strxdhana succession in as much as the grandchildren inheriting 
strxdhana take per stirpes, there is also a dissimilarity, namely, 
that sons of a predeceased son do not succeed simultaneously with 
another son of the proposita.
(2)
The rights of illegitimate children to succeed to their 
mother's property have been recognised without much hesitation but 
not without encroaching upon the sastra and not without leaving some 
complications in the order of succession also. In the Sastra there 
does not appear to be any express authority for the right of illegit­
imate children to succeed to their mother's strxdhana. It has always
been recognised that an illegitimate son of a sudra is not nullius
(3)filius but quasi nullius filius. Excepting the case of an illegit
imate son of a sudra illegitimate children have no right at all in
(4)
succession to male's property. But in the case of strxdhana the
(1) 27 Mad.300 at p.305. Their Lordships pointed out for instance 
that property which comes to joint members by devise or gift is 
not taken by them as tenants-in-common - Reman Persad v. Radha 
Beeby (1846)4 M.I.A.137 at 174, Bai Diwali v. Patel (1902)26 
Bom.445. Their Lordships however very skillfully distinguished 
the decision in Venkayamma v. Venkataramanayyamma 25 Mad.678 
which they appear to accept with some difficulty. See also 
Mt.Munia v. Manoher Lai A.I.R.1941 Oudh 429 wherein the same 
line was taken. Although the headnote in this case shows that 
sons taking the strxdhana of their mother take as tenants-in­
common the facts relate to joint brothers taking as tenants-in- 
common the strxdhana of the sister of their grandmother.
(2) For an almost exhaustive account of the illegitimate children's 
right to succeed see Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: Inheritence by, from, 
and through illegitimates at Hindu Law 57 Bom.L.R.1-21; More 
about illegitimacy at Hindu Law 57 Bom.L.R.89; Kamalakara on 
illegitimates 58 Bom.L.R.177.
(3) Pandaiya v. Puli Telavar (1863)1 M.H.C.R.478; Mayna bai v.
Uttaram (1864)2 M.H.C.R.196.
(4) See Mayne 633; Gupte 398; Mulla (1946)36.
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rule judicially decided is entirely different. In Mayna Baee v.
(1)Uttar am it was laid down that sons of a brahmin married woman who
are born of an adulterous intercourse with a European are entitled
to inherit their mother's strxdhana and can also inherit each other's
property. Observing further that even a son of concealed birth
(Gudhaja or quaesitus filius) could be a son of the husband himself
their Lordships further remarked that mere adultery is not the dis-
(2)
abling stigma which codes based upon Christianity have made it.
It was also observed that a mother could also succeed to the property 
of her illegitimate children. The reasoning of their Lordships 
forms the basis of many later cases and hence it deserves to be 
quoted: "That the illegitimate offsprings of women of the lowest
Hindu classes succeed to the property, both of their mother and one 
another, without question or dispute, we can, upon our own experience, 
affirm. It would be illogical if it were otherwise, for the illegit­
imate son of a sudra, in the absence of preferable sons, is his 
heir. That the property is almost invariably small of itself pre­
vents the question from coming before the Courts. Further, the 
practice is so well understood that litigation would be hopeless.
We may refer, by way of analogy, to the practices of Malabar and 
Canara which received Hindu law not in its present state, but in a 
condition in which all races are observable in the books. There
(1) 2 M.H.C.R.196 supra. But see Saraswati Bai v. ICashiram (1884)
C.P.L.R.IV.43 (an illegitimate daughter, especially one born 
of adulterous intercourse, is not entitled to inherit her 
mother's property.
(2) 2 M.H.C.R.&96 at 199, Manu XI.177-78 was referred to for 
expiation for adultery.
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concubinage is the rule, and the whole law of inheritance is based
upon the existence of heritable blood between the mother and son,
quite irrespective of the f a t h e r . T h e i r  Lordships claimed to
substantiate their reasoning also from the point of view of justice,
equity and good conscience and fur this purpose they elicited support
(2)from the Roman Jurists.
It is not easy to see how the reasoning as regards the
sudras was also extended to the brahmin proposita also. But as, on
the authority of Abbe Dubois, their Lordships considered the woman
(3)to have been so degraded as to have become 'hopelessly outcast©1, 
and lower than a sudra, it seems that they thought it proper to 
apply the rules about illegitimate sons of a sudra woman to illegit­
imate sons of a degraded brahmin woman also.
Since heritable blood or sapindaship can be traced through
(4)
a common mother as lire 11 as through a common father an illegitimate
daughter is also considered to have been entitled to succeed to her
(5)mother's property in the absence of nearer heirs. In Subbayya v.
(1) 2 Mad.H.C.R.196 at 201-2.
(2) See Gaius Dig.Tit.VIII fr.2 & 3, Justinian Inst.III.Tit.V 4 
quoted by their Lordships to the effect that a spurious son has
heritable blood with his mother and also with a brother who is
equally spurious.
(3) For succession to degraded woman's property see next chapter.
(4) 2 M.H.C.R.196 supra, Narayan v. Laxman (1927)51 Bom.784 at 793,
Battatraya v. Matha Bala (1934)58 Bom.119, Viswanatha v. Dorai- 
swami (1925)48 Mad.944.
(5) Arunagiri v. Ranganayaki (1898)21 Mad.40, Bundappa v. Bhimva 
(1921)45 Bom.557. It is not clear whether the ratio in these 
cases applied to illegitimate offsprings of twice-born classes 
also; but their Lordships in the second case have relied solely 
upon a statement in Ghose's H.L.3rd edi.p.763 which appears to 
confer this right of succession upon all illegitimate children 
in general.
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(1)Chandrayya it was held that illegitimate daughters of women of
all castes have a right to succeed to their mother's strTdhana since
there is no difference between the status of a degraded woman of one
caste and another. As amongst the illegitimate children themselves
an illegitimate daughter succeeds in preference to an illegitimate
son by way of analogy from the rule of preference amongst the legit-
(2)imates. With regard to competition between legitimate and illegit­
imate children the law has not been uniform. In Meenakshi v . Muni™
( 3)
andi it was held that a legitimate son succeeds in preference to
(4)an illegxtxmate daughter. In Jagannath v. Marayan Chandaravarkar
J. held that strxdhana goes to the husband in preference to a son
born of an adulterous intercourse, as terms like 'woman*, 'husband1,
'issue' etc. are used in the Mitaksara with co-relative sense so«
that such a son cannot be included in the word 'issue' so as to over-
(5)ride the husband's right to succeed. The same line has been
adopted in Meenakshi's case, wherein Sheshagiri Ayyar J. observed 
that words denoting issue cannot be interpreted with a duplicity of 
meaning so as to include both legitimate and illegitimate children.
(1) (1941)11 M.L.J.442.
(2) Subbayya v. Chandrayya (1941)II M.L.J.442, Krishnarao v. Kumar- 
ajamma second appeal n.80 of 911 (illegitimate daughter pre­
ferred to illegitimate son) referred to in Meenakshi v. Muni- 
andi (1914) 38 Mad.1144 at 1153, Naramayya v. Tiruvengadathan 
(1913)24 M.L.J.223 (legitimate daughter's daughter is preferred 
to illegitimate son born later on in prostitution) - referred 
to in 38 Mad.1144.
(3) (1914)38 Mad.1144.
(4) £1910)34 Bom.553.
(5) 34 Bom.553 at 559.
(6) Ghose's opinion to this effect was rejected, see report at 
p.1148. For "duplicity of meaning" his Lordship quoted the 
Adhikaranakaumadx (quotation misprinted) and cited Regina v. 
Poor Law Commissioners for England and South Wales. In re
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It is strange that both these cases tend totally to deny the right 
of succession of an illegitimate child which was so easily and em­
phatically recognised in frjayna Bae1s case.^  ^ In a recent case of
(2)Venkanna v. Narayanamma their Lordships of the Madras High Court
have taken an altogether different view. In this case it was held 
that the word 'prasuta* (one who has given birth to children) in­
clusively refers to both legitimate and illegitimate children and 
that they succeed to their mother's strTdhana equally and simultane­
ously.
None of these decisions can be regarded as stating the
correct position of the Gastric law or as a coherent presentation 
"VKc
of judjj^inMe law. There can be no doubt that the word * prasuta' used
by Yajnavalkya and Yijnanesvara definitely refers to a married woman
(3)(udha) and, presumably, to her legitimate issue. Although illegit-
(4)imate children of a woman are declared to be heirs of her husband 
they are nowhere declared to be heirs of the woman herself and the
Holborn Union (1838)6A & E56, S.D., 112 E.R.21; In re Kirktall 
Brewery Co.(1877)5 Ch.D.535-38 Mad.1144- at 1150-51. The rule 
of AdhikarnakaumudT referred to in this case has been mentioned 
in Kishorilal Sarkar's Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation p.276 
(referred to in 57 Bom.L.R.89 supra at 93). But the present 
writer was unable to trace the same in the edition of the San­
skrit text published by the Chowkhamfoa series. But for the 
same arthaikatva rule see supra p.9 note
(1) But see Dundappa v. Bhimava (1920)45 Bom.557 wherein Sir Norman 
Macleod C.J. observed that it has never been disputed that 
illegitimate children are heirs to their mother's property.
(2) A.I.R.1954 Mad.136. For a vigorous and the best possible 
argument in favour of the ratio of this decision see the 
articles of Dr.J.B.M.Berrett in 57 Bom.L.R.supra.
(3) Mit.on Yaj.II 145: "Sarveseveva vivahesu prasutapatyavati chet.."
(4) See 1kanlna' and 'gudhaja' admitted as heirs to a male in Mit. 
on Yaj.II 132., wherein Vijnanesvara specifically rejects the 
opinion of Vishu to the contrary.
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reason also is obvious, namely, that secondary sons of a man are
admitted as his heirs on account of their capacity to confer spiritual
benefit upon him^^ whereas there is no such possibility in the case
(2)
of a woman as pihdas are not offerred to women at all. But since
their Lordships in Mayna Baee1s case held upon their personal, though 
probably dubious, knowledge, that illegitimate children are
(1) Yaj.II.132: 1Pindadomsaharaschaisam...*. See also the alleged 
text of Manu quoted in Bal.on Yaj.II.135 to the effect that a 
sonless person should, for the performance of his *pindakriya*,
try ’to make* a son by hook or by crook.
(2) It must be noted here again that the cadre of secondary sons of
women which appears to have been specially created on the analogy
of secondary sons of men does not include her illegitimate 
children but her legitimate relations like sister*s son, step­
son etc. It is true though awkward that according to the Sastra 
an illegitimate son of a woman could be an heir to her husband 
but not to herself. The reason for the former alternative is 
only the expediency of conferring spiritual benefit. The reason 
becomes all the more pertinent when one sees that there is no 
reference to illegitimate daughter at all in succession either
to male*s or female’s property. And even if it were possible 
for the heirs to confer spiritual benefit upon the woman also, 
it was improbable that illegitimate sons would have been admit­
ted as heirs; for the whole law of succession to strTdhana is 
based upon equitable reasoning and not upon spitirual efficacy 
and generally prefers females to males. Usually according to 
the leading authors of Smritis an unaurasa does not succeed in 
presense of an aurasa and^gets only maintenance or gets only a
_____  fraction of a share. - See Ya.i.II 132. Manu IX 163, Manii IX 194,
Addition to p.428 note 2:
However, for an illefitimate son’s right to perform the funeral ceremony 
of his mother see supra p.348 note 4.
iaj.li ±o& auu aiuuxt m e  ruie mentioned tnerem tnat twelve sons 
succeed only in the order mentioned. Manu’s verse (IX.184) 
specifically states that a son born of a sinful origin succeeds 
only in default of a better son.
(3) As pointed by Ayyar J. in Meenakshi’s case the opinion of their 
Lordships of the P.C. in Mayna Baee's case were not in full 
support of the opinion of their Lordships of the Madras High 
Court in the same case. See Mayna Baee v. Ootaram 8 M.I.A.
400 at 423 wherein their Lordships of the P.C. clearly state 
that the heritable capacity of the illegitimate sons to succeed 
to their mother’s strTdhana has not been established and that 
if there was a custom to that effect it was not in proof. But 
see their Lordships of the Madras High Court (when the case was
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Lordships of the P.C. in Mayna Baee's case were not in full 
support of the opinion of their Lordships of the Madras High 
Court in the same case. See Mayna Baee v. Ootaram 8 M.I.A.
400 at 423 wherein their Lordships of the P.C. clearly state 
that the heritable capacity of the illegitimate sons to succeed 
to their mother's strTdhana has not been established and that 
if there was a custom to that effect it was not in proof. But 
see their Lordships of the Madras High Court (when the case was
w* .  cA j
429
entitled to succeed to their mother's property among the sudras and 
extended this rule to the other classes also, the right of illegit­
imate children to succeed to their mother's property has become an 
established rule and must be followed on the principle of stare 
decisis. Once it is admitted that these are entitled to succeed to 
their mother's property their inclusion in the word 'issue' becomes
inescapable. But from a profitable analogy of succession to male's
(1) . _ property it must be suggested that in stndhana succession also
a legitimate issue ought to be preferred to an illegitimate issue.
But this rule of preference should be applied only to
legitimate and illegitimate heirs of the same class and not if those
remitted to them with these remarks) held the custom to be 
proved upon their personal knowledge and without recording any 
evidence in favour of the custom. Under s.57 of the Indian 
Evidence Act Judicial Notice can be taken of Acts, Rules and 
Regulations etc. but the provision of the section do not 
authorise a Court to take judicial notice of a custom. Sarkar 
on Evidence 4th Edi.p.403 states 'Court can take judicial notice 
of a custom which is very general* and quotes in support of this 
statement Baijnath v. Bhadur 91 I.C.583, and Bagridi v. Rahim 
93 I.C.332. But a casual glance at the reports would show that 
their Lordships in both these cases were themselves not sure 
about this stand and relied upon additional grounds to hold the 
respective customs proved. Not a single case can be quoted in 
favour of the stand taken by Sarkar. On the other hand see 
Gurdiyal's case infra.
(1) It need not be said that the relation of an illegitimate child 
with its mother is more definite than with its father. See for 
instance 57 Bom.L.R.i at p.13 where the learned author of the 
article suggests that an illegitimate son of a daughter should 
be preferred to an illegitimate son of a son. Such an argument 
may hold water from socialogical rather than the legal point of 
view; for even when an illegitimate son is admitted or proved 
to be a son of a man the relation of the former with the latter 
is as 'definite' in the eyes of the law as the relation of the 
latter with his legitimate son. The only difference is in the 
former case it has to be proved whereas in the latter it is, 
subject to certain conditions, a conclusive presumption.
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(1)
two belong to different classes, for instance in the order of 
succession a legitimate daughter should be preferred to an illegiti­
mate daughter but a legitimate son should not be preferred to an 
illegitimate daughter; for a son succeeds in default of daughters 
who, according to the established rule, would include both legitimate 
and illegitimate daughters. The rule should be applied mutatis
—  p i i ♦■■miul' ii.uitMtol i w w m
mutandis to an illegitimate daughter's legitimate daughter or son,
illegitimate son and illegitimate son's legitimate son all of whom
would take place immediately after their legitimate equals. It need
not be add,ed, therefore, that the decision given by Chandavarkar J.
( 2 )in Jagannath v. Narayana that strTdhana goes to her husband in 
preference to her son born of an adulterous intercourse does not 
stand to reason. The precept of the Sastra in such case had since 
long been set aside by the case-law.
(3)It has been held in Viswanatha v. Doraiswami that the
legitimate descendants of a woman's illegitimate children are heirs
to one another. The ratio of this decision is that heritable blood
can be traced through a common mother as well as through a common
(4)
father. Naturally they are heirs to the woman herself also.
(1) This suggestion is based on an analogy from succession to male's 
property - though the secondary sons succeed in default of an
anrasa ©on the wife succeeds only in default of aurasa as well 
as secondary sons who also include illegitimate sons - see Mit•
on Yaj.II 135-36, Vi.Mi.488, Smr.Cha.672-73, Vi.Ta.382, Raghv-
ananda on Manu IX.181.
(2) (1910)34 Bom.553, see also the suggestion of Dr.J.D.M.Derrett 
in 57 Bom.L.R.at p.27.
(3) (1925)48 Mad.944, Veeranna v. Satyam A.I.R.1948 Mad.10.
(4) See 48 Mad.944- at 954 wherein Nandapandita has been referred to
as including son of the same mother in the line of heirs. To 
accept heirship of legitimate descendants of an illegitimate 
child Ramalinga v. Pavadai (1902)25 Mad.519 was followed - See 
report at p.955-57.
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(l)In Duttatraya v« Mat ha it was. held that a daughter born of a
woman by an adulterous intercourse is entitled to succeed to her
brother similarly born. A similar decision could be expected in a
case where the brother claims as an heir to her strxdhana. But the
Courts have refused to extend the equitable consideration in favour
of illegitimate children of a female to the illegitimate children of
her, legitimate children. It has accordingly been held in Meenakshi
(2)v . Ramaswami that an illegitimate daughter of a legitimate
daughter is not entitled to succeed to her grandmother’s strTdhana
in preference to her grandmother's sister's grandsons. Her right
( 3 )was later totally denied in Meenakshi v. Muragayya. On the same
principle the right of an illegitimate son of a daughter was totally
denied in M a d r a s a n d  in Nagpur. As an illegitimate son of a
male cannot succeed to the property of a legitimate son and vice
(7) .versa, xt has been correctly held in Pandurang v. Administrator
(8)General of Bombay that the legitimate collaterals of a woman 
cannot succeed to the strxdhana of her illegitimate daughter. It 
is thus to be rejoiced that as regards the right of illegitimate 




(4) Veeranna v. Satyam A.I.R.1948 Mad.10.
(5) Sadu Gunaji v. Shankerrao A.I.R.1955 Nag.84. But see the ratio
of Venkanna v. Narayannanuna wherein all legitimate and illegiti
mate descendents such as daughter, daughter’s daughter, 
daughter’s son and son's son are placed on an equal footing.
(6) Dharma v. Sakharam (1919)44 Bom.185.
(7) Zipru v. Bomtya (1921)46 Bom.424.
(8) A,I.R.1953 Bom.127.
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Mayna Bate 1s case under the cover of custom was not allowed to de
velop into a wider mischief.
A convert to Hinduism would be governed by Hindu law.
Accordingly it was held that the property of a Muslim woman who
lives as a concubine with a Hindu and gets herself converted later
on to Hinduism, would constitute her strxdhana; that the children
which have been born from her paramour to her before the conversion
would be her illegitimate children and that they would succeed to
their mother's strxdhana in the same order in which the legitimate
(1)children succeed.
The illegitimate son of a sudra is an heir to his propert^^ 
r ( 3 )and the putative father of a sudra also is an heir to his property.
It should be expected, therefore, that amongst the sudras the illegit­
imate son of the husband of a woman should be entitled to succeed to 
her strxdhana as her husband's heir. But his right has expressly
(4)
been denied in Ayiswaryanandaji v. Sivaji upon the ground that an
illegitimate son has no right to succeed to the collaterals.
(5)BapuAppa v. Kashinath was a strange case wherein there 
was competition between the sons born from two different husbands of
(1) Sunderi Devi v. Thaboo Lai A.I.E.1957 All.215.
(2) pp.£*>,3“^6 j Cr-ipta pp. 398-i|0<5 -
(3) See the excellent judgement of Kumarswami Sastriyar J. in 
Subramania v, Hathnavelu (1917)41 Mad.44 F*B. wherein the 
learned judge strongly advocates that the position of a dasxp- 
utra is in all respects equal to that of an aurasa according 
to the &astra and that the &astra has been pushed aside by the 
case-law only.
(4) (1925)49 Mad.116. See the report at pp.136-37 and pp.154 on­
wards. The latter part is from the judgement of the same 
Kumar as ami Sastriyar O', (written here as Sastri). It is doubt­




a woman* The appellant contended that by remarriage the widow ceased
to have any connection with the first family and the first son. Their
Lordshops observed that remarriage was not recognised in Hindu law;
that if this argument is 'pushed to its logical conclusion* the
second son would be illegitimate; that there is no text or authority
on this particular question but that as succession to strTdhana de-
pends upon natural love and affection both sons are entitled to
succeed equally to their mother's strxdhana. The reasoning of this
decision is really perverse. Manu expressly provides for a case
wherein a woman has two sons from tvsro husbands. According to this
verse of Manu each son would exclusively share the strTdhana of his
mother which was given to her by his own father. As regards property
( 2)acquired by herself Srxkrisna while commenting on the same verse 
says that both the sons share equally. The category of strTdhana 
has not been specifically stated in this case. But the above rule 
of the oastra could have been accepted for guidance.
According to the &astra the adopted son can hardly be in­
cluded in the word issue (praja) and it has already been seen that 
excepting the authors of the Bengal school and Durgayya none of the 
commentators includes adopted son within the word 'praja'. But the 
drift of the case-law which developed in the High Courts has been 
quite different right from the beginning. In Teencowree v. Dinon-
(1) See Manii IX.191 supra and the commentaries especially of 
Kulluka and also of S a r va h an ar ay ana, Raghavananda, Nandana and 
Ramachandra. See also Kautilya supra. A deserted or a widowed 
woman can remarry and the son of the second marriage was called 
paunarbhava• See Manu IX.175 and the commentaries of these five 
commentators. Remarriage is also recognised by custom in 
several parts of India. See infra.
(2) Da.Kra.Sam.56.
434
(1)ath their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed: ,fAn
adopted son has all the rights and privileges of a son born. He is
the son of the father and of the mother, and succeeds to the paternal
property, and also to the streedhan of his adoptive mother in the
absence of daughter as a son born would do." In later cases the same
(2)position was given to a Kritrima son in the Mithila school. Their
Lordships do not appear to have had any textual authority before them
(3)but they relied mainly on the authority of Macnaghten. In Pudmak-
(4)uman v. Court of Wards their Lordships of the Privy Council held
that 'An adopted son occupies the same position as a natural-born son 
except in a few instances which are accurately defined in the Dattaka 
Chandrika and Battaka Mimamsa". Their Lordships really meant to 
elevate the adopted son to the position of an ausura son as regards 
succession both to a male *s property and strxdhana; for in a later 
case they held that an adopted son of a daughter could succeed as a
/ p* \
daughter*s son in preference to brother's son's son.
(1) (1865)3 W.R.49. See Norton's leading cases part I.p.101 for a
case decided against the right of an adopted son to inherit his
adoptive mother's property. On the other hand see W.B.Digest of 
Hindu Law 4th.edi.pp.480,1034,1038 wherein cases in favour of 
the adoptive son's right are cited.
(2) Collector of Jirhoot v. Huropershad (1867)7 W.R.500, Boolee
Singh v. Mt.Busunt ICoeree (1867)8 W.R.155.
(3) The texts referred to in Teencowree's case, were Sutherland's 
Dattaka Chandrika Synopsis p.219 1834 edi.p.153, the Dayakrame- 
sangraha p.57 sec.5, Macnaghten's H.L.Vo.X 39-40. In Huroper- 
shad's case Mac.H.L.Volp.76 was relied upon. In Boollee 
Singh's case besides other, texts 'Ovaita Nirnaya of Vaeshpati 
Misra' was referred to.
(4) (1881)8 Cal.302 P.C. Their Lordships of the P.C. referred to, 
based their decision upon, Sumbhoochander v. Naraini I Suth. 
P.C.J.25 wherein it was held that notwithstanding the fact that 
in Da.Bha.10.8 JTmuta has denied to an adopted son a right of 
collateral succession he succeeds both lineally and collaterally.
(5) Kalikomul v. Uma sunker (1883)10 Cal.232. Mayne favours the 
view adopted in this decision whereas Banerjee appears to be 
against it. See Mayne p.745 and Banerjee p.412.
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It is interesting to note that report© of none of the above- 
mentioned cases contain a reference to the authority of the commenta­
tors in favour of the right of the adopted son to be treated as an 
aurasa son in strTdhana succession. It is strange that none of the 
text-book writers excepting Bhattacharya^1* appears to have had even 
the faintest suspicion that there exists a textual authority in
favour of an adopted son. On the other hand they seem to think that
/ (2) there is no sastrie authority at all in favour of an adopted son.
Once it is admitted that an adopted son is equal to an
aurasa son the question which inevitably arises is: what should be
the rights of an adopted son and an aurasa son when in competition?
There has been no judicial authority on this point. The opinion of
iSrxkrisna, which may be considered even in determining the law of
(3 }the Mitaksara School, appears to be that they should share equally.
The trend of the ratio in Pudmakumari* s case points in this direction
only. On the same principle of equality between an adopted and an
aurasa son a daughter*s adopted son should be preferred to an aurasa
son himself. An argument, despite the clearest law on the subject,
that the law of succession to strxdhana is based upon natural love
and affection should not be resorted to to arrive at an incorrect
(4)
conclusion to the contrary.
(1) Commentaries on Hindu law 2nd Edi.p.599 wherein the author
mentions the authority of Srikrisna only but states that he
says nothing about the share taken by an adopted son in com­
petition with an aurasa son.
(2) See for instance Gupte p.609.
(3) See supra pp. 3'77~7&9 SL-3.
(4) See Banerjee p.412.
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A son adopted by a son in conjunction with one of his wives 
becomes the step-son of another wife hence he succeeds to her, not 
as her adopted son but as her s t e p - s o n . B u t  the position of a 
son adopted by a bachelor who subsequently marries has remained un­
decided. The better view, it is submitted, is to treat the son as 
an adopted son of his adoptive father's first wife and not as her 
step-son; otherwise there would be an anomalous position that a 
person without ever having had an adoptive mother has an adoptive
step-mother. Moreover as the union of husband and wife which re™
( 2)suits from marriage is retrospective in effect it is better to
hold that the first wife of a man shares the motherhood of a boy
adopted by her husband before their marriage.
It has long since been admitted that a step-son is entitled
(3)
to inherit his step-mother's strTdhana. The commentators who re™
(4)cognise his right rely upon the text of Manu which says that a
(5)
son of one of the co-wives becomes the son of all the co-wives.
But there is a great difference between the Bengal and the Mitaksara 
Schools on this point. On the principle of spiritual efficacy the 
Bengali authors treat him as an issue of the step-mother herself
(X) Gangadhur v. Hiralal (1916)43 Gal.944 at 972. But see Bhatta™
charya: Commentaries on H.L.p.599 where the author says that j
there cannot be an atidesa of atidesa and that thex*ef ore the j
adopted son of one of the co-wives should not be held entitled j
to inherit the strTdhana of another co-wife. From the point of j
view of MTmarasa the argument is no doubt irrebuttable. j
(2) See Mar a d a-t-t a—and Balambhatta (supra p. ) "who states that by j 
marriage the wife acquires ownership in husband1s property j
gained not only after the marriage but also before the marriage, j
(3) Teencowree v. Dinonath (1865)3 W.R.49.
(4) Manu IX 183. j
(5) See Da.Bha., Vi.Mr., Vi.Ta. etc. supra. \
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whereas the authors of the Mitaksara School fix this position after 
the husband presumably giving him a right to succeed only as a
husband's sapinda.(I) Moreover, as Vi jnanesvara specifically ex-
( 2)eludes non-uterine (bhinnodara) children and includes only 
uterine ones in the line of succession, it cannot be argued that in 
view of the words like 'praja' or 'janani* appearing in Manu1s and 
Yajnavalkyaf s texts the step-children should be admitted in default 
of the natural progeny; for that would infringe the maxim of unity 
of sense (arthaikatva).^^ In Vijnanesvara1s mind the words 'praja1 
(progeny), 1apatya1 (child) and 'sodara' have but one sense; lffor 
let it not be overlooked that although in the translation by Cole- 
brooke the text of the Mitakshara is divided into different para­
graphs, in the original the passage appears as one continuous and
(4) /■unbroken discussion." The only exception made by Vijnanesvara
in favour of step-children is that of a step-daughter of a higher
(1) Smr.Cha.666, Vi.Mi.553-54, Vi.Ta.465 etc. supra. It must be
stated that the comment of Mitra Misra on Brihaspati's text is 
slightly ambiguous though he introduces the ultimate heirs as 
coming in default of the heirs already spoken of (i.e. the 
husband, father etc.) who succeed to the strTdhana of a child- }
less woman. It may be added again/ ;  that Vi.Ta.467 which reads j
as if a husband succeeds in default of step-son's son etc. is j
a misprint and the other reading viz. ' Bhratrijah* accepted j
in the other version must be preferred to 'bharta' which is 
printed in the text of the edition.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.II 145. !
(3) Kumarila "Sakriduchcharitah sabdah sakridevartham gamayati" -
quoted in Bhattachaya: commentaries on H.L. edi.2nd p.63, see
also a reference to the same in Da.Mi.II 35, Vya.I.i.11-15,
Da.Bha.Ill.ii.30, Bhimacharya v. Ramacharya (1909)33 Bom.452 
at 457, Gangadhar v. Hiralal (1916)43 Cal.944 at 967. This is 
called the arthaikatva maxim for which see the Mimamsa Rules 
of Interpretation p. T Sfr- 9 & p.g ,
(4) 43 Cal.944 at 967-68 supra.
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(1)
caste and her children.
(&)Moreover the declaration of Manu that a son of one of
the co-wives makes him the son of all does not put him in the po­
sition of a son for the purpose of succession to their property; 
for Sarvajnanarayana takes this provision as prohibiting niyoga 
whereas Kulluka and Raghavananda interpret the same as preventing
the other co-wives from adopting another son. In the immediately
(3 )preceding verse Manu similarly declares the son of one of the
brothers to be the son of all the brothers, and the above commenta-
(4)tors interpret the verse as preventing procreation of a ksetraja.
« ' (5)Vijnanesvara who quotes this verse promptly says that this verse
is intended only to prevent the creation of other secondary sons and
not for the purpose of advocating the sonship (putratva) of such a
( 6 )son for that would contradict the position stated by Yajnavalkya
in laying down the line of succession known in modern Hindu law as
(7)
the compact series of heirs.
(1) Mit.on Yaj.II 145 supra.
(2) Manu IX 183 supra.
(3) Manu IX 182.
(4) Only Kulluka connects this provision with Yaj.II 132 (supra
1pindadomsaharaschaisam* etc.) but says that his position is 
determined by Yaj.II 135-36 only which means that he does not 
succeed as a son.
(5) Mit.on Yaj.II 132.
(6) See Yaj.II 135-36.
(7) For the same explanation see Smr.Cha.670-71, Vi.Mi.477. Vijn-
anesvara does not refer to Manu's provision about step-son but
Devanna and Mitra Misra refer to the same and connect it to the • •
provision about the brother*s son giving the same explanation 
for both. Mitra Misra states that such an explanation would 
apparently coine into conflict with provision that a step-son is 
entitled to succeed, in default of the husband, to his step­
mother's strTdhana but that the conflict would be resolved at 
a proper place. However he does not resolve the same in the 
portion dealing with strTdhana and meekly admits that he does
(C »k td J
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(1)In Bhimacharya v. Rainach.ar.ya most of the above poxnts 
were noted and it was held that the husband of a woman succeeds in 
preference to her step-son. In Gangadhar v. Hiralal^^  it was con­
firmed that a step-son can succeed only as a husband1s sapinda and 
not as a son.
Something must be said about the position of the great-
grandson. He does not appear in the line of succession given in the 
_ (3 )Mitaksara. It is surprising that most of the text-hooks writers
(4)
do not refer to him at all. Mr.Gupte refers to him and says that
he can succeed only as husband's heir or^^ father's heir but the
author does not refer to him at all in the line of succession which
(6)he lays down for the strxdhana of a childless woman. Both Mitra
/ ry \ / o \
Misra and Kamalakara allow him to succeed in default of a 
grandson and that ought to be his place. Otherwise if he is allowed
succeed in default of the husband. One thing is certain, 
namely, if a step-son at all succeeds according to Mitra Misra 
he succeeds in default of the husband.
(1) (1909)33 Bom.452.
(2) (1916)43 Cal.944. It was held that the position of a son adopt­
ed by a co-wife was the same. In Maiyan Dalip v. Sri Mohun 
Bikram I,L.R.1944 All.315 the adopted son of the husband was 
preferred to the sister; apparently he was treated as a step­
son. The case is notable for two things, firstly, the property 
involved was worth Rs.6,000,000 showing how large an estate 
could be owned by a woman as stridhana; secondly this is one 
of those cases in which an off-hand decision is given without 
giving a reference to any case, text or text-book on which the 
decision is or could have been based.
(3) Mit.on Yaj.II 145 supra.
(4) See Mayne pp.744-46, Bhattacharya Commentaries on Hindu Law 2nd 
edi.pp.480 & 484, Sarkar H.L.6th edi.pp.731-32, Banerjee pp. 
421-428.
(5) Gupte: H.L.p.591.
(6) Ibid p.592. It is surprising that the greatgrandson of a co­




to succeed as a husband’s sapinda even a step-son or step-grandson 
of the proposita would exclude her own great-grandson - a contingency 
least to be expected by any author of the Mitaksara school; more­
over his position would be much more precarious if the proposita 
were married in an unapproved form.
In default of the above-mentioned progeny succession goes 
to the husband and his nearest sapindas if the proposita was married 
in an approved form. It goes to the mother, father and father’s 
nearest sapindas if her marriage was celebrated in an unapproved 
form.
If the proposita was married in an approved form any heir
from the former line succeeds in preference to any heir from the
latter line. So the husband’s collateral is preferred to her own
(1)
brother; the husband’s brother’s daughter is preferred to an
(2)adopted son of her maternal uncle or of her sister's daughter.
The husband himself, of course, succeeds in preference to any other
(3) (4)
heir like a stepson, woman's own sister or her son born of an
adulterous intercourse.^^
(1) Champut v. Shiba (1886)8 All.39. See also Laxman v. Sadashiv 
A.I.R.1955. Madh Bha.138 (husband's sister 's daughter prefer­
red to the woman's own brother according to the Bombay school).
(2) Venkatasubramaniara v. Thayarammah (1898)21 Mad.263. The de­
cision was given in favour of the plaintiffs on the principle 
that females could succeed as Bhinna-gotra sapindas according 
to the established case-law.
(3) Bhimacharya v. Ramacharya (1909)33 Bom.452.
(4) Govind v. Dawlat 6 N.L.R.3-5 I.C.426 - referred to in Sarkar 
Qth edi.p.’J'^S-
(5) Jagap..nath v. Narayan (1910)34 Bom. 553. The objection to this 
decision has been discussed before supra p.lf3o. See,also 
Ponamma v. Nallakannu (1889)8 T.L.R.167 (the husband jxreferred 
to the mother); Rangappa v. Basamma (1919)24- Mys.C.C.R.387 
(step-daughter preferred to mother's brother's son); Sranagappa
(C » vi U K Mi e.4 J
441
The questioii of determining the husband's nearest sapindas
is, however, not so easy and is beset with two difficulties: firstly
what basic principle should be adopted in determining the order of
succession amongst such sapindas; secondly whether the text of
Brihaspati which enumerates the secondary sons of a woman affects
the line of succession.
As regards the first reference there are two opinions.
According to Kamalakara the husband's sapindas would succeed to
strTdhana of a woman in the same order in which they succeed to the
(1)separate property of the husband himself. According to this rule
the heirs to strTdhana of a childless widow would be her step-son, 
step-son's son, step-son's grandson, co-wife, step-daughter, step­
daughter's son, mother-in-law, father-in-law etc. But Messers West
and Buhler suggest another principle based upon the literal con-
(2)
struction of the Mitaksara: they say that according to the words
'nearest (pratyasanna) sapindas' all the heirs who are related to 
the husband in the first degree viz. the co-wife, step-son, and
v. Halappa 16 M.C.C.R.99 (husband's brother's son preferred to 
sister's son). There is no custom to the contrary amongst the 
the Vellalas of Travancore - Ambalavanan v. Thankavadivoo (1885)
7 T .L .L .80. But amongst the Kathis of Jetpur the jiwai grants 
which a father bestows iupon his daughter revert, after her death, 
to the father and his heirs in preference to the husband accord- t
ing to a special custom. However the 'hathgarna' grants are •
different from the jiwai grants and it seems they follow the j
ordinary course of succession - see Government Resolution In 
re Kumribai and other appellants (1909)K.L.R.XX.145. Similarly 
amongst the brahmins of Nagercoil all property of a childless 
married woman except her sulka devolves, by special custom, 
upon the parental family in preference to the husband. {
(1) Vi.Ta.462 and 465 referring to Yaj.II.135-36 as showing the
order of succession.
(2) See W.& B.pp.484-85. |
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father-in-law and mother-in-law shoul4 succeed simultaneously, then
the heirs who are related to the husband in the second degree should
come in and so on. Taking into consideration the general policy of
Vijnanesvara of preferring the nearest amongst the nearer heirs of 
‘(1)
a deceased it seems improbable that he wanted to confer a simul­
taneous right upon many nearer heirs. The former interpretation is,
(2 )therefore, much more reasonable and has been accepted by the Courts
(3)
as well as by text-book writers. Accordingly a co-wife succeeds
(4)
in preference to the husband's collateral, a grandson of a co-wife
(5)in preference to the co-widow or husband's brother's son, a co-
/ Q \
wife in preference to husband's brother or husband's brother's son,
(7)
a step-son m  preference to the woman's sister's son, a co-wife's
(8)daughter in preference to the husband's brother's son, the
(9)husband's full-brother in preference to husband's half-brother.
(1) For instance a full brother is preferred to a half-brother see
Mit.on Yaj.II 135-36•
($) See infra.
(3) Mayne 746; Sarkar 732; Gupte 591-93; Mu11a (1946)140.
(4) Krishna! v. Shripati (1905)30 Bom.333 (W.& B.3rd edi.p.362)
Baner.2nd edi.p.
(5) Gojabai v. Shrimant Shanajirao (1892)17 Bom.114.
(6) Bai Kesserbai v. Hunsraj (1906)30 Bom.4-31 P.C.
(7) Brahmappa v. Papanna (1889)13 Mad.138. But see the report at
p.140 where Wilkinson J. appears to be reluctant to accept this
position and doubts the correctness of the ratio in Baccha Jha's
case (infra). He says none except Bevanna is in favour of such 
a proposition. But see Vi.Mi.554 wherein Mitra Misra says that 
he prefers step-son and observes that to hold that the secondary 
sons succeed in preference to him would be opposed to an already 
established practice. j
(8) Nanja Pillai v. Sivabagyathachi (1910)36 Mad.116. To prefer a ;
step-daughter to husband's collaterals reliance was placed upon ;
Kamalakara.
(9) Parmappa v. Sidappa (1906)30 Bom.607 (Smr.Cha., W.& B.3rd edi. j
p.518). But see Bhattacharya: Commentaries on Hindu Law 2nd edi. ;
p.580. Bhattacharya states the right only of an unmarried J
daughter of a rival wife of a superior caste and that too not j
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Although the author of the Mayukha mentions the right of
a woman's own nearest sapindas the order does not change very much
for it has been held that the Mayukha and the Mitaksara are to be
interpreted in harmony with each other and that the identity of the
husband and wife being the leading principle of the Mitaksara, or
rather of the whole of Hindu law, the sapindas of the husband are
(1)the sapindas of the wife. Similarly the Mithila school does not
only in preference to that of collaterals but to the right of 
the husband as well. That statement is based upon an entirely 
different text and is not applicable to the present case.
(1) Tel sing J. was the first to lay down this principle in Gojabai 
v. Shahajirao (1893)17 Bom.114. It was approved in toto in 
Kesserbai v. Hunsraj (1906)30 Bom.431 P.C.at 442-44 and followed 
in Jodha v. Darbari Ijal A .1.R.1928 Oudh 339, Paramappa v. Sid™ 
appa (1906)30 Bom.607, Jotiram v. Bai Divali A.I.R.1939 Bom.154. 
See 17 Bom.114 at pp.118-19 & p.122 wherein Telang J. advocates 
for the principle of identity of husband and wife and relies 
upon Lallubai v. Cassibai 5 Bom.121 W.& B .3rd edi.518, Siromani 
p.389, Banerjee p.377 etc. See also Lallubai v. Mankunwarbai 
(1876)2 Bom.388 at 423 approved in 30 Bom.P.C.431 at 443 to 
show that co-wives also are sapindas of each other. In Jodha 
v. Darbari Lai (supra) the expression 1 collateral heir1 used in 
Oudh Rent Act XX of 1886 as amended by Act IV of 1921 was to be 
interpreted. Misra J. observing that even in common parlance 
a husband's nephew is also considered to be the nephew of the 
wife held that the husband's collaterals are the collaterals of 
the wife. But see the headnote to Nathalal v. Babu Ram (1935)
63 I.A. 155 wherein the nephew of the husband is described as 
'nephew-in-law' of the wife - an expression utterly unknown to 
Hindus. See the judgement of Batty J. reprinted in Kesserbai 
v. Hunsraj (1906)30 Bom.431 P.C. at 434 wherein the learned 
judge raises an interesting point that on the principle of 
identity of husband and wife the co-wife is to be preferred to j 
anybody who is not the issue of the female proposita. This i
means that she should succeed in preference to the step-son etc. j 
See the two principles of inheritance, namely, funeral oblations I 
and survivorship discussed in Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of 
Shivagunga (1963)9 M.I *A.543 at 614-15. But against the enunci­
ation of their Lordships of the P.C. see Goldstucker's Paper j
opj^ . cit.p. 19. Though the sapindas of the husband are sapindas ! 
of the wife the converse is not true; the reason is "wife's !
subordinate position and dependence" - Janglubai v, Jetha 
Appozi (1908)32 Bom*409 at 413.
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lay down separate rules for succession to strxdhana of a childless
woman so there would be no difference to this point between the law
. ■ (1)of the Mitaksara and of the Mxthxla schools.
As regards the text of Brihispati about secondary sons of 
a woman, the provisions of the Mitaksara were confused in the begin­
ning - as was usual in those days - with the provisions of the Day- 
abhaga. It may be recalled here that the heirs mentioned in that 
text are the sister’s son, husband's sister's son, husband's brother's 
son, brother's son, son-in-law and husband's younger brother. Once 
it is accepted that strxdhana devolves upon the husband's sapindas 
in the same order in which his own separate property does, it is 
very difficult to accommodate the above heirs in that order. They
obviously cannot succeed in the order of enumeration; for no direct
of uny extepl fhe So^hx evK £ E h £> r> |
suggestion to that effect has been made by the commentators who quoteA
r ( 2 )that text. On the othex* hand Mitra Misra and all authors of the 
(3)Bengal school repudiate such a suggestion. Moreover there is no 
point in postponing the husband's brother to the husband's brother's 
son. Whether in the order of enumeration inter se or not, it is
0») \y
possible to fit this group of heirs by three ways into the
A
accepted order given by Kamalakara: (i) that they should succeed 
after the husband but before his sapindas; (ii) that they should
(1) "The law of the Mithila school is the law of the Mitaksara 
except in a few matters in respect of which the law of the 
Mithila school has departed from the law of Mitaksara" - 
Surendra Mohan v. Hari Prasad (1925)52 I.A. 418 at 437, 
quoted in Kamal prasad v. Murli Manohar A.I.R.1934 Pat.398 
at 404 *
(2) Vi.Mi.554: they should succeed inter se in order of pro­
pinquity after the great-grandson, of a co-wife but before 
the sapindas like father-in-law etc. SMpvet
(3) See supra4 pp. I*0 ^ .
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succeed after the husband and his sapindas, and (iii) that according 
to the distributive construction they should succeed as husband's or 
father's sapindas as the case may be according to the form in which 
the proposita was m a r r i e d . T h e  first two views cannot be accepted 
because the group of secondary sons includes heirs some of whom are 
sapindas of the husband and some are not, and this would come into
«i
conflict with the order accepted by N'ilkantha, Chandesvara, DevannaA ‘J /i a * ' < * 7 • *
etc. that the nearest sapinda succeeds in default of the husband.
So to accept either of these two interpretations would be equal to 
denying the position of secondary sons to these heirs and then there 
is no reason why they should not succeed only according to the gener­
al rule of preference according to propinquity. Thus Brihaspati's 
text has no value at all in settling this order.
(1) In Kesserbai v. Hunsraj (1906)BO Bom.431 P.C. at 447 it was
noted that the Dayabhaga, the VTramitrodaya, Vyavastha-chand­
rika, West Sc Buhler, Banerjee, Golapchandra Sarkar were in 
favour of the second interpretation. Jenkins C.J. in the same 
case in the Bom.H.C. was also in favour of the same view. See 
report at p.436. The Sudder pundits in Sree Narain Rai v.
Bhya Jha 2 Mac.Rep.29 were in favour of such construction. 
Sarkar himself succeeded as a counsel in establishing his view 
in Mohun Pershad v. Kishen Kishore (1893)21 Cal.344 but failed 
to do so in Jagannath v. Ranjit (1897)25 Cal.354 since when the 
view had always been rejected. According to Banerjee p.455 
these heirs come in after the husband or parents as the case 
may be. Mayne gave a wrong translation of Brihaspati's text. 
See Mayne 5th edi.p.767 referred to in Banerjee p.456. Cole- 
brooke also has translated the verse incorrectly - see Theodor 
Goldstuker: On the deficiencies in the present administration
of Hindu law, a paper read at the meeting of the East India 
Association (London 1871)pp.11-12, also infra p.t*0£.
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(1)But in Bunwaree Lai v. Mt.Farbuttee the 'judges of the
Sudder Diwanajbourt of Bengal depended upon the authority of Sir
( 2)William Macnaghten who has confused the Mitaksara and the Daya-
bhaga law on this point and held that according to the Mitaksara
law the husband’s sister’s son is entitled to succeed in preference
(3)
to husband’s uncle's son. However, in Bacha Jha v. Jugmohan Jha 
their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed that Brihaspati's 
text has not been mentioned at all in the Parijata - the oldest
(1) S.D.H.R.Beng.(1858)Part II p.976.
(2) Mac.H.L.Vol.1.p.39 referred to wherein he states the Bayabhaga 
order and adds 'I do not find that the law in this particular 
varies materially in different schools.' A precedent of a 
Tirhoot case (Mithila) given Mac.H.L.Vol.II 35 was also quoted 
with approval. But for Macnaghten's authority the honourable 
judges would have followed the general rule of Taj.II 135-36 - 
see report at p.979. It is to be noted that the pundits of the 
district Court had rightly preferred the husband's uncle’s son 
but the Sudder Court Pundits held otherwise. The confusion was 
caused by inclusion of some of the district of the Mithila 
school into the province of Bengal as it stood then.
(3) (1885)12 Cal,348. The case was followed in Kamia Prasad v.
Murli Manohar A.1.R.1934 Pat.398 wherein Dhavle J. considered <h**- 
Kritya-kalpataru, Vivadachandra, and the latest authority of
the Mithila school, namely, the Dvaitaparisista of Kesava Misra 
or its later version the Suslstaparisista by Italyana Misra.
Dhavle J. added that the later two authorities also do not re- 
fer to the text of Brihaspati and that the intermediate treaties 
simply paraphrase the text. He further observed that 'In this 
respect the Mithila school is much weaker than the Mayukha vis- 
a-vis the Mitaksara...' - See A.1.R.1934 Pat.398 at 409 (see 
notes to p. ), In Mohun Pershad v. Kishen Kishore (1893)
5 Cal,344 their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court approving 
the argument of Golapchander Sarkar and following the opinion 
of Banerjee and the Vyavastha of the Sudder Pundits in Sree 
Narayan Rai's case wrongly distinguished Bacha Jha's case as 
determining preference only between the heirs both of whom come 
under Brihaspati's text and held that the husband's sister's 
son is to be preferred to his paternal great-grantdather's 
grandson. But in Hamla Prasad's case (A.1.R.1934 Par.398 at 
405) Dhavle J. pointed out that the Vyavastha included - and 
that too in the beginning - even the woman's own brother and 
sister in the heirs given by Brihaspati and held that the 
Mitaksara order alone is to be followed.
a
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authority of the Mithila school - and the Vivadachintamani; that 
the order of succession of these secondary sons inter se has not 
been given in the Ratnakara, Mayukha or Smritichandrika etc. and so 
applying the general rule of succession stated in the Mitaksara they 
held that according to the Mithila school the husband’s brother's son 
succeeds in preference to the woman's own sister's son. In Go j abai
v. Shrimant Shahajirao^  ^Telang J. laid down the principles of the
(2) — —identity of husband and wife and of construing the Mitaksara in
(3)harmony with the Mayukha; but holding that the Mayukha is self-
( 5)contradictory and anomalous as regards Brihaspati's text, he held 
that in the Bombay school where Mitaksara is predominant the text of 
Brihaspati is not to be taken into consideration at all. In Bai
(5)
Kesserbai v. Hunsraj their Lordships of the P.C. approved all of
the above points made out by Telang J. in Gojabai's case and relied
solely upon the Mitaksara to determine the succession according to
the school of law applicable even to that part of Bombay where the
-  (6)Mayukha is predominant. In Jagannath v. Hanjit their Lordships
(1) (1892)17 Bom.114 (Grandson of a co-widow preferred to the 
husband's brother's son).
(2) 17 Bom.114 at 118-19 and at 122, approved in 30 Bom.P.C.431 
supra at p.444.
(3) 17 Bom.114 at 118 approved in 30 Bom.431 P.C. at 442.
(4) 17 Bom.114 at 123 8c 126 quoted and approved in 30 Bom.431 at j
448-49. |
(5) (1906)30 Bom.431 P.C. (co-wife succeeds in preference to the j
husband's brother).
(6) (1897)25 Ca.345 at 366-68. It was held that the Viramitrodaya
is to be referred to only where there is a doubt about the mean- !
ing of the Mitaksara but hot "for the purpose of creating a
doubt" - Report at 368 followed in Dwarkanath v. Saratchandra ;
(1911)39 Cal.319 at 339. But in their zest to substantiate this ‘
stand their Lordships observed that in fhakore JDehee v. Rai 
Baluk Ram (1866)11 M.I.A. 139. ICatyagana's text as cited in the ;
Vi.Mi.was referred to only because the Mitaksara was 'silent or
(C OVi hvivtt 4 )
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of the Calcutta High Court rejected the argument put forward by
Golapchandra Sarkar and, rejecting the authority of the Vxramitrodaya
as against that of the Mitaksara, held that to determine the law of
the Benares school in this respect the Mitaksara is to be followed.
The position, namely, that according to all the Mitaksara sub-schools
the simple order of succession stated in the Mitaksara is applicable
to strxdhana of a childless woman. has never been deviated from
since then (1) x .
The line of succession to strxdhana of a childless woman
married in an unapproved form is very similar to the line prescribed
for succession to maiden's property. In the former the heirs are the
(2 )mother, father and their nearest sapindas, whereas in the latter
case the heirs are uterine brother, father, mother and then the
(3)
nearest sapxndas of the father and mother. For the purpose of
determining the father's nearest sapindas the case of a woman married
in one of the 'blamed riie^s* is similar to that of a maiden since
in the case of the former there is no 1kanyadana' or giving away of
(4)the bride; so the case-law for both the lines of succession xs
(*5)the same.
at least doubtful' - Report at - 368. The statement obviously 
■ proceeds from a mistaken notion about the text of the Mitaksara; 
see supra (chapter II).
(1) Ganeshi Lai v. Ajudhia (1906)28 All.345 (husband's sister's son 
preferred to woman's own sister's son).
(2) See Mit., Vi.Mi. supra.
(3) See Mit.on Yaj.II 145 quoting Baudhayana and the addition of 
Vi.Mi.552 to the same.
(4) Bhagwan v. Warubai (1908)32 Bom.300. j
(5) Janglubai v. Jetha Appaji (1908)32 Bom.409, Bwarkanath v. Sarat 1 
Chandra (1911)39 Cal.319 at 333, Raghava Surendra v. Lachmi ;
Koer A.I.R.1939 Pat.636. !
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It has been held that the words 1 their nearest sapindas’
denote only the nearest sapindas of the father^a© the sapindas of the
(1)father are also the sapindas of the mother, and that these sap-
(2)ind^ .s include both sagotra and bhinna-gotra sapindas of the father.
As in the case of the husband’s nearest sapindas in the case of
father's sapindas also the order laid down by Yajnavalkya and accept-
(3)ed by Kamalakara is to be followed; the result is that the pro­
perty devolves like a male's x>roperty and in default of the father 
himself his sapindas would take it in the same way in which they
(4)
would have taken his property.
Succession to a childless woman's property thus assumes 
the shape of succession to a male's property and almost all the rules 
that are applicable to the succession to a male's property according 
to the particular school are also applicable here. Accordingly it 
has been held that the principle of preferring a sapindas of full
(1) Janglabai v. Jetha Appaji (1908)32 Bom.409, Dwarkanath v. 
Saratchandra (1911)39 Cal*319 at 337-39 (Sarkar 4th edi.460, 
Banerjee 2nd edi.424 in favour of order according to Yaj.II. 
135-36 quoted for support), Kamala v. Bhagirthi 38 Mad.45, 
Jatiram v. Bai Diwali A.I.R.1939 Bom.154- (Kane Vya.Ma.p.299).
(2) Dwarkanath v. Sarat Chandra (1911)39 Cal.319 at p.329-30 
(Banerjee 2nd edi.260), Raghava Surendra v. Balai Lachmi Koer 
A.I.R.1939 Pat.636 at 651, Meghaji v. Anant A.I.R.1948 Bom.396.
X3) See supra.
(4) Dwarkanath v. Sarat Chandra at 337-39 (Sarkar 9th edi.460,
Banerjee 2nd edi.424), also at 332 (Kamalakara is to be pre­
ferred to W.& B. in Benares according to Banerjee 2nd edi.p.
363), Jotiram v. Bai Diwali A.I.R.1939 Bom.154, Raghava Surendra
v. Lachmi ICoer A.I.E. 1939 Pat.636 at (Kamalakara pre­
ferred to W.B. in Benares, Vi.Cha.II 539 Banerjee edi.4 p.383, 
389, Golapchandra 6th edi.p.730-31 etc. referred to), Chhater- 
pati v. Lachmidhar (1940)73 I.A.231 confirming the decision in 
Raghava Surendra v. Lachmi Hoer supra, Meghaji v. Annant A.I.R. 
1948 Bom.396. at 398, Tukaram v. Narayan 36 Bom.339 F.8.
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blood to a sapinda of half-blood is limited to heirs who are equal
in degree of propinquity but that a nearer person of half-olood ex-
eludes the remoter one of full blood.^ Similarly a remoter agnate
(2)
is to be preferred to a nearer cognate. Accordingly the heirs in
default of the father would be brother, brother1s son, brother's
grandson, sister, sister's son etc. and the step-relations would
succeed immediately after the whole blood relation of their own class.
It has accordingly been held that the father's sister is
(3)preferred to the maternal grandfather of the deceased, sister or
(4)
sister's son to father's brother's son, step~mother to mother's
(5) (6)sister, father's brother's son to father's sister, brother's
(1) Shusha1 v. Sheoshankar A.I.R.1949 All.672 (though this case re­
lates to the husband's sapindas it is equally applicable to the 
father's sapindas as well). Shakuntalabai v. Court of Wards
I.L.R.1942 Mag.629 (woman's full sister prefenced to woman's 
half-sister in Bombay).
(2) Kumar Raghava Surendra v. Lachmi Koer A.I.R.1939 Pat.636, 
Chatterpati v. Lachmidhas (1946)73 A.I. 231, Kuppuswami v. 
Manicksari A.I.R.195 Mad.196. But see Dwarkanath v. Sarat 
Chandar (1911)39 Cal.at 329-30 wherein it is observed that this 
principle is not applicable to strTdhana succession wherein 
cognates are in many cases preferred to agnates. See also 
Naja Pillai v. Sivabayyathachi (1910)36 Mad.116. In the former 
case the observations were obiter whereas in the latter case 
the judges seems to have wrongly considered a step-daughter to 
be a bhinna-gotra sapiirdh. See also the argumant of P.R.Bas
the coulsel in A.1.R.1939 Pat.636 at p.655 onwards: Kamalakara
in the end prefers heirs - some of whom are cognates - on the 
basis of religious efficacy. (This is not true. See Vi.Ta.
468 wherein the whole passage is quoted as being the interpre­
tation of JTmuta).
(3) Jagulubai v . Jatha Appaji (1908)32 Bom.409. It was rightly 
held that thoggh the mother is preferred to the father in the 
Mitaksara this preference is purely personal and that it cannot 
be extended to the effect of preferring matribandhus to pit- 
ribandhus.
(4) Dwarleantha v. Sarat Chandar (1911)39 Cal.319.
(5) Kamala v. Bhagirthi (1912)38 Mad.45.
(6) Sundaram Pillai v. Samaswami (1920)43 Mad.32.
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(1) ( 2 )son to a sister, step-brother to a sister, and sister to
( 3) —sister's son. According to the Bombay school where the Mayukha i
is predominant the father's brother and the father's brother’s son
(4)inherit together. It need not be added that in the same school
certain additional female heirs of the father of the deceased would
-  (3)also be entitled to inherit her strxdhana.
The decisions in all the above cases concerning the husband' i 
or the father's sapindas as the case may be proceed on the assump­
tion that the strxdhana of a childless woman, devolves exactly like 
male's property according to the text of Yajnavalkya which is accept­
ed by Kamalakara. The Bombay High Court indeed lays down specifica­
lly that this rule of 'merger' prevails against the normal rule of
(6)propinquity to the deceased. Almost all the modern text-books
state that in default of the husband or the father as the case may 
be the husband's or father's nearest sapindas respectively succeed 
to the strxdhana of a childless woman in the same order in which 
they would have succeeded to the property of the husband or the
(1) Jobiram v. Bai Diwali A.I.R.1939 Bom.154.
(2) Gopibai v. Chuhermal A.I.R.1939 Sind 234.
(3) Raja Grammani v. Ammani Animal (1906)29 Mad.3:58.
(4) Maghaji v. Anant A.I.R.1948 Bom.369. following the ratio of
Keserlal v. Jagufohai A.I.E.1925 Bom.406 wherein a similar de­
cision has been given in respect of husband's brother and 
husband's brother's son.
(5) Tukaram v. Narayan (1911)36 Bora.339 F.B. (father's sister 
succeeds in preference to father's gotrajasapindas five or six 
degrees removed.)
(6) Meghaji v. Anant A.I.R.1948 Bom.369 at 398. In Keserlal v. 
Jagubhai wherein the husband's brother and the husband's 
brother's son were held to be entitled to succeed equally as 
husband's sapindas it was observed that succession to the pro­




The position, however, does not appear to be entirely
( 2)correct from the point of view of either the Gastric law or the 
case-lav/. In Gangadhar v. Hiralal^^ there was a competition between
a son born to a co-wife and son adopted by the husband in conjunction 
with another co-wife of the deceased proposita. Mow if the success­
ion were to descend exactly as in the case of male's property the 
adopted step-son could have taken only a one-fourth share in com-
(4)
petition with the natural born step-son, for the rule of Vasistha
that an adopted son takes one-fourth in competition with an aurasa
son would have srome into operation. But all the judges in that case
unanimously held that the text of Vasistha is to be treated only as
an exception to the general well-established rule that an adojjted
son is equal to a natural-born son in all respects, and that an
application of this exception which must be confined to itself,
* ( 5)cannot be allowed a furthei? extension by atidesa.
(1) Mayne 11th edi.746, Sarkar H.L.6th edi.p.732, Trevelyan H.L.
3rd edi.pp.489,492,493, Gupte H.L.p.492 & 593. For cases from 
the Native States see Maji v. Kaliani (1889)12 Mys.L.R.64-
(the grandson of the brother of the grandfather is preferred to 
brother's daughter; Mailamina v. fhimamma (1899)4 Mys.C.C.E.130 
Xsister preferred to sister's son); Ernagappa v. Halappa (1910) 
16 M.C.C.R.99.
(2) See supra Vi.Mi., D«\.Ta.etc giving the successive order as 
stepson, stepson's son etc.
(3) (1916)43 Cal.944.
(4) See 43 Cal.944 at 969 where the text of Vasistha together with 
the extension of its application given in Dct-Mi.X.1 and Da.Cha. 
11*11 and 11.17-18 have been noted. It is also remarked that 
the atidesa in Da.Mi.II is rather forced and erroneous. The 
rule applies to the father's property.
(5) See 43 Cal.944 at 956 per Sanderson J., at pp.959-60 per Wood- 
roffe J., and at pp.970-72 per Mookerjee J. In support of the 
principle that an exception should not be extended by atidesa 
Mookerjee J. quoted Ebbs v. Boulnois 1875 L.R.10 Ch.App.479,
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Referring to the text of the Mitaksara which lays down the rule that 
strTdhana goes to the husband’s nearest sapindas Mookerjee J. re­
marked: ”In my opinion, this does not show that the property 
descends as if it belonged to the husband; the only effect of the 
two paragraphs is to determine the heir to the woman by application 
of the test of sapindaship with her husband. 11 Their Lordships 
rightly refused to apply to strTdhana succession the text of Vasistha 
and held that both the sons succeed equally to the strTdhana of their 
step-mother and adoptive step-mother respectively.
(2)
Further, in the recent case of Krishnaswami v. Sankili 
the question before the Madras High Court was whether the step-grand- 
sons of the deceased proposita inherited simultaneously with the sons 
of another step-grandson of the proposita. If the succession were to 
be treated as being on all fours with succession to a male’s property 
there could be no doubt that on the principle of representation both 
kinds of heirs would have succeeded simultaneously to the strTdhana 
of the proposita as constituting their coparcenary property. But
484 and the Mitaksara Moghe's edi.at p.292 which is Mit.on Yaj. 
III.28-29 (Hij.edi.p.321): "Badhasya Chanupapattinibandhanat-
vat yavatyabadhite ’nupapattiprasamo na bhavati tavadbadhanTyam” 
Incidentally it must be remarked that the method of giving re­
ference to a portion of a commentary by giving the page-number 
of a particular edition is highly inadvisable. If the particular 
edition is not at hand the reader is at a loss to know how to 
trace the reference. The best way is to quote the number of the 
portion of the original work upon which the particular comments 
are made. Moghe's edition is not available in London and trac­
ing this quotation which lies buried in the asauchaprakarana of 
the Mitaksara was a stupendous task. The sentence is incorrect­
ly quoted in the report and there is a misprint in Nir.Edition 
also. Read ’badhasya’ instead of 1Badhasyam1 .
(1) 43 Cal.944 at 972 (Mit.Trans.II.11.11 referred to).
(2) I.L.R.1956 Mad.324.
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their Lordships of the Madras High Cour# rightly held that the
(1)doctrine of representation is based upon spiritual benefit, that
the principle of spiritual benefit has no application to strTdhana 
*C 2 )succession* and that the step-grandsons excluded the step-great-
grandsons. Ayyangar J. further observed that one cannot lose
sight of the fact that the '"propositus" is really the woman, that it
is to her that succession is to be traced and that the kinsman of
the husband inherit her property because they are also her kinsmen.
As the ratio of this case, naipely, that the strTdhana of
(4)
a childless woman does not exactly devolve like male's property
(1) Report at p.329.
(2) The decision given by Sir Basil Scott C.J. in Bai Raman v. Jug- 
jivandas (1917)41 Bom.618 at 624 was relied upon. - See the Re­
port at p.330. See also Karuppai v. Sankaranarayanan (1903)27 
Mad.300 F.B. at 308 referred to supra and at Report p.328. Both 
these cases refer to woman's own sons: it was held that the 
grandsons etc. do not succeed in presense of sons. The former 
pertained to non-technical strTdhana under the Mayukha. See 
infra. It was held that propinquity was the only test (Manu 
IX.187 quoted). See also the same rule stated in Gopifoai Mul- 
chand v. Chuhermal Mulchand A.I.R.1939 Sind 234 (relying upon 
Mulla H.L.8th edi.p.139 to the same effect).
(3) Reliance was based upon Bhimacharya v. Ramcharya (1909)33 Bom.
452 at p.459 wherein Chandavarkar J. observed that step-son, 
step-grandson etc. 'become heirs in their order'. - See Report 
at p.330. It was stated that the order given in Mayne's 11th. 
edi.para 624 and in Mulla H.L. 11th edi.para 147 is correct.
There is no explanation, however, in these and other text-books 
why the step-son should exclude step-grandsons. But the rule 
of the sastra as stated in Vi.Mi., Vi.Ta. etc. is clear. See 
supra.
(4) This was exactly the stand taken by the two eminent lawyers 
Dr.M.R.Jayakar and P.R.Das in Bai Raman v. Jugjivandas (1917)
41 Bom.618 and Raghava Surendra v. Lachmi Koer (1939)8 Pat.590 
respectively. But the reasoning adopted by each is different: 
the former based his view on the principle of propinquity where­
as the latter resorted to the principles of both propinquity and 
spiritual efficacy. The former was successful but the latter 
was not. It is surprising that nearly 30 years after he had 
taken the above stand in Bai Raman's case the same Dr.M*R.Jayakar 
as a member of the P.C. refused to accept the argument of P.R.
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but proceeds on the principle of propinquity, is based upon the de­
cision and the reasoning of their Lordships of the Bombay High Court, 
the decisions of the same High Court in the two Mayukha^^ cases in 
which brother and brother's son of the husband or of the father were 
held to be equally entitled to the strTdhana of the proposita, appear 
to have been incorrectly decided.
According to the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 
II of 1929 the son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister and 
sister's son succeed in that order to a male's estate and this group 
of heirs comes after the paternal grandfather and before the paternal 
uncle. It is important to ascertain whether the Act affects that 
part of the line of succession to strXdhana which consists of 
husband's or father's sajjindas as the case may be. It had been uni­
formly approved that the Act does apply to a case where the male 
propositus has died before the .act but succession to his property has
opened upon the death of a female owner having a limited estate in
(2)the same and dying after the commencement of the Act. In Charjo
(3 )v. Dinanath Tekchand J. applied this analogy to the stridhana of
a woman who had died after the commencement of the Act but whose
husband had died before the commencement of the Act and held that
Das in Chatterpati v. Lachmi Koer (1946)73 I.A.231 supra and 
held that the succession devolves exactly like a male's pro­
perty and that a remoter agnate is to be preferred to nearer 
cognate.
(1) Iteserlal v. Jagubhai A.I.R.1925 Bom.406, Meghaji v. Anant 
A.I.R.1943 Bom.368 - see supra.
(2) See the cases referred to in Mayne 11th.edi.p.78.
(3) A.I.R.1937 Lah.196. See also Keher Singh v. Attar Singh A.I.R. 
1944- Lah.442 wherein the position is presumed to be a settled
one on the authority of Mulla 9th edi.p.43.
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her step-son*s daughter was to be preferred to the husband's colla- 
(1)terals. It was held in the Bombay High Court that on account of
the new rule introduced by this Act a maiden's father's sister's son
( 2)is preferred to the father's collaterals. But subsection two of
the first section of this Act expressly limits the application of
this Act to a male's property and hence it was rightly held in the
Madras, Nagpur and Patna High Courts that succession to stridhana
(3)is to be determined without the help of this Act. The controversy
is set at rest since the Supreme Court in Annagonda v. Court of
(4)Wards upheld the view of the Madras High Court and overruled all
the previous decisions to the contrary.
Broadly speaking, at present only the Brahma and Ssura
(5)forms of marriage are practiced in India. For the purpose of
determining the line of succession to stridhana the deceased woman
(1) See Report at p.200 wherein it was remarked: "To ascertain
as to who the heirs of the husband are we must, ex necessitate 
r*ei refer to the law governing succession to the property of 
the husband in force at the time when the succession opened 
out." But against this remark see Mayne edi.10th p.84 approved 
in Mahalakshamma v. Suryanarayana I.L.R.1947 Mad.23 at 27.
(2) Shamrao v. Raghunandan I.L.R.1939 Bom.228, Raghunandan v. 
ICeshavrao A.I.R.1939 Bom*194. The argument of Sir Chimanlal 
Setalwad was flatly rejected.
(3) Talukraj Kuer v. Bacha Kuer I.L.R.(1947)26 Par.150, Mahalak­
shamma v. Suryanarayana I.L.R.1947 Mad.23, Shakuntlabai v.
Court of Wards l.L.R.1942 Nag.629. Kuppuswami v. Minaksari 
A.I.R.1950 Mad.196. See also P .H.Banatvala: Succession to
the stridhan property of a female under Hindu law and effect 





-  (l)is presumed to have been married in the brahma form. The money
which is received by the parents etc. as the bride-price forms the
- (2)
e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e  of the A s u r a  form. E v e n  if  the b r i d e - p r i c e  is
received by the maternal relations of the deceased woman, the form
of the marriage would nevertheless be considered as Asu'ra if
(3)actually such maternal relative made the gift of the bride. Once
the bride-price is accepted, performance of brahma rites does not
(4)transform an A s u r a  form into a Brahma one.
Although the Asura form is quite prevalent amongst the
' — (5)Tamils and especially amongst the sudras like Balijas or Kuverais
(1) Gojabai v, Shahajirao (1893)17 Bom.114 at 117, Jagannath v.
Ranjit (1897)25 Cal.345 at 365. Authikesavulu v. Ramanujam 
(1909)32 Mad.512 at 525. In Authikesavulu*s case the parties 
had not undergone even saptapadi or vivahahoma. But see Moosa 
Haji v. Haji Abdul (1905)30 Bom.197: the non-performance of
saptapadi or vivahahoma may invalidate a marriage but does not 
determine the form - cited in 32 Mad.515 supra at 519-20. For 
this presumption of the Brahma form see also Ambalavanan v. 
Thanlcavadivoo (1885)7 T.L.R.80; Ponmamma v. Nallakannu (1889)
8 T.L.R.167.
(2) Chunilal v. Surajram (1909)33 Bom.433. Chandavarkar J. has 
excellently discussed various Gastric texts in this case: 
Samskara Mayukha (Amarapurker’s edi.p.45) quoted: "Evahcha 
atmartham dhanagrahane tu dosah kanyarthe tu na dosah." See 
also Ambalavahan v. Thankavadivoo supra.
(3) 33 Bom.433 supra. It was held that the word ' adi1 in "pitrad- 
iraksitayaii kanyaya eva danopadesat1 in the Mitaksara on Yaj.II 
290 denoted all relations ajusdem generis. Reliance was placed 
upon the maxim of nyayasamatva or samananyayatva stated by 
Usanas who is quoted in the Mitaksara (Moghe's edi.p.397 i.e. 
Mit.on Yaj.Ill 265 Nirnayasagara edi.p.429):
B a hu n am e ka dh ar man am ekasyapi yaduchyate/
Sarvesam tadbhavetkaryam ekarupa hi te smritah//.
The same maxim is referred to by the same judge in Bai Parson 
v. Bai Somli (1912)36 Bom.424 supra. This is in fact the 
principle of atidesa.
(4) 33 Bom.433 supra. But see Subramonia v. Krishna T.L.R.(1947) 
523 wherein it was held that where a marriage is celebrated in 
a Brahma form payment of money to the bride's father does not 
transform it into an Asura one.
(5) See 32 Mad.515 supra at p.516 wherein Leon Sorg is quoted:
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the mere payment of a trifling sum known as payidimudupu does not
turn the form of marriage into an Bxsura one especially if the
(1)mantras peculiar to the bi'ahma form are utterred. But xn Bombay
where fI)ej’ is paid, the marriage is considered to have taken place 
- (2)in the asura form. In Punjab a woman who is called 'Madkhula' is
nothing more than a concubine, and marriage celebrated according to
(3 )'chadar andazi1 is treated as one celebrated in an unapproved form.
According to a custom prevailing in Manipur marriage between a
divorced wife and a remote relative of her husband being valid the
marriage is presumed to be of an approved kind though the wife is
not able to participate with such second husband in certain social
(4)functions. It has been held that there is no provision in the
Punjab customary law for succession to stridhana and that the lacuna 
in the customary law is to be filled in by the application of the
( "marriage by purchase is common amongst the Tamils with the 
formula ’The money is for you, the girl is for me'". He in­
cludes Kaverais amongst the people who practice the same form. 
See also Strang'e H.L.I.43 referred to in the same case.
(1) Authikesavulu1s case.
(2) Govind Ramji v. Savitri (1918)43 Bom.173 (therefore in pre­
ference to the husband).
(3) Gurdial Singh v. Bhagwan Devi (1927)8 Lah.366.
(4) Payam Liklai Singh v. Mairenthem Maipak Singh A.X.H.1956 
Mani.18 (husband preferable heir, Mulla approved).
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(1)
rules of the ordinary Hindu law. Accordingly even in Punjab the
property of a childless Hindu woman would devolve upon her husband 
and his nearest sapindas or her father and his nearest sapindas asJ* • t -*■ • «
the case may be.
Whether allowed by the J§astra or not remarriage is quite
common amongst the lower castes in certain parts of India and it has
been held that in determining the line of succession to stridhana
the form of remarriage is as important as the form of the first
marriage so that if a bride-price is given in the second marriage the
property of the proposita would devolve upon her father and his near-
(2)est sapindas. - If this is so a very intricate situation can be
(1) Gurdial Singh v. Bhagwan Devi (1927)8 Lah.366 followed in Kehar 
Singh v. Attar Singh A.I.R.1944 Lah.442. In 8 Lah.366 at 372 
Tekchand J. referred to Rattigan’s Digest p.271 giving the line 
of heirs to stridhana but observed: "Custom is a matter of
proof and not of conclusions based upon a priori reasoning or 
deductions drawn from a comparitive study of the laws of dis­
tribution prevailing among the primitive societies. The learned 
author of the digest does not base his remark on any entry in 
the rivaz-i-am of any district in the Punjab or any decided 
case, reported or unreported. I must, therefore, respectfully 
decline to follow it". Unlike the learned judges in Mayna
Baee's case Tekchand J. wisely refrained from bringing his per­
sonal knowledge into the picture. The decision to follow the 
ordinary Hindu law in such case was based upon Daya Ram v. Sohel 
Singh (1906)110 P.R. (F.B.)372. Another point decided in Gurd­
ial ' s case was that a woman from Oudh who was a kept mistress 
of a Punjabi or alternatively was married to him in an unapprov­
ed form was not governed by the Punjab customary lav/ but by the 
ordinary Hindu law.
(2) Jotiram v. Bai Diwali A.I.E.1939 Bom.154. The defendant in 
this case tried to distinguish between palla and bride-price, 
for the purpose of determining the form of marriage. There 
could be some truth in the argument; for whereas sulka goes to 
uterine brother, mother and father, in a very old case in Bom­
bay, namely, Manohurdas v. Lukineedas (1823) Borr.II.69 the court 
implicitly admitted, upon the evidence of witness, that upon the 
death of the bride after marriage the 'pulla’ is to be returned 
to the husband’s family. For pulla see supra p. 263
f»P. 6 .
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imagined, though it has never confronted the Courts so far: if a
ivoman*s first marriage has been celebrated in approved form and the 
second one in an unapproved form how will her property devolve? 
Unquestionably she becomes a gotraja sapinda of her first husband 
but the second marriage having been celebrated in an unapproved form 
she does not acquire the gotra of her second husband; however, the 
property does not devolve upon her father and his heirs, for the 
woman cannot be held to have been made bereft of her first husband’s 
gotra either by his death or her second marriage. Her stridhana in 
such a strange case like this would devolve upon the heirs of her 
first husband. This point has not been brought to the notice of 
their Lordships in the above-mentioned case and they probably pro­
ceeded on the presumption that both the marriages must have had been 
celebrated in an unapproved form. But according to the established 
view the first marriage, in the absence of any evidence to the con­
trary, ought to have been presumed to have had been celebrated in
an approved form.
(1)In Kanalcammal v. Ananthamathi their Lordships of the 
Madras High Court held that stridhana of a woman married in an
(1) (1912)37 Mad.293, followed in Ganpat Rama v. Secretary of
State for India (1920)45 Bom.1106, Motichund v. Kunvar Kalika 
(1926)48 All.663, Vithal Tukaram v. Balu Bapu (1935)60 Bom.671, 
Asu Tala v. Sha Kanji A.I.R.1952 Kutch 69. It is interesting 
to note that judicial notice of jus tertii was taken in Kan- 
akammal*s case although the defendant had not pleaded the
same. If the same procedure had been adopted by their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council in Sheo Shankar v. Debi Sahai 
(supra) it would have spared the time and trouble of their 
Lordships of the various High Courts who had to interpret the 
ratio of the decision in Sheo Shankar’s case. See supra
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approved form devolves, in default of her husband and his sapindas,
upon her blood-relations and they succeed in preference to the Crown.
Referring to the doctrine of escheat to the Crown their Lordships
observed: ,TThis is a doctrine contrary to the general principles of
Hindu law of inheritance, and one to which we should be loth to give
effect. It is unsupported by any text to which our attention had
(1)been drawn.11 No reference to Sanskrit texts was in fact made in
this case. It must be said that the doctrine of escheat has been
(2)admitted in Hindu law since the days of Kautilya. But it is also
true that the property of a brahmin and the six-fold stridhana of a
(3)woman are expressly excluded from the operation of this doctrine.
The decision in Kanakammal's case seems to have settled the law all
"________
(1) 37 Mad.293 at 295. For a very old notion to the same effect enter­
tained by their Lordships of the P.C. see Giridharilal v. Government 
of Bengal (1868) 1 B.L.R.45 at 49 It is impossible to read the 
second chapter of the Mitakshara without remarking the extreme jea­
lousy with which the Hindu law regareded the right of the king to 
take on failur.; of heirs. The 7th section refuses altogether to 
revognise that right where the property was that of a brahman.11
(2) ICau.3.5 :"Adayadakam raja haret." See also Devala cited in Vi. 
Ra.597, Vi.Chi.155, Vi.Ta.410 etc. For other quotations see Vi.Chi. 
155-56 but therein 'technical stridhana like adhyagni etc.' is expre­
ssly excluded from escheat. For escheat see also Mit. on 3Taj.II.135 
wherein Manu IX.189 is referred to; Kulluks on Manu IX.189; Na.Smr.
16.51 and Na.Sam.14.48; Sangrahakara quoted in Smr.Cha.699 and Sa.
Vi.420.
(5) PaithTnasi quoted in Apa. on yaj.II.136 and >§ankha quoted in
Vi.Ra.598' and Vi.Chi.156.
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over India and all the text-book writers appear to be in full support
of the sarne^^ It can also be supported on the grounds of justice,
equity and good conscience.
Messrs, West and Biihler opine that in such case the father1 s
sapindas should be considered as being entitled to succeed in the
same order in which they would have succeeded if she had been married
in an unapproved form or had not been married at a l l . B u t  in
( <5 )Yithal Tukaram v. Balu Bapu, Divatia J, held that in default of 
the husband and his sapindas the strxdhana of a woman married in an 
approved form is taken equally by her brother and sister. As the 
decision is totally inconsistent with the i&astra as well as case-law 
and as it was given solely at the instance of such a leading scholar 
as Dr.P.V.Kane it needs special scrutiny. The points cleverly but 
misleadingly put forward by Dr.Kane and accepted by the learned 
judge are as,follows
(1) That after an approved form of marriage the bride 
goes into the gotra of her husband's family and that the relations 
in her father's family can be treated only as bhinna-gotra sapindas 
or bandhus.
(1) See infra p.467 note no.2.
(2) W.& B. 4th ed.p.508 If, therefore, the rigljt of the widow's 
own blood-relations revives on the failuhe of the husband's saj^indas, 
it seems natural to allow them to succeed in the same order as they 
would* hciVfi done before her marriage, and to place the mother first, 
next the father, after him the brother and the rest of the sapindas, 
according to their nearness of relationship". - quoted and disapp­
roved in Vithal Tukaram v. Balu Bapu (1935) 60 bom.671 at 676.
(3) See above note no.2.
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(2) That the analogy of succession to maiden1s property
cannot be applied to such a case since a maiden or a woman married
in an unapproved form have the gotra of their father,
(1)(3) That according to Rajeppa v. Gangappa bandhus who 
are related in equal degrees take equally and no preference is given 
to male over female.
(4) That according to this principle the brother and 
sister of such a woman would inherit her property equally as her 
bandhus or bhinna-gotra sapindas.
The whole argument is full of fallacies and strikes at the 
root of some of the basic principles laid down by the Gastric and 
judicial law. In the first place it is incorrect to say that by 
marriage a daughter ceases to be a gotraja sapinda of her father or
(2) fhis family. Vi j hane svara no doubt uses the words "samanagotra
sapinda" for the words 1fgotraja sapinda." But the illustration
which he gives of the former leaves no doubt that these persons are
(3)born in the family of the propositus. Moreover according to him
(4)the word gotra denotes a continuity of line by birth and name.
The words "gotraja sapinda", therefore, are used in contradistinction 
from the words "bhinnagotra sapinda". Thus a bhinnagotra sapinda 
of a is a person who is A's blood-relation but not born in A's gotra. 
There can be no doubt that a woman married in one of the approved
(1) (1922)47 Bom.48.
(2) See Mayne1s opinion (11th edi.p.610) approved in Shakuntalabai
v. Court of Wards X.L.R.1942 Nag.629. But as against this
view see Mayne 11th edi.pp.611-14.
(3) Mi t. on Yaj.22.135-36 Nir .liidi . 223.
(4) See Mit.on Yaj.1.53 p.14: "Gotram Vamsaparamparaprasiddham"
and Mit.on Yaj.2.135-36 p.223: "Janmanamnoh smritereke
tatparam gotra uchyate."
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forms passes into her husband*s gotra and by fiction becomes his 
gotraja sapinda. But this does not mean that she ceases to be a 
gotraja sapinda of her father * s family. According to Dr.Kane's view 
she would cease to be a gotraja sapinda of her father and mother also. 
But shell a case does not appear to have been anticipated by any of 
the commentators and nobody has ventured to say so far that father 
and mother can foe included in the list of bandhus. Moreover if it 
is contended that according to the established view of the case-law 
there is a complete fusion of the wife with her husband in an app­
roved form of marriage then it is evident that a wife can have no 
sapindas in her father1s family at all; for her husband*s gotraja 
sapindas will be her gotraja sapindas and it is his bandhus who will 
be her bandhus. She will have no bandhus of her own at all; for 
once it is admitted that she becomes a gotraja sapinda of her husband 
and completely merges into him, it follows that only those persons 
who are blood-relations of her husband's family but who are not born 
in that family can be her bandhus.
To avoid all this confusion NXlanantha rightly points out 
that in succession to a male's property a sister succeeds as a
gotraja sapinda though she may not foe called as a person of the same
(1)gotra. Taking into consideration the established manner of inter-
_ _  (2)
preting the Mitaksara and the Mayukha in harmony there is no
reason why this reasoning should not be followed in all cases at 
least of the Bombay School, and accordingly all persons who are born
(1) Vya.Ma.143: "Tasya api bhratrigotrotpannatvena gotrajatva- 
visesachcha. Sagotrata param nasti."
(2) See supra pp.
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in a married woman's father's gotra are her gotraja sapindas. As
(1)
amongst gotraja sapindas the heirs mentioned in the compact series
of heirs supercede the heirs not mentioned in it; therefore the
brother succeeds in preference to a sister.
Moreover in Rajeppa's case the competition was not between
a male and a female bandhu; it was only held that bandhus related
in equal degrees would succeed equally and that propinquity being
the only test in Bombay Presidency the test of religious efficacy
is not applicable. Even the ratio of this case cannot be stretched
to its logical extent since in a later case of the Bombay School
(2)Kenchava v. Girimallappa their Lordships of the Privy Council held 
that amongst bandhus of the same class and removed equally from the 
propositus the male would exclude a female.
Thus it is clear that whether it is held that succession 
in such case devolves upon the woman's father's sapindas or her own 
bhinna-gotra sapindas the result would be the same, namely, a brother
(3) (4)
is preferred to a sister. It may be added that in a later case
the Judicial Commissioner of Sind took a more attractive view of the 
problem. Observing that the property in <such case devolved exactly
(1) Yaj.2.135.
(2) (1924)51 I.A. 368.
(3) For adverse but inadequate comments against the decision in 
Vithal's case see also Mayne p.746, Gupte p.593. Divatia J. 
gave out also an uncalled for obiter, namely, that the strxd- 
hana of a childless woman married in an approved form devolves, 
in default of her husband and his sapindas, upon her * blood” 
relations' but that if she is married in an unapproved form 
'the husband and his kinsmen do not come in the order of 
succession at all' - 60 Bom.671 at 676-77. But see the de­
cision given by Sir John Beaumont C.J. in Chandulal's case - 
infra p.
(4) Asu Tala v. Sha Kanji A.I.R. 1952 Kutch 69.
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like male's property i.e. father’s property, he held that a woman’s 
sister’s son is preferable to her paternal uncle.
In Cliundulal v. Bai Kashi Sir John Beaumont C.J. pro­
ceeded on the analogy furnished by Itanakammal' s case and held that 
where a woman is married in an unapproved form her stridhana devolves 
even upon her husband and her sapindas in preference to the Crown if
she has no heirs left in her father's family. He depended upon the
(2)
observations of Chandavarlcar J. in Janglubai1s case that even in
an unapproved form of marriage the husband and wife become sapindas
of each other. Observing that the list of heirs in the Mitaksara
is not exhaustive as shown by Mitra Misra and inferring thereby that
( 3 )even the list in the Viramitrodaya is not exhaustive Sen J. in 
the same case further observed: "There is no text specifically ex­
cluding all heirs who are not mentioned, and there does not appear
to be any intention that on failure of the heirs that are mentioned,
(4)the property is escheat to the Crown."
It is submitted that the learned Chief Justice was quite 
correct in adopting this analogy but he proceeded on the incorrect 
statement of Chandavarkar J. in Janglubai*s case. The husband and 
wife do not become sapindas of each other in unapproved form of 
marriage. The wife in such case can become the sapinda of her 
husband only after the sapindikarana sraddha which is to be per-
(1) I.L.R.1939 Bom.97.
(2) (1908)32 Bom.409, see supra p.
(3) For the same point see Giridharilal v. Govt.of Bengal (1868)
1 B.L.R.(P.C.)45.
(4) I.L.R.1939 Bom.97 at 103.
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(1)
formed after her death. The reasoning of Sen J. is, moreover,
nothing hut a circular argument I to prove that the husband also is 
an heir in such cases he first assumes that the husband is an heir 
and then proceeds on a reasoning that all heirs who are not excluded 
by specific texts are not non-heirs.
However the alternative lines of husband and his heirs and
of father and his heirs in approved and unapproved forms of marriage
respectively have been accepted as settled law by all the text-book 
(2)
writers and this arrangement is perfectly justifiable according
to the principle of justice, equity and good conscience which is
(3)applicable in Hindu law also.
For succession to sulka Gautama gives the line of heirs
(4)
as uterine brother, mother, and father. The order has been acc-
(5 )epted by the majority of the commentators and text-book writers;
so the other interpretation which prefers the mother to a uterine
(6)brother ought to be discarded in favour of the former one.
(1) See Vi.Mi.pp.232-243 .of &uddhiprakasa with a conclusion on p.243 
"Evancha ninditavivahodhayah bhartrigotrapraptih na panigrah- 
anadina, kintu sapindikaranenaivetyuktam bhavati." See Mit.on 
Yaj.II 254 where the author discusses *sapindTkayana* and says 
that in ’Asuradi* and 1putrikakarana1 only father’s gotra is 
retained by a woman whereas in 1brahmadi’ there is an option.
(2) Mayne 746-47; Gupte 581; Mulla (1946)14©-41.
(3) See introduction pp.lg-1 9 .
(4) Gautama su. 28.22.
(5) See Mayne 742; Bhattacharya 580; Gupte 581; Mulla 139.
(6) For a discussion see supra. But see Sarkar H.L.Sth edi.p.734 
where the author prefers the mother in preference to a brother 
with an argument that this is a compromise between the older 
view that such property belonged to the parents themselves and 
the later view that such property becomes stridhana. He also 
quotes the supposed authority of Jagannath v. Runjit (1897)25 
Cal.354 for this proposition. But the case does not refer to 
sulka at all.
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There has been no direct decision on succession to sulka.
(1)
But in Bhola Ram v. Dhani Ram it was observed that the essential 
character of sulka is that the progeny of the woman herseif is ex­
cluded by the brother etc. Considering that the order for sulka has 
been so uniformly distinguished from the rest of stridhana by authors 
of all the sub-schools, it appears to us that the Courts in India
would not and should not venture to set aside the above-mentioned
( 2)order of heirs. In conformity with the later policy of the Madras
High C o u r t t h e r e  can be no doubt that in Madras the Mitaksara de­
finition of sulka would prevail against the Smritichandrika defini­
tion of the same so that sulka can mean bride-price only and nothing 
else.
Considering that the Asura marriage is quite common in
(4)Bombay and Madras amongst the lower casts there appears to be no 
reason why this special order of succession should not be applied 
in cases - and these may be not be few - wherein the parents, out 
of affection for their daughter, hand over the money, in cash or in 
kind, to the bride herself.
The text of Baudhayana which lays down the order of
a) A.I.R.1929 All.25.
(2) But see Surayya v. Balakrishnayya (194-1)I.M.L.J.4-96 at 499 
wherein Mayne*s opinion to the contrary was approved. For his 
view see Mayne iith. edi .p.74-3 wherein he says that sulka in 
the sense of bride-price ultimately given to the bride herself 
is obsolete, that if it is given to the parents it does not 
raise any question about stridhana at all, that if it is paid 
to the bride as the price of ornaments etc. it need not have 
special order of succession.
(3) See supra
(4) See Leon Sorg quoted supra also cases of unapproved
forms of marriage supra.
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succession to a maiden's property has been accepted in toto by Chand-
(1)avarkar J, in Janglubaifs case. It has never been disputed since
then that the property of a maiden devolves upon the uterine brother,
J
mother and dather in that order. The heirs, in default of the
(2)
father, to a maiden's property have already been discussed. How­
ever, the property given to the bride-to-be by the prospective bride­
groom will be given back to him is case the bride dies before the
(3)marriage.
The Mayukha contains different rules for succession to 
, (4 )
Stridhana of a woman having children. The anvadheya and bhart-
ridatta stridhana devolves upon the sons and daughters jointly with
unmarried daughters taking a preference over the married daughters.
(5)It was held in Ashabai v. Haji Tyeb that the ornaments given to 
a woman after her marriage by her husband or his kindred devolver 
upon the sons and daughters in equal shares. No text-book or case
(6)was quoted m  this case for support. But in DayaIdas v. Savitribai
(1) Janglubai v. Jetha Appaji (1908)52 Bom.409.
(2) See supra p.^^6 ftnwaTro&s.
(3) Yaj.2.146 supra.
(4) Supra pp. iSA.- 5$.
(5) (1882)9 Bom.115 followed in Sitafoai v. Wasantarao 3 Bom.L.R.
201, Dayaldas v. Savitribai (1909)34 Bom.385. The report of 
Sitabai's case was not available in London but the case has 
been mentioned in Dayaldas*s case.
(6) 34 Bom.385 supra. Reliance was placed on W. & B.3rd edi.p.145, 
Banerji 2nd edi.p.371. Bhattacharya 2nd edi.p.583, Ghose H.L.
2nd edi*p.281, Mayne 7th edi.p.898. The counsel for the re­
spondent in this case raised two interesting points, namely,
that NTlakantha in this matter quotes the Mitaksara view and * » x ♦
then introduces the other view with the words 'pare tu’ and 
that according to Vasudeo v. Venkatesh (1873)10 Bom.H.C.R.139 
and Ki’ishnaji v. Pandurang (1875)12 Bom.H.C.R.65 when NTlaka­
ntha mentions two view in this way without stating which is 
his own the Mitaksara view is to be followed. But it was held 
that the words 'pare tu', as shown by their use in Nagojlbha-
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Chandavarkar J, accepted the above-mentioned rule as being the lav/ 
of the Mayukha. There is no reason, therefore, why the rest of the 
Mayukha order of succession to the technical stridhana should not be 
accepted.
It has already been seen that there is no such thing as 
non-technical stridhana according to the Mayukha: all which is
technical property of a woman is her stridhana whereas all her non­
technical property is not her s t r i d h a n a . B u t  since the decided 
cases have been uniform in holding self-acquired property (silpapr-
apta) and gifts from strangers as being stridhana according to the
(2)Mayukha, disputes about the line of succession to such property
/
were inevitable. According to NTlakantha, as according to the
writers of the Bengal School, such non-technical property of a woman
devolves upon her sons etc. as if it wtre her husband’s property.
But the decisions have been otherwise. West J. in Yijia-
(4)rangam v. Lakshuman observed that the order of succession to such 
property should be determined by treating the female proposita 1 as 
if she were a male’. Mayne thought that according to the Mayukha 
such property ’is taken by heirs, being sons or otherwise, as would
have taken it, if the accident of its falling to a woman had never
atta’s Paribhasendusekhara Kilhorn's edi.p.106 and Jagannatha’s 
Rasagangadhara Nir.edi. p.276 & 501, denote a modest refuta­
tion of the view stated immediately before them. Sir Ramak- 
rishna Bhandarkar’s opinion has been specially added to the 
report in the form of a foot-note.
(1) See supra pp. 90-9£-
(2) See supra pp. | £ J & 9 .
(3) See supra p p. ^ - So •
(4) (1871)8 B.H.C.R.244 at 260.
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(1) (2)occurred1. But in Manilal v. Bai Rewa wherein the point came
before the Bombay High Court for a direct decision Telang J, brushed 
aside both these opinions and held that "the heirs to strxdhan proper 
and stridhan improper are identical, save that as between the male 
and female Offspring the latter have a preferential right as regards 
stridhan proper, while the former have a similar right as to strid­
han improper."
(4)In Bax Raman v. dagjxvandas xt was held that the doc­
trine of spiritual efficacy is not applicable to devolution of strxd- 
hana and that therefore the non-technical strxdhana of a woman does 
not devolve simultaneously upon her sons, grandsons, and great-grand­
sons. It may accordingly be summed up that in view of the decisions 
the "non-technical" strxdhana of a woman governed by the Mayukha has 
the following line of succession: son, grandson, great-grandson,
daughter, daughter's son, daughter's daughter and in default of these 
the husband and his sapindas or the father and his sapindas as the 
case may be.
According to the Benares School, the Southern, and the 
Bombay School where the Mitaksara has a preponderance over the
(1) See Mayne referred to in 17 Bom.758 infra at 763.
(2) (1892)17 Bom.758. It need not be added that Mayne and West J., 
though appearing to be ambiguous, were nearer to truth than 
Telang J. was. But they did not come across the identical pro­
visions of Raghurama Siromani showing that such property de­
volves exactly like husband's property; otherwise they would 
have been more precise in their statement. Telang J., however, 
is at great pains to explain why in default of the progeny of 
the woman there is no provision in the Mayukha for further de­
volution of this so-called 'stridhan improper'. - See Report
at pp.768-70.
7 (3) 17 Bom.758 at 768.
(4) (1917)41 Bom.618, See also supra p. L; **> .
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Mayukha, there can be no doubt that such "non-technical” stridhana
would devolve according to the general line of succession given in
-  (1)the Mitaksara.
The law of the Mithila School and of the Mitaksara with re-
gard to succession to a childless woman's stridhana has been declared
(2)
by the Courts to be almost identical. But no case has come before
the Courts wherein the rule of preference amongst the progeny them­
selves could have been laid down. According to the authors of the
dll 5 V * a  t)tt£|>1r
Mithila School the yautaka and pitridatta stridhana ox a woman de-
volves jointly upon sons and daughters with unmarried daughters
(3)taking preference over the married ones. The order prescribed
for the fcvvT.er kind of stridhana is thus similar to the order given 
in the Mayukha for anvadheya etc.. It may not be unreasonable to 
conclude, therefore, that the order prescribed, according to the 
Mithila School, for all stridhana excepting yautaka and pitridatta 
should be the same as the order prescribed by Nilanantha for anvad-
(4)
heya and bhartridatta.
Before -turning to the decisions on the Dayabhaga School
it would be profitable to recapitulate in the form of synopsis the
 ^ ( 5)
position of its Gastric law on this topic.
v According to Jimuta the line of succession to all stridhana
(1) In view of the judicial law self-acquired property and gifts 
from strangers form stridhana of woman governed by any school 
of law. - See supra pp. 1 £ .
(2) Supra pp.M-h^
(3) See . supra p . ^ O  J.^ 5-70
(4) For the judicial law on the Mayukha see supra pp. for the 
sastric law see supra * A
(5) For a detailed discussion about the sastfic law of the Bengal 
School see supra p p . 4 .
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except yautaka and pitridatta is as follows:- uterine son and 
maiden daughter, married daughter who has or is likely to have a male 
issue, son's son, daughter's son and barren and widowed daughters 
taking together. In a parenthetical paragraph he also introduces 
the step-son and his son as heirs and states that a step-son succeeds 
in preference to the daughter's son. These are the only heirs 
amongst the progeny mentioned by JTmuta. But according to t§rxnatha, 
Ramabhadra and Srxkrisna the word 'praja' (progeny) includes also 
great-grandson, step-son, step-son's son, and step-son's son's son. 
Raghunandana and &rxkrisna place the great-grandson above the barren 
and widowed daughters in the list. &rxkrisna adds the above-mentioned 
step-children, in the order mentioned, immediately after the great- 
grandson and before the barren and widowed daughters.
The order of succession to yautaka is, according to JTmuta, 
as follows:- unbetrothed daughter, betrothed daughter, married 
daughter, and son. &rxnatha and iSrxkrisna also mention barren and 
widowed daughters before the son but &rxkrisna mentions that a 
daughter who has or is likely to have a male issue supersedes a 
barren or widowed one. To this incomplete list the commentators 
Srxkrisna and Srxkrisnakanta add the following heirs in order:♦ • • • * t ^
daughter's son, son's son, son's son's son, step-son, step-son's 
son and step-son's son's son.
The Dayabhaga is not quite clear as regards the line of 
succession to pitridatta. But on the whole it appears that accord­
ing to JTmuta the order prescribed for yautaka applies also to
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pitridatta given by the parents whether before, at the time of, or 
after the marriage. The commentators SrXkrisna and SrXkrisnakanta 
prescribe for pitridatta a special order of succession which, accord­
ing to the former apparently, and according to the latter definitely, 
applies to pitridatta which is not yautaka i.e. property given by 
parents either before or after the marriage. However, according to 
the Dayakramasangraha of SrXkrisna this order applies to all pitrid­
atta whether it is yautaka or ayautaka. The special order is maiden 
daughter, son, daughter who has or is likely to have a male issue, 
daughter's son, son's son, son's son's son, step-son, step-son's son, 
step-son's son's son, and barren and widowed daughters. According 
to the Dayakramasangraha, however, a son succeeds in default of all 
the daughters. Thus the provisions of the Bayabhaga and the Dayak­
ramasangraha are in complete accord with each other in this respect.
According to JTmuta the yautaka obtained by a woman during 
an approved form of marriage devolves upon the husband whereas the 
one gained during an unapproved form of marriage devolves upon the 
mother and then upon the father. According to him the bandhutta,
I
sulka, and anvadheyaka - in fact all property which is not yautaka, 
devolves successively upon uterine brother, mother, father and 
husband.
According to the commentators J&rTkrisna and SrTkrisnakanta 
the yautaka gained by a woman during an approved form of marriage 
devolves upon the husband, brother, mother and father whereas 
yautaka gained during an unapproved form of marriage devolves upon
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the mother, father, brother, and husband. They prescribe the same 
orders of succession for ayautaka: the former order is applicable
to ayautaka of a woman married in an approved form whereas the latter 
order is applicable to the ayautaka of a woman married in an un­
approved form.
The order of ultimate heirs, applicable to all kinds of 
stridhana in default of the above-mentioned heirs, is uniform accord­
ing to JTmuta and his commentators. It is as follows:- Husband's 
younger brother, husband’s brother's son, sister’s son, husband's 
sister's son, brother's son, son-in-law. JTmuta states that in de­
fault of these ultimate heirs the other sapindas inherit in their 
order. SrTkrisna states the successive right of the samanodakas, 
sakulyas and the king who take in default of all the sapindas.
It may be reiterated here again that the order of success­
ion given by JTmuta is incomplete, unsystematic and at some places 
even ambiguous whereas the order given by his last two commentators 
has been comparatively more elaborate, harmonious and precise.
Bwarkanath Mitter J. has laid down the foundations of the 
modern judicial law of the Bengal School concerning succession to 
strxdhana. The stand taken by him in a leading decision of the Cal­
cutta High Court must be noted before examining in particular the
mischief caused by the later decisions of the same High Court.
(1)Judoonath v. Bussant he tried to explain with the help of the 
Bayabhaga some passages in the Dayakramasangraha which were
(1) (1873)19 V/.R.264 followed in Hurrymohun v. Shonatun (1876)
1 Cal.275 and cases mentioned in note (2) below.
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obviously contrary to the former and held that the latter was in
consonance with the former. The attempt of reconciling these two
treatises was indeed so unsatisfactory that the later judges of the
same High Court who noticed the contradiction nevertheless followed
the decision given by Mitter J* but proceeded on a different ratio:
wherever there is a disagreement between JTmuta and any of his
(1)followers the former is to be followed by the Courts.
With the exception of the great-grandson and step-children
who are introduced only by the later authors of the Bengal School
the line of succession to stridhana amongst the progeny themselves
is practically uniform according to all authors of the same School;
naturally very few cases in which this order of preferential heirs
was under dispute have appeared before the Courts.
(2)
In Srinath v. Sarbamangala it was held that a betrothed
daughter is not entitled to succeed to ayautaka of her mother so
long as an unbetrothed daughter existed. Similarly unbetrothed
daughter and son are both preferred to a married daughter in success-
(3)ion.
It has been held that a widowed daughter having a son at 
the time when the succession opens is to be considered as a daughter
(1) Gopal Changrla v. Ram Chandra (1901)28 Cal.311, Ram Gopal v. 
Narain Chandra (1905)33 Cal.315, Debiprasanna v. Harendra (1910) 
37 Cal.863, Mohendra v. Giris Chandra (1915)19 C.W.1V.12S7, 
Krishnabehari v. Sarojini (1933)60 Cal.1061, Chamatkari Deyi
v. Narendra I.L.R.1947 Cal.Vol.1.p.173, Jyotiprasad v. Baid- 
yanath I.L.R. 194-9 Pat.75.
(2) (1868)10 W.R.488. It was contended by the counsel that be­
trothed means marriage and he relied on Mac.H .L .Vol.I.58 and 
Vya.Da.2nd edi.645.
(3) P.J.Delanney v. Pranhari Guha (1918)22 C.W.N.990.
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having or likely to have a male issue. CD But it appears that a
widowed daughter having only a daughter cannot he included in this
yautaka or ayautaka of her mother*s mother as the general principle
not succeed to a woman*s stridhana as her progeny their place will 
be considered while dealing with the heirs to strxdhana of a child' 
less woman.
cutta High Court held by a majority of two to one that pitridatta
which is not yautaka devolves upon the son in preference to the
married daughter. The order given by SrTkrisna in his synopsis on
the commentary on the Dayabhaga was preferred by Brett J. and Mitra
J. to the order laid down by him in his Dayakramasangraha. Both the
learned judges pointed out that the word 'kanya* as used in Manu's
(6)verse which is quoted in the Dayabhaga means, according to all
(7)
commentators and lexicographers, unmarried daughters only; that
(1) Charu Chander v. Nobo Sundari (1898)18 Cal.327.
(2) See Bhattacharya H.L.2nd edi.p.599. The reason is that such
daughter is not in a position to confer any spiritual benefit 
on the proposita which is the reason why according to JTmuta a
daughter who has or is likely to have a male issue gets a pre­
ferential right.
(5) Madhumala v. Lakshan (1913)20 C.W.N.627 (Mayne 7th ed/.pp.671 
8c 673, Banerjee 3rd edi.p.429, Sarkar 4-th edi.p.463-64 relied 
upon). The same is the case with a sister's son's son - 
Satish Chandra v. Haridas A.I .R. 1934 Cal.399. Sc* <*!**> Vi-Mi*. Sup^
(4) Chamtkari v. Narendra Nath I.L.R. 1947 Vol.I.p. 173 infra.
(5) (1908)36 Cal.87.
(6) Manu 9.198 quoted in Da.Bha.4-.2.16 supra.
(7) See 37 Cal.87 at 113-4 wherein Mitra J. states — i
class (2) A daughter's daughter is not an heir at all either to
(3)in Bengal is that women can inherit only under an express text.
(4)As in a recent case it has been laid down that step-son etc. can-
Succession to pitridatta, however, offered a very intricate
(5)
problem. In Prosanno v. Sarat Shoshi their Lordships of the Cal-
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the order laid down by &rxkrxsna in his commentary has been accepted 
as correct by Macnaghten, Strange, Banerjee, Siromani, Elfoerling 
etc;^^ and that according to the established judicial view the pro­
visions of the Dayabhaga are to be preferred to the provisions of
_ — . (2)the Dayatatva or the Dayakramasangraha* It was also pointed out
that though the order given in the Dayakramasangraha was accepted
in the third edition of the Vyavasthadarpana the view of the author
was different in the previous editions and that such change in op-
(3)inion only weakens the authority of the author.
Coxe J., however, adopted a more attractive view: observ­
ing that JTmuta used the word 'kanya' only because Manu had used the 
same and not necessarily to include unmarried daughter only he
primarily means maiden daughter and cites in his favour Amara- 
sin^ *, Hemachandra, Medini, £abdakalpadruma, Wilson’s dictionary 
as well as Kulluka, Raghavananda, Nandana, and Ramachandra on 
Manu 9,198 and all the commentaries on Da.Bha.4.2.16. Only 
Sarvajnanarayana commenting upon the above says: ’’Kanyeti
duhitrimatraparani”. But it is remarked that in Bengal the 
authority of Kulluka is superior to that of Sarvajnanarayana.
(1) Macnaghten 1829 edi.vol.I.p.39-40, Strange vol.I.p.247, Siro­
mani 1885 edi.p.398 referred to ft report pp.95-97 by Brett J.
See also Vya.Da.and Elberling referred to at pp.97 and 114. 
Banerjee in his first edition gives Srxkrisna’s order as gener­
ally correct, in his second edition states that order as correct 
according to some authorities but does not express his own op­
inion; Vyavastha Darpana 1st edi. follows the synopsis, 
second edi. is slightly changed and the third edi. puts all the 
daughters before son; Mayne 8th edi.p.900 accepts all daughters 
before a son; - see all these authorities discussed in the re­
port at pp.95-98 and at p.114.
(2) Report at p.114.
(3) Report at p.114. The third edi. was published after the death 
of the author. However, Strange was also alleged to have 
changedfois previous opinion that according to the Mitaksara 
inherited property is strxdhana but their Lordships of the 
Madras High Court did not regard this change to have weakened 
the authority of Strange. See supra p.130.
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further advocated that the Dayakramasangraha being a later work of 
&rxkrisna than his commentary the view adopted by the author in his 
later work should be preferred.
Their Lordships ajjparently did not understand the import 
either of the Dayabhaga or of the commentaries on the same.
Jxmuta gives two interpretations for Manu’s verse; one is that all 
pitridatta is to devolve just like yautaka with preference to dau­
ghters over sons; the second one is that a step-daughter of Brahmin 
co-wife should succeed in preference to a son of proposita of a 
lower caste. Brett J. and Mitra J. have carried an elaborate dis­
cussion to show that Jxmuta has used the word ’kanya' (umparried 
daughter) in contradistinction to the word 'duhita' and they think 
that the commentators also adopt the same view. They do not refer 
to the two interpretations put forward by JTmuta. But Srxnatha, 
Ramabhadra and Achyuta concentrate upon the second interpretation 
and state that a daughter of a brahmin co-wife succeeds in preference 
to a woman’s own son because she is able to confer spiritual benefit 
through her son. The explanation shows that these authors included 
a married daughter also in the words 'brahmanx kanya'. Mahesvara 
actually uses the word 'duhita' and Achyuta appears to repudiate 
the argument that the word 'kanya* should be limited to its original 
meaning, namely, an unmarried daughter. Despite all these author­
ities their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court ventured to main­
tain that according to the Dayabhaga as supported by its commenta­
ries a son succeeds in preference to a married daughter in succession
(1) 'See supra pp.3$f^-£7 wherein the commentaries on Da.Bha.
4.2.16 are discussed.
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to his mother’s pitridatta which is ayautaka. It is clear that the 
decision of their Lordships is in consonance neither with the pro­
visions of Jxmuta nor with those of his followers.
This special order applies, according to &rikrisnafs 
synopsis apparently and according to &rTkrisnakanta’s synopsis de­
finitely, only to pitridatta which is ayautaka. But according to 
the Dayabhaga and the Dayakramasangraha there is no distinction, 
for the purpose of succession, between pitridatta which is yautaka 
and that which is not yautaka. The point about succession to pit­
ridatta yautaka was not before the Courts but it appears that if we 
follow the ratio of Prosanno's case the synopsis of SrXkrisna wi 11 
be preferred to his independent treatise and that instead of apply­
ing this special order, the general order prescribed for yautaka will
(1)also be applied to pitridatta which is yautaka.
So far there has been only one case and that too a recent
one on succession to yautaka of a childless woman. In Bhadu I)asi v.
(2)Gokul Chandra, Miter J. held that the husband is to foe preferred
(1) But really speaking the line of succession to all pitridatta 
whether it is yautaka or ayautaka should foe the same. - See 
Sarkar 6th edi.p.737. But see Bhattacharya p.595 wherein the 
author maintains that excepting the fact that an unmarried 
daughter is preferred to a son in succession to pit ridatta the
rules governing succession to both yautaka and ayautaka apply 
to pitridatta also; he further argues that the special rules 
about pitridatta have no scope at all as regards pitridatta 
which is yautaka. He maintains that Da.Kra.Sam.2.5.2-3 apply 
to yautaka pitridatta and 2.5.4 applies to ayautaka pitridatta. 
This view appears to have been adopted in Ram Gopal v. Narain 
Chandra (1905)53 Cal.315* But a perusal of the original text 
(pp.26-27) leaves no doubt that there is no such distinction 




when the yautaka has been obtained in an approved form of marriage
while the mother and the father are to be preferred to the husband
where the yautaka is obtained during unapproved form of marriage.
So far the decision remains unchallenged; for this order is common
to Jx$uta, Raghunandana, and Srikrisna. But Mitter J. in this case
(1)has relied solely upon Banerjee's statement to this effect and 
the mischief which can be caused by relying only on a text-book is 
apparent when one looks to Banerjee’s book itself.
Now the question is whether yautaka should directly de­
volve upon the ultimate heirs in default of the husband in case of an 
approved form of marriage and in default of the mother and father in 
case of unapproved form of marriage. Banerjee correctly states that 
according to Srxkrisna the husband, brother, mother, and father 
successively are heirs in the former case and that the mother, father, 
brother and the husband are heirs in the latter case. lie states
this order as being ’generally accepted’ and therefore approves the
(2)
same. However, the larned author states that according to Rag­
hunandana the former order is: the husband, mother, brother and
of I W U  ^ ^  bKcij h . ( 3)
father and refers to a portion from which he claims to derive ^upporx.
(1) Banerjee 5th edi.pp.489-91 relied upon.
(2) See Banerjee referring to Mac.pp.39-40, Strange vo.X.p.251 
and Vya.Da.pp.5318-19.
(3) See Banerjee pp.490-91 wherein the author relies upon Da.Ta. 
10.62. But the chapter in the translation consists only of 
thirty-nine sections. The truth is that Raghunandana simply 
confirms the order given by Jxmuta - See Da.Ta.trans.10.19 - 
text p.45. The reference given by Banerjee may be a misprint 
for Da.Ta.10.26 wherein the text of Devala is quoted. By the 
context the text may be made applicable to yautaka and the order 
therein is the husband, mother, brother or the father. But the 
enumeration given is not necessarily in order of succession; 
for by context the text may be made applicable to yautaka
j)
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But from the foregoing discussion it will have become clear that at
the proper place Raghunandana simply confirms the order given by
T~ (1)Jimuta.
Now as the provisions given by Jimuta are preferred to 
those given by his followers it is quite possible that by analogical 
reasoning the provisions given by Raghunandana might be preferred to 
the provisions given by the later author Srikrisna; on a footing of 
this kind any,judge of High Court, who is not in a position to go 
to the original texts or their translations, may depend upon Baner­
jee ' s statement and hold, upon the supposed authority of Raghunandana, 
that the mother of a woman is preferrable to her own brother in 
succession to yautaka obtained by her in an approved form of marriage. 
To avoid such mischief it is essential for a judge of a High Court 
not to rely solely upon the opinion of a text-book writer.
Coming to succession to ayautaka of a childless woman
(2)Judoonath v. Busu_nt appears to be the first case on the point.
In this case the property under dispute was given to the proposita, 
under a testamentary disposition, by her father before her marriage. 
The property was thus pitridatta which was ayautaka. Their Lordships 
of the Calcutta High Court observed that Jimuta is ambiguous on 
this point and following Macnaghten and Strange who base their view
gained either during approved or unapproved form of marriage 
and it is obvious that even according to Raghunandana himself 
the husband cannot be the first preferential heir to the yau­
taka of a childless woman gained by her during an unapproved 
form of marriage. See supra pi 5.So it is better to assume 
that he has simply confirmed in Da.fa.10.19 the order given 
by Jimuta.
(1) See supra p.
(2) (1871)16 W.R.105.
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on the order given in Srikrisna's commentary they held that property
obtained by a woman from her father either before or after marriage 
devolves upon the husband in preference to her brother or mother in 
cases wherein she has been married in an approved form. This was 
evidently the correct view.
(1)But the case, came in review before the same High Court
_  _  (2)and Mitter J. approved the order given in the Bayabhaga, namely, 
uterine brother, mother, father and the husband, for determining 
succession either to bandhudatta, sulka or anvadheyaka of a childless 
woman married either in approved or unapproved form. He tried to 
show that even Srikrisna in his D ay akramas ah grah a supports this
(3)
conclusion. He was obviously wrong in holding so, for whether
(1) Judoonath v. Bussunt (1873)19 W.R.264.
(2) Da.Bha.4.3.29 was considered to be a resume of all the dis­
cussion started in 4.3.10 wherein Jimuta refers to Yaj.2.144 
mentioning bandhudatta, anvadheyaka A n d sulka.
(3) Mitter J. quoted Da.Kra.Sam.2.3.15-16 in favour of such con­
clusion and observed that in conformity with these passages 
the words "the son and the rest succeed as in the case of pro­
perty received at nuptials..." occurring in Da.Kra.Sam.2.5.3. 
include heirs only up to great-grandson but do not include the 
husband. But section two of the treatise deals with succession 
only to yautaka whereas section five deals with pitridatta. A 
casual glance at section five would prove that the limitation 
suggested by Mitter J. is absolutely uncalled for*. Moreover 
section four of the treatise pertains to ayautaka and paragraph 
eleven of the same says that the rules about yautaka apply also 
to all ayautaka of a childless woman in accordance with the 
form of her marriage. (See supra pp. 33$-$) Mitter J. also 
states that in Wynch's translation of Da.Kra.Sam.2.3.15-16 there 
is a printing mistake, namely, that there should be a full-stop 
after the word 'successor'. But thex^ e is no defedt in Wynch's 
punctuation at all. It is Mitter J. himself who approaches
the paragraph with a pre-conceived notiam and wants to carve 
out a particular meaning from the same - see Bhattacharya H.L. 
2nd edi.pp.595-97. The contradiction between Da.Bha. and Da.
Kra .Sain, was admitted in later cases - See infra pp. -8 5 .
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property is yautaka or ayautaka Srikrisna, both in his commentary
on the Bayabhaga and in his Bayakramasaiigraha gives two uniform lines 
of succession applicable to all property of a childless woman with 
preference to one line or the other depending solely upon the form 
of the marriage of the woman.
However in later cases their Lordships of the Calcutta 
High Court have merely followed the decision given by Mitter J. in 
Judoonath's case. Thus it has been held that the same rule is 
applicable to anvadheyaka (post-nuptial gifts) of a woman which was 
given to her after her marriage by her husband's father's sister's 
son.^^ In Gopal Chandra v. Ram Chandra the same order was held 
to be applicable to the property of a woman which she secures after 
her marriage, though their Lordships admitted that 'there is no 
doubt some conflict* between Jimuta and his followers. On the 
authority of Judoonath's case it has been held that the same order 
is applicable to all kinds of ayautaka including ayautaka which is
(1) See supra pp. 398**39.
(2) Hurrymohun v. Shonatun (1876)1 Cal.275.
(3) (1901)28 Cal.311 (¥ya.Ba.3rd edi.pp.246-48 and 262, and 
Mayne 6th edi.p.875 were followed in this case). But the 
view of Sarkar to the contrary was not followed. But see 
Sarkar 6th edi.p.737 wherein the author adversely comments 
upon the decision in this case.
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( X) (2)• pitridatta. It was"also remarked in this case that a partic-
ular heir mentioned in the Dayhbhaga does not necessarily include
persons of half-blood as well as full-blood. This bring us to the
discussion about the right of succession of step-relations.
Jimuta mentions only uterine brother in this group of 4
heirs to ayautaka strldhana of a childless woman; so it has been
(3<Xheld in bebiprasanna v. Harendra that a step-brother is not in­
cluded in this group of heirs and that the husband's younger brother 
is to be preferred to the woman's own step-brother. Their Lordships
(1) Ram Gopal v. Narain Chandra (1905)33 Cal.315, followed in
Debiprasanna v. Harendra (1910)37 Cal.863, Mohendra v. Giris
Chandra (1915)19 C.W.N.1287, Chamatkari v. Narendra Nath I.L.R. 
1947 Cal.Vol.I p.173. The ratio of these decisions is that Da. 
Bha.4.3.29 is resume of a long discussion begun in para.no.10 
and so the order mentioned in the former paragraph is to be 
followed notwithstanding any discussion to the contrary in the 
previous paragraphs. In all these cases the authority of 
Srikrisna was brushed aside in favour of the decision in Jud­
oonath's case. In Mohendra's case Fletcher J. observed: "I 
must accept what has been accepted in this Court for a long
time. The Hindu law must be understood not by what it is in
the text-books but by what it has been interpreted to be by the 
judges of this Court." In the same case he held that property 
given to a sister by her brother 7 years after her marriage but 
in fulfilment of a promise made at the time of her marriage is, 
nevertheless, her ayautaka as the promise is not capable of 
being specifically enforced. But he seems to have neglected 
the argument of counsel that the property in this case was given 
at the time of 'dviragamana' and that according Churaman v.
Gopi (1910)37 Cal.l such property is to be treated as yautaka. 
For 'dviragamana' see supra
(2) Ram Gopal's case supra.
(3) (1910)37 Cal.863. To substantiate their view that the word
'bhrata' includes only full brother their Lordships referred to 
Ilemachandra, Bothlingk and Roth: Sanskrit Worterhuch Vol.Ill
p.1201 and Sam.Ma.Mandlik's edi.p.80: "bhratritvam ekapitri- 
matri janyatvam". See also Vya.Ma.14-2. Followed in Gunamani v. 
l)ebi Prasanna Roy (1919)23 C.W.N. (husband's younger brother 
preferred to a son adopted by the father of the proposita after 
her mother's death). Incidentally the mistake in Colebrook's 
translation of Da.Bh. 4.3.31 was pointed out in Debi Prasanna's 
case. See also Setlur's translation of the same paragraph where
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held that the doctrine of spiritual benefit cannot be invoked in
favour of a step-brother as Jimuta mentions only four heirs in the
first group and six ultimate heirs in the second group. The case
was followed by their Lordships of the Patna High Court in
(1)Jyotiprasad v. Baidyanath.
(2)
Similarly in Krishnabehari v. Sarojini it was held that
a brother’s son succeeds in preference to a step-daughter's son.
Their Lordships brushed aside the authority of the commentaries of
Srikrisna and others who include step-daughter and her son in the
paragraph wherein Jimuta parenthetically introduces step-son and
(3 )
step-son’s son as heirs, and observed that Srxkrisna being more 
zealous about the doctrine of spiritual benefit, introduces these
(4)additional heirs whereas Jimuta is more equitable and authoritative.
It was also remarked that a particular heir mentioned in the Dayafoh- 
aga does not necessarily include a person of half-blood as well as 
of full-blood. Although the decision in this case was right the
in the words 'paternal uncle's wife* should be introduced in 
between the maternal uncle's wife and the father's sister; 
also Goldstuker's paper supra p. if-if.?.
(1) I.L.R.1949 Pat.75. See report at p.83 wherein on the authority 
of Col.Big.vol.il p.612 their Lordships refused to apply the 
doctrine of spiritual benefit.
(2) (1933)60 Cal.1061.
(3) See supra for Da.Bha.4.3.33 and the commentaries upon the same.
(4) 60 Cal.1061 at 1066 (Banerjee cited for holding that Jxmuta 
is more equitable). It was also pointed out that Colebrook's 
translation of Da.Bha.4.3.33 wherein the word 'sapatnxputra' 
has been translated by him as 'the child of a rival wife' has 
been more in consonance with view of the commentators and not 
of Jimuta and hence wrong. For once the view held by their 
Lordships of the Calcutta High Court appears to be correct; 
because Srxkrisna, although he mentions a step-daughter and 
her son in his commentary on this paragraph, does not mention 
these heirs in his synopsis - See Da.Bha.4.3.40-42.
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luqS
reasoning definitely wrong. It was from Banerjee that their Lord- 
ships of the Calcutta High Court borrowed their idea that succession 
to strxdhana, according to the Bengal School, is not as much governed 
by the doctrine of spiritual efficacy as by natural love and affec­
tion. The statement may be true in a few cases; but Jxmuta as pro­
perly understood by all the commentators from Srxnatha to Srxkrisna-
kanta has not deserted this principle even in succession to strxd-
(2)hana. But the misunderstanding of their Lordships of the Calcutta
High Court was of such long standing that any more recent suggestion
to the contrary was promptly negatived by them in every case.
But it is necessary to refer to an older case which had
been neglected in Debi Prasanna*s case. In .Oasharathi v. Bipin
(3)Behari, Golapchandra Sarkar argued that capacity to offer spiritual 
benefit is the governing principle also in succession to strxdhana 
according to the Bengal School and that the ultimate heirs have been 
given their preferential place only because of this doctrine. Accord­
ingly, their Lordships, though they did not exactly agree with Sarkar, 
held that a half-sisterfs son succeeds in the place of a sister’s 
son on account of his equal capacity of conferring spiritual benefit 
and is to be preferred to the husband’s eider brother.
Dasharathi’s case was not referred to in Debiprasanna’s 
case but was considered in Krishnabehari’s and Jyotiprasad’s cases
(1) See supra p and infra p. ^ ^0.
(2) For instance see Da.Bha.4.3.35-37.
(3) (1904)32 Cal.2Ql followed in Shashi Bhushan v. Rajendra Nath
(1912)40 cal.82. The ratio in Dasharathi1s case was based 
upon Bhola Nath Roy v. Rakhal Dass Mukherji (1884)11 Cal.69.
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but it ivas held in these latter cases that the decision in Dashar­
athi * s case is limited only to the line of ultimate heirs. But it 
is evident that what is applicable to a step-sister’s son is also 
applicable mutatis mutandis to a step-daughter’s son or step-brother
It is now important to determine the position of a step­
son, his son and his son's son which has been recently shifted by a 
decision of the Calcutta High Court. It must be noted that most of 
the old as well as the new text-books show these three successive 
heirs as taking their place immediately before the husband or the 
mother, as the case may be, in succession to yautaka and immediately
before the barren and the widowed daughters in succession to ayaut-
(2)aka. Their position has thus been fixed on the authority of
Srikrisna. It should be remembered that Jimuta, in a parenthetical
(3)paragraph, introduces the step-son and his son as heirs and puts 
the step-son even before the daughter's son although the commentators 
who comment on this paragraph deny this preferential position to a 
step-son.
(4)
In Purna Chandra v. Gopal Lai Mukherjee J. held, on the 
supposed authority of the commentators, that this very paragraph
(1) But see Nogendra v. Benoy (1902)31 Cal.521 at‘ 527 wherein 
Stephen J. observed: "...That the characteristic doctrine of 
the Bengal law is that, as far as the nearer relatives are con­
cerned, inheritance depends 011 consanguinity; but in the case 
of remote relations the law falls back on the principle of 
spiritual benefit."
(2) See Macnaghten p.39; Mayne 749-51; Bhattacharya 590-93;
Grady 196-98; Mu Ha 132-54. However, as regards the position 
of these heirs in succession to ayautaka Mayne, Mulla and 
Gupte refer only to the authority of the Dayakramasahgraha.
(3) Da.Bha.4.3.33 supra p.
(4) 8 C.L.J.369 referred to in Chamatkari’s case.
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which introduces, and determines the position of, a step-son is
spurious. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, without considering
the genuineness of this paragraph, reversed the decision in this case
(1)on another point. It is because of this, it seems, that the same
learned judge did not venture to say anything in Debiprasqnna' s
(2)case about the genuineness of this paragraph. In Itrishnabehari*s
( 3 )case their Lordships were inclined to think that though Jxmuta
mentions the right of the step-son etc. he does not indicate their 
position and that they need not succeed as progeny of a woman.
So far the decisions in which the step-relations of a 
woman were not given the place of their co-relative heirs of full- 
blood were based on an inclination to think that the enumeration in 
the Dayabhaga is successive and complete. They dealt with step- 
relations like step-brother etc. who have not been mentioned by 
Jimuta at all. But the question about the right of the step-son
came before the Calcutta High Court in a recent case of Chamatkari
(4) . .v. Narendra Nath and their Lordships gave a devastating decision
to the effect that succession to ayautaka of a woman devolves, in
default of her issue, upon her brother, mother, father and the
husband and that a step-son can come in only after the husband.
Following the lamentable tradition of the Calcutta High Court of
(1) Gopal Lai v. Furnachandra (1921)49 Cal.P.C.459. The reader 
ought to be reminded here that although Achyuta and SrTkrisna 
refuse to put the step-son before the daughter's son and thus 
take a more equitable view than their master they do not 
totally deny the right of a step-son to inherit to his step--'B 
mother's property as her son.
(2) (1910)37 Cal.863 supra. See a remark to this effect in Krish-
nabehari v. Sarojini (1933)60 Cal.1061 at 1068-69.
(3) ibid at pp.1068 onwards.
(4) I.L.R.1947 vol.I.p.173.
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misjudging the opinion and importance of JXmdta's commentators their 
Lordships observed that according to all the commentators the paren­
thetical paragraph in the Dayabhaga which fixed the position of a 
step-son before daughter*s son was spurious. Noticing that in the 
Dayatatva and the Dayakrasangraha the step-son has been introduced
even before the widowed and barren daughters their Lordships remarked
(1)that Jimuta is more equitable than his followers; that Srikrisna
in his commentary on the Dayabhaga contradicts his opinion expressed
( 2 )in the Dayakramasangraha, that the spiritual reasoning given in
the Dayatatva for'admitting a step-son as an heir amongst the progeny
(3)is not correct; that Macnaghten, Strange and others merely
(1) Ibid at p.181. As usual Banerjee (5th edi.p.477)is referred
to with approval. But Banerjee does not totally deny the right 
of a step-son to inherit his step-mother *s stridhana as her son. 
He simply says that the step-children should not succeed before 
the barren and widowed daughters in succession to ayautaka.
But he accepts the opinion of Srxkrisna that a woman's own 
great-grandson and her step-son etc, should succeed immediately 
after son's son in succession to yautaka. - See Banerjee p.483, 
Thus even in the former case it seems that according to the 
learned scholar the step-son etc. succeed as sons after the 
barren and widowed daughters; otherwise he would have mentioned 
these heirs as being entitled to succeed as sapindas after the 
ultimate heirs at a place where he deals with the right of the 
former. - See Banerjee at pp.498-99. Unfortunately this is one 
of the many lacunae in his otherwise useful book.
(2) Report at p.181-82.
(3) Report at p.182-83. Da.Ta.10.25 has been referred to wherein 
the author says that step-son etc. should succeed before the 
husband etc. because the latter have no capacity to present 
oblations which can be enjoyed by the deceased proposita. But 
their Lordships point out that according to Da.Kra.Sam.l.8.1-2 
and Mahesvara on Da.Bha.4.3.33 a woman does not share the obla­
tion offered to her husband by her step-son so that his position 
is none better. See also Da.Bha.3.2.30 and 11.6.3 upon the 
authority of which it has been held that a step-mother is not 
entitled to succeed to her step-son. See Mayne p.624. But on 
the other hand see Da.Kra.Sam.2.3.13 and 2.4.9 which pertain
to stridhana succession and in which Srlkrisna states that a, • *
son and grandson of a step-son succeed because they offer 
pindas to the husband of the proposita in which she partakes.
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Reproduced' tables from the Dayakramasangraha and that according to 
the established judicial view the opinion of Jxmuta is to be pre-
Cl)ferred to that of his followers.
They gave the gist of their view in these words: "We can­
not say that the list of heirs given in the Dayabhaga in regard to 
stridhan property of a woman is complete or exhaustive. But we are 
definitely of the opinion that to the extent the author purports to 
enumerate the heirs specifically one after another, the list must be 
taken to be complete, and there is no room for introducing any per­
son who has not been expressly mentioned in between persons specific­
ally enumerated. As has been said already the rules of succession 
to stridhan property are not based on a uniform principle like that 
of spiritual benefit and it cannot be said that the commentators in
the present case have merely applied the principle which is enumera-
( 2)
ted by the author...".
It is sufficient to say that their Lordships have misinter­
preted the Sastric law on each and every ground which they have re-
(3)sorted to for the purpose of substantiating their conclusion.
Moreover according to the Dayabhaga the doctrine of spiritual bene­
fit is as applicable to succession to strxdhana as to succession to
(1) For these see supra pp. 47 5-7tf.
(2) Report at pp.178-79.
(3) For the alleged spuriousness of Da.Bha.4.3.33 see supra pp. 401*-5 
However^about the spiritual efficacy of a step-son there appears 
to be a conflict of opinion - see supra p. 4 9 0  • Mitra Misra
on the other hand admits the right of a step-son to succeed as 
a son on the ground of established tradition - see supra p. 346* 
The same must be the reason why the later authors of the Bengal 
School ascribe a preferential position to step-son etc.
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a male's property. A few exceptions to this principle are seen
in succession to a male's property as well as in succession to 
(2)strxdhana. Moreover if in succession to a male's property heirs
that are not mentioned in the Dayabhaga but who are recommended,
whether on the ground of spiritual efficacy or otherwise, in the
Dayakramasangraha are entitled to succeed in the position ascribed
to them by SrTkrisna there is no reason why the same rule should not
be made applicable to succession to strxdhana also. Even Banerjee
upon whose alleged opinion the decision in this case appears to have
been based does not put step-son etc. after the husband but simply
(3 )postpones them till after the widowed and barren daughters. More­
over it is to be noted that he admits, on the ground of spiritual 
efficacy, the suggestion of Jagannatha that the father's kinsmen 
and mother's kinsmen should succeed in between the samanodakas and
the Crown though they are not mentioned either by Jxmuta or by 
, (4)
SrTkri^na. There xs, therefore, no reason why the step-son etc.
should not be given the position ascribed to them by Raghunandana 
and Srxkrisna.
(1) See supra pp. 379-S'o. ^ 93-
(2) For instance in succession to a male's property the father and
mother of the deceased are preferred to many heirs who are 
capable of conferring better spiritual benefit on the deceased. 
See Ganesabhatta's Da.Vya.Sam.f.1(a): "Yah sraddhakarta sa• • • u x f t
eva na sarvatra dhanadhikarx prayikatvat. Yatha matapitarau 
dayadhikarinau sraddhadhikarinastu bhratradayah." See also 
Akshay Chandra v. Haridas (1908)35 Cal.721 wherein several 
instances are quoted in which the test of spiritual efficacy 
either fails or is not the sole test. See also Mayne 11th 
edi.p.682.
(3) See supra p.J+^Lo*
(4) Banerjee 5th edi.p.500. He remarks: "One of the strongest 
arguments in support of this view is the fact that it is de- 
ducible from the doctrine of spiritual benefit, which is so 
emphatically and so repeatedly declared by the founder of 
Bengal School to be applicable to the devolution of strxdhana."
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The decision which has been given with regard to ayautaka 
is equally applicable to yautaka also as the same paragraph of the 
Bayabhaga which has been declared to be spurious is applicable to 
both* Most of the text-book writers admit the right of the great- 
grandson, step-son, step-son’s son and step-son’s son's son immedia­
tely after the son's son in yautaka succession and some state that
they succeed in the same way but before the barren and widowed
(1)daughters xn ayautaka successxon. All of them wxll have to be 
amended now. The worst thing is that according to the ratio of the 
decision even woman's own great-grandson cannot succeed before all 
heirs enumerated in the Dayabhaga. This creates a lot of intricac­
ies in determining the line of succession after the so-called 
ultimate heirs.
f In default of the ultimate heirs mentioned in Brihaspati's
text Jimuta mentions that the sapindas like husband’s elder brother
or father-in-law succeed in accordance with their degree of sapinda- 
(2)ship. This remark by itself shows that Jimuta did not expect the
step-children to succeed after the six secondary sons mentioned by 
Brihaspati; if he did there can be no doubt that he would have de­
nominated the sapindas as the step-son etc. instead of the father- 
in-law etc.. The effect of the decision in Chamatkari1s case is 
felt here also since according to it it is evident that even a 
woman’s own great-grandson would succeed in this group. The heirs,
(1) Mac.Vol.I.p.39-40; Vya.Da.716-19; Bhattacharya pp.590 & 593; 
Mayne 11th edi_.p.749-51; Banerjee p.483 (for yautaka) and
p.484 (for pr*itidatta).
(2) See supra p. 1|.g 6.
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accordingly would be: step-son, step-son*s son, step-son*s grand­
son and woman*s own great-grandson succeeding together, step-daughter, 
step-daughter*s son, the father-in-law, the husband's elder brother
etc.* They would come in the same order in which they would succeed
(1)to the property of the husband of the deceased.
The position of a woman's own great-grandson in this set 
of heirs appears to be ludicrous since he is superior, both from the 
point of consanguinity or spiritual efficacy, to all the persons who 
are heirs to stridhana of a "childless" woman* The position of a 
step-son is also not less surprising since, talcing into considera­
tion the decision in Dasharathi * s case, a woman's half-sister's son 
would exclude her own step-son* These anomalies in the law have been 
brought about by the fact that the decisions which are contrary to
(1) Although SrTkrisna admits in his commentary on Da.Bha.4.3.32
the right of step-daughter and her son as being included in the 
words 'suta* and 'tatsuta' he does not mention them in his 
synopsis on Da.Bha.4.3.40-42* Bhattacharya, after having noticed 
the above thing, appears to neglect the right of these heirs. - 
Bhattacharya H.L.2nd edi.p.600. Sarkar gives a peculiar po­
sition to step-children whom he puts after the set of four 
heirs 'the husband etc.', who succeed in different order accord­
ingly as the property is yautaka or ayautaka, and before the 
six secondary sons mentioned by Brihaspati. Amongst the child­
ren of a rival wife inter se he fixes the order as her son, 
daughter, son's son, and daughter's son. - Sarkar 6th edi. 
p.736. According to him this order applies to both yautaka and 
ayautaka. In view of this provision the caption for the last 
paragraph on p.739 of the same edition of his book namely, 
'step-sons are treated as sons' is a misprint. Read 'sons-in- 
law' instead of 'step-sons'. According to Banerjee it seems that 
amongst the sapindas first the father-in-law and then the 
husband's elder brother succeed. After them he admits, dn the 
authority of Jagannatha, great-grandson in the male line of the 
father-in-law, husband's paternal grandfather and his 'issue* 
and next the husband's paternal great-grandfather and his 'off­
spring' • But he seems to have totally forgotten about the step­
daughter and her issue. See Banerjee pp.498-99.
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each other have been given by the divisional benches of the same 
High Court. It must be remarked that it would have been more reason­
able on the part of their Lordships in Chamatlcari’s case to have had 
referred the case to the full bench instead of deciding it themselves. 
The full bench of the High Court would have brought at least uni­
formity, if not correctness, into the law of the Bengal School.
According to Srtkrisna the sakulyas, samanodakas and the 
Crown in that order inherit in default of the sapindas of the pro­
posita and this position has been accepted by the text-book writeri^ 
Jagannatha mentions that the kinsmen, up to the tenth degree, of the 
father and then of the mother should inherit in the absence of saman­
odakas , and before the Crown. This addition has been accepted on the
( 2)
grounds of spiritual efficacy also by Banerjee. There is no
reason why this suggestion should not be accepted on the grounds of
equity if not necessarily of spiritual efficacy.
&rZkrisna does not authorise a king to take by escheat the
( 3 )property of a brahmin woman. But notwithstanding a similar pro­
vision concerning the property of a brahmin male it has been held
that the property of a brahmin male is escheated to the Crowh in the
(4)absence of heirs, so it seems inevitable that the rule in favour
of a brahmin woman also will be disregarded by the Courts.
Thus there are two special features of JTmuta*s system of
(1) Banerqee p.499, Bhattacharya p.598, Mayne 11th edi.p.750. But 
only father’s kinsmen are mentioned after the husband’s sapi­
ndas in Sarkar 6th edi.p.736.
(2) Banerjee p.500, Mayne p.750.
(3) See Da.Kra.Sam. supra p.lfo£ * For the general attitude of
Courts against escheat see supra p p . , * + 6 6 *
(4) Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata (1961)8 M.I.A.529.
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succession to stridhana of a married woman. One is that the only
a
heirs on the father*s side of a woman that are accepted by Jimuta 
are the father, mother, uterine brother, sister*s son, and brother*s 
son. No other heir on the father*s side has been mentioned by him 
in succession either to yautaka or ayautaka. The second is that all 
the property which a woman gets after her marriage as also all her 
property which she obtains from her parents devolves upon the first 
three heirs of the parental family in preference to even her husband 
and his family; but in default of these three heirs the line of 
succession reverts again to her husband and his family to the total 
exclusion of all except the remaining two heirs in her father*s 
family.
According to the Gastric law of the Bengal School immove­
able property which is giveh to a woman by her husband, property 
which is given to her by strangers and property which is acquired 
by herself is not her s t r i d h a n a . B u t  according to the case-law
the first category in some cases and the latter two categories in
(2)all cases form stridhana of a woman. But questions of succession
to such property do not appear to have come before the courts. Like
NTlakantha the later authors of the Bengal School pronounce that
such property would devolve upon the sons etc. as if it were the
(3 )woman’s husband's property; but they definitely proceeded on an
assumption that such property, though it formed an object of woman's 
ownership, was something less than stridhana. Now that the Courts
(1) See supra pp. 103-10 .
(2) See supra pp. 16,-7*. |S3 .
(3) See supra pp. ||5-ld/S«  .1,. V.'. S£.f 7 > O )  5 p . 3C| .
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have held such property to be stridhana the inescapable conclusion is
that the general rules of devolution of stridhana should also apply
to such property.^^
When stridhana of a woman is inherited by another woman it
does not become the stridhana of the latter according to all except
the Bombay School. In such case it reverts to the stridhana heirs
of the original proposita and the same rules would be applicable to
(2)
the second devolution as to the first devolution.
For succession to a maiden's property the order stated by
Baudhayana and accepted by Jimuta is uterine brother, mother and
(3)father. It has never been challenged so far in Courts. In default
of the father it appears that the property would devolve upon the 
father's sapindas in the same order in which they would take his pro­
perty according to the law of the Bengal School. Thus unlike the 
Mitaksara system, according to the Dayabhaga system the heirs to 
stridhana of a maiden and of a childless woman married in an unapp­
roved form are not identical. As regards the property of a betrothed 
daughter who dies before marriage Srikrisna follows the provision of 
Yajhavalleya that the bridegroom should get back the property given 
by him to the deceased bride. He further remarks that in such case 
it is customary for everybody to take back whatever he gave to the
bride at the time of her betrothal.
Thus after having surveyed the judicial decision we may now
turn to customs and customary law and finally to the new enacted law
which has brought about a metamorphosis both in the ordinary Hindu
law and customary law.
(1) Succession would depend upon such questionaas whether such 
property has been yautaka or not etc.
(2) See supra p.^^Lo.
(3) Supra p. 3 9 » _________
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lit is indeed impossible to complete the study of strxdhana 
without noticing the various provisions of the different customary 
laws and individual customs about the same* Due to the variegated 
and complex nature of these customs and customary laws it is almost 
impossible for a single person to make a complete research into them 
so as to incorporate in a sort of a compendium all the material 
available on the subject*
Before noting the importance of custom and customary laws 
and the various provisions thereof it is necessary to ascertain the 
correct meaning of the terms 'law', ‘custom* and ‘customary law*.
As to the meaning of the term law there are two leading schools, 
namely, the historical one and the analytical one. The former is 
headed by authors like Hale, Blaclcstone, Henry Maine etc. whereas 
the latter is supported by Hobbes, Bentham, Austin etc. The real 
difference between these two schools lies on the point whether con­
straint or consent is, in the last resort, the principle from whicjr 
law derives its validity.
Positive law, according to Austin, is a rule “set by
( 2)political superiors to political inferiors.*1 According to him it
(1) S.Roy: T.L.L.(1908); for different theories of jurisprudence 
see ICarunamay Basu: The Modern theories of jurisprudence (1925) 
T.L.L.1921, (for the characteristics of the historical school 
see ibid pp.217-18; for those of analytical school see pp. 
235-567); Sir Paul Vinogradoff: Outlines of Historical Juris­
prudence (1920) pp.103-160 etc.
(2) “The matter of jurisprudence is positive law; law, simply and 
strictly so called: or law set by political superiors to 
political inferiors.11 - Austin* s Jurisprudence (1911) Vol.I. 
p.85.
is a “creature of the sovereign or State: having been established
immediately by the monarch or supreme body, as exercising legisla­
tive or judicial functions: or having been established immediately
by a subject individual or body, as exercising rights or powers of 
direct or judicial legislation which the monarch or supreme body h£ 
expressly or tacitly conferred. He holds that a custom does nc
become positive law till it is recognised by a judicial court and
(<includes unrecognised customs in what he calls positive morality.
Holland, although he practically adopts the definition given by
Austin, goes a step further by admitting that when a Court recognig
the validity of a particular custom it implies that “the custom wag
( 3)law before it received the stamp of judicial authentication.“
Blades tone defines municipal law as ,fa rule of civil con­
duct prescribed by the supreme power in the state, commanding what
(4)
xs right and prohibiting what is wrong.“ However, he admits int
(1) Austin Juris.(1911) Vol.II.p.534.
(2) Austin Juris.Vol.I.p.87. See also ibid. pp.101-2. “At its 
origin a custom is rule of conduct which the governed observe 
spontaneously, and not in pursuance of a law set by political 
superior. The custom is transmuted into positive law, when il 
is adopted as such by the courts of justice, and when the judi 
cial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of 
the state. But before it is adopted by the Courts, and clothe 
with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive moral 
ity: a rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects;
but deriving the only force, which it can be said to possess, 
from the general disapprobation falling on those who transgres 
it.... Considered as rules of positive morality, customary le 
arise from the consent of the governed, and not from the posi­
tion or the establishment of political superiors. But, con­
sidered as morals rules turned into positive law, customary 1e 
are established by the state: established by the state direct
when customs are promulgated in its statutes; established by 
the state circuitously, when the customs are adopted by its 
tribunals.“
(3) Holland Juris.p.53 referred to in T.L.L.(190S)pp.4-5.
(4) Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1826)Vol.I. 
p. 41.
the term law both lex scripta and lex non scripta and he calls this
(1)latter the common law of England. About the lex non scripta he 
remarks: “And indeed it is one of the characteristic marks of
English liberty, that our common law depends upon custom; which 
carries this internal evidence of freedom along with it, that it
(2]probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the people.“
Vinogradoff says: “Laws may be commands of the Sovereigi
in a formal sense, but Law is not the aggregate of such commands bi
the aggregate of all rules directed towards ensuring order in the
Commonwealth, whether these rules are made by legislators, laid dov
by the judges in their administration of justice or worked out by
customary practice. Law exists for the sake of order, while right
is essentially the measure of power. Hence an adequate definition
(3of law is bound to reckon with the concepts of order and power.“
Amongst the modern law lexicons only two seem to contain an attempi
to define and explain the term law; from amongst these latter
Wharton follows the stand taken by the analytical school whereas
(4)Byrne follows the historical school.
(1) Ibid. Vol.I.pp.57 & 60.
(2) Ibid. Vol.I.p.68. The eminent Hindu law scholar Mayne obvioui 
follows the historical school of jurisprudence when he remark 
“The beginnings of Law were in Custom. Law and usage act, an 
react, upon each other. A belief in the propriety, or impera 
nature of a particular course of conduct, produces a uniformi 
of behaviour in following it; and a uniformity of behaviour 
following a particular course of conduct produces a belief th 
it is imperative, or proper, to do so." - Mayne, 11th edi. 
pp.63-64.
(3) Sir Paul Vinogradoff: Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence
(1921)p.119.
(4) Wharton's Law Lexicon p.573; A Dictionary of English Law 
p.519.
To examine the relative importance of custom and law it is 
necessary to see which of the schools gives a correct definition of 
the term law. According to the analytical school customs not recog­
nised by the judicial courts are not part and parcel of law but con­
stitute mere rules of positive morality. But it is impossible to 
hold the position that the political sovereign in the state is the 
only fountainhead of law; for, in the first place, this would bring 
mischievous results in comparative jurisprudence about primitive law* 
“In a savage community it is often hard to distinguish any sovereign, 
any determinate person or body of persons vested with the power 
either of making or of maintaining the laws. Nevertheless, the 
result is not anarchy. On the contrary, such a society is normally 
so law-abiding, in the sense of responsive to the social routine, 
that it might seem almost superfluous to provide a legal machinery 
that must actually but rust in disuse. A closer scrutiny, however, 
would disclose a considerable degree of coercive power, diffused 
through the body politic if not centralized in official hands, such 
as reinforces the strong natural propensity of the unreflective to 
keep in the fashion.“^^^ This custom is as easily observed in a 
savage community as law in a politically advanced society; for 
“custom is social habit partly based on a general inclination to
conform and a no less general disinclination to suffer as a non-con- 
(2)formist;1’ therefore it has as much sanction as the 'positive'
law itself has. Thus, as Bagehot explains, the imitative tendency
(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957)Vol.13 p.781.
(2) Ibid. p.781.
coupled with the persecuting tendency forms the legal fibre of a 
primitive society^ ^ and the customs followed therein do constitute 
law though primitive one.
Secondly, even in a politically advanced society the rudi­
ments of the enacted law of a particular country are to be found in 
the customary law of that country* Custom is, in its origin, de­
finitely anterior to enacted law. In its elementary growth statute 
law was usually nothing more than the complex system of customary 
law as recognised by a political sovereign. The Law in Greece, 
Rome^^ and England^3  ^was based upon custom* Thus in England King 
Alfred thought it expedient to compile his dome-book or liber 
judicialis which contained the local customs of the several pro­
vinces of his kingdom. A common digest of uniform law was prepared 
in the reign of King Edward the Confessor and similar attempts to
make digests of customs were made in Sweden and Spain in the 13th
(4)century, and xn Portugal in the fifteenth century. Thus the 
original Vpositive law' was hardly distinguishable from custom.
Again^as in the case of the British Constitution, even in modern 
times; customs do grow up pari passu with the enacted law and the 
former claim the same unquestionable reverence as the latter does. 
Thus from the point of view of coersive sanction or uniform observ­
ance, custom is hardly distinguishable from positive law. The only
(1) Walter Bagehot: Physics and Politics, 18th edi.chap.I.
(2) The Roman Law was adopting custom when written law was 
deficient: Blackstone Vol.I.p.67-68.
(3) About Common law see supra; see also IC.Kahana Kagan; Three 
Great Systems of Jurisprudence (1955)pp.101-103.
(4) Blackstone Vol.I.pp.58-59.
jurisprudential distinction between the two is that whereas Courts 
are bound to follow even vexatious or unreasonable provisions of the 
positive law they are not bound to accept as valid each and every 
proved custom: for instance, a Court may refuse to give effect to
a custom whic$r is immoral or opposed to public policy. But consider­
ing the fact that even according to Austin every custom possesses 
the potency of becoming 1positive law1 the modern definition of law
as a subject of jurisprudence should be "the sum of influences that
(1)determine decisions in Court of Justice.'1 This definition does 
justice to the political as well as to the psychological and anthro­
pological views which are all taken into consideration by the com­
parative jurisprudence of the modern era. V/ith this definition in 
mind it is improper to underestimate the importance of custom as law 
and/or as a source of future 'positive law*•
It is necessary here to know what exactly custom is. Austin 
says that: "At its origin a custom is a rule of conduct which the
governed observe spontaneously, and not in pursuance of a law set
(2)by a political superior." But their Lordships of the Judicial
Committee once defined custom as "a rule which in a particular
family or in a particular district has from long usage obtained the 
( 3)force of law." Remarking that the leges non scriptae "receive
their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial
(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957)Vol.l3 p.198.
(2) Supra p*A*30 note3L.
(3) Hurpershad v. Sheo byal (1876)3 I.A.259.
usage, and by their universal reception throughout the Kingdom" 
Blackstone further observes: "... in our law the goodness of a cus­
tom depends upon its having been used time out of mind, or in the
soleminity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man run-
(2)
neth not to the contrary.” Custom, therefore, may be defined as
a long-standing rule of conduct which is so uniformly and strictly
observed by the members of a particular family, group, community or
country as to have acquired in that particular family, group etc. a
sanction equal, in its coercive power, to that of a political sov- 
(3 )ereign. Custom is equal to law in accordance with the principle
that what the sovereign permits he commands.
(4)Custom is different from prescription as the latter
•t
attaches only to an individual person or his estate; is to be dis-
A
(1) Commentaries on the laws of England Vol.I.p.57. This peculiar 
nature of its sanction forms a distinctive feature of custom.
See Vangerow's Lehrbuch der Pandekten t.l xiv and Thibaut's 
System der Pandekten p.15 in T.L.L.(1908)p.12.
(2) Blackstone Vol.I.p.60.
(3) The definition is intended to be midway between the historical 
and the analytical school: although it admits custom to be a
source of law it does not obliterate that fine line which dis­
tinguishes unrecognised custom from the 'positive law* of the 
analytical school. See also T.L.L.(1908)p.5: "Custom, there­
fore, may be defined to be a rule of conduct uniformly govern­
ing a community from time immemorial." Apart from anything else 
the definition is too narrow since it does not include the 
family customs which the author himself deals with in a sub­
sequent chapter. See also: "Custom may be defined to be a law 
or a right not written which being established by long use and 
consent of our ancestors has been and daily is put in practice" 
Les Termes Be La Ley quoted in Wharton's Law Lexicon p.573 and 
Stroud Vol.I.p.701. The definition of custom given in s.3(d)
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and s.3(a) of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, is similar to the one given in the present 
work.
(4) T.L.L.(1908)p.6. But the new Hindu enactments treat custom and 
usage as synonymous words.
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tinguished from usage which usually has less antiquity than a custom 
has.^^ As against custom which may be judicially recognised in some 
cases, every usage requires to be strictly proved in a Court of law.^ 
Blackstone divides English unwritten law into three parts, 
i namely, ’general Customs' or the common law properly so-called, 'par­
ticular customs' which affect the inhabitants only of a particular 
part of the country and 'particular laws' that are 'by custom' obser­
ved only in certain courts like the ecclesiastical or military couris 
The validity of the common law depends upon the judicial decisions. 
But a particular custom, according to Blackstone, is required to be 
strictly proved and even when proved the next enquiry is into the
legality of the same; 'for, if it is not a good custom, it ought to
be no longer used; "Malus usus abolendus est" is an established
(4)maxxm of the law'. He, therefore, lays down the following re­
quisites for a valid custom:
(a) 'that it must have been used so long, that the memory of man 
runneth not to the contrary1.
(b) 'It must have been continued'.
(c) 'It must have been peaceable, and aquiesced in; not subject
to contention and dispute.'
(d) It must be 'reasonable' or rather taken negatively, it 'must 
not be unreasonable•'
(1) T.L.L.(1908)p.6.
(2) Wharton p.1029. But see Encyclopaedia Americana (1957)Vo1.8
p.337. This however, is not true in India wherein according
to the Indian Evidence Act every custom is required to be 
proved - See supra p. Moreover the words custom and
usage are used synonymously in India as well as in the United 
States.
(3) Blackstone Vol.I.p.57 & 60. See also Byrne: A dictionary
of English Law p.271.
____________ Vn1*T n71.
(e) It ’ought to be certain*1
(f) It must be compulsory; and not left to the option of every man*
(g) It ought to be ’consistent* with other custom.
In India the importance of customs and usages was recognis­
ed by an Act of Parliament and by subsequent central and provincial 
enactments whereby in determining disputes coming under the perview 
of the personal law of the two parties all British Courts were re­
quired to give a decision in accordance with the esbatlished custom
and usage whether they were in derogation of the ordinary personal 
(2)law or not. As early as in the year 1868 the Judicial Committee
in the Ramnad case laid down the cardinal principle of Hindu law, 
namely, Hunder the Hindu system of law clear proof of usage will out­
weigh!: the written text of the law."^^




(1) Blackstone*s Vol.I .pp.71-73; ViTharton p.292; T.L.L. (1908)p.26.
As against the last requisite mentioned by Blackstone see Sir 
Frederick Pollock: A first book of jurisprudence p.279 note 1.
(2) 21 Geo.Ill, C.70,S.17; Indian Regulation IV of 1793 s.15; Act 
XII of 1887 s.37; Bombay Regulation IV of 1827; Act II of 1864 
s.15; Burma Act XVII of 1875 s.5; Central Provinces Act XX of
1875 s.5; Madras Act III of 1873 s.16; Oudh Act XVIII of 1876 
s.3; Punjab Act XII of 1878 s.l; Burma Courts Act XI of 1889 
s.4; Arakan Hills Regulation VIII of 1876 s.5; Terai Reg.IV of
1876 s.5; Ajmere Regulation VI of 1877 s.4; Indian Contract Act 
IX of 1872 ss.l and 110; Indian Trusts Act II of 1882 s.l; 
Bengal Tenancy Act VIII of 1885 s.183; Oudh Land Revenue Act 
XVII of 1876 s.31; N.W.P.Rent Act XII of 1881 s.29 etc. refer­
red to in T.L.L.(1908)pp.23-24.
(3) Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramlinga (1868)12 M.L.A.397 at 
436. For the sastric basis of this rule see supra; intro­
duction.
(c) certain;
(1)(d) and must not be unreasonable*
In a case wherein a special usage of succession was set
up, their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed: "What the
law requires before an alleged custom can receive the recognition
of the*Court, and so acquire legal force, is satisfactory proof of
usage, so long and invariably acted upon in practice, as to show
that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established
governing rule of the particular family, class, district, or country;
and the course of practice upon which the custom rests must not be
(2)left in doubt, but be proved with certainty." Affirming this 
rule their Lordships of the Judicial Committee remarked: "Their
Lordship^ are fully sensible of the importance and justice of giving 
effect to long established usages existing in particular districts 
and families in India, but it is of the essence of special usages, 
modifying the ordinary law of succession, that they should be ancient 
and invariable; and it is further essential that they should be 
established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only 
by means of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of their 
existence, and that they possess the condition of antiquity and
/ 3
certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends."
(4)
However as in the United States, so in India, the
(1) Mayne 11th edi.pp.65-69.
(2) Sivanananda v. Mutta Ramalinga (1866)3 M.H.C.R.75 at 77.
(3) Ramlakshmi v. Sivananth (1872)14 M.I.A.585. See also T.L.L. 
(1908)pp.24-26, Magme p.74 for other cases.
(4) Encyclopaedia Americana Vol.8 p.337.
English text of antiquity, namely, that of legal memory, is not ap­
plicable.^^ According to the view established in the Calcutta High 
Court a valid custom ought to have been established before the year
1773 if in Calcutta and before 1793 if in the mofussil of the pro­
fs )vince. Otherwise under the Sastra a usage may be considered to
be immemorial^^ if it is more than a hundred years old.^^
Continuity being another essential of a custom it is
evident that a custom is capable of being destroyed by disuetude:
want of continuity brings the new custom within the span of the legal
(5)memory or raises an inference that the custom never had a legal 
e x i s t e n c e . B u t  a breach of custom in a particular instance will 
not destroy the same. In Blackstone's archaic terminology it is the 
interruption of the 'right* and not merely of 'possession* that des­
troys a custom; for instance, if the inhabitants of a parish have a 
customary right of watering their cattle at a certain pool, the 
custom is not destroyed even if they do not exercise their right for
ten years: it only makes it more difficult to prove that the
(7)custom does exist.
(1) Mt.Subhani v. Nawak I.L.R. (1941)Lah.l54 P.C.; see T.L.L.(1908) 
pp.26-27 for the explanation of the phrase 'legal memory'; see 
also Chitty's note no.11 to Blackstone Vol.I.p.71 for the ex­
pression 'the memory of man*.
(2) T.L.L.(1908)pp.27-28.
(3) For this expression see Umrithanath Chowdri v. Goureenath (1870) 
13 M.I.A.542 at 549.
(4) Mit.on Yaj.II 27 pp.139-40.
(5) Blackstone Vol.I.p.71.
(6) Mayne p.69. for destruction of custom see T.L.L.(1908) pp.
30-31.
(7) Blackstone Vol.I.p.71.
The desideratum of certainty makes it impossible for a
vague or an ambiguous custom to be recognised and enforced by the
Courts. Consequentially customs like choosing the worthiest son to
(l)be an heir to the property or appointing the wisest person"to be 
the headman of a village panchayat will not be recognised by the 
Court since it is impossible to select 'the worthiest son' or 'the 
wisest person'.
Lastly, for a custom to be valmd it must not be unreasonabL
though it may, in some cases, be far from being reasonable. Thus a
custom that no man should put his cattle into the common till the
third of October would be valid although no reason can be shown why
the day should not be the second or fourth of October. But a custom
that no man put in his beasts till the lord of manor putsr in his, is
unreasonable, and, therefore, bad; for perchance the lord will never
put in his and the tenants will lose all their profits. So although
lack of reason in favour of a custom does not impeach its validity a
(2)strong reason against it does. That is why customs which are
immoral, opposed to public policy or repugnant to the enacted law
( 3 )will not be recognised by Courts.
The onus of proving a particular custom lies on the person 
who asserts it. The standard of proof required in such case would 
depend upon whether the alleged custom merely supplements the general
i ^




(1)evidence in favour of the custom would be required. A custom may­
be proved by particular instances or by general evidence of the 
members of the family, tribe etc., as the case may be, who would 
naturally be cognisant of the existence of such custom; but when a 
custom is being repeatedly brought to the notice of the Court it may
be held to have been 'introduced into the law* whereafter it may be
(2)recognised without proof in subsequent cases. A custom which is
proved to have been existing in derogation f^iothe general law should
be construed strictly and should not be allowed to extend, by process
of analogy, beyond the sphere which is strictly proved to have been
( 3 )covered by the same.
It is now necessary to determine the meaning of the term 
'customary law* a loose use of which has made the term devoid of any 
precise legal sense. Authors of both the historical and the analy­
tical schools agree that before the sovereign-made law or any other 
written law came into existence, there already existed a large body 
of rules which regulated the relation between an individual and 
another individual as well as between an individual and society. 
According to the historical school this bulk of unwritten laws con­
stitute what is termed 'customary law' which was known to, and con­
trolled by, a privileged minority constituting a particular caste,
(4)a prxestly tribe or a sacredotal college etc. as the case may be.
(1) Ibid.
(2) Mayne p.66; for proof of custom see ss.10,32,35,48 and of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 discussed in Rattigan's Digest of 
customary Law Chap.I.
(3) Blackstone Vol.I.p.73.
(4) Maine: Ancient Law pp.12-13.
On the other hand, according to Austin, customary law is 'positive 
law fashioned by judicial decisions upon pre-existing c u s t o m s ' o r ,  
in other words, it contains only those customs which have been re­
cognised by the Courts. Commenting that Austin himself uses the 
terms positive law and customary law in a confusing manner Sripati 
Roy explains the term law as being 'composed of a large body of rules 
observed by communities, evidenced by long usages and founded on pre­
existing rules sanctioned by the will of the community. It exists
independently of a Sovereign authority. It forms the ground-work of
( 2)every system of legislation." This definition or rather explana­
tion which follows the tenor of the historical school makes only an 
obscure distinction between an individual custom and customary law; 
for, according to the same, 'customary law' would be nothing more 
than an aggregate of all possibly imaginable customs; in such case 
the expression becomes so vast and unmeaningful as to be capable of 
being defined only by its contents. Hence it is proposed that the 
expression 'customary law' should be used to denote one particular 
system of law which, as opposed to the general law, comprises the 
total body of rules governing a particular caste, community or 
locality. This would distinguish the term from a mere individual 
custom on the one hand and the written laws on the other and would, 
at the same time, guard the term against acquiring a hazy abstract 
meaning. In the modern world the expression would help us to dis- 
distinguish between a complete system of law which stands side by
(1) Austin Vol.I.p.148.
(2) T.L.L.(1908)p.11.
side with, and in derogation from, the general law. Thus the law 
governing succession, marriage, guardianship etc. amongst the 
different systems of the customary law of India should better be sub­
stituted by the words customary laws of India; for in India there 
are several customary laws, namely, the Marumakkattayam law, the 
Aliyasantana law, the Punjab customary law etc.
With regard to customs and customary laws relating to a 
Hindu woman*s separate property it is proposed to divide this 
chapter into three parts, namely,
(I) The special provisions of Hindu law and customary law 
concerning the property of prostitutes ^nd other profligate women.
(II) The different systems of customary laws like the 
Marumakkattayam law etc.
(III) The different customs which are followed in par­
ticular tribes, communities or areas and are recorded by eminent 
authors like Steele, Borradail^j Thurston etc. some of whom made a
personal, and some a semi-official, attempt to ascertain the un-
(1)written laws of a particular tract or community.
Before turning to other customs and customary law it
V
would be interesting to note the special provisions of Hindu law
with respect to profligate women and their proprietory rights. Like
(2)
other ancient law-givers of the world the Hindu oastrakaras 
always treated profligate women as being segregated from the rest of 
women-folk. On the one hand, they failed to claim the respedlt and
(1) For individual customs which have been brought to the notice 
of the Court and have been held to be proved' or not proved 
see supra .
(2) For a comparative development of the law about prostitution in 
other countries see i»:.E IksMfeft *. .
honour which chaste women could, in the eyes of the law, claim; on 
the other, they enjoyed some special privileges which were denied to 
chaste and respectable women. The cause of such distinction was 
obvious: whereas an ordinary respectable woman was under the control
either of her father, husband or son, a profligate woman, by the 
very reason of her profligacy and - in most cases - of her economic 
independence, could hardly be controlled by any of these persons.
As a result of this the responsibility of these persons to look after 
their unchaste female relatives decreased with the comparative in­
crease in the responsibility of such women to look after themselves. 
Thus whereas a res pectable woman could not be summoned to a Court, 
prostitutes and other profligate and degraded women had to present
themselves before a judicial authority for the purpose of defending
(2)themselves in proceedings against them. Similarly the husband of
an ordinary respectable woman was usually not liable to pay the
(3 )debts contracted by her; but the husband, if he was an actor, a
or a launderer - in fact any person who depended for his
livelihood upon clandestine prostitution of his wife, had to pay the
(4)
debts contracted by his wife. A respectable married woman was
(1) See the introduction.
(2) See Mit.on Yaj.II.5 Nir .^di.p.117 wherein two anonymous verses 
are quoted. See also Vi.Mi.39 wherein Mitra Misra quotes the 
same two verses and asserts that this distinction between res­
pectable and other kinds of women depends upon their dependence 
or independence respectively. See also Vi.Ta.41-42. For the 
regulations and enactments recognising some special privileges 
of respectable women see - w. rKs. y
(3) Yaj.IX.46 etc. See supra pp.5g-6o- ud - g />. -4a y .
(4) Yaj.2.48 The reason is that the wives of these people
earned money for the family by clandestine prostitution - See 
the word 1tadadhxnakutumbinyah* in the verse quoted in the Mit. 
on Yaj.2.5; the words 1Yasmadvrittistadasraya■ in Yaj.2.48; 
the word *atmopajxvisu1 in Manu 8.362 commented upon in Mit.on
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fined even for talking to a forbidden person; but wives of the above-
mentioned persons were specifically excluded from these provisions
of the penal law which dealt with illicit connection between men and
(1)women* Having noticed that the Sastra always made a broad dis­
tinction between respectable women and profligate women we now pro­
ceed to consider the special provisions, if any, of the &astra con­
cerning different categories of profligate women and their proprie­
tory capacity*
For the purpose of our survey prostitutes must be distin­
guished from other unchaste women, the distinguishing feature of the
former class being sexual laxity in consideration for prompt money
(2)
from the customers* They existed and do exist as a separate class
Yaj.2.285; the word 'gudhajxvah* in X£au.2.48 (Ganapati Sastri's 
edi.p.305; Warayana quoted in Vardhamana*s Dandaviveka p.158 etc 
The reason why these women carried on underground prostitution 
may be two-fold: they wanted to avoid the special tax which was
levied upon the prostitutes'in some parts of India during a par­
ticular period (see infraSi'T ), or the adverse attitude of the 
&astra which was getting increasingly deprecatory towards 
immoral connections between men and women might have driven 
underground the bulk of the prostitute class - See infra.
Similar things are happening or have happened in other countries 
also - See infra p
(1) See Mit.on Yaj.2.285 wherein Vijnanesvara relies on Manu 8*362; 
Vi.Mi.401, Vi.Ta.801 etc.
(2) In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary prostitution has been defined 
in relation to women as * the offering of the body to indiscrim­
inate lewdness for hire.* The English law accepts a similar 
interpretation. See infra. The various rules given in the 
Sastra for payment and nonpaymentCof) fee (sulka) of a prosti­
tute support the conclusion that the laxity in morals on con­
tractual basis for money was a distinctive feature of her class. 
See also sec.2(f) of The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in 
Women and Girls Act (104 of 1956): "prostitution" means the
act of a female offering her body for promiscuous sexual inter­
course for hire, whether in money or kind;" For the adverse 
effect of this recent enactment see infra.
(1)recognised by the society*
As in other countries of the world » ancient or modern -
(2)prostitutes have existed in India since ancient times. A few
references in the Vedas and the Brahamanas unmistakably point out
that even in those days prostitution was the main occupation of some
(3) ,women. The provisions in the Arthasastra of ICautilya clearly
show that by the third century B.C. prostitutes had acquired recog-
(4)nition from the law as a separate class of the society. Amongst
the several officers mentioned by ICautilya for different departments
+Vi e.vt
of the government was one called *ganikadhyaksa* or the officer for
(5)
the prostitutes. The very fact that Kautilya had to create or
recognise a special post of 1ganikadhyaksa' to be on equal par with
the officers in charge of the military, exchequer etc. evidently show*
that prostitution was carried on, in those days, on a blatantly large 
(6)scale. The profession appears to have had been so lucrative that
the ganikadhyaksa was to take one thousand silver coins from a woman
(7)to 'make* her a prostitute (ganika). Prom the authority and the 
power given to this officer it appears that in ancient India, as'in
(1) See infra p.Sig-
(2) Por comparative systems see Ewfj^ T3r.itavinIc«. Vol* *8 PP*
(3) See Maharastriya Jnanakosa (1926)Vol.20 (Va p.283). For refer­
ences in classical Sanskrit literature see Ludwik Sternback ; 
GanikHvrittasangraha. Ste .ft:* pp.3 * 5 6  3,^ 6, -
(4) Kau.2.48.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Por other officers see the second adhikarana of the Arthasastra.
(7) The provision applied to a woman whether she was a member of a
family of traditional prostitutes or not: ” Ganikadhy ales o 
ganikanvayamaganikanvayam va rupayauvanasilpasampannam sahasr- 
ena ganikam karayet11 - ibid.
(1)ancient Greece, prostitution was something like a state monopoly
and formed one of the departments of the government like defence,
commerce, finance etc. From the fact that the king used to accept
taxes for prostitution as also from the fact that the king used to
give as a mark of royal favour a life-time pension to a prostitute
( 2 )
specially skilled in arts etc. it appears that the profession was
not looked upon as that of the mean and the degraded.
Kautilya includes in the term prostitutes (ganika) also
wives of actors, dancers, musicians etc. who were apparently married
/ *** \
women but practised clandestine prostitution. ° The secrecy of the
profession of these women was probably devised more to evade the
taxes than to avoid public censure.
Vatsyayana in his Kamasutras gives nine categories of
Vesyas or prostitutes but he seems to intermix in the word !vesya*
(4)both prostitutes and other unchaste women like concubines etc.
However, his commentator Yasodhara adds that the categories which
consist of real prostitutes are more well known but that the rest of
( 5)them have been included only on account of similarity. Vatsyayana
openly states that all these women should be enjoyed according to
. '     ' ' Wo'te. £L- ...  .
(1) See lUJPra p#. 515 A The ganikadhyaksa had a right to prevent
a prostitutg^ from wasting her property - see infra. Accord­
ing to* wTho^preceded Medhatithi it was the duty of the king to 
pr\otect prostitutes and their property - Medh.on Manu 8.28 
(Jha*s edi.p.85).
(2) ICau 2.48 (Ganapati Sastri*s edi.p.305).
(3) Kau.2.48 p.305.: ,fEtena natanartakagayakavadaka... .saubhilcach- 
aranastrxvyavaharinam striyo gudhajxvascha vyakhyatah/**.
(4) Ka.Su.6.6.4 (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series edi.p.327).
(5) He refers to kumbhadasi, rupajxva and ganika as being well 
known but the first one also is not a 1 prostitute*.
( X)suitability which means that even according to the Kamasastra 
neither becoming a prostitute nor visiting a prostitute was a cen­
surable thing*
The attitude of the dharmasatra towards prostitutes is not
so lenient. Vijnanesvara, however1, does recognise prostitutes as a
separate fifth class of the society and as different ab initio from
(2)
the other four castes. Denying that prostitutes are something
like Kunda or Golaka i.e. persons who do not share the caste of their
parents because of the illicit nature of the connection between their 
( 3 )parents he further argues on the authority of the Skandapurana
that from time immemorial this caste of prostitutes has been born of
(4prostitutes by their connection with men of equal or superior caste
v
and that having sexual relations with men forms the means of subsis­
(1) Ka.Su.6.6.55. See also Nelson p.143*
(2) See the Skandapurana : "Panchachuda nama kaschanapsarasastat- 
santatirvefe^akhya panehaml jatih" quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.290 
and Vi.Ta.808; also cited in Sarna Moyee v. Secretary of State 
(1897)25 Gal.254, Hiralal v. Tripura charan (1913)40 Cal.650 
at 672, Ram Pargash v. Mt.Dahan Bibi Pat.H.C.eases (1924)85 at 
96; see also infra pp.561-3 the cases in which this position 
is assumed.
(3) For an explanation of Kunda and golaka see Medh.on Manu 3.174*; 
Smr.Cha. Sraddhakanda p.180. But according to Mit.on Ya j.
2.129 the son called *gudhaja* takes the caste of his parents 
as it is not possible to determine the caste of his putative 
father.
(4) Even the prostitutes cannot have sexual relations with a person 
of a caste lower than that of themselves - Mit.on Yaj.2.190 
wherein Na.Sam.12.78 is discussed; Vi.Ta.308.
tence for this caste.
He further says that the prostitutes thus being free from
any injunction of the Sastra which could have confined them to one
person, incur no fault, ahd have no punishment, according to the re-
(2)
ligious or the secular law respectively. But the position of the
men visiting prostitutes is different. Although they do not commit
any offence according to the positive law they incur fault according
(3)to the religious law and have to undergo a ceremony of atonement;
for according to the Dharmasastra a man is supposed to have sexual
(4)connection only with his own wife.
But notwithstanding the prohibition about visiting pros­
titutes which was laid down by the religious part of the Dharmasastra 
it is evident that there would be some persons who would disregard
(1) Mit.on Yaj.2.290: nAto ves^rakhya kachijjatiranadirvesyayamu- 
tkristajatersamanajaterva purusadutpanna purusasambhogavritt- 
irveshya iti brahman^adivallokaprasiddhibaladabhyupagamaniyam/M; 
also Vi.Ta.808. Here Vijnanesvara says that *vesyatva' like 
fbrahmanya etc.1 is definable by what is known to public. But 
commenting on Yaj.1.90 he says that castes like Brahmana etc. 
are defined, unlike the species of other animals, only on the 
authority of the Sastra. The former explanation was probably 
inevitable for ;>him since excepting the solitary extract from 
the Skandapurana he could not produce any extract from the 
§astra to prove that the prostitutes form a separate class of 
the society.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.2.290: "Atastasam niyatapurusaparinayanavidhividhur- 
ataya samanotkristajatipurusabhigamane nadristadoso napi 
dandah.../M
(o) Mit.on Yaj.2.290: "Tasu chanavaruddhasu gachchatam purusanam 
yadyapi na dandastathapyadristadoso astyeva. Svadaraniyatass- 
ada iti niyamat1’. For atonement for visiting prostitutes etc. 
see also Mit.on Yaj.1.81; Yama and Samvarta quoted in Mit.on 
Yaj.3.288; Briheteamvarta, Apastamba and Usanas quoted in Mit. 
on Yaj.3.265 p.4297&ulapani1s Prayaschitta-viveka (with Tatt- 
vartha-Kaumudi of "Sovindananda) pp.365-66; Vi.Mi.402; Vi.Ta.
808; Smriti-Muktavali (prayaschitta KanipUiO of Vaidyanatha pp. 
888-89 etc.
(4) Manu 3.45; Manu 9.101; Yaj.1.81 etc.
the precepts of the &astra and would have some relations with pros­
titutes. That the positive Dharmasastra could ill-afford to neglect 
such situation is evident from the special provisions given by Yaj-
havalkya and Narada who prescribe certain rules about money-transac-
(1)txons between prostxtutes and their customers. Thus notwithstand­
ing the ethical attitude of the &astra it is evident that prostitutes 
did collect some money and did possess some property of their own. 
Obviously this money must have been treated as their strxdhana since, 
except during the days of Kautilya, there was no person who was 
authorised to control prostitutes in enjoyment or disposition of 
their property.
What could be the nature of succession to their property?
No adequate answer to this question has been found in the Sastra and
(3)the reason is manifest: the rules given for succession to male's
(1) Yqj.2.292; an anonymous verse quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.291; Na. 
Sinr.9.18-19 & Na.Sam.7.20-21; Vyasa quoted in Smr.Cha.750 and 
Vi.Mi.402; Matsyapurana quoted in Vi.Ta.654-55, Vi.Chi.120 etc.
(2) A prostitute’s property is her strxdhana - for cases see infra. 
But during Kautilya1s days when prostitution was a state monop­
oly it seems that the ganikadhyaksa had a right to control the 
extravagance of a prostitute; the latter moreover was not allow­
ed to place her ornaments etc. into the hands of anybody else 
except her mother. Similar restrictions were placed on dis­
bursement of property by a prostitute's son etc. See Kau.2.44, 
Ganapati Sastri's edi.Vol.1.302: "Niskrqyachaturvimsatisafiasro 
ganikayah. Dvadasasahasro ganikaputrasya. .. .Bhogrhin dayamayaim^ 
vyayamayatim clia ganikaya nibandhayet • Ativyayakarma cha 
varayet. Matrihastadanyatrabharananyase sapadachatuspano dandah'1 
From the last clause it is evident that the mother acted as a 
manager of the family and controlled its finance. A superannu­
ated harlot was promoted to become a brothe1-keeper and then she 
controlled the family as a manageress of the same - ibid p.302; 
Saubhagyabbange matrxkam kuryat/"
(3) Yaj.2.117; Yaj.2.135-36; see the words "sarvavarnesvayam 
vidhih" in the latter verse.
(1)or female’s property presumably applied to the persons of the four 
varnas or castes and not to prostitutes who, being a fifth class, 
apparently followed their own customs and usages in any matter of 
succession concerning the property of persons of their class. It is 
only Kautilya who gives some special rules of succession to a pros­
titute’s property. He says that in case a recognised prostitute is
dead or goes abroad her daughter or sister should represent her, or
(2)
her mother should get appointed in her place another prostitute.
It may be inferred that the same persons must take the property and
(3 )responsibility of a deceased prostitute. Although the other
authors do not give special rules of succession to prostitute’s pro­
perty it is not difficult to infer them from the sociological positio 
of a prostitute’s family. In her family a prostitute would naturally
be the manageress since the other persons whether male or female
(4)would depend for livelihood upon her income. This inference is
also substantiated by the fact that the prostitutes who camouflaged
themselves as married women had substantial control over the finance
(5)of their families. In a case where two prostitutes exist in the
same family the mother or the senior one would naturally be the
(1) Yaj.2.144-45. The importance given to the father and his sap- 
indas and the husband and his sapindas in these lines of 
succession apparently appears to repudiate a suggestion that 
these provisions apply also to a prostitute’s property. But 
see infra.
(2) Kau.2.44 (Vol.I.301): "Nispatitapretayo duhita bhaginT va 
kutumbam bharet/ Tanmata va pratiganikam sthapayet/1’.
(3) The translation of the passage mentioned just above (given by 
Shama Sastri in his edition of the work) supports this inference
(4) For the text see supra p?. 5I3-I*f.
(5) See suprar-p.I b.'«i *
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manageress whereas the daughter or the other junior females would be
subordinate to the manageress but superior to the rest of the
(1) *members of the family. From the provisions of the Arthasastra
it seems that in those days a prostitute daughter was supposed to
place all her ornaments in the hands of her mother. She was fined
if she placed them in somebody else's hands. Similarly she was fined
(2)
also if she sold or mortgaged her own property* These provisions 
go to show that a prostitute family in those days bore a close re­
semblance to a joint Hindu family with this much difference that 
instead of a senior male member a senior female member was the mana­
geress of the family. Thus the sociological structure of a pros­
titute family was that which is found in a matriarchial society and
was nearer to the framework of the Malabar families following
(3 )Marumakkattayam law. Even in the present age a prostitute family 
can hardly be otherwise than the one which used to exist in Kautilya' 
days.
There can be no doubt that because of the matriarchial 
structure of a prostitute's family succession to her property, durihg 
the days of Kautilya, must have been matrilineal one. As for the 
later age it is true that although Vijnanesvara gives special pro­
visions for succession to property of a male who is a celebate
(4) (5)student, a hermit, an ascetic or a foreign merchant he does
not give special provisions for succession to prostitute's property.
(1) See supra p.Sia.
(2) See—supra—p • Tbr«4.
(3) For this customary law see infra pp. 5*77- 9JL.
(4) Mit.on Yaj.2.137.
(5) Mit.on Yaj.2.264.
But a casual glance at the line of succession given in the Mitaksara 
for a married woman1s strxdhana would prove that it is pre-eminently
e ( 1 )matrilineal in all cases except sulka. Now a prostitute did not
and cannot stand any chance of making sulka (bride-price) as a pafct 
of her strxdhana; hence there was no reason why Vijnanesvara should 
have laid down special provisions for succession to a prostitute*s 
property. Of course, it would have been better if he had endorsed 
that the same line of succession is applicable also to prostitute’s 
strxdhana. It need not, however, be supposed that this omission to 
make special provisions for prostitute*s property is a serious mis­
take on the part of Devanna, Nxlakantha and other authors who, as 
regards succession to some categories of strxdhana, admit sons along 
with daughters; for almost all these provisions refer to property 
gained after marriage and property given by the husband; the pros­
titutes were presumably incapable of having either of these two cate-
(2)
gories of strxdhana. On the part of Jxmuta, however, this
omission might be thought as a serious mistake since according to 
him such order applies to general strxdhana except a few categories 
like yautaka etc.^^
But the case of a married woman who becomes a prostitute 
or of a prostitute who becomes a married woman, or, to go still 
further, the case of a prostitute who becomes a married woman and 
then again resumes her original profession, is a very intricate one - 
the Sastra in fact could hardly anticipate a case like this. Accord­
(1) For the order see supra.
(2) For these various lines of succession see supra *-fc.
(3) For the order of succession see supra pp. ^ 76-77. For an in­
equitable result this omission can bring about see infra p.
ing to the opinion of Vijnanesvara a married woman of one of the four
varnas who indulges in prostitution does not thereby reduce herself
(1)to a prostitute who can be so by birth only* Although such a
woman can evade the punitive provisions of the positive law she does
not escape the provisions of the religious law and has to atone for
(2)
her profligacy. A prostitute’s case is entirely different. So
it is evident that by whatever profligacy a married woman of one of
the four varnas does not become a prostitute but remains an unchaste
and, in some cases, a degraded woman.
A prostitute on the other hand, is a person who is not ex- 
(4)pected to marry. But once she voluntarily renounces her freedom
and goes into the fold of married life there is no reason why she 
should not have the same privileges and disabilities which belong 
to other married women. This conclusion is arrived at with the help 
of some other analogical provisions about prostitutes. When a 
common prostitute becomes a concubine of a particular person she 
gains the status of a concubine which is nearer to the status of a
(5)
wife. Accordingly the fine which can be imposed upon a man for
having illicit connection with married women and concubines (but not
(1) See supra p.5l£ note •I'.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.2.290: “Svairinyadxnam punardandabhavo vidhanabhavat. 
Prayaschittam tu svadharmaskhalananimittam gamyanam cha gant- 
rxnam chavisesadbhavatyeva/11, "Tathahi svairinyo dasyascha 
tavadvarnastriya eva/"; Vi.Ta.808.
(3) Mit. on Yaj. 2 * 290: HAtah purusantaropabhoge tasam ninditakarma*-. 
bhyasena patityat/11.
(4) Ibid on p.287: H ...niyatapurusaparinayanavidhividhurataya..**.
(5) See infra pj>. £St5-2iC*
for having similar connection with a common prostitute) can also be 
imposed upon a man who is having such a connection with a prostitute 
who has already become a concubine of another person.*1* If a pros- 
titute, by voluntarily renouncing in favour of a particular man her 
freedom to have connection with any and many persons, acquires the 
status of a concubine there is no reason why a prostitute who has 
voluntarily renounced all such freedom by marrying a particular 
person should not be treated as an ordinary married woman at least 
so long as she is under coverture.
But the case of such prostitute married woman returning to 
her original calling before or after the death of her husband is a 
very intricate one. On the one hand, it is difficult to see how a 
prostitute, once she has, by her marriage, made herself bereft of 
her freedom, can have the means of legally regaining the same. 
Apparently at least it seems that her freedom is irretrievably lost. 
But on the other hand it has already been seen that those married 
women who practice clandestine prostitution are treated by the 
Sastra as prostitutes.*2* Moreover although a prostitute caases, by 
her marriage, to be a prostitute by profession she does not cease to 
be a prostitute by caste; for a woman cannot change her caste by 
marriage. Thus as a compromise between these two positions it may 
be suggested that a married prostitute who indulges merely in a 
milder type of profligacy like becoming a concubine of another 
person etc. should be treated only as an unchaste married woman and
(1) Mtt*on Yaj.2.290 p.286: f*...chasabdadvesyasvairinTnamapi 
sadharanastrlnam bhujisyanam cha grahanam//11.
(2) Supra pp. •
not as a pi’ostitute, but that if she indulges in prostitution and 
earns money thereby she should be treated only as a prostitute and 
not as an unchaste married woman; for earning one *s own money and 
becoming thereby the supporter of the family is one of the two things 
- the other being caste - which distinguish prostitutes from other 
profligate women.
A concubine ought to be distinguished from a prostitute
whether the former establishes illicit connection with her paramour
before or after her marriage. Right from the time of Medhatithi the
commentators have always recognised the position of a paramour as
(1)being that of a secondary or virtual husband. Yajnavalkya pre­
scribes punishment for those who try to establish sexual intimacy
(2)
with somebody else's concubine. Narada says that by establishing 
such intimacy with somebody else's concubine a person incurs the same 
fault which he would have incurred by having such intimacy with some-
( 3  )  ~  r *body1elsefs wife. Vijnanesvara and Mitra Misra fully endorse the
(4)positron taken by Narada. Hence it must not be forgotten that a
(1) See the word 'upapatitva' in Medh.on Manu 3.174; Devanna says 
that a paramour is equal to a secondary husband if he actually 
stays with his concubine - Smr .Cha.(sraddhakanda)p*179. It is 
to be noted that a concubine has a similar semi-official positioi 
in the Burmese customary law - see infra p.6°7, She is called x 
'inferior wife'.
(2) Yaj.2.290 and Mit.on the same; see also Manu 8.363 and the
commentaries on the same; Vi.Mi.401; Vi.Ta.803; Narayana quoted
in Vardhamana's Bandaviveka p.159.
/ \ * *(3) See comments of Bhavasvami on the words "..dosah syat paradara- 
vat.." occurring in Na.Sam.12.79.
(4) Mit.on Yaj.2.290: "paraparigrihitatvena paradaratulyatvat"; Vi. 
Mi.401: "tSscIw paraparigrihitatvena parastritulyatvat"; etc.
Here the words 'paradara* and 'parastrx' definitely denote some­
body else's wife. But see the chapter 'Atha paradarabhimarsan- 
adanda* in the Danndaviveka wherein punitive sanctions against 
illicit connections between men and women are elaborately given. 
On p.154 the author says: "Tatra paradarapadena svabharyavyati- 
rikta stri vivaksita/ Sa cha dvividha parinita aparinita cheti/..
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concubine is almost equal to a wife in Hindu law and must not be
confused with a prostitute. The only difference between a wife and
a concubine will probably be that a wife (patnx), as expressed by
Panini, is entitled to associate herself with her husband for the
purpose of performance of a sacrifice whereas a concubine is not.^^
Succession to the property of a concubine whose relation
with her paramour has not been adulterous is not very difficult to
determine. If she was unmarried before she become a concubine her
property should be treated as that of a married woman; if she was
married and widowed before she became a concubine of another person
her property should be treated as that of a remarried widow. But it
is evident that the rule that every Hindu Carriage is presumed to
(3 )have been celebrated in an approved form cannot be applied to this
fictional marriage. In the case of a concubine who is having an
adulterous relation with her paramour it is very difficult to decide
the relative predominence of the conflicting rights of her husband
and paramour. On the one hand it seems that the connection she
establishes by her marriage with her husband is an unending life-
long connection which cannot be broken at the instance of either
(4)
spouse; on the other, it seems that the husband1s status of
being a husband depends upon the fulfilment of his duty to maintain
#1) Pan.4.1.33: "Patyurno yajnasamyoge'1 referred in Vis.on Yaj.
1.69, Mit.on Yaj.2.135-36 at p.217, Medh.on Manu 3.174, Smr.
Cha.674 etc.
(2) Amongst &udras continuous concubinage is equal to marriage - 
see suprarfp * \ /> Z‘j
(3) See supra pp. A56-57.
(4) Manu 9.46 and 9.101; see also introduction.
(X)his own wife and that if somebody els© maintains his wife that
person comes into the shoes of the husband and gains and exclusively
retains all the rights which previously belonged to the husband*
But according to the &astra the husband is bound to maintain even
(2)his degraded or adulterous wife; so from a legal point of view
there appears to be no reason why a husband should not be able to
regain control of his adulterous wife who has become a concubine of
another person and to maintain her as his own wife. Since the real
husband is thus in a position to destroy the rights of a secondary
husband and to retrieve his own supremacy at any time it appears that
he has a legal preponderance over a paramour. Prom this point of
view succession to the strTdhana of a concubine who is a childless
adulteress at the time of her death, should devolve upon her husband
and his sapindas in preference to her paramour. On the other hand
the question may, in exceptional cases, be viewed also on the basis
(3)of equity and not purely of law. Accordingly in determining
succession to such concubine*s property questions of fact like the 
cause of her desertion, the proportion between the duration of her 
marital life and of her illicit relations etc. may be taken into 
consideration. Thus if the husband has deserted his wife without 
any reason and has refused to maintain her as a result of which she 
clinge^ to some other person; or if the duration of her marital life
(1) Ma.Bha.1•104.30: "Bharyaya bhranat bharta palanachcha patih 
smritah/". See introduction. This economic aspect cannot be 
disregarded in judging whether, and to what e x t e n t w i f e  is 
under the control of her husband. Even in England Hse wife 
became ’discovert* by the operation of the Married Woman's 
Property Act of 1882 - see St^oudlvol. J. p. $ ^ p i  a&fc
(2) See infra p. 51$7-
X3) For equitable considerations admissible in Hindu law see supra
is utterly insignificant in proportion with the duration of her con­
cubinage, then there appears to be no reason why in succession to her 
strxdhana her paramour should not be preferred to her husband and his 
sapindas.
As for succession inter se amongst children born to such 
an adulterous concubine from her husband and from her paramour re­
spectively it has already been stated that her legitimate heirs of
a particular class should be preferred to illegitimate heirs of the
(1)
same class. Thxs rule should be followed, of course, subject to
the exception mentioned by Manu whereby the property given to such 
woman by her husband and paramour devolves upon their own children 
exclusively.
The property of all unchaste women except prostitutes shoul< 
devolve according to the general rules of succession to strxdhana.
But as, on the basis of unchastity and the consequential religious 
degradation, a line has been drawn in some cases between ordinary 
women and unchaste women it is necessary to examine in particular
/ fT \
the Gastric law on the subject. While considering this aspect of
Hindu law on which abrupt, hasty and in many cases erroneous opinions 
have been exjjressed by the leading Hindu law scholars, the three 
questions that arise are:-
(1) See supra pp.*f^7-3o.
(2) Manu]}?-I9l supra pP. ^ £7- .
(3) For degradation from higher caste to lower caste see Manu 
10.43-45; Harivamsa chapter 14 & Chap.12.123; Ram Pargash v. 
Dahan Bibi Pat.H.C. cases (1924) 85 at 96. According to Srya 
Samajists it seems that both degradation and elevation in 
caste is possible - see Prayaschittavichara of Inderjit p.19: 
"jSudro brahmanatamaiti brahmanaschapi sudratam/”,
(1) What are the causes of degradation?
(2) What are the after-effects of degradation?
(3) Whether degradation amounts to civil death?
Yajnavalkya says that a person goes into degradation either
by not following what is enjoined upon him by the Sastra or by doing
(1)what is prohibited to him. To avoid the religious and secular 
ill-effects of his misbehaviour a person has to undergo * prayaschitta 
which denotes an occasional ceremony of expiation done for the
(2)purpose of destroying sin and appeasing the public in general.
Thus it is sin (pataka) which is at the basis of all degradation and
etymologically sin denotes that which brings about the fall of a 
(3 )person. A very broad definition of the word degraded (patita),
(4)it seems, would include all those who have committed some sin.
The Sastra, however, divides sins into several categories in accord­
ance with the graveness of misbehaviour and its after-effects. These 
categories have different names like mahapatakas, upapatakas etc..
The authors of the Sastra try to state exhaustively and discuss
(1) Yaj.3.219: HVihitasyananusthanninditasya cha sevanat/ Anigra- 
hachchendriyanam narah patanamrichchhati/'*. See also Manu
11.44.
(2) Yaj.3.220: ’’Tasmatteneha kartavyam prayaschittam visuddhaye/ 
<evemasyantaratma lokaschaiva prasidati/"; see also Manu 11. 
45-46 and Yaj.3.226; Mit.on Yaj .3.220: "Prayasehittasabdas-
c hay am pa p aks ay art he naimittike karmavisese rudhah/11; Brihas- 
pati and Aiigiras quoted in Vaidyanatha*s Smr.Mu. (prayaschitt- 
akanda) p.859.
(3) Mit.on Yaj .3.227 p.376: lfPatayantiti patakani brahmahatyadini,t.
(4) XCulluka on Manu 11.181: "Patitasabdo'yam papakarivaehanah 
sakalapapinamavisesapathat/u. Medhatithi*s comment im this 
verse is unfortunately unintelligible.
(1) _
elaborately these several categories of sm. The mahapatakas
mainly include killing a brahmin, drinking wine, stealing, having
illicit connection with one's own preceptor's wife and keeping con-
(2)
tact with persons who have already done some mahapataka. The
upapatakas include also some such insignigicanfe things like cutting
(3)
a living tree for the purpose of having some fuel* Considering the 
after-effects of degradation to which we shall return it is necessary 
to see whether all these sins can bring about degradation.
According to Narada, Sarvajnanarayana, Raghavananda etc. it
(1) For mahapatakas see Manu 11.54, Yaj.3.227; upapatakas - Manu
11.59-66, Yaj.3.234-42; Jatibhramsakaras - Manu 11.67; sankar- 
lkaras - Manu 11.68; apatrikaras - Manu 11.69; malavahas -
Manu 11.70-71. See also Mit.on Yaj.3*290 wherein sin is divided 
into five categories. The divisions seem to be overlapping ones 
for Vijnanesvara mentions also jatibhramsakara which is not 
mentioned in these five categories - Mit.on Yaj.3.242 p.383.
For these different categories of sins see also Hemadri's 
Chaturvargachintamani vol.4 p.3, &ulapani*s Pra.Yi, with Ta.Kau. 
pp.36-45, Kasinatha's Prayasehittendusekhara pp.2-4, Vaidyanatha 
Smr.Mu.(pra.ka.)p.862. This is a place to note that one of the 
upapatakas for a man is living on a woman's stridhana or making 
one's own wife a prostitute for one's livelihood. - See the 
word 'stryajXvah* in Manu 11.63 on which Medhatithi comments:- 
"StrXnamajXvah striyamupajXvyate strXdhanena kutumbadhara^nam 
Kriyate va vesastrXprayojanam va/". See also the words 
strXhimsausadhajXvanam* in Yaj.3.240 and comments to the same 
effect in Mit.p.382 and Ma.Pa.856. For expiation of this sin 
see the Pra.She.(of ICasinatha)p.22. Thus there was a secular 
(see Manu 9.200 supra) as well as a religious sanction against 
jjeople who tried to snatch women's property. Actors, dancers 
who habitually lived on the earnings of their wives' prostitu­
tion must have been considered degraded as a class and it is no 
wonder that their families were treated as on a par with the 
prostitute families.
(2) Manu 9.235 & 11.54; Yaj.3.227 etc.
(3) Manu 11.64; Yaj.3.240 and Mit.on the same.
by (1)seems that a person becomes patxta only mahapataka. On the
A
other hand according to Kulluka, Visvesvara, Mitra Misra and others,
all persons who have committed some sin, whether a mahapataka or
(2) . .upapataka etc. become degraded. This opxnxon appears to be a 
later development in the field of law; for quoting a text from the 
Brahmapurana which explains the word 'patita* as a person who commits 
mahapataka, Mitra Misra comments that even persons who commit
(1) See Na.Smr.16.21 & Na.Sam.14.20 wherein 'patita' and faupap- 
atika* have been separately mentioned amongst persons incapable 
of having inheritance. Sar. on Manu 9.20; Kulluka and Rag. on 
Manu 11.182-84 (for the word 1chaturbhih* used by Rag. see 
Manu 9.235). The word 'aupapatika1 denotes a person who has 
done some upapataka - see Apa.on Yaj.II.140; the author of the 
Prakasa mentioned in Vi.Ra.489; Da.Ta.21; Da.Kra.Sam.30.
See also the readings 1apapatrita* and 'apayatrita1 instead of 
1aupapatika* in Vi.Ra.489 and Vi.Ta.431-32 respectively. For 
the significance and explanation of these readings see 
Bhattacharya: T.L.L.1884-85 pp.399-400.
(2) Kulluka on Manu 11.181; Ma.Pa.pp.964 & 966 wherein the author 
states that the ceremonies of excommunication and rehabilita­
tion are applicable to mahapatakins et cetera; the Brahmapur­
ana cited and comments of Mitra Misra on the same in Vi.Mi. 
(suddhiprakasa) p.56 etc. The comments of Kulluka here are 
contrary to his remarks on Manu 11.182 (supra); it appears, 
however, that according to him the ceremonies mentioned in 
Manu 11.182, which have a semblance with funeral ceremonies, 
should be performed in the case of a person who is degraded 
because of any sin other than a mahapataka. Similarly in Vi.
Mi.(Vya.Pra.)559 Mitra Misra seems to include in degraded 
persons only mahapatakins. This is, of course, an inference 
but this apparent, though not definite, contradiction between 
his two statements in two different volumes may give at least 
a weak support to the theory that all the volumes of the 
Vxramitrodaya have not been written by one and the same person. 
Pandit V.L.Joshi informs me that the recent notion amongst the 
pandits was that degradation could be brought about only by any 
one of the mahapatakas; but the opinion has tn be rejected with 
respect since it has not been borne out by the Sastric evidence 
on the subject. The trend of the Sastra appears to be exactly 
the reverse. According to Vasistha 2.13 and Atri 5.22 even 
eating onions, garlic etc. is a cause of immediate 'fall* for
a brahmin. This strict sociological jiruPelion does appear to 
have softened down till the dawn of the twentieth century.
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(X)atipataka, anupataka etc. are included in the term. Thus it seems
that the mahapatakins (persons who commit mahapataka) were "abomni-
(2)able" from ancient days but that the persons who committed lesser
types of sin also began to share the unenviable fate of the mahapat­
akins •
Vijnanesvara appears to make a compromise between these
two views and says whereas a mahapataka brings about immediate de- 
( 3)gradation other smaller patakas bring about degradation only by
(4)repetition and that the quantum of such repetitive action required 
for degradation depends upon the respective sin and its heinousnesi?^
(1) Vi.Mi.(suddhiprakasa) 56 supra.
(2) See Manu 9.238-39 which gives provisions of excommunication 
specially for the mahapatakins who are mentioned in Manu 
9.235. For general provisions of excommunication see infra 
p. 5-^ -5 . Even a king cannot accept fine from a mahapatakin 
- Manu 9.243 and the commentaries on the same. But for an 
imaginary provision to the same effect fantastically alleged
' by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court and Banerjee to 
have been laid down in the Arthasastra see infra pp. 5-7^'75-
(3) See the remark in Mit.on Yaj.3.232-33 p.380 : "Et3ni....
mahapatakatidesavisayani sadyahpatanahetutvat patakanyuchyante/1*
(4) Mit.on Yaj.3.234-42 p.384 : "Yadyapi mahapatakesviva sadyah;•- 
patityahetutvam nasti tathapyabhyasapeksaya patityahetutvam- 
aviruddham/11.
(5) Mit.on Yaj.3.234-42 p.384 : “Yavatyabhyasyamane mahapatalcat- 
ulyatvam bhavati tavanabhyasah patityahetuh/11.
It must be remembered that keeping contact with a degraded person is 
itself a cause of degradation so that relatives of a degraded personA
(1)
who live with him will themselves become degraded.
The law about sins and the consequential degradation does
not make much distinction between men and women. Those acts and
omissions which are declared to be sinful in the case of a man are
(2)mutatis mutadis sinful in the case of a woman. But wom&n have to
(3)perform only one-half of the prayaschitta prescribed for men.
Women, however, have some special modes of sin and degradation. They 
are: having sexual relation with a man of lower caste, causing
(1) Manu XI.180; Yaj.3.261; Devala and Parasara quoted in Mit.on 
Yaj.3.261 etc. Commenting on this verse Vijnanesvara says that 
a person remaining in contact with a sinner of a particular 
category has to undergo the same prayaschitta as the sinner 
himself. For prayaschitta for such contact (samsarga) see Manu 
181; Gautama quoted in Mit.on Yaj.3.292; Mit.on Yaj.3.294 at
p.467; Pra.Vi.(with Ta.Kau.)pp.165-74; Pra.Kadamba pp.205-6; 
Pra.Nirupana pp.109-114 etc. Vaidyanatka maintains, on the 
authority of Parasara, 1.25 that in Kaliyuga contact cannot by 
itself be a cause of degradation and that it is only the sinner 
himself who is liable to be degraded. This opinion is wholly 
adverse to the ratio of the decisions in the old cases in which 
the relatives of the proposita who stayed with her were pre­
ferred to the relatives who did not stay with her. - See Smr.
Mu.(pra.ka.)898. But without referring to Vaidyanatha*s name 
another eminent author Sankara Bhatta vehemently and very ela­
borately attacks this view and on the whole he appears to be 
correct. - See the Dharmadvaitanirnaya pp.131-32.
(2) Medh.on Manu 11.188; Saunaka quoted in Mit.on Yaj.3.261 p.415; 
Mit.on Yaj.3.297 etc.
(3) Medh.,Rag., and Kulluka on Manu 11.176; Angiras, Visnu and 
Sumantu discussed in Mit.on Yaj.3.243 p.287; Mit.on Yaj.3.258 
p.406; Pra.She.81 etc. But the rule is not applicable to ex­
piation for adultery - see Ma.Pa.861-62; Pra.Vi.361 etc. The 
basis for this rule is that the &astra does make some concess­
ions in performing the ceremonies of expiation and that the 
nature of such concessions depends upon the place and time of 
the performance, the age qnd the capacity of the performer etc.
abortion, killing one*s own husband^^ etc.
As a married woman is enjoined by the &astra to be devoted
(2)
to her husband there can be no doubt that adultery on her part is 
(3 )s*>n. But the &astra does not seem to contain any provision where­
by fornication is declared to be a sin on the part of a maiden. Even 
as regards adultery it seems that it is a pardonable sin which is 
presumed to be washed away by appearance of menstruation. Yajnaval- 
Icya says that a woman is to be discarded only if she starts carrying
as a result of her adultery and that otherwise her sin is presumed
( 4 )to be washed away by the appearance of menstruation. This is an 
important point to be remembered in deciding whether a woman goes 
into degradation by her adultery which is nevertheless an expiable 
offence.
(1) Yaj.3.297; see also Medh.on Manu 11.188; Hemadri^ Chaturvarga-‘ 
chintamaniTvol.4 p.666-68 containing special section under the 
heading "St^nam visesani pataniyani"; Smr.Cha.576-580: "Tyajy- 
astrTvisayani’'; Ma*Pa.668: MStrXnam visesapatanahetavah”.
(2) See P W *  XIL- 5 * »  5*-7 3 V  a T7* * u  -
(3) Adultery is termed by the Sastra as ’vybhichara* for the texts 
about which see Smr.Cha.576-580 etc. The prayaschitta for 
adulterous women is the same as the one prescribed for men hav­
ing intercourse with somebody else*s wife - Manu 11.176.
(4) Yaj.1.72. See also Parasara 10.10 & 10.26 for such valid de­
sertion and automatic purification respectively. That the 
tendency of the Sastra was to get stricter towards women can be 
seen by comparing the commentaries on the verse: whereas Vis- 
varupa gives a natural meaning to the above verse of Yajhavalkya 
Vijnanesvara and Apararka says that this purification refers 
only to mental and not to physical adultery. But see Manu 5.108 
which supports these later commentators. For a compromise be­
tween the two views see the Chaturvimsati quoted in Smr.Mu. 
(pra.ka.)893.
(5) For prayaschitta see Manu 11.176-77; Pra.Vi.(with Ta.ICau.)365- 
66; Pra.Ka.134; Chaturvimsati, Usanas and Samvarta quoted in 
Smr.Mu.893-94. But the Jains seem to have a stricter attitude - 
see SurendrakXrti*s Prayaschitta p.58: "Parapurusata narx 
yavajjXvam na suddhyati/”.
The after-effects of sin and its consequential degradation
are two-fold: religious and secular. From the religious point of
view a sinning person goes to hell and has to undergo some sort of
punishment in accordance with the seriousness of his s<*n. He has
also to suffer in his next birth the ill-effects of the sins which
(1)he has committed in his previous birth. From a religio-secular
point of view the relatives of a degraded person have to perform a
ceremony of ex-communication which is very similar to obsequial
(2)ceremonies and to cut off all contact wxth him. The sastra is so
strict about this severance that all those who keep contact; with a
(3)patita themselves become patita. There is no funeral ceremony or
(4)asaucha for those persons who are degraded before their death.
(5)Even mourning for their death is forbidden.
From the point of view of positive law the effect of de­
gradation is apparently two-fold. Firstly a degraded person and his 
descendants born after his degradation lose their share in the joint
(1) Manu 11.49-52; Yaj.3.221-225.
(2) Manu 11.182-84: HFatitasyodakam karyam sapindairbandhavairbah- 
ih/ Nindite'hani sayanhe jnatritviggurusannidhau// DasT ghata- 
mapampurnam paryasyetpretavatpada / Ahoratramupasxrannasauchan 
bandhavaissaha// Nivarteran cha tasmattu sambhasanasahasane/ 
Dayadyasya pradanam cha yatra chaiva hi laukiki//11; Yaj.3.294; 
Ma.Pa.964 e Nir.Sin.(Nenesastri's edi.)1959-60; Tr,
(3) See supra
(4) No Ucriya* for a patita - Yama quoted in Mit.on Yaj.3.6 p.298; 
no sutaka - ICrisnacharya*s Smr.Mu.p.16; no $havy ahavy a' - Gir- 
idharalala's Smr.Sa.Samuchchaya p.29; no asaucha - the Txka on 
Nir.Sin.1907. This is especially so in the case of a woman 
who causes abortion or kills her own husband - Manu 5.90 8s Yaj. 
3.6. But this does not denote that degradation is equal to 
civil death (see infra); for there is no asaucha seven for the 
Kingfs death - Manu 5.97.
(5) Mit.on Yaj.3.6 p.299.
family property and their right to inherit the property of their 
undegraded relatives. According to Baudhayana, Itautilya and
(1) Apa,2.14.1; Hi.2.7; Va.Smr.7.46; Vi.Smr.15.32; Kau.3.5; &ankha 
quoted by Apa.on Yaj.2.116; Manu 9.201; Yaj.2.140; Na.Smr.16.21 
& Na.Sam.14.20 etc. This is a place to note a few irresponsible 
statements which K.K.Bhattacharya has made in his T.L.L.1884-85. 
Firstly, he says that "This law of exclusion is peculiar to the 
Hindu system"; secondly, he remarks that this inclusion of de­
graded persons into the list of disqualified persons is a later 
addition of the Brahmins. The first statement proceeds out of 
ignorance . (s^e infra pp.5 &l-s£^nd T.L.L.1883 p.282) whereas the 
second one^?roni reluctance to realise that such inclusion has 
been made since the days of the oldest of the dharmasutras of 
Apastamfoa. In his enthusiasm for something original he makes 
another objectionable statement, namely, that exclusion on 
account of degradation had already become obsolete by the time 
of &rxkrisna. For his support he relies on the commentary of 
&rikrisna on Da.Bha.1.31. This statement needs special re­
futation as it was meekly accepted by their Lordships of the 
Madras High Court in Subbaraya v. Ramasami (1899)23 Mad.171 at 
176. In this particular paragraph JXmuta says that like death 
and renunciation, degradation results in destruction of owner­
ship. Commenting on this Ramabhadra points out that as there 
are provisions whereby a patita is enjoined to make a gift of 
cow etc. in a sacrifice and whereby there is also a prohibition 
against accepting gifts from a degraded person, degradation does 
not destroy ownership. (Ramabhadra*s point may be understood 
when it is remembered.that a right to make gift denotes also its 
prerequisite, namely, the ownership of the donor in the property 
to be given away - see Mit.on Yaj.II.27 p.141: "Svasvatvanivr- 
ittih parasyatyapadanam cha danam"). Catching this very point 
Achyuta says that a degraded person loses his ownership only 
if he is averse to making expiation. 6rTkrisna simply endorses 
Achyuta*s opinion as follows: "Atra patitasyapi sarvasvadanad- 
iprayaschitta&ravanat prayaschittaparanmulcheti visesanam deyam 
tena prayaschittapragabhavabhavasahakritam patityam svatvanas- 
aheturiti bodhyam". This position is accepted on all hands.
See infra p/. 5H&. So an inescapable corollory of this state­
ment will be that if such person refuses to perform the praya­
schitta he loses his ownership according to the Bengal school 
and his share on account of suspension of ownership according 
to the Mitaksara school. - See infra pp.SVZ-^OjSee Vi .Mi.559 
wherein a similar remark together with the corollory is given. 
Bhattacharya*s statement is, therefore, baseless.
Devala who are followed by all the commentators the degraded person
and his descendants cannot claim even maintenance from the joint pro-
perty.(1) The latter rule, however, does not appear to apply to de-
graded person’s daughter who, after some technical and insignificant
ceremony of expiation and purification, can be taken back into the
original fold of the family for the purpose of social intercourse and 
(2)
marriage. The progeny of a degraded person referred to here is
( 3)the progeny born to him after his degradation.
A special provision of the Sastra in favour of women aught
to be noted here, namely, it is obligatory for the responsible person
to provide, even for degraded women, residence near the family house
(4)and maintenance. The reason of this provision is clear enough:
in a majority of cases women being incapable of earning their own
livelihood, complete severence from their own families is more likely
to bring about further degradation by compelling them to resort, for
(5)their own subsistence, to vicious company.
The second legal effect o<j? degradation, according to some 
authors, is that the degraded person is divested of his property and 
the latter devolves upon his heirs in the same way as if he has died. 
It is well-known that the joint-family property can be partitioned 
at the father’s will during his life-time and at the will of the sons
, . to ~ ... ..... .
(1) Bau.2.2.46; Kau.3.5; Devala quoted in Sr.Cha.632, Vi.Ra.490, 
Sa.Vi.366, Vi.Mi.559, Vi.Ta.436 etc.
(2) Yaj.3.261 and Vriddhaharlta and Vasistha quoted in Mit.on the 
same; Ma.Pa.850; Pra.Vi.174; Nri.Pra.256; Pra.NirHpana 113-14.
(3) Vi.Smr.15.34-35; Smr.Cha.633; Sa.Vi.365 etc.
(4) Manu 11.188; Yaj.3.296.
(5) See Sarvajnanarayana on Manu 11.188.
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after his death. Commenting on Narada’s verse^*^ which gives
other alternative circumstances for partition during the life-time
of the father Vijnanesvara says that sons can force partition upon
(3)the father if he leads a sinful life (adharmavartini). Comment­
ing upon the same verse Jxmuta &ives two alternative circumstances 
as follows:- One is when the father has lost his ownership in the 
property by degradation, renunciation or death; second is if the
(4)father is willing to partition the property during his life-time. 
Visvesvara and Mitra Misra also admit that degradation of the father
is a reason whereby a son can compel his father to partition the
(5)joint family property. It is most important to note that the line
of succession known as compact series of heirs which is applicable 
to the property of a person who has died without leaving any issue,
(1) Yaj.2.115 & 2.117.
(2) Na.Smr.16.3 & Na.Sam.14.3.
(3) Mit.on Yaj.2.114 p.201, Ma.Pa.645, Smr.Cha.605 containing com­
ments on Na.Smr.16.16.
(4) See the discussion in Da.Bha.1.32-50 with the assertion in para, 
no.44: "Tasmat patitatvanisprihatvoparamaih svatvapagama itye- 
kah kalo 'parascha sati satve tadichchhata iti kaladvayameva 
yuktam/11. See also ibid para.no.40. But see Da.Ta.9 and Da. 
ICra.Sam.42-43 wherein the authors seem to have neglected the 
suggestion of their master that the father loses by his degrada­
tion his ownership in the property: they state that father1s
own will is the only circumstance whereby there can be a par­
tition, during the life-time of the father, of his self-acquired 
property as distinguished from the ancestral property. But see 
Raghunandana infra p.5^0 note *1 . The principle of des-
trudtion of ownership as enunciated by Jxmuta has been only con­
ditionally accepted by his followers - Supra p.5^6 note!
On the other hand according to the Mitaksara School the father 
loses only his right to withhold partition and his ownership 
is only suspended but not totally destroyed - infra p. 5*bO,
(5) Ma.Pa.648; Vi.Mi.435.
is also applicable, according to Mitra Misra, to the property of a
(1)person who has become degraded or has renounced the world. This
appears to show that a degraded person is dead not only to the world 
but also to his wife, daughter and other relatives and that he loses 
all his rights in his property which he has acquired before degrada­
tion •
But this inference does not appear to be correct. If 
Mitra Misra thereby wants to suggest divesting of property he is con­
tradicting not only other leading authors but himself too. For Vij­
nanesvara, Visvesvara and Mitra Misra himself say that the provision 
about incapacity to take a share at partition applies only to those 
persons who suffer from the requisite disqualification before and at
the time of the partition but not to those who have already taken
(2) . . # their share and have become separate. The reason, Mitra Misra
himself adds, is that "there is no authority for divesting of (an
(3 )already) given share. Raghunandana appears to be the only author
who directly contradicts this position. Admitting that disqualified 
persons other than a degraded one are not divested of their share if 
they acquire their disqualification only after the partition he
(1) Vi.Mi.488: "Gaunamuldiyaputrabhave mritapatitaparivrajakadidh- 
anagrahanadhikarina uchyante. *'
( 2) Mit.on Yaj.2.140: "Etesara vibhagat prageva dosapraptavanamsa- 
tvamupapannam na punarvibhaktasya/"; Ma.Pa.682; Vi.Mi.559.
There appears to be a printing mistake in the passage: "Sarve- 
samamsanarhanam ... anamsa eva/M in Ma.Pa.682 which is reprint- 
ed in Dha.ICo.1394. The editors of the latter have not corrected 
the text of the passage but have added a comma which makes the 
confusion worst confounded. The word ’vibhakto1 therein must 
be read as *vibhakte* or 'vibhaktau* though the latter one would 
be slightly far-fetched. The suggestion would be amply: clear 
if this passage is compared with the above-cited Mitaksara 
passage of which the former is almost a copy.
(3) Vi.Mi.559i 1dattavibhagapaharane pramanabhavat1.
further remarks that a degraded person, however, is divested of his 
share even if he becomes degraded after the x>artition. Adducing the 
provisions of the Sastra about prohibition of accepting gifts from 
a degraded person he further states that by degradation only that 
much ownership of a person which was accrued to him before his de­
gradation is destroyed but that he does acquire ownership in pro-
(1)perty which he acquires after degradation. The opinion which is
worth considering has, however, to be discarded in favour of the 
opinion of the multitude of authors who are against it.
Moreover - and this is more important for our purpose - 
Vijnanesvara, Visvesvara, Nilakantha, Kamalalcara, Mitra Misra and 
iSrikris^a maintain that if, after the partition, any one of these 
disqualified heirs gets relieved of his disqualification he is en-
(2)titled to a share in the same way as a son born after the partition.
Visvesvara specially includes amongst such heirs a degraded person
* (3 )who has undergone prayaschitta. This shows that by degradation
the ownership of a person or his right to inherit is not destroyed
oil
but only suspended according at lo.-ist to the authors of the Mitak-
A
sara School/ .
We thus come to three conclusions as regards the £astrie 
position about the proprietory right of a degraded person: firstly,
a person who is degraded does not get a share at a partition of the 
joint family property and does not succeed to the property of his 
undegraded relatives; secondly, a degraded person, once he has
(1) Raghunandana on Da.Bha.5.7.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.2.140; Ma.Pa.682; Ma.Ra.355-56; Vya.Ma.163; Vi.Ta.
432; Vi.Mi.559; &rTlcrisna on Da.Bha.5.10.
(3) See ’kritaprayaschitto va* in Ma.Pa*632.
secured a share in partition, cannot be divested of his property; 
thirdly, a degraded person is, after the performance of due expiatory
■Hit
ceremonies, entitled to his share in^property which he would have
taken had he not been degraded at the time when the partition took
place. The only acceptable conclusion, therefore, which could be
drawn from the remark of Mitra Misra which is contradictory to this
(1)position is that the property of a degraded person devolves upon 
the same heirs upon whom it would have devolved if he had not been 
degraded at the time of his death. This is also fortified by the 
fact that although there is a provision debarring a degraded person 
from inheriting the property of his undegraded relative*s property 
there is no provision debarring an undegraded relative from inherit­
ing his degraded relative*s property. The only part of Raghunandana'£ 
commentary which is conformable with the above position is that even 
a degraded person is capable of acquiring and owning property after 
his degradation.
It may be added here that the same seasons which disqualify 
a man from having a share in inheritance disqualify a woman a l s o ; ^  
so the position stated above is equally applicable to degraded women.
We now come to the third important question partly answered 
in the negative by the foregoing discussion, namely, whether degrada­
tion amounts to civil death? The scholars and the judges who in­
troduced into Hindu law this doctrine of civil death have evidently 
adopted this fiction of death from the old English law according to
(1) i.e. no divesting oh account of post-partition defect.
(2) Mit.on Yaj.2.140; Ma.Pa.682; Vi.Mi.559.
which death could be mors civilis or mors naturalis. Under the
common thaw a man could be said to be civilly dead (civiliter mortuus) 
if he was attained of treason or felony of if he was banished or 
abjured the realm. He lost all his existing property and also his 
right to acquire and retain new property. In Bullock v. Dodds^^
Abbott C.J. characteristically puts the position of an attainted 
person as follows: f,He may acquire; but he cannot retain; he may
acquire not by the reason of any capacity in himself, but because if 
a gift be made to him, the donor cannot make his act void, and re­
claim his own gift; and as the donor cannot do this, and the attain­
ted donee cannot enjoy, the thing given vests in the Crown by its
( 3 )perogative, there being no other person in whom it can vest".
There appears to be a remarkable concurrence of opinion 
amongst the indigenous as well as European scholars that degradation 
in effect amounts to civil death in Hindu law. Sir Thomas Strange 
picturesquely describes in the following words the effects of degra­
dation: "Accompanied with certain ceremonies, its effect is, to
(1) See Wharton*s Law Lexicone (1938)p.197; W.J.Byrne: A dictionary 
of English law (1923)p.278. The forfeiture Act 1870(33 & 34 
Viet.C.23) provides that conviction for treason and felony etc. 
shall not involve any attainder, forfeiture or escheat - 
Wharton p.197. The doctrine of mors civilis, though abolished 
may be applicable if a person is outlawed; outlawry, though 
theoretically possible in criminal proceeding, was abolished in 
civil proceedings by the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879 
sect.3 —  Byrne p.278.
(2) (1819)2 Barnwell and Alderson 256 reprinted in English Reports
Vol.106.
(3) 2 B.& Aid.258 at 275 - also quoted with approval by Sir J.Dod­
son in Coombes v. The Queen*s Proctor 16 Jur.820 at 821. The 
learned judge also refers to the opinion of Spelman, approved 
also by Blackstone, to the effect that the derivation and mean­
ing of the word * felony* implies forfeiture of property. While 
the husband is undergoing sentence for felony the wife was re­
garded as q widow or a wife divorced a vinculo matrimonii - 
ibid at p.821. See also 2 B.& Aid.258 at 268-69 where Manning
exclude him from all social intercourse, to suspend him in every
civil function, to disqualify him for all the offices, and all the
charities of life; - he is to be deserted by his connexions, who are
from the moment of the sentence attaching upon him, to ’desist from
speaking to him, from sitting in his company, from delivering to him
any inherited, or other property, and from every civil or usual
attention, as inviting him on the first day of the year or the like' ■
So that a man under these circumstances, might as well be dead; whicjy
indeed, the Hindu law considers him to be, directing libations to be
(1)offered to Manes, as though he were naturally so.1' Other eminent
scholars like Jolly, Sarvadhikari, Golapchandra Sarkar etc, follow
(2)
this and hold that degradation brings about civil death.
It must at the time be noted that almost all these scholars
also maintain that a degraded person cannot be divested of an already
(3)given share and some also accept the provisions of Vijnanesvara 
that if the defdct is removed even after the partition, the dis­
qualified person is entitled to a share in the manner of an after­
in his argument refers to statutes, Yearbooks and to the op­
inions of Bracton, Lord Hold etc. to prove the proprietory 
effects of civil death.
(1) Strange (1830)p.160.
(2) Jolly: T.L.L.1883 pp.175, 277-79; Sarvadhikari T.L.L.1880 p.969: 
"To all intents and purposes the disqualified person is viewed 
in the eye of law as dead; . Sarkar (1927)p,585: "... an out- 
caste or an excommunicated sinner is deemed civilly dead.." &
p.587.
(3) Strange p.163; Cowell T.L.L.1871 p.184-85; Jolly: T.L.L.1883
p.279; Grady H.L.(1868) pp.100-1; Ram Charan Mitra: T.L.L. 
1895-96 p.323 etc. But see Shamachurn Sirkar: Vya Dq.(1867) 
p.1017 quoted infra p.S4*^ Jolly is self-contradictory when at 
p.175 he remarks: "... one formally expelled from caste by the 
ceremony of Ghatasphota 'the smashing of the pot1, is divested 
of his entire property."
(1)born son.
On the authority of a very old case Sheonauth Rai v.
(2)
Mussummaut Dayamyee Chowdrain which was decided in the Bengal
Sudder Court in the year 1814 scholars like Shamachurn Sirkar, Cowell
(3)and apparently Sir Thomas Strange also maintain that’ there are 
two kinds of sins or offences; some cause partial and temporary de­
gradation which, together with its incidental hindrance to succession 
is removed by expiation; others cause a final and irreparable de­
gradation resulting in a permanent hindrance to succession, and in 
excommunication - in such a case expiation may remove the sin but it 
is alleged to leave irredeemable the loss of caste and the forfeiture 
of right to inherit. In this particular case an adoptive mother hadA
made an application to the Court to get her adopted son disinherited. 
The son was a drunkard, had attacked many people, had tried to des­
troy the adoptive mother and co-habited with a muslim woman. Dis­
tinguishing between the two kinds of sins in the above-mentioned 
manner the pandits of the Sudder Court opined that only the last
(1) Jolly T.L.L.1883 p.279; Bhattacharya T.L.L.1884-83 pp.396-97; 
opinion of Bhalachandra Sastri expressed in his edition of 
Steele's Law and Custom of Hindu Castes p.55 referred to in 
W.B.4th edi*p.56; see also Steele (1868)p.61: a disqualified 
person is excluded "unless the defect can be removed by 
medicaments or penance." But as against this see Sarvadhik­
ari: T.L.L.1880p.968. Jolly at p.279 adds "but they give no 
clue as to the way in which this analogy has to be worked 
out."
(2) (1814)2 Mad.Rep.137.
(3) The case is referred to in Strange vol.1.161-62; Sirkar's Vya. 
Da.(1867)pp.1001-2 & 1017-18, Cowell : T.L.L.1871 p.186. 
Sirkar at p.1017 remarks: "The person committing a crime or a 
sin which causes degradation by loss of caste unredeemable by 
atonement, forfeits property whenever the same is committed, 
and cannot regain inheritibility even by expiatory penance."
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offence was of such a kind as to make the adopted son permanently- 
bereft of his caste and of his right to inherit. The Coux’t ungrudg­
ingly accepted their finding and decided the case accordingly. This 
position which superimposes the idea of civil death upon Hindu law
Ivo# * c)
is utterly baseless; it neglects completely the fundamental purpose;;
A
for which a prayaschitta is performed, namely purification of mind
(1)and appeasement of the public; the latter is evidently borne in 
mind with a view to avert the evil effects of excommunication. More­
over immediately after mentioning the provisions of excommunication
Manu and Yajnavalkya mention also the provisions of rehabilitation of
(2)
an excommunicated person if he performs prayaschitta. From these 
provisions it is definite that such person completely retrieves his 
original position. It cannot be said that these provisions of rehab­
ilitation apply only to a person who has been degraded on account of
a lesser type of sin; for Visvesvara says that these provisions
(3)apply even to a mahapatakin who has performed expiation. ICamal-
akara, an author of great authority, in his Nirnayasindhu states that
funeral ceremonies are to be performed and asaucha is to be observed
after the death of a degraded relative who had performed prayasch-
(4)itta before his own death.
Moreover even a person who did not perform expiation was 
not totally severed from his nearest relatives. Baudhayana, Vasistha,
(1) Yaj.3.220; the other etymological definitions of prayaschitta 
stress either of these purposes - see Harxta quoted in Pra.Ka.l; 
Angiras quoted in Pra.Vi.2 & the Dharmadxpika 71; Paraskara 
quoted in the Dharmadxpika 71; Gurudasa’s Prayaschittasamuch- 
chaya 109; for its meaning both according to yoga and rudhi 
seeSMr.Mu.(pra.ka.)859.
(2) Manu 11.186-87: M...Sarvani jhatikaryani yathapurvam samacharet.’ 
See’ also Vas.Smr.15.12 and Yaj.3.295.*
(3) Ma.Pa.966.
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&ankha and Satatapa affirm that there can be no severence from a de-
(1)graded mother. Kamalakara says that if he xs a nearer relative
(2)like father etc. the ceremony of Narayanafoali is to be performed.
He also says that obsequial ceremonies may be performed, out of com-
(3 }passion, for degraded relatives. Thus excommunication in toto is 
impossible in the case of nearest relatives and it is definitely 
wiped out by performance of expiation.
Moreover, leaving aside sins like having cohabitation with 
a Muslim woman etc. which cannot be much more grievous than the 
offence of having connection with a prostitute or a woman of the low­
est class, even apostasy does not bring about permanent excommunica­
tion sd &s to bring about the civil death of the apostate who, in 
view of the Sastra, is nothing more than a patita. Long since the 
days of the Brahmanas and the $ryanyakas a special ceremony called 
fvratyastomd'was performed for converting the non-Aryan aboriginals
(1) See Bau.II.2.48, Vas.Smr.13.47, &ankha & Likhita quoted in Apa. 
on Yaj.2,237 - all referred to by Kane: History of Bharmasastra 
Vol.III.p.803; see also &atatapa quoted in Medh.on Manu 8.389.
(2) Ibid. However, it is only the author of the Sarasvatx-Vilasa 
who openly ventures to say that the relation between the father 
and son being secular (laukika) it becomes severed upon degrada­
tion (of either) - Sa.Vi.365: "Pitaputrasambandho laukikah . 
patityadau nivartata iti purastannivedayisyate." Strangely, 
however, none of the leading scholars who vociferously maintain 
that degradation is equal to civil death, have come across this 
passage. The present writer was unable to trace any section in 
the same treatise wherein this passage has been explained by the 
author in detail as he here promises. The statement, however, 
cannot apply to the relation between a mother and her issue 
which is natural and not only social. - See also the Matsyapur- 
ana quoted in the Sabdakalpadruma vol.3p.24 cited in Hiralal v. 




or for purifying the renegade Aryans themselves* Even during the
days of the British regine the Hindu pandits were getting in favour 
of readmitting into Hindu fold a Hindu who got himself converted to
(2)another religion but wished to come back again into the Hindu fold.
It is thus evident that the &astra never contemplated any such thing
as permanent degradation or excommunication.
Thus we arrive at the following conclusions:-
(1) That degradation does not result in civil death.
(2) That degradation does not sever the relation with the nearest
kinsmen and cannot bring about permanent excommunication.
(3) That the only adverse effect of degradation from the proprietory 
point of view is that the degraded person and his male children born 
after his degradation lose all their rights of partition and inherit­
ance pertaining to the joint property of the family or separate pro­
perty of their undegraded relations.
(4) That a degraded person continues, even after his degradation, to 
hold the property which he has acquired before his degradation and is 
capable of acquiring new property after his fall.
(5) That the effect of excommunication can be dislodged by proper 
penance in which case the person is restored to his normal status.
(6) That a degraded person who has undergone expiation is entitled
to a share in partition in the like manner of an after-born son.
(1) For the probable theories of conversion of non-Aryan aborigines 
into Aryans by a ceremony called Vratyastoma see Stanley Rice: 
Hindu Customs and their origins (1937)pp.87-90; see also N.C. 
Sen-Gupta p.35. For the expiatory ceremony for renegade Aryans 
see the Vratyaprayaschitta mentioned in Pra.Nirupana of Rip- 
unjaya p.131.
(2) See ,MlechchhTkri(bhu)tanam suddhivyavastha* compiled by Gang- 
arama at the orders of Ranavxrasimha, the king of Jammu and 
KasmTra.
(7) That succession to property of a degraded person is the same as 
succession to the property of an undegraded person.
The main proprietory effect of degradation, namely, exclu­
sion from inheritance has long since been wiped out since the passing
M  )
of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act Sect.Wo.1 of which reads:
"So much of law or usage now in force within the territories subject 
to the Government of the East India Company as inflicts on any per­
son forfeiture of rights or property, or may be held in any way to 
impair or affect any right of inheritance, by reason of his or her 
renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of, any re­
ligion, or being deprived of caste, shall cease to be enforced as 
law in the Courts of the East India Company, and in the Courts es­
tablished by the Royal Charter within the said territories.*' The 
Act relieves a person against deprivation of caste as well as change 
of religion or exclusion from religion. It certainly helps any per­
son who is excluded from inheritance by reason of his degradation and 
consequent excommunication. But it has always been held that the 
relief given by this enactment is personal and that the descendants
of an apostate cannot enjoy the benefits conferred by the provisions
(2) # of this Act. However, the Sastra does not recognise any such
thing as conversion to other religion; hence an apostate could have
t
been excluded under the Sastra only on the ground that he had become 
patita. So the decisions about the descendants of apostates can be 
applied by way of analogy to the descendants of a degraded and ex­
communicated person also. But it would be wrong to hold that des-
(1) Act XXI of 1850 which extended the principle underlined in 
section 9, Regulation VII of 1832 Bengal Code to all the terri­
tories subject to the Government of the East India Company.
(2) See the cases cited in Gupte Il.L.p.53*
cendants of a degraded person cannot benefit under this Act; for 
the sons etc, of a degraded person are excluded from inheritance not 
simply because it would be unreasonable to allow them to claim
through a person who is himself excluded but because, as Jxmuta and
# (1)
Mitra Misra clearly put it, they themselves also become patita*
Their degradation may be the result of their being born to a degraded
person or of their social intercourse with a degraded person like
father etc. But their degradation being also personal they should
( 2)be held to be entitled to claim benefit under this enactment. The
SEime rule obviously applies to descendants of apostates* It is high
time that the law on this point was rectified and placed on
(3 )its proper footing*
If not degradation there were some other reasons whereby 
in ancient days women, it seems, could be divested of their strxdhana. 
The oldest authority for this is found in Kautilya’s Arthasastra 
wherein the author says that a woman loses all her dominion over her
(1) Da.Bha.5.12; Vi.Mi.S53 : ’’patitotpannatvena patitatvat”.
(2) But see Sarkar p.581 wherein the author maintains that the de­
scendants of an outcaste ^orn after excommunication of their
ancestor, cannot claim benefit under this Act as an outcaste 
falls outside the pale of Hinduism and Hindu law does not apply 
to him. The reasoning is obscure; in any case the learned 
scholar has failed to notice that the disqualification of the 
descendants of an outcaste depends also upon their personal
degradation.
(5) As rules of exclusion are the same in succession to a male’s 
or a female’s property Tbe Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Dis­
abilities ) Act XII of 1928 must also be noted. In consequence 
of this Act which applies only to persons of the Mitaksara 
School no person other than a congenital lunatic or an idiot 
is excluded from inheritance by the reason only of a disease, 
deformity or physical or mental defect.
strxdhana by* seditious activities or by* revolting against her husband*
A famous and an oft-quoted verse of Itatyayana reads: "A woman does not
deserve strxdhana if she indulges in harmful activities, or is shame-
(2)
less, a spendthrift, or an adulteress." Quoting this verse Med-
hatithi says that such kind of woman should not be given any gift on
supersession, or if she already possesses some property she should be
( 3 )divested of the same. Unfortunately this verse is not quoted at
all by either of the two leading commentators, namely, Vijnanesvara 
or Jxmuta. Others who refer to the same either leave it without any
(4)
comment or connect xt only to gxft on supersession. Only accord­
ing to Mitra Misra does this text provide reasons both for exclusion
(5)from inheritance and divesting of an already vested property. But 
on the whole, however, it seems that the attitude of the law develop­
ed towards softening the provisions of divesting of strxdhana and
(1) Kau.3.3: "Rajadvistaticharabhyam atmapakramanena cha/ Strxdhan- 
anxtasulkanam asvamyam jayate striyah//" The word 'atmapakram- 
anena* is explained in the Srxmula as deserting of one‘s own 
accord one's own husband.
(2) "Apakarakriyayukta nirlajja eharthanasika/ Vyabhichararata ya 
cha strxdhanam na cha sarhati//" - cited Vi.Mi.516 etc. For 
other readings see the appendix. For the result of extravag­
ance see Na.Smr.15.92 & Na.Sam.13.94 1Strxdhanabhrastsarvasvam• • «
etc.1 wherein Narada gives a list of women who deserve to be
deserted. For deprivation of all rights because of adultery
see Yaj.1.70 1Hritadhikaram etc.' and Mit.on the same. u * •
(3) Medh.on Manu 8.28 (Jha's edi.p.85) wherein the commentator takes 
this stand and tries to derive support from Manu 9.78. But he 
also mentions the opinion of other people to the effect that 
this verse does not provide for divesting of strxdhana which is 
already given but only prevents further gift of strxdhana for 
supersession in accordance with Yaj.II.148.
(4) However, Kamalakara utilises this verse to prove that an un­
chaste widow is not entitled even to maintenance from her 
husband's property - Vi.Ta.398.
(5) Vi.Mi.545 referred to supra p.5l*r.
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creating absolute ownership of a woman in her stndhana.
WitJx regard to the reasons of exclusion from inheritance
which include extravagance on the part of an heir Colebrooke in his
letter to Sir Thomas Strange observes: nIn regard to the causes of
disinheritance, discussed in the Digest b.V.ch.5 sec.l, correspond-
ing with the 5th ch. of Jimuta Vahana, and the 10th sec.of ch.2 of
the M&tacshara, I am not aware, that any can be said to have been
abrogated, or to be obsolete. At the same time I do not think any
of our Courts would go into proof of one of the brethren being
addicted to vice, or profusion, or being guilty of neglect of
obsequies, and duty towards ancestors. But expulsion from caste,
leprosy, and similar diseases, natural deformity from birth, neutral
sex, unlawful birtlh, resulting from an uncanonical marriage, would
doubtlessly now exclude; and I apprehend, it would be to be so ad-
(2)
judged in our Adawluts.” It need not be stressed how important
these words were since they emanated from the pen of a person who
was eminent both as a judge and as a Sanskrit scholar. However,
Strange and Grady point out that in a society wherein individual
interest is subdued to community interest it is necessary to have
some measures of security against vicious extravagance of an individ-
(3)ual member of a family. Even under Roman law a notorious prodig­
al was regarded as non compos; and uqder the old English common law
(1) See supra for the extent of woman’s dominion over her property 
and her right to dispose of the same.
(2) Strange vol.I.159; also reproduced in Grady H . L .(1868)p.103.
(3) Strange vol.I.158; Grady p.103. Strange refers also to Col. 
Dig.3.300 wherein Jagannatha says that according to some authors 
gaming people should be excluded whereas according to others 
what they dissipate should reduce their share pro tanto - vol.I. 
157-58.
552
dissipation of feuds was, by the law of feuds, a cause of forfeiture. 
It is no wonder that even Hindu law adopted the same attitude towards 
the prodigal. What applies to an extravagant male member of a joint 
Hindu family applies a fortiori to a woman. An extravagant woman 
could be even more dangerous since she can be in possession both of 
her own strxdhana and household property which can be valuable.
But Colebrooke perhaps adopted a more reasonable attitude 
towards these texts since it was better utterly to disregard extra­
vagance etc. as causes of exclusion from inheritance or of divesting 
rather than to admit them as necessarily difficult questions of fact 
in every case; for there can be no accepted measure of prudence
N
whereby a person can be branded as extrayagant. It may be noted here
that the only reported case on strxdhana in which the text of ICaty-
ayana was brought to the notice of the Court, namely, Ganga v. Gha- 
(2)sxta the full bench of the Allahabad High Court held, without 
giving any reason or reference, that the text has become obsolete 
and unenforceable in Courts. But talcing into consideration the fact 
that the tendency of the &astra was becoming progressively in favour 
of creating absolute and irrevocable ownership of a woman in her 
strxdhana it appears that the decision was given unknowingly on the 
correct lines.
(1) Strajxge vol.I.158. MSi vassalus feudum disipaverit, aut insigni 
detrimento deterius fecerit, privabitur*' - Zasius in Usus.Feud. 
91 and Crag.de Jur. Feud.362 quoted by Wright on Tenures p.44 
and referred to by Strange vol.I.158. For prodigi in Roman 
law see Buckland: The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law 
(I931)p.83; Fritz Schulz: Classical Roman Law (1951)pp.200-201; 
H.F.Jolowicz: Roman Foundations of Modern Law (1957)pp.125-26. 
The authors agree,however, that the exact position of a prodigal 
in Roman law cannot now be acertained with certainty.
(2) (1875)1 All.46 F.B. See supra p.5T|if„
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Coming to the judicial decisions on succession to the pro­
perty of unchaste women one finds that no distinction whatsoever was 
made betewwn succession to property of a professional hereditary 
prostitute and of an unchaste woman who is not a prostitute• A quick 
glance at the facts of the following cases would prove that all pro­
fligate women, whether they were unchaste married women, concubines 
or hereditary dancing girls, were treated on the same basis as pros­
titutes. Hence all the existing law about succession to
unchaste women may not inaccurately be described as the law of
(1)succession to property of prostitutes.
The foundation of this confusion between hereditary pros­
titutes and other degraded women was laid by the Bengal Sudder Court
(2)
in Taramunee Dasee v. Motee Buneanee. The facts of the case were 
as follows: A married woman who later on lapsed into prostitution
had died leaving three daughters. One was born in lawful wedlock, 
married and having children; the other two were born during the pros­
titution of their mother and were themselves prostitutes. The pros­
titute daughters stayed with their mother. To recover the maternal 
estate on the death of the mother her married daughter sued the other 
two daughters as a guardian on behalf of her minor sons. When the 
question was referred to the pandits of the Sudder Court they replied: 
"The two prostitute daughters alone inherit whatever the mother may 
have left; because the relation of the married and respectable 
daughter to the outcaste mother has been severed.M The Gourt accepted
(1) But for exceptions see infra ’ .
(2) (1846)7 Mac.Rep.325.
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the opinion and accordingly gave a decision to the same effect.
Treating this decision in this case as his basis Strange 
(junior) in his Manual of Hindu Law has summed the law on the subject 
as follows^1
I, ~ ’’The property of a dancing-girl will pass to her female issue 
first, and then to her male, as in the case of other females,”
XI, - ”0n failure of issue, the property of a dancing-girl will go 
to the pagoda to which she is attached,”
III. - "With prostitutes, the tie of kindred being broken, none of 
their relatives who remain undegraded in the caste, whether offspring 
or other, inherit from them. Their issue after their degradation 
succeeds.
As the provisions of the Sastra in this respect have been 
fully discussed three points against the decision in Taramunee’s case 
need only be cursorily stated:-
(1) That a married woman lapsing into profligacy does not 
become a prostitute thereby and should not be treated as such.^^
(2) That by degradation the tie of kinship between a
(4)mother and her offspring is never completely severed.
(3) That between legitimate and illegitimate issue of
/ HJ \
the same class preference must be given to the former.
(1) It is obvious that while relying on this decision Strange is 
confusing dancing girls with unchaste married women.
(2) Strange: Manual of H.L.p.89 - approved in Mayna Bai v. Uttaram 
(1864)2 M.H.C.R.196 at 202; Sivasangu v. Minal (1888)12 Mad.277. 
For heritable blood between a woman and her illegitimate off­
spring see supra
(8) See Guddati Reddi v. Ganapathi (1912)23 M.L.J.493 approved in
Meenakshi v. Muniandi (1914)38 Mad.1144. For the Gastric
position see supra pp. 5
(4) Supra pp.
(5) Supra pp.
However, since the decision in Taramunee1s case there has 
been a difference of opinion almost upon every point concerning 
succession to property of unchaste women, namely, whether degrada­
tion brings about severance of the relationship with the undegraded 
relatives; whether customary or ordinary Hindu law is applicable 
in determining succession to a prostitute*s property; whether a 
prostitute's family resembles a Hindu co-parcenary; whether a pros­
titute's female heirs take a limited or absolute interest in the pro­
perty which they inherit from her etc.
On the question whether degradation brings about a complete 
severance from the undegraded relatives there have been two views.
The older and the incorrect view is that degradation brings about a 
severance and that in succession to a degraded woman's property not 
only her degraded relatives but even the Crown succeeds to the total 
exclusion of her undegraded relatives. Accordingly a co-prostitute
(and hence a degraded) sister staying jointly was preferred to a
(1)separate undegraded brother resuming caste usages, a niece intro­
duced into the temple as a devasasi, though not formally adopted, by
the proposita was preferred to the brother of the latter who remained
* (2) xn caste.
(1) Sivasangu v. Minal (1888)12 Mad.277. It was also remarked that
the Act XXI of 1850 did not abrogate the rule of preference be­
tween a co-prostitute sister and a separate undegraded brother. 
Report at p.284.
(2) Narasanna v. Gangu (1889)13 Mad.133. See also In re Goods of
Kamineymoney Bewah (1894)21 Cal.697 wherein the husband's sis­
ter's adopted son being undegraded was declared as being no heir 
and hence not entitled to apply for revocation of the probate 
granted to the paramour of the deceased woman who, in her will, 
had appointed him as an executor. See also Bhutnath Mondol v. 
Secretary of State for India (1906)10 C.W.N.1086 wherein the 
Court refused to issue letters of administration in favour of 
the sister's son of the deceased on the basis that the property
( tom i'1 On. I'K.e. H I ” C
Mid-way between this and the next following view is the
belief that degradation brings about severance from the husband's
(1)family but not from the father's family of natural relatives. The 
reason of severance from the husband's family, according to this 
view, is that an unchaste wife is not entitled to succeed to her 
husband's property or to obtain maintenance from him or his heirs and 
that it would be inequitable to allow the husband etc., who have no 
corresponding liability, to succeed to the property of a degraded 
woman•
On the other hand in Sarna Moyee v. Secretary of State for
(2)India it was held, notwithstanding the arguments of Golapchandra 
Sarkar to the contrary, that by prostitution a woman may become out- 
caste but she does not thereby cease to be a Hindu and that ordinary 
Hindu law would be applicable to her property. But as the case was 
decided on another point the question about severance by degradation 
was left open. However, observing that "It is almost impossible to 
construct out of the smrities and commentaries a consistent doctrine
escheated to the Crown. The exact decision in this does not 
appear to be correct; because it seems both the sisters were 
prostitutes and hence there was no question of the sister's son 
being undegraded; secondly, letters of administration can be 
granted to undegraded relatives of a degraded woman without re­
cognising their title - see In re Goods of Sowdaminey Dassee 
decided in the Calcutta High Court on April 28th 1893 and re­
ferred to in Kamineymoney's case at p.702. See also Sundari 
Do see v. Neinye Charan (1907)6 C.L.J.372.
(1) See Ramprasad v. Mt.Subu Bai (1908)4 Na.L.R.31 and Moharani v. 
Thalcur Proshad ( )14 Oudh Cases 234 referred to in Iliralal
v. Tripura Charan (1913)40 Cal.650 at 674-76. See also Tripura 
v. Harimati (1911)38 Cal.493; degradation severs a woman from 
her natural relations but not from her own sons or chaste 
daughters born after the degradation.
(2) (1897)25 Cal.254.
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(i)of 'civil death' or as it has been called fiction of death," their
(2)Lordships of the Madras High Court held in Subbaraya v. Ramasami 
that degradation of a woman does not sever her tie of relationship 
with her husband's family and that in the absence of a preferable 
heir her step-son succeeds to her property. The Madras view was later
(3 )
on followed in the Allahabad High Court. The conflicting decisions
soon brought the point before a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court
(4) .in Hiralal v. Tripura Charan. In that case the property m  questioi
belonged to a deceased married woman who, after her husband's death,
became a 'prostitute* by staying as a mistress with some other person.
The question was whether her undegraded brother's son was entitled to
inherit her property. Eminent Hindu law scholars like Golapchandra
Sarkar and Ghose represented the two views, namely, that degradation
is equal to civil death and not equal to civil death respectively.
Referring to many of the texts mentioned in the foregoing
discussion and regretting that the decision based on doubtful author-
( 5)ity in Taramunee's case should subsequently have been accepted
(6)without question m  some of the later cases their Lordships of the
Full Bench gave a unanimous opinion that prostitution does not sever
the tie of kindred by blood. Rejecting as baseless the statement made
by Sutherland in his Synopsis of Hindu law of Adoption that an outcast*
(7)
person becomes civilly dead their Lordships overruled the decision
(1) Infra, Report at p.176.
(2) (1899)23 Mad.171, followed in Subbaratna v. Balakrishnaswami 
A.I.E.1918 Mad.642.
(3) Narain v. Tirlok (1906)29 All.4.
(4) (1913)40 Cal.650 P.B.
(5) (1846)7 Mac.Rep.375 supra.
(6) 40 Cal.650 at 672-73.
(7) Ibid at p.670.
of their High Court in Taramunee1s case and the decisions that follow­
ed the same.^  ^
Scholars like Banerjee and Golapchandra Sarkar have severely
criticised the decision of the Full Bench but as their criticism has
been fully met in the foregoing Sastric discussion no special attempt
(2)
is necessary here to counter each one of them individually.
/ Since the decision in Hiralal's case it has been uniformly
held that prostitution or degradation does not sever the tie of re-
(3)lationship with kindred by blood and that the same rule applies to
(4)relations by marriage. It has also been held that even amongst
undegraded relations there can be no uniform preference to relations
(5)by blood over relations by marriage.
In one of the later cases Venkatasubba Rao J. held that 
unless there is formal expulsion from the caste a woman cannot be 
taken to have been degraded merely on account of her unchastity.
On the question whether an excommunicated person can give his son in 
adoption their Lordships of the Bombay High Court - though they
(1) For these see supra^j .
(2) Banerjee pp.463-67; Sarkar pp.588-89. There is no doubt some 
considerable force in the equitable grounds stated by Sarkar in 
support of his view; but equity should not be allowed to en­
feeble the preponderance of the legal position in this matter. 
As for Banerjee it appears he himself was a party to the de­
cision in Sarna Moyee's case - see Shaikh Taleb Ali v. Shaikh 
Atldul Taaack A.I.R. 1925 Cal.748 at 749.
(3) Meenakshi v. Muniandi (1914)38 **ad.ll44; T.S.Kothandaram v. 
Subbier (1926)52 M.L.J.514; Charu Bala Basi v. Province of West 
Bengal A.I.R.1950 Cal.473.
(4) Subbaraya v. Ramasami (1899)23 Mad.171; Jagannath v. Narayan 
(1910)34 Bom.553; Kothandaram v. Subbier (1926)52 M.L.J.514. In 
Jagannath's case in which the husband was preferred to a son 
born of an adulterous intercourse the question of degradation 
was not discussed at all.
(5) Kothandaram v. Subbier supra.
(6) Ibid at p.516.
inadvertantly admitted that formal expulsion from caste brings about 
civil death, - held on the authority of Golapchandra Sarkar that it 
is only the most heinous kind of degradation that brings about ex­
communication and that a person cannot be considered as excommunicat­
ed unless there is evidence that there is a recognised dignitory who 
has the capacity to enforce excommunication and that he did excommu­
nicate a particular person for valid reasons.
As regards preference between degraded and undegraded re-
(2 ) ( 3)lations three views have been held. In Sivasangu v. Minal and
(4)
Narasanna v. Gangu the rights of the undegraded relations had
(5)been totally denied. But in Hiralal v. Tripura Charan the Full
Bench of the Calcutta High Court apparently distinguished the cases
as pertaining to a competition between degraded and undegraded heirs
I \
and left the question open. In Subbaraya v . Ramasami Ayyar and
Boddam J.J. uttered an obiter dictum to the effect that on equitable
grounds preference may be given to the degraded relations. In Meen-
(7)akshx V. Munxandx xn which a legxtxmate son was preferred to an 
illegitimate daughter Oldfield J. criticised the obiter in Subbaraya1s 
case and caustically observed: ,fI cannot understand how the Court
would be following any equity, or good conscience in doing so or 
would be promoting any other result that the mitigation of disabilit­
ies, which at present in some degrees at least deter people from
(1) Neelawa v. Gurushidappa (1936)A.I.R.1937 Bom.169. See also
Bhattacharya*s Commentaries on H.L.p.346: degradation is not
necessarily equal to excommunication.
(2) Kothandaram v. Subbier supra.
(3) (1888)12 Mad.277 supra.
(4) (1899)13 Mad.133.
(5) (1913)40 Cal.650.
(6) (1899)23 Mad.171; see also Sarkar pp.588-89 supra.p.34- no.8.
(7) (1914)38 Mad.1144
formation of illicit r e l a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g  to this view a re­
moter legitimate heir should be preferred to a nearer illegitimate - 
and eventually a degraded - heir. The third view is that amongst
both undegraded and degraded relations the nearer one, whether de-
( 2 )graded or not, should exclude the remote one.
There appears to be some confusion in the reasoning of their 
Lordships in Meenakshi1s case. The question about competition be­
tween degraded and undegraded relatives is not necessarily the same 
as the question about competition between the legitimate and illegit­
imate relatives. As regards the latter competition a legitimate heir
should always exclude an illegitimate heirs of the same class though
( 3 )not an illegitimate heir from a nearer class of heirs. But, as
(4)
in the case of Narsanna v. Gangu, there can be a competition be­
tween a degraded and an undegraded relative both of whom are legiti-
( 5 )
mate ones; similarly, as in Sivasangu v. Minal, there can be a 
competition between degraded and undegraded relatives both of whom 
are illegitimate. But without making such distinctions their Lord­
ships in Meenakshi's case remained content with laying down a broad
as well as an indistinct principle for all such cases.
Since degradation is not equal to civil death and does not
sever the tie of relationship with the undegraded relations, the real
(1) Ibid at p. 114-7; see also at p. 1152.
(2) Nammaiya v. Tiruvengadam (1913)24 M.L.J.223 (i.e. 18 I.C.601) 
referred to in Kothandaram v. Subbier (1927)52 M.L.J.514. In 
Nammaiya*s case a legitimate daughter*s daughter was preferred 
to an illegitimate daughter’s son. But see the different ver­
sion put upon the ratio of this case in Meenakshi v. Muniandi 
(1914)38 Mad.1144 and Sarkar p.590.
(3) See supra pp. -
(4) (1889)13 Mad.133.
(5) (1888)12 Mad.277.
stand that should he adopted is that subject to the rule of preference 
based on legitimacy, questions of preference between degraded and un­
degraded relations should be solved purely on the basis of nearness 
of heirs according to the general law.
There have been two views as to whether the ordinary law or 
special customary law should be adopted in determining succession to 
the property of a prostitute or a dancing girl. On the one hand 
special attempt has been made in some of the cases to find out whether
the parties were, amongst themselves, subject to some special custom
—  (1) of succession to stridhana. In Sivasangu v » PHivMy;h their Lordships
of the Madras High Court specially remitted the case to find out
whether there was a custom amongst prostitutes to the effect that a
degraded sister is preferred to an undegraded sister and secured an
(2)answer in the affirmative. In Muttukannu v. Paramasami their Lord­
ships took the view that the class of dancing women being recognised 
by Hindu law as a separate class having legal status as such, the 
usage of that class regulates, in the absence of positive legislation 
to the contrary, the rights of the parties with regard to inheritance, 
adoption, survivorship etc.
Thus there is a flow of cases on custom of adoption by pro­
stitutes, According to the view approved in the Bombay High Court o 
adoption of a daughter by a naikin is invalid notwithstanding a 
custom to the contrary as the custom itself is to be regarded as
(1) (1888)12 Mad.277.
(2) (1889)12 Mad.214. See also Meenakshi v. Muniandi (1914)38 Mad.
114-4 at 1151; Subbaratna v. Balakrishnaswami A.I.R.1918
Mad•642.
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(1)immoral. In Madras such, custom is recognised to have existed
amongst the devadasis (dancing girls) and the adoption has been held
to be valid in the absence of proof that such adoption v/as made with
( 2)the1 purpose of utilising the girl for prostitution. According to
this latter view such adoption has no reference to spiritual benefit
but arises out of one’s own desire to have a daughter to look after
oneself in old age and so no formal ceremony of adoption is necess- 
(3 )ary. When a dancing girl has been adopted by another dancing girl
the former becomes entitled to inherit from the latter and vice versa;
but in the absence of proof of a custom to that effect she does not
acquire rights of collateral succession in the family of the adopt™
(4)ress.
/ p \
Asserting a bold but an incorrect proposition that in 
every previous case about dancing girls the general accepted principle 
was that not Hindu law but customary law and usage govern such dis­
putes, their Lordships of the Madras High Court held that according 
to a custom amongst the dasis of Palamcottah an unmarried sister is
(1) Mathura v. AHsu (1880)4 Bom.845; Tara Naikin v. Nana (1890)14 
Bom.90; Hira v. Radha (1913)37 Bom.116; But see Manjamma v. 
Sheshagirirao (1902)26 Bom.491 at 495: an adoption by a pros­
titute as distinguished from a naikin may be valid. See also 
Narendra v. Dina (1909)36 Cal.824: a prostitute cannot validly
adopt a son to herself and such son has no right of inheritance
to her property.
(2) Chalakonda v. Chalakonda (1864)2 M.H.C.R.56; Kamalam v. Sada- 
gopa (1878)1 Mad.356; Venku v. Mahalinga (1888)11 Mad.393; 
Muttukannu v. Paramasami (1889)12 Mad.214; Kamalakshi v. Rama- 
swami (1896)19 Mad.127; Sarojini v. Jalajakshi (1898)21 Mad.229; 
Veeranna v. Sarasiratnam A.X.R.1936 Mad.639; Gangamma v. ICuppa™ 
mmal A.I.E.1937 Mad.139.
(3) Gangamma v• Kuppammal A .I.R .1937 Mad•13 9•
(4) Venkata Chellamina v. Cheekati A.I.R.1953 Mad.57
(5) For the contrary view taken in some of the cases previous.,
to this one see infra.
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preferred to a married sister in succession to property left by a
(1) (2 ) dasi. In Bera Chandramma v. Naganna it had been held that
according to a custom amongst dancing girls sons and daughters
succeed equally and simultaneously. But in Brahadeeswara v. Rajag-
opal their Lordships of the same High Court refused to extend the
(*3)custom beyond Vizgapatam district and endorsed the general rule
accepted in the Madras High Court about succession to dancing girls,
(4)namely, amongst their progeny females are preferred to males.
As against this the other view adopted in an overwhelming 
majority of decisions is that only ordinary Hindu law - subject, of 
course, to the proof of a special custom - is applicable to succession 
to property of prostitutes. Rejecting an argument of Golapchandra 
Sarkar that as prostitutes form a separate fifth class by themselvei^ 
the custom of a sister succeeding to another prostitute sister which 
was recognised in Sivasangu*s case should be recognised all over 
India their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held in Sarna Moyee
/p \
v. Secretary of State of India that a prostitute, even if she
(1) Shanmugathammal v. Gomathi A.I.R.1935 Mad.58
Although the actual custom proved in this case was that an un­
married sister is preferred to a married sister the Court un­
justifiably extended the same to preferring an unmarried niece 
to a married sister. See the report for an unconvincing 
attempt to justify such extension.
(2) (1923)45 M.L.J.228.
(3) (1946)11 M.L.J.173. One of the main reasons for putting such 
territorial restriction was that the decision in Bera Chandra­
mma* s case was based upon a statement in Thurston*s Caste and 
Tribes of Southern India which the author had taken from a 
census report published fifty years before.
(4) Kamakshi v. Nagaratnam 5 M.H.C.R.161 at 164-65; Subbaratnam v. 
Balakrishnaswami (1918)Mad.642, Balasundaram v. Kamakshi l.L.R. 
1937 Mad.278; Gangamma v. Kuppammal A.I.R. 1937 Mad.139.
(5) See supra p.
(6) (1897)25 Cal.254.
becomes an outcaste, does not cease to be a Hindu and that ordinary 
Hindu law would be applicable to succession to her property. The 
ratio of this decision was followed in many other cases by their 
Lordships of the Allahabad, Madras and Calcutta High C o u r t s . I n  
Ram Pergash v. Mt.Dahan Bibi,(2) Jawala Prasad J. who stands probab- 
ly as the best amongst the protagonists of this view explained in 
detail why Hindu law must apply to all those people who have not ad­
opted the personal law relating to another religion. Admitting that 
the class of prostitutes was recognised by the Sastra as a different 
class his Lordship stressed the fact that the provisions in the sastra 
are as applicable to the persons who have fallen off from the re­
ligion and have become outcaste as to persons who strictly follow the
. (3)relxgxon.
But considering that the position of a prostitute*s family
. . (4)is very similar to that of a Hindu male coparcenary it is reason­
able to give, at least amongst the issue of the proposita, a prefer­
ence to females over males. Similarly after the helpful remark of 
( 5 )
Kautilya it is also necessary to stress that in any case the 
sister of a prostitute ought to be considered as her heir.
(1) Subbaraya v. Ramasami (1899)23 Mad.171 at 177; Narain v. Tirlok 
(1906)29 All.4 at 7; Tripura v. Harimati (1911)38 Cal.493;
Hiralal v. Tripura Charan (1913)40 Cal.650; Ram Pergash v. Mt. 
Dahan Bibi Pat.H.C. cases (1924)85 at 96; Shaikh Taleb Ali v. 
Shaikh Abdul Razack A.I.R.1925 Cal.748; Narayan v. Laxman (1927) 
51 Bora.784 at 788; Charu Bala Basi v. Province of West Bengal
A.I.R.1950 Cal.473.
(2) Pat.H.C. cases (1924)85.
(3) Ibid at p.95. The vast number of texts about prostitutes which 
were quoted and discussed in the judgement were probably 
suggested to the Court by the eminent scholar Dr.IC.P.Jayaswal 
who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff - appellant in this case.
(4) Suprapp.StLO-pand infra pp.
(5) Supra pjJ.5^ .0.
However, such preference in favour of female children will
not always be possible if the position, namely, only ordinary Hindu
law is applicable, is accepted in toto. IVor instance in Shaikh Taleb
(1)All v. Shaikh Abdul Razack, which was a case of the Bengal School,
(2)it was held, following the law of the Dayabhaga, that the son of a
prostitute is to be preferred to her married daughter. Similarly
though the right of a prostitute’s sister was recognised under a
(3)custom in Madras and, on the basis of heritable sapindaship, in
(4)Bombay, their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court simply refused
AS
to recognise her right and declared the property escheat* to the
A
(5)Crown in the absence of any other heir. The decisions in these .
latter cases have evidently over-looked the fundamental structure of
(1) A.I.R.1925 Gal.748.
(2) Supra pp.^77-79.
(3) Sivasangu v. Minal (1888)12 Mad.277; Shanmugathammal v. Gomathi 
A.I.R.1935 Mad.58.
(4) Narayan v. Laxman (1927)51 Bom.784. Notwithstanding the argu­
ments of Dr.P.V.Kane, their Lordships admitted the right of a 
sister to succeed to her prostitute sister*s property as a 
heritable bandhu of the latter. For a discussion about herit­
able sapindaship through common mother see supra pti•
(5) Sarna Moyee v. Secretary of State for India (1897)25 Cal.254; 
Charu Bala v. Province of West Bengal A.I.E.1950 Cal.473. Not­
withstanding the argument of Golapchandra Sarkar the decision 
in Sivasangu * s case was distinguished in Sarna Moyee * s case as 
being based upon local usage and upon the fact that the sisters 
stayed jointly. But even granting that only ordinary Hindu law 
is applicable and that Jxmuta and his followers do not give 
heirs after the sapindas and samanodakas of the husband, their 
Lordships ought to have followed Jagannatha who says that the 
sapindas of the father and then of the mother should succeed
in default of the husband*s sapindas etc. - see supra pjs. *t95T. 
His opinion has been accepted by almost all the leading text­
book writers - see Banerjee p.500; Mayne loth edi.p.761; Mulla 
9th edi.pp.149-51; .& B.4th edi.pp.507-8; Trevelyan 2nd edi•
461; Sarkar 8th edi.646 - all referred to in A.I.R.1950 Cal.
473 at 475-76. But their Lordships rejected the unanimous op­
inion of all these scholars and blindly followed the decision 
in Sarna Moyee*s case•
a prostitute's family as well as some of the provisions of the ordin­
ary Hindu law of the Bengal School. It may be stated that the view 
of the Bombay High Court that a sister should be allowed to succeed 
before the Crown at least as a blood-relation and heritable bandhu 
ought to be upheld.
This discussion invariably leads us to another question, 
namely, whether a prostitute's family remembles a Hindu coparcenary. 
From the provisions bf the Arthasastra it seems that there is a
striking resemblance between the two except for the fact that females
(1)alone would become members of a prostitute's coparcenary. It is 
very difficult to determine whether the members of a prostitute's 
coparcenary have the two important rights invariably connected with 
an ordinary Hindu coparcenary, namely, right by birth, and right by 
survivorship.
The law on this point has developed entirely in the South.
The older view of the Madras High Court was towards admitting that a
prostitute's family does form a coparcenary. In c.Alasani v. c.Rat-
nachalam^2  ^ wherein a senior member of a devadasi family claimed
that she was entitled to joint family property her right was conceded
on that basis but without considering the question of right by birth
(3)or survivorship. In Kamakshi v. Nagaratnam the facts were as 
follows:™ Two sisters Sitalakshimi and Kamakshi had jointly inherit­
ed the property of their grandmother and continued to stay joint.
(1) See supra pp.
(2) (1864)2 M.H.C.R.56. Here at p.76 Holloway, J. calls the 
mother and daughter tfan undivided family".
(3) (1870)5 M.H.C.R.161.
On the death of the former her daughter, the plaintiff, claimed the
moiety of the property on the ground that she herself was a 'copar-
(1)cener with her mother's sister*. Following Segamalathammal's case
their Lordships held that the property^being inherited one, was not
strxdhana in the hands of the two sisters. Naturally one would have
had expected their Lordships to follow by analogy the other incorrect
rule laid down in Sengamalathammal1s case, namely, two daughters
succeeding to the property of their mother take jointly with rights
(2)of survivorship. Or even otherwise succession to Sitalakshimi's
share would have devolved upon Itamakshi as the next nearest heir to
( 3 )her grandmother. But remaining oblivious of the position which
they themselves had taken, namely, that the property was not strid- 
hana of Sitalakshimi, and also of the position taken by their Lord­
ships in Sengamalathammal(s case, Scott C.J. and Collett J. firmly 
declared that " ... the general rule must, we think, be considered 
to be that children of dancing women take by descent the estate of 
coparcenors in their mother's property; their daughters as a class
(4)
first and on failure of daughters their sons as a class...1' and 
gave a decision in favour of the plaintiff daughter. But as Sita­
lakshimi took only a limited estate according to their Lordships 
themselves her share had ceased on her death to be the plaintiff's 
'mother's property' and had reverted to the heirs of the original
(1) (1867)3 M.H.C.R.312.
(2) See supra p.if-XX*
(3) As succession in such case is traced to the original proposita - 
see supra r .. From this point of view the plaintiff had
no locus standi at all as daughter's daughter's daughter is 
not at all an heir in succession to her maternal great-grand- 
motlier's stridhana - see supra 1 .
(4) 5 M.H.C.R.161 at 165. It must be stated here that the interest 
which coparceners take in their property is by birth and by 
survivorship but not by 'descent*.
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proposita i.e. the plaintiff’s great-grandmother* So it is impossible
to understand the ratio of this decision unless it is assumed that
their Lordships recognised the-daughter1s right both by birth as well
as by survivorship*
Preferring an undegraded sister to a degraded brother their
(1)Lordships of the Madras High Court remarked in Sivasangu v. Minal
”... we observe that there is an analogy between the legal relation
of two prostitute sisters living together in their degraded condition
and that of two brothers living in coparcenary; In Muttukannu
( 2)v . Paramasami it was observed that amongst dancing girls the 
special usage of the class governed, in the absense of positive legis­
lation to the contrary the rights of inheritance, adoption and sur­
vivorship. ^hus it can be seen that according to the old notion of 
the Madras High Court a Hindu male coparcenary and a prostitute's 
family were looked upon as identical so far as the basic rights of 
the members of the latter are concerned.
But in Ko 1 ikambal v. Sundarammal ^  ^ wherein the mother and 
the daughter from a dancing girl family had joined to - defeat the 
interest of the alienee by maintaining that the alienated property 
was joint family property the learned judge Kumarasami Sastri J. 
observed that the previous cases recognised coparcenary with right
(1) (1889)12 Mad.277 at 284-85.
(2) (1889)12 Mad.214. Referring to the decision in Kamakshi*s
case their Lordships observed: "Though the right of survivor­
ship recognised in that case was one known (unknown?) to 
ordinary Hindu law yet the usage of the caste was upheld so 
far as it related to the adoption of daughters and gave them 
the status of male coparceners in an ordinary Hindu family.”




of survivorship but not with right by birth; however, he gave the
actual decision in favour of the mother and daughter on the factual
basis that their property was coparcenary property as it consisted
of the joint earnings of the mother and daughter which were pooled
together for joint living. In Gangamma v. Kuppammal wherein the
question of right by birth came as a direct issue before a single
judge, Wadsworth J. remarked that in the previous case Sastri J. used
the word ’coparcenary* 1 in a somewhat unprecise manner1 and held that
whether according to the law or any custom recognised by a Court of
law coparcenary with its essence of right by birth does not exist
amongst the dancing girls* The decision had lamentable effects on
the families of dancing girls since it failed to have regard for the
sociological structure of a dancing girl's family and disturbed the
tenor of the previous decisions.
There is no certainty whether a prostitute heir takes a limited
or an absolute interest in the property which she inherits from
(2)
another prostitute. In Kamakshi1s case the general law was relied
upon for the conclusion that even a dancing girl gets only a limited
interest in the property which she inherits from another dancing girl.
But the later view of the Madras High Court is that they take absolute
(3)estate in inherited strldhana. Taking into consideration the fqct
that the dancing girls - and in fact all prostitutes - form a 
separate 'emancipated community* and 'live and acquire property quite
(1) A.I.E.1937 Mad.139.
(2) (1870)5 M.H.C.R.161.
(3) Subbaratna v. Balakrishnaswarai (1918)A.1.R.Mad.642.
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independently of their male r elatives'there can he no doubt that 
the latter view is definitely more reasonable and equitable. But 
sitting as a single judge Wadsworth J. gave another questionable de­
cision in Balasundaram v. Kamakshi^  wherein the dispute concerned 
the property of a dancing girl who, leaving her traditional calling, 
had become a married woman but reverted to her original calling after 
widowhood and acquired property during such immoral life. The ques­
tion was whether her daughter took a limited or an absolute estate 
in the property which sheihherited from her mother. Doubting whether 
the subsequent laxity of a married dancing girl 'would give her any 
other character than that of an unchaste woman* Wadsworth J. observed 
that the property 'has devolved upon her daughters clothed with the 
character of the property acquired by an ordinary Hindu female* and 
that 'they would hold it subject to the same disabilities as attended 
the ownership of property by a female when it was in the hands of 
their mother'• The learned judge seems to have forgotten the basic 
general principle of Hindu law, namely, that the quantum of interest 
taken by a particular heir depends not upon the kind of the property 
or the status of the proposita but upon the status of the heir alone. 
For instance a son inheriting his father's property or his mother's 
strxdhana takes a full interest whereas a daughter takes limited 
interest. Similarly a widow takes a limited interest in her husband1 
property but the husband gets an absolute interest in the strxdhana 




absolute property in her prostitute mother*s strxdhana - and to this 
the learned judge has taken no objection - the daughter in this case5 
who presumably appears to have continued living only as a dancing 
girl,ought to have been held as an absolute owner of the inherited 
property. The learned judge has also neglected to consider the fact
that the property in dispute was acquired by the proposita from the
paramour and not from the husband and that too after she reverted to 
the profession by becoming a concubine. It was also necessary to 
consider and compare the duration of her married life and profession­
al life both before and after the marriage. If it is assumed that 
she remained as a mai^ried woman for five years and led an immoral 
life for forty years then it was rediculous to hold that she died
only as * an unchaste married woman*. It is only to be hoped that the
ratio of this decision would not be followed by their Lordships of
the Madras or other High Courts.
Touching the question of succession to a prostitute*s pro­
perty their Lordships of the Supreme Court have given an important
(1)decision recently m  Saraswanthi v. Jagadambal which has made the 
already slippery position of the law more unstable. The facts of
this case were as follows:- One Tfcangathammal who was a devadasi
died leaving three daughters two of whom were married and one of 
whohiwas herself a dasi. This dasi who was an unmarried girl claimed 
that on the bases of degradation as well as custom she excluded her 
two married sisters in succession to their mother's property. Their 
Lordships of the Madras High Court had decided that all the daughters
(1) A.I.R.1953 S.C.201.
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were entitled to inherit equally. Confirming this decision in the
Supreme Court Mahajan J. observed:
(I) "Degradation of a woman does not and cannot sever the ties of 
blood and succession is more often than not determined by ties of 
blood than by moral character of the heir."
(II) "In the absence of proof of existence of a custom governing
succession the decision of the case has. to rest on the rules of 
justice, equity and good conscience because admittedly no clear text 
of Hindu law applied to such a case. The High Court thought that the 
just rule to apply was one of propinquity to the case, according to 
which the married and the dasi daughter would take the mother’s pro­
perty in equal shares. No exception can be taken to this finding
(1)given by the High Court."
As regards degradation the decision is, of course, a correct
(2)one. Moreover in the case of a hereditary prostitute the question
about degradation does not arise at all^^ since she forms a member
(4)of a class by itself. At the most her married daughters could
(5)have been considered as ‘elevated* from their original class.
But the other ratio resorted to in this case is highly
confusing. Hitherto the decisions concerning succession to property
{ \
of dancing girls were based either on custom or on ordinary Hindu
(7)
law. The conflict m  this case ought to have been resolved
(1) A.I.R.1953 S.C.201 at 204.
(2) See supra pp.
(3) Narayan v. Laxman (1927)51 Bom.784 at 787.
(4) Supra
(5) Such was the case in Sivasangu v. Minal (1888)12 Mad.277. For 
degradation and elevation from caste see supra pp.
(6) Supra 1 •
(7) Supra
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either by taking recourse to ordinary Hindu law, by taking evidence
to see whether there is any custom in this respect, or by resorting
to the Mitaksara line of succession which is nearest to the matrili-
neal succession logically expected in the case of a prostitute’s pro- 
Cl)perty. But by resorting to principles both of propinquity as
well as of justice, equity and good conscience in determining the law 
of succession to prostitute's property their Lordships of the Supreme 
Court have made vague what was already indistinct.
In the first place, a simple rule of propinquity should not 
be resorted to as it would bring both male and female heirs on equal 
footing; and this is more undesirable in succession to a prostitute' 
property. In the second place, the results of the application of 
both these principles may not coincide with each other: propinquity
and equity may select two different heirs at the same time. For 
instance, a prostitute's son staying separate from her would be pre­
ferable, from the point of view of propinquity, to her daughter's 
daughter who is a prostitute and stays jointly with her grandmother; 
but from an equitable point of view the position would be just the 
reverse. The same thing has happened in this case also. The un­
married daughter was sharing the social position of her mother and 
had nothing to depend upon for her livelihood except the very pro­
fession which her mother followed. On the other hand, the married 
sisters could easily afford to depend on their husbands. So just as 
in the case of an ordinary female, so in the case of a prostitute, 
an unmarried daughter ought to be preferred to a married daughter.
(1) Supra pp.5til-3.3:. Of course, this would have been the same as 
ordinary law in this case which came from Madras.
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Their Lordships of the Supreme Court could have made the law simple
and systematic by laying down that the Mitaksara line of succession
is applicable to property of all prostitutes wherever they come from;
instead of that they preferred to cling to two incongruent principles,
leaving the law in a somewhat speculative position.
It has been laid down in many cases that in the absence of
(1)hexr© the property devolves upon the Crown by escheat. The op-
inion of Mr. Justice Strange to the effect that the property of a 
dancing girl in such case should devolve upon the other members of 
the pagoda (i.e. the temple to which the dasi was dedicated) has to 
be discarded; for Vijnanesvara would have certainly laid down such 
a provision in the manner in which he lays down similar rules for 
the property of a celebate student, an ascetic or a foreign merch- 
a n t/2*
However, a certain musunderstanding on the poinf of escheat
deserves to be cleared here. In Hiralal v. Tripura C h a r a n Their
Lordships of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court derived an
imaginary support from a passage in the Arthasastra and laid down
an obiter dictum that according to this passage even the Crown taking
by escheat the property of a prostitute was enjoined to give away
( 4 )
the property in charity. Depending upon this passage referred to
by their Lordships Banerjee advances in the following words his ar­
gument that degradation brings about complete severence from the
(1) Sarna Moyee v. Secretary of State for India (1897)25 Cal.254; 
Bhutnath v. Secretary of State for India (1906)10 C.W.i\M1086; 
Charu Bala Dasi v. Province of West Bengal A.I.E.1950 Ca.473.
(2) See supra p.S^I-
(3) (1913)40 Cal.650.
(4) Ibid at p.671-2.
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undegraded relations: "If the king himself is enjoined to use such
property in this particular way, is it reasonable to hold that unde­
graded relations of a deceased fallen woman should inherit and enjoy
(1)these wages of sin as ordinary property?” It is evident that
neither their Lordships nor the learned scholar have cared to look
(2)
into the original passage to which they refer. It has no connect­
ion whatsoever with succession to prostitutes' property. It refers 
to succession to a male's property and ICautilya merely lays down 
therein that the property of an heirless male should be taken by the 
king after having provided for the maintenance of the 'women' of the 
propositus but that the property of a srotriya brahmin should be given 
away to other srotriya brahmins. The latter provision is quite in 
consonance with many other provisions which are specially favourable 
to Brahmins.
Before turing to other customary laws it must be stated
that the recent trend of the Indian law is towards limiting or, as
far as possible, stopping prostitution in India. In Bombay Province,
which was always ahead of others in such social reforms, an enactment
was passed in the year 1934 which declared illegal any dedication of
(3 )a woman as devadasi. The example was soon followed in the Madras
(1) Banerjee p.466.
(2) They refer to Mysore edi.p.161 which reads: "Adayadakam raja 
haret strxvrittipretakadaryavarj^manyatra srotriyadravyat.
Tat traividyebhyah prayachchhet/^1 See also Ganapati Sastri's 
edi.vol.2 p.34 - ICau.3.60.
(3) The Bombay Devadasis Protection Act X of 1934 s.3.
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(1)province where even dancing in a temple at any festival held
(2)in respect of a diety was made unlawful.
Under the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act XI of
1923 soliciting, living on the earnings of prostitution, importing
a woman or a girl for prostitution, procuring a woman or girl for
prostitution, unlawful detention of a woman or girl for the purpose
(3 )of prostitution etc* have been made punishable offences. The
Indian Parliament has recently incorporated almost all the provi­
sions from the Bombay enactment into The Suppression of Immoral
(4)Traffic in Women and Girls Act 104 of 1956. Although the new
Act does not make prostitution itself an offence it will destroy 
within a few years the whole class of prostitutes or,-and this is
(5)
more likely - may drive the whole profession underground.
Amongst the different systems of customary laws in India 
the most prominent is the Marumakkattayam law which, being based 
upon matriarchial society and matrilineal successions is directly 
opposed not only to the general Hindu law but also to most of the 
other leading legal systems of the world. It has now been established 
that kinship through females has existed in different ages and ©till 
exists in the world in widely distributed areas like North America, 
Haili, Mexico, Peru, Guiana, Central and South Africa, Madagascar,
(1) The Madras Bevadasis (Prevention of Dedication)Act XXXI of 1947.
(2) Ibid s.3(3).
(3) See ss.3,5,6,7 and 8. The Act has been amended by the Bombay 
enactments: IX of 1926; IX of 1927; XII of 1930; XX of 1931;
VII of 1943; XVII of 1945 and XXVI of 1948.
(4) See ss.3-9.
(5) For the probable social effects of this Act see the conclusion.
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Borneo, Southern and Northern India, Ceylon etc. Usually regarded
as a mark of a primitive state of society, matriarchial systems have
aroused great curiosity and deeper interest amongst students of early
(1)civilization and the evolution of social institutions. This mat-
riaehial system still prevails as a living' institution in the south-
west part of India. Leaving aside the many interesting details of
this system the reader of the present work will have to rivet his
attention, as far as possible, only on that part of the system which
deals with inheritance and succession that affect the proprietory
status of women.
The Matriarchial system prevails in Malabar, Travancore,
Cochin and the district of South Canara. In South Canara it is known
as the Aliyasantana law whereas elsewhere it is known as Marumakkatt-
ayam law. A family subject to the Aliyasantana law is called Kut-
umba whereas one subject to the Marumakkattayam law is called tar-
(2)wad. Before turning to the salient features of the Marumakkatt­
ayam law. it must be stated that before the introduction of the 
British regime there was no uniformity in this customary law: the
different Kajas and the native chieftains had different and irregular 
systems of administering justice; there were no records of decisions 
which, in some cases, were based upon ordeals and, in some, upon the 
opjimion of brahmins assisted by laymen acting as their assessors.
With such complex nature of the different local systems of judicial 
administrations one could have hardly thought of tracing unswerving
(1) Krishna Pandalai: Marumakkattyam Law (a thesis submitted to
the University of London for LL.D.(1914) p.l.
(2) Marumakkattayam Law p.3.
adherence to some inflexible principles. It was only the 
law of the British Courts followed by the Native State Courts(which 
were formulated on similar basis ) that put an end to the complex as 
well as to the growing state of the law and, at the same time, harm­
onised and, petrified the same.^^
Although many earlier though stray references to this
( 2 )system of law can be traced, Wigram who in 1885 wrote his book 
* Malabar Law and Custom* was almost the first person to state a com­
plete and well-connected account of the development of the judicial 
acceptance of this customary law. The salient features of the Maru-
mukkattayam system in those days were non-existence of the institution
(3 )of marriage, impartibility of the joint property of Tarwads and 
matrilineal succession. About the quasi-marriage customs Wigram 
wrote: "All European writers, Lubbock, Mayr, McLennan and others 
agree in the conclusion that the system of inheritance in the female 
line prevalent among the Nayars could only have originated from a 
type of polyandry resembling free love. The ancient rule was that
(1) Marumakat t ay am law p.182 - relying upon the report of Joint 
Commission from Bengal and Bombay 1792 & 1793 paragraphs 387- 
400; Wigram 2nd edi.p.132: 11 In this, as in many other cases, the 
probability is that there was no uniform custom till hard and 
fast rules were introduced by the Courts.11
(2) For a good bibliography see E.K.Gough: Changing kinship usages 
in the setting of political and economic change among the Nayars 
of Malabar, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
(1952) Vol.82 pp.71-87.
(3) Tarwad in Marumakkattayam law means a joint family consisting
of a common ancestress with her children and all the descendants 
in the female line and having a community of property, favazhi 
means only a sub-group of a tarwad formed on a similar basis but 
having at its head a common ancestress who is lower in degree 
than the common ancestress of the tarwad. The same meaning is 
given to the words Kutumfoa and kavaru respectively in the Aliy- 
santana law - compare s.3(i 8c j) of the Madras Marumakkattayam 
Act, 1932 with s.3(b 8c c) of the Madras Aliyasantarna Act, 1949.
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the woman should remain in her own house and be visited by her hus­
band, and that the eldest female in the house should be the head of 
the house. Time has brought modification in the system, and in Mala­
bar, though not in Canara, the eldest female has given way to the 
eldest male. The wife sometimes has a separate house provided for 
her, where she lives with her husband. ... But polyandry may now be 
said to be dead, and although the issue of a Nayar marriage are still 
children of their mother rather than of their father, marriage may 
be defined as a contract based on mutual consent and dissoluble at
will...... 1 am quite ready to admit that, but for the brahmans, all
traces of polyandry would long since have disappeared, and that the 
brahmans encouraged concubinage between the younger members of their 
families and the Nayar woman for the purpose of maintaining the im­
part ibility of their estates. The generally received opinion in
(1) Wigram 2nd.edi,pp.32-33. Montaigne in his "Essay upon Some Verses 
of Virgil" says that polyandry was introduced by the Nayars be­
cause like Gatewayo they looked upon 1 army of bachelors* as the 
most effective instrument in war. It is interesting to note 
that this essay was published in 1588 i.e. even before the Iter- 
alamahatmya and the Keralotpatti which were written not earlier 
than two centuries ago by the Nambudri Brahmins - Wigram 2nd 
edi.pp.33-34. Moreover apart from the intention of retaining 
the impartibility of the estates, Brahmins in the Malabar who 
are supposed to have gone there sometime during 200-5G0A.D. and 
to have remained unaffected by the development of the Hindu law 
outside Malabar might have had another reason to start polyandry. 
Constituting only a fraction of the society in Malabar the males 
amongst the brahmins had, probably through scarsity of females 
of their caste in those days, to establish some kind of rela­
tionship with the females of the sudra class which constituted 
the bulk of the population of the Malabar. But although a 
brahmin is technically allowed to have a sudra wife both Manu 
and Yajnavalkya carry on a tirade against marriage between a 
brahmin male and a sudra female. The brahmins who went into 
Kerala probably cut a midway through the precepts of the sastra 
and the expediency arising out of the circumstances: they
decided to cohabit with the sudra concubines but left the issue
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the last century was that till the passing of the Act IV of 1896
which was entitled "An Act to provide a form of marriage for persons
following the Marumakka t hay am or Aliy Sanatana Law" it was almost
impossible for a marumakkattayam person to contract marriage in its
(1)ordinary popular significance. Every girl in a Nayar Tarwad,
while still a child, goes through a ceremony called fali-Katta-Kal- 
yanam but this ceremony, although something similar in name to
S ir
marriage, is nothing * : but a caste rite the historical origin
(2)and the exact significance of which is shrowded in mystery. A
girl in a Marumakkattayam tarwad is, after she has attained maturity,
united to a man of her own caste or a brahmin. The quasi-matrimonial
connection which subsists between the two is called * sambandham',
literally an (innominate) relationship, and during the last century
and in the beginning of this century there were two views as to
whether this sambandham is in any way equal to a valid marriage and
( 3 )
creates the consequential rights and liabilities. But since
originally at least the wife used to stay in her own house and the 
husband in his own it is evident that the sambandham between them
of such relationship in the families of the mothers themselves. 
This clever idea brought about two desirable effects for them, 
namely, that regular visits to a particular woman established 
a continuity in sexual relatiohship which is so essential for 
social stability; at the same time, keeping both the sudra 
female and her children in her own house prevented the breach 
of the sastric rules and kept the brahminical culture unadul­
terated.
(1) Wigram 2nd edi.p.34.
(2) Wigram p.34. For the ceremony see Memorandum A p.5 attached
to the Malabar Commission quoted in Wigram pp.34-36.
(3) Wigram p.38. For the different views about Sambandham see
Wigram pp.40-51.
58l
appears to be ineongruent with the idea of the marriage which pre­
vails in the patriarchial and eventually the larger part of the world.
As regards the proprietry ideas of the Marumakka11ayis the 
most notable thing is that the property of a tarwad is impartible;
community of interest can be severed only by voluntary consent of all
(1)the members. The senior male member in a Marumakkattayi family is
called Karnavan and as such he is the natural guardian of every 
member in the family. He alone can sue and be sued as the represen­
tative of the family. The Karnavan for the time being has absolute 
control over the family income and expenditure. The rights of the 
junior members are the rights of males to succeed to Karnavanskip by
seniority and the right of males and females to be supported and
(2)maintained in the house of the family. Tarwad property being
(apart from Statute) impartible there is no question about the de­
volution of the interest of an undivided member of a tarwad.
The self-acquisitions of an individual member of a Marum­
akkat t ay i family are at his absolute disposal during his life-time
i.1
and the last survivor of a tarwad has the same power over the family j
 ^^ \ j
property as if it were his self-acquisitions. Females have the j
(4) Isame rights m  this respect as males. Under the Madras Act V of |
]
(1) Wigram p.3. j
(2) Wigram p.52-53 - For detailed information about karnavan*s
rights and obligations in the last century see Wigram chapters
III-V. But in sudra families the seniormost woman, by custom, 
bedomes the manageress - Wigra$ p.52. See also Dr.Buchanan*s
*A Journey from Madras through Mysore, Cannanore and Malabar* I 
Vol.XI.pp.95-96 quoted in Wigram pp.132-33: '*... A man's mother 
manages his family; and after his death his eldest sister 
assumes the direction. ..,f
(3) Wigram p •127.
(4) T . L .Strange: Manual of Hindu Law 2nd edi.p.399.
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(1) y*m1858 every person governed by the Marumakkatta^ law of inheritance
could, by will, dispose of property which he could legally alienate
by gift inter vivos, but self-acquired property not disposed of in
the above-mentioned manner by a deceased Marumakkattayi devolves upon
his or her family with this distinction that a man’s property devolved
upon his tarwad whereas a woman*s property devolved upon her child- 
52)ren .
From 1916 onwards there started a downpour of several en­
actments on Marumalckattayam law which was continuouslyj^gowing and 
gaining shape since Mr. Wigram wrote his book at a time at which it 
apparently appeared to be exhaustive. It would be interesting to 
know the exact stage it had arrived at just before the law was being 
moulded by legislation. Krishnan Pandalai who in 1914 attempted to 
ascertain the rules of partition and succession under Marumakkattayarn
(1) The history of the power of testamentary disposition in the 
former Travancore State is different. At first the right extend­
ed to a half only of the separate and self-acquired property, 
and later it was enlarged to cover the whole.
(2) Wigram p.129 & 131. Although the word used in V/igram p.129 is
'family* of a man what he really means thereby is man's tarwad 
and not his tavazhi - compare the above page from Wigram with 
Marumakkattayain law p.18. Mr.T.S.Strange who is the earliest 
amongst the authors who have written something on Marumakkatta­
yain law (Marumalckattayam Law p. 3.9 ) writes "self-acquired move-
able property .....  belongs exclusively to the acquirer, and
may be disposed of by him at his pleasure. Females may hold it 
as well as males. On demise it descends, in the case of males, 
to their sister's sons, or nearest Anandravans, and, in the case
of females, to their issue male and female." - T.L.Strange:
Manual of Hindu Law 2nd edi.s.399. Buchanan says that on the 
death of a male his moveable property is taken by his sister's 
sons and daughters whereas his landed estate is managed by the 
eldest male of the family - A Journey from Madras through Mysore, 
Cannanore and Malabar - by Br.Buchanan Vol.II.pp.95-96 quoted in 
V/igram p.133. The judicial development of the law was, however, 
in favour of treating a man’s tarwad and not only his tavazhi
as his heirs. This was obviously against the original custom 
and public opinion. - Marumalckattayam Law pp.18-37, esp.pp.18, 
19,24,27 etc.
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law stated his conclusions as follows
(1) Separate Property: In the case of a deceased male 
the heirs to his separate property were his mother and her descend­
ants i.e. his mother*s tavazhi; in the case of a female her heirs 
were her own children and the descendants in the female line of her
daughters. Thus Marumakkattayam system was founded on and followed
(I)propinquity of relation traced through females.
(2) Joint property of a tarwad: The uniformly accepted
rule was that tarwad property was impartible unless the members of
(2)a tarwad agreed to divide the property. Though there was no
direct decision to that effect it was felt that an individual member
should not have the right capriciously or maliciously to veto the
wishes of the other members to effect the partition of the tarwad 
( 3)property. However, once partition was Effected all the members
in the undivided tarwad were entitled to a share, but partition of 
a tarwad property was done by making independent the different tava- 
shis of that tarwad so as to constitute new tarwads and by giving
(4them full ownership m  their respective shares in the original tarwad.
(5)
Since the second decade of this century, however, the 
customary law of the different matriarchial communities in Malabar 
has been covered by legislation as a result of which their original 
shape has undergone several, and some of them radical, changes.
The enactments have been passed in different states and
(1 ) Marumakkattayam Law p.43.
(2 ) Ibid. p.101.
(3) Ibid. pp.120-21.
(4) Ibid. p.130.
(5) The legislation appears to have begun with the Travancore
Mayar Regulation I of 10B8 (1913 A.D.).
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pertain to different communities in the Malabar; it isaiot.surprint 
ing, therefore, that as a result of the permutation of bhth these
factors we have fourteen enactments all ox which contain provisions
. (1) concerning partition and inheritance.
All these enactments have brought out some common and con­
spicuous changes in the Malabar law which they purport to amend and 
( 2)codify The salient changes may be noted as follows:-
(A) Property of tarwad or has been declared to be
partible and the right of every member of a tarwad or a to
have a per capita share in the partition is recognised although the
pre-requisite conditions for such partition vary from enactment to 
( 3 )enactment.
(B) In succession to the Separate property of a male his
widow, children and father have been accepted as his heirs and the
(4)first two have been recognised as heirs in the first instance.
(1) For different castes governed by patrilineal, matrilineal or 
mixed system of inheritance see M.S.A.Rao: Social Change in 
Malabar (1957)p.23. For an account as to how caste society in 
Malabar is fast changing into a class society see E.J.Miller; 
Caste and Territory in Malabar, American Anthropologist 1954 
Vol.56 pp.410-20. The Nambudri brahmins form, however, a un­
ique caste in Malabar. They went into Malabar from outside 
some time the 2nd and the 5th century A.D. and carried
along with them Hindu law as it existed then. Patriarchial 
family of the Roman type, deep-rooted bigotry, impartibility of 
the family property and dowry system (varasulka) are some of 
the distinctive features of this community. See Paramaswaren 
v. Nanjeli (1894)10 T.L.R.151 at 157; Vishnu v. Krishnan (1909)
25 T.L.R.196 at 200-204, 215-17 and 218-19.
(2) See also Social Changes in Malabar pp.132-42. The change towards' 
Hindu law had already started in the last century -  see Mayne1s i 
preface to his first edition of Hindu Law. ]
(3) Travancore Nayar Regulation ss.33-38; Travancore Nanjinad Vella- I 
la RegMation ss.30-31; Travancore Fzhava Regulation ss.30-31; j 
Travancore ICshatriya Regulation ss.43-44; Travancore Krishnav- j 
aka Regulation ss.33-36; Madras Aliysantana Act ss.35-36 etc.
(4) Travancore Nayars ss.11-15; Tra.Nan.Vellalas ss.16 & 24: Tra.
Mai.Brahmins ss.15-16; Tra.ICshatriya ss.15-19; Cochin Thiyyas
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(C) In succession to the separate property of a female her 
husband has been accepted as an heir though his position and the 
quantum of the share which he takes differs from enactment to enact­
ment . ^  ^
Apart from these common features which give a fraternal re­
semblance to these enactments the other provisions of the same are so 
diverse as to create an impression of a jig-saw puzzle on the mind of 
a reader who tries to trace some uniformity in the codified law of 
Malabar* His work, however, has been considerably simplified by 
Dr* Derrett who has rightly divided these enactments into two sets, 
one of them comprising the enactments which are nearer in spirit to
the general Hindu law and the other comprising the enactments which
(2)
contain as it were the core of the real matrilineal law* The
division may be noted here as it would be of immense use in under­
ss.21-29; Mad•Marumakkattayam ss.19-23; Mad.Nambudris ss.18-20; 
Cochin Nayars ss.28-32; Cochin Marumaakkattayam ss.20-23; Cochin 
Nambudris ss.27-28 etc.; Tra.ICrio Makkathayees ss.12-15; Cochin 
Mak.Thiyyas ss.23-41; Mad.Aliyasantana ss.19-23.
(1) Tra.Nayars s.19; Tra.Ezhavas s.18, Tra.Nanjinnal Vellalas s.22; 
Tra.Malyala Brahmins s.17; Tra.Kshatriya ss.20-22; Cochin Thiy- 
yas s.23, Mad.Marumakkattayam s.28; Mad.Nambudris s.21, Cochin 
Marumakkattayam s.24; Cochin Nambudris s.29; Tra.Krishnalvaka 
s.19; Mad.Aliyasantana s.25* The position and the share of the 
husband is, however, different in different enactments: amongst 
Nambudris he succeeds after the descendants and takes the whole 
of his wife’s property; amongst the Travancore Ezhavas he shares 
equally with his wife’s mother’s tavazhi; amongst the Travancore 
Nayars and the Krishnavakas as well as the Madras Marumukka11ayis 
he shares equally with the tavazhi of the mother's mother of his 
wife. Amongst the Nanjinad Vellalas both the husband wife take 
only a life-estate in each other’s property in some cases - see 
ss.17 8c 22; the principle of Hindu law has thus been engrafted 
upon the Malabar law so as to blend both of them into a complex 
admixture. The different provisions represent only the different 
stages of the struggle between the institution of marriage and 
the matriarchial system, and show the extent to which the former 
has gained preponderance over the latter.
(2) Dr.J.D.M.Derrett: The Future of the Malabar personal law within 
the framework of the projected Hindu Code Bill - ICerala Law 
Times (Journal), 1952, pp.9-20 at pp.14-15.
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standing this synopsis of the Malabar lav/* The first set is:-
(1 ) The Travancore Ezhava Regulation III of 1100 (1925A.D.)
(2) The travancore Nanjinad Vellalc^Reg.Vi of 1101 (1926 
A.D.)
(3) Travancore Malayala Brahmin Reg.Ill of 1106 (1931 A.D. )
(4) Cochin Thiyya Regulation VIII of 1107 (1932 A .D.)
(5) Madras Nambudri Act XXI of 1933
(6 ) Cochin Nambudiri Act XVII of 1114 (1939 A.D.)
(7) Cochin Makkathayam Thiyya Regulation XVII of 1115 
(1940 A*D.).
The second set is:-
(1) Travancore Nayar Regulation II of 1100 (1925 A.D.)
(2) Travancore ICshatriya Regulation VII of 1108 (1932 A.D.)
(3) The Madras Marumakkattayam Act XXII of 1933
(4) The Cochin Nayar Regulation XXIX of 1113 (1938 A.D.)
(5) Cochin Marumakkattayam Reg.XXXIII of 1113 (1938 A.D.)
(6 ) The Travancore ICrishnavaka Marumakkathayee Regulation 
VII of 1115 (1939 A.D.)
(7) The Madras Aliyasantana Act IX of 1949.
(1)
With the exception of the Travancore Ezhava this divi­
sion may be accepted as correct and sound. The following are the
!
features which the enactments in the first set share in common with
i
the general Hindu law.
i.
(1) A distinctive feature of this division is that either in the 
case of a male or female her mother1s mother and her tavazhi
I
and all other remoter heirs in the matrilineal succession have 
no place at all in these enactments according to which success- j
ion ultimately devolves upon the descendants of the paternal
ancestors in the case of a deceased male and upon the husband*s i
relation in the case of a deceased female. This is not the
6 c.o
(A) In succession to the separate property of a male the 
line of heirs prescribed is based on the same principles as the line 
in Hindu law, namely, firstly it goes to the widow and the descend­
ants of the deceased, then goes a degree in ascent and includes his 
father and mother, comes down to the nearer agnatic collaterals such
as brother, his son etc. and then alternatelyxy takes a degree in
(1)ascent and descent. Thus matrilineal preference is abseent m
these enactments.
(B) In succession to the separate property of a female
her husband has been accepted as an heir and his heirs and relations
are also included in the line. Thus in the case of a woman the tie
of marriage is as relevant according to these enactments as accord-
(2)
ing to Hindu law.
The provisions differ from the general Hindu law in the
case with Ezhavas of Travancore - see infra. It is only 1makk­
athayam * property whic^ is defined in s.4(11) of the Travancore 
Ezhava Regulation as 'property obtained from the husband or 
father by the wife or child or both of them, by gift, inherit­
ance or bequest* which devolves upon wife and children - s.32; 
otherwise, all separate property of a male devolves equally upon 
the widow and the tavazhi of the deceased - s.16. However 
Exhavas in Cochin are in a different position from that of Tra­
vancore Eshavas as they are included in Makkathayi Thiyyas - 
Cochin Makkathayam Thiyya Regulation s.5.
(1) The rough sketch-work of the line is: widow and lineal des­
cendants together, father, mother, brothers and sisters, their 
children, father1s father etc• The enactments for Madras and 
Cochin Nambudris and Cochin Marumakkathayam Thiyyas, being 
later, are more elaborate so that the provisions of these enact­
ments and of General Hindu Law can more easily be compared; see 
Tra.Nanjinad Vellal ss.16-17, Tra.Mai.Brahmin s.15-16; Cochin 
Thiyya ss.21-29; Mad.Nambudri ss.18-20; Cochin Nambudri ss.27- 
28; Cochin Mak.Thiyya ss.30-45.
(2) Nanjinada Vellala ss.22-24; Tra.Malayala Brahmins ss.16-18; 
Cochin Thiyyas s.23; Mad.Nambudri s.21; Cochin Nambudri s.29; 
Cochin Mak.Thiyyas s. . Amongst Nambudris the line of 
succession prescribed for property of an unmarried female is 
similar to the line prescribed in Hindu law for stridhana of 
an unmarried woman - Mad.Nam*s.22; Cochin Nam.s.30.
588
following respects:™
(A) The widow as well as the daughter of a deceased male 
shares his separate property along with his son and there is no dis­
tinction between married and unmarried daughters except in the case
(1)
of the Nambudris.
(B) The doctrine of representation applies to descendants
of predeceased daughters as well as predeceased sons except in the
(2)
case of Nambudris.
(C) Unlike the Hindu law, all the heirs to the separate 
property of a male are, with the exception of his widow and mother, 
either his direct descendants, ascendants, or the direct descendants 
of his paternal ancestors in the male line so that persons like the 
maternal grandfather or maternal uncle, who succeed as bandhus ex 
parte materna in Hindu law, have no locus standi at all in these en­
actments.
(D) Many female heirs not recognised by the general Hindu 
law like sister, aunt etc. are able to inherit a male * s property as 
his fatherfs or father's father's descendants and all female heirs
(1) See the sections too cm 5:$^  note 1 . Widows or all co-widows 
together, sons and daughters take equal shares except in the case 
of Cochin Thiyyas and Cochin Makkathayam Thiyyas amongst whom 
she takes a small share in some cases - see Cochin Thiyya s.21; 
Cochin Makkathayam Thiyya ss.30-31.
(2) See Nanjinad Vallala s.16 whereby widow has only a right of 
maintenance if sons or daughters also exist. See supra p.5$ 7 
note 1 • For exception amongst Nambudris see Mad.Nambudri
ss.18-19 and Cochin Nambudri s.27: According to both only pre­
deceased sons can be represented by his issue, which can be 
only male in Madras and sons and unmarried daughter in Cochin.
But amongst Cochin Thiyyas the doctrine is extended also to 
children of predeceased brothers and sisters who share with 
the living brothers and sisters.
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(1)take an absolute estate.
(E) There is a uniform line of succession for a female's 
separate property in which both sons and all daughters married or un­
married share equally; some of the blood-relations of the deceased 
like father, mother, brother, sister etc. are invariably interposed
between the husband and his heirs who are in all cases ultimately en-
(2)titled to take the property of a female. This is how these enact­
ments stand in direct contrast with the general Hindu Law which pre­
scribes different lines of succession by distinguishing either the
(3)category of stndhana or the status of the woman or both.
Coming to the second set of the enactments we find that 
although they admit the widow and children as heirs in the first in­
stance to the separate property of a male and confer upon the husband
(4 )
the right to succeed to his wife's separate property they stand on 
a different footing from the above-noted enactments and general Hindii 
Law in as much as they disclose conspicuous traces of matrilineal 
succession, the distinctive features of which are:-
(I) In succession to a male's property his mother shares
(1) For an exception see Nanjinad Vellala s.17 whereby a widow 
takes only a life estate in some cases.
(2 ) Supra 5$7 note X.
(3) Supra Chapter IV.
(4) Supra 5 ^5 • It is to be quoted, however, that amongst the 
Cochin Nayars and the Madras Marumakka11ayis it is only the 
lineal descendant in the female line of daughters, who are 
allowed to have a right to take by representation so that son 
of predeceased son or the son's son of the latter have no such 
right at all. The provision stands in contradistinction from 
the provision amongst the Madras Nabudris that direct descend­
ants only in the male line of male predeceased children have a 
right to take by representation. See supra. This brings these 
enactments closer to matrilineal succession•
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equally with his widows and issue and his father has to compete on 
equal terms with the tavazhi of the mother’s mother of the deceased. 
Moreover, in the absence of the widow the mother is entitled to take 
the whole inheritance but in the absence of the mother the widow has
to share equally with the mother’s tavazhi.
(II) No paternal male ancestor of a deceased male except 
his own father is recognised as his heir and his remoter heirs are 
the tavazhies of his mother’s mother, mother's mother's mother and 
so on in the ascending female line of his mother.(1)
(III) Unlike as in the previous set of enactments the 
husband does not succeed wholly to the separate property of his wife,
and immediately in the absence of her issue but he has to share with
her mother's tavazhi amongst Travancore Kshatriyas, Cochin Nayars, 
Cochin Marumakkattayis, Madras Aliyasantanis and with the tavazhi of 
her mother's mother amongst Travancore Nayars, Madras Marumakkattayis 
and Travancore Krishnavakas•
(IV) With the exception of the husband the issue, success-
A
ion to a female's separate property devolves exclusively upon her 
mother's tavazhi, mother's mother's tavazhi and so on in the ascend­
ing maternal line of tavazhies so that even her own father or husband
(2)
father is not an heir at all. Thus exclusion of all relations of
(1) For provisions to separate property of a female see Travancore 
Nayar ss.11-16, Travancore Kshatriya ss.15-17, Madras Marumakk­
at tayam ss.19-24, Cochin Nayar ss.28-33, Cochin Marumakkattayam 
ss.20-23, Travancore Krishanavakas ss.12-16, Madras Aliyasantana 
ss.19-24. The Cochin Marumakkattayam is the farthest from Hindu 
Law in matrilineal succession as even the lineal descendants as 
well as the widow of a male have to share equally with his un­
divided heirs so that the heirs in the former group share only
a moiety of the property of the deceased.
(2) For provisions concerning succession to female's separate pro­
perty see Travancore Nayar ss.17-20, Tra.Kshatriya ss.20-22, Mad
( tohhMvit.4 oh Kttt"
591
a female who are ex parte paterna as well as of all the relatives of 
her husband who are not also her own blood relations, forms a prom­
inent feature of the line of succession to her property as laid down 
in these enactments.
A few important individual features of some of these enact­
ments may be noted here in addition to those already noted on the 
basis of categorical devision into two classes. The most important 
provision is to foe found in the Madras Marumakkat tayam Act and the 
Madras Aliyasantana Act which covers the case of a non-Marumakkatt- 
ayi or non-Aliyasantani male who married a female governed by either 
of those acts and leaves heirs under his personal law as well as his 
widow, children and/or lineal descendants who would have been his 
heirs under one of these Acts had he been governed by the same. In 
such case one-half of his separate property goes to his personal 
heirs whereas one-half goes to his widow etc. who take all his pro­
perty in the absence of his personal heir.
According to the Cochin Makkathayam Thiyya Act illegiti­
mate children of a female are entitled to inherit the property of
(2)
their mother as if they were her legitimate children. The pro­
vision, though slightly in advance of the general Hindu law, is by
no means a novel one since it was already preceded by a similar pro-
(3)vision in the Mysore Hindu Code.
Marumakkat tayam ss.26-29, Cochin Nayar ss.36-37, Cochin Mar. 
ss.24, Tra.Kris.ss.17-20, Mad.Ali.s.25 read with s.20.
(1) Mad.Marumakkattayam Act s.30, Mad.Aliyasantana Act.s.26.
(2) s.46.
(3) For the provision of which see infra.
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The 1strTdhana' or varasulka which, amongst the Nambudri
brahmins, is given by a bride’s father to the bridegroom or his
father and which after a big controversy amongst the judges as to
whether it belongs to the bridegroom or the bride was decided to be
the exclusive property of the bridegroom, has been declared in Trav-
(1)ancore to be the joint property of the husband and wife. The pro­
vision is amicable since it procides a solution to the problem of 
finding a golden mean between a desire not to oppose the already 
existing custom of paying the 'breeding-bull price' and a desire to
(2)
do justice to the woman for whose sake her father gives 'strxdhanomf.
After having discussed the matrilineal customary law we 
come to the Punjab customary law which, being based on a more or less 
strict theory of agnation, is utterly opposed to the former system*
"In no country, throughout British India, is the reign of custom so 
paramount as in the Punjab* Here in village communities, among 
Hindus and Mahomedans, agriculturists and non-agriculturists, customs 
and usages regulate and determine the civil and municipal rights of 
the people much more than Statutes and Laws. Decisions by the high­
est court of the land abound in the recognition of such customs and 
( 3)usages." Custom in this province is the first rule of decision 
on all questions regarding succession, special property of females,
(1) Travancore Maliyala Brahmin Regulation s.21.
(2) It is to be noted that 'stridhanom' which is paid to the bride­
groom or his parents by the bride's parents or their heirs be­
comes her own property amongst the Latin Christians of Travan­
core - Travancore Christian Succession Regulation II of 1092 
(1916 A.D.)s•3 read with s.28. For more information about the 
same see Report of the Christian Committee Para.2 & s p.312-13 
of the Regulation. For cases dealing with the point whether 
varasulka becomes strxdhana see supra p.133*.
(3) S.Roy: Customs and Customary Law T.L.L.(1908)p.462.
betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption, guardianship, wills,
alluvion and diluvion, religious institutions etc.^^
The sources of ascertaining the customary law of the Punjab
have been the traditions, text-books written by eminent scholars and
judicial decisions. The traditions are recorded in the Wajib-ul-arz
and the Riwaj-i-ain which form settlement records and'administration
papers of the villages respectively. The statements made therein
form a prima facie, though not an irrebutable, evidence of any custom
(2)in a particular village, district, community etc.
Amongst the text-books on the Punjab dustomary law the 
earliest attempt appears to have been a book called 'Principles of 
Lav/' written by Sir Richard Temple in 1864 which passed under the 
name 'Punjab Civil Code'. It comprised rules drawn from a great 
variety of sources like Hindu law, Mahomedan law, the English law, 
the French law as well as from local customs and usages. The book 
which was circulated as a manual was accepted for a long time in 
Courts as a sort of semi-inspired volume of unquestionable author-
t
<1 But in 1872 the Punjab Laws Act was passed whereby the
Courts were required to follow the custom as a general rule of de-
cision in matters concerning succession, marriage, adoption etc. and
to apply Hindu law or Mahomedan law to cases where Hindus or Mahomed-
(4)ans respectively were the parties. In 1880 Bulnois and Rattigan
(1) W.H.Rattigan : Digest of Customary Law (1953)p.34.
(2) T .L .L ,(1908)p•463.
(3) Rattigan pp.37-39.
(4) See sec.5 of the Act for the meaning and the scope of which 
see Rattigan pp.42-50.
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wrote *4 Treatise on the Customary Law of the Punjab* in which the 
decisions of the Chief Court were collected and classified. Soon 
afterwards Tupper wrote *Customary Law of Punjab* in which he incor­
porated the material gathered by the settlement officers of the pro­
vince. These books were followed by admirable attempts by Ellis and 
(1)Rose. In the meantime many digests of the dxstrictwxse customary
(2) slaw had started bexng published.
In 1915 an attempt was made by the Governor of the Punjab 
to prepare a code of the Punjab customary law which would have regula-
i
ted the diverse provisions of the customary law. Both Ellis and Rat- I
tigan (junior) were members of the conference called for the purpose
of forming a recommendatory bill. But whereas the former was in
favour of such legislation the latter was not and it seems the govern-
(3)ment was impressed by the latter*© view and deserted the attempt.
1
1
Rattigan*® work, however, has gone through several editions at the j
{
hands of many eminent scholars including his own son and in 1940 de- !' I
served a compliment from their Lordships of the Privy Council as j
(4) ibeing a * book of unquestioned authority xn the Punjab*. In an t
(1) T.P.Ellis : Notes on Punjab Custom; H.A.Rose : A Compendium of i
the Punjab Customary Law (1911). j
(2) See the various digests referred to in Rattigan pp.243-275.
(3) See the Report on the Punjab Codification of Customary Law Con- 1
ference 1915. For the opinion of Ellis see ibid p. 18; for the ■’
opinion of Sir Henry Rattigan see his letter to Hon.F.Robert­
son, judge, Chief Court, Punjab printed in ibid pp.90-91 in 
which he expresses an apprehension that the proposed legislation \ 
might ride roughshod over the custom of the people. His opinion ! 
is in accord with that of his father who agreed with the French 
historian Voltaire in maintaining "that the more vast a state
is in size and composed of different peoples, the more difficult i 
it becomes to unite all together by one and the same jurisprud­
ence*1. - Preface to Rattigan*s 1st edition.
(4) Mst.Subhani v. Nawab A.I.R.1941 p.c.21 at 23.
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attempt to give a synopsis of the Punjab customary law the present
writer has placed great reliance on the celebrated work of Rattigan*
The Punjab customary law which applies generally to both
Hindus and Mahomedans^^ is essentially non-brahmanical in charactirl
( 3 )
It is unsacredotal, unsacreamental and secular* Whatever may have 
been the growth of the law of property, namely, whether it has de­
volved successively on the basis of the family, the house, and the
(4)tribe as Sir Henry Maine would suggest or on the basis of the tra.be,
the house and the family which, according to Tupper, is the case in 
( 5)the Punjab, there is no doubt that on account of the village
communities being a living institution in the Punjab, instances of
.Collective ownership of land by men, whether united by common tie of
kinship or not, are common enough to form one of the distinctive
(6)features of the system of this customary law. The village commun­
ities in the Punjab being usually based on a strong sense of family 
origin there is no wonder that like Romans their notion about proper­
ty and its devolution is strongly impressed by agnatic kinship.
Landed property, therefore, passes on to those heirs who are best able
to manage it and to those who stand least chance of severing their
k*. ■
connection with tribe. In such a system cognates and females have
(1) T.L.L.1908 p.463.
(2) Tupper vol.II pp.82-87; Baden Powell : The Indian Village 
Community (1896) pp.80, 102.
(3) Tupper vol.II.p.87.
(4) Early History of Institutions (1897)pp.77-82.
(5) Tupper vol.II.pp.7-10; see also Baden Powell : Land Systems in 
British India vol.I p.110 referred to in Rattigan p.13; Ratti­
gan p.227*
(6) For different kinds of collective ownership in villages see The 
Indian Village Community pp.404-406; for the stages in the pro­
cess of transition from collective ownership to individual 
ownership in the Punjab see Tupper vol.II p.l.
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but a meagre chance of becoming heirs; the former because they are
as good as strangers who would destroy the harmony and the homogeneity
of a clan and the latter because they become strangers by going into
(1)other clans after marriage♦
The collective ownership of land being at the basis of the
Punjab customary law, in the case of members of an agricultural tribe
following agriculture pursuits there is a presumption that the cus-
(2)
tomary law and not their personal law applies to them. The same
presumption arises in the case of non-agricultural tribes following
(3)agricultural pursuits but not if they are not following agricul-
(4)tural pursuits. In the latter case they are governed by their
personal law. Similarly there is presumption in favour of the appli­
cability of the personal law in the case of agricultural tribes who 
have left their original occupation and have adopted non-agricultural
(5)pursuits.
In cases wherein presumption arises in favour of the cus­
tomary law, the personal law is not totally excluded and has to be
• (q)resorted to if a particular custom m  a case fails to be proved;
but it seems that the Court would be bound to make an inquiry into
the probable existence of custom especially if it is alleged by one
(7)
of the parties to have been existing. The gaps in the customary
(1) For the agnatic theory see Tupper vol.II pp.70-77; Sir Charles 
Roe: Tribal Law in the Punjab pp.28-3; Rattigan pp.232-33.
(2) Rattigan pp.65-68. This statement and the following ones about 
applicability of customary law are only general. For a detailed 





(7) Ibid pp.50, 59-60.
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law are to be filled in by the relevant provisions of the personal 
law.^^ It has been noted that for a custom to be valid under Hindu 
law it must be ancient, certain, invariable, and not unreasonable, 
immoral or opposed to public policy. But in the Punjab where the 
whole process of the development of the law of property is still per­
ceptible in its changing patterns it has rightly been held that in 
this province a valid custom need not necessarily be ancient; it is 
sufficient if it is shown that it generally prevails amongst the
members of the tribe to which the parties belong and is uniformly
( 2 ) ( 3 )
observed by them. But it seems it ought to be invariable.
With regard to succession to a male’s property "There are 
four leading canons governing succession to an estate amongst agri­
culturists. First, that male descendants invariably exclude the 
widow and all other relations; second, that when the male line of 
descendants had died out, it is treated as never having existed, the 
last male who left descendants being regarded as the proprietors 
(propositus ?); third, that a right of representation exists, where­
by descendants in different degrees from a common ancestor succeed to
(1) Ibid pp.51-52.
(2) Ibid pp.155-56.
(3) Ibid pp.155-56. But in Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh (1906)110 P.R. 
390 F.B. on which Rattigan relies for support it was actually 
admitted that it ’need not be absolutely invariable.' See also 
Ellis pp.4-5 wherein he compares the essentials for validity
- ®--i - _i~ — J —  --+—  a —  - r — —-
p.597 V .
See Mst. Jeo v. Ujagar Singh A.I.R.1953 Pun.177 and Dataram v. Teja 
Singh A.I.R.1959 Pun.428.
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law are to be filled in by the relevant provisions of the personal 
law.^^ It has been noted that for a custom to be valid under Hindu 
law it must be ancient, certain, invariable, and not unreasonable, 
immoral or opposed to public policy. But in the Punjab where the 
whole process of the development of the law of property is still per­
ceptible in its changing patterns it has rightly been held that in 
this province a valid custom need not necessarily be ancient; it is 
sufficient if it is shown that it generally prevails amongst the
members of the tribe to which the parties belong and is uniformly
( 2 ) ( 3 )
observed by them. But it seems it ought to be invariable.
With regard to succession to a male's property "There are 
four leading canons governing succession to an estate amongst agri­
culturists. First, that male descendants invariably exclude the 
widow and all other relations; second, that when the male line of 
descendants had died out, it is treated as never having existed, the 
last male who left descendants being regarded as the proprietors 
(propositus ?); third, that a right of representation exists, where­
by descendants in different degrees from a common ancestor succeed to
(1) Ibid pp.51-52.
(2) Ibid pp.155-56.
(3) Ibid pp.155-56. But in Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh (1906)110 P.R. 
390 F.B. on which Rattigan relies for support it was actually 
admitted that it 'need not be absolutely invariable•' See also 
Ellis pp.4-5 wherein he compares the essentials for validity
of an English and an Indian custom and on p.5 remarks : "Custom 
in India, on the other hand, has in itself a legislative power 
and like all legislation is variable." Accordingly the state­
ment of S. Roy in T.L.L.1908 p.462: "As in other countries, a 
custom to be valid in the Pubjab must satisfy all its requisit- 
ies, viz. it must be ancient, consistent, continuous and 
'?n" does not appear to be correct.
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the share which their immediate ancestor, if alive, would succeed to;
fourth, the females other than the widow or mother of the deceased
are usually excluded by near male collaterals, an exception being
occasionally allowed in favour of daughters or their issue, chiefly
(1)amongst tribes that are strictly endogamous. ”
The detailed working of these rules is as follows:™ After
a man’s death his sons are entitled equally to his property together
with the male representatives of the pre-deceased sons. In default
of all male descendants the widow succeeds whether to the joint or
the separate property of the deceased but takes only a life-interest;
then the mother^if not remarried^succeeds. In default of the mother
the daughter comes in and succeeds to the separate property usually
in preference to the collaterals but not to the joint property of the
deceased to which the collaterals succeed in preference to the
daughter. Daughter’s son, sister and her son etc. are not at all
recognised as heirs. But a khana-damad or a son-in-law who comes to
stay with his sonless father-in-law was till recently recognised as
heir in default of the male issue. In default of all the collaterals
the property devolves upon the proprietory body or the government as
the case may be in accordance with the different customary rules
(2)applicable to such property.
These details of the rules of succession display a strong 
influence of the agnatic theory. The widow succeeds to both the 
joint and separate estate of her husband since after all she takes
(1) Rattigan p.233; also quoted in T.L.L.1908 p.464. The bracket­
ed word is inserted by comparing this with the other editions 
of the same work i.e. 7th edi.(1909)p.l4; 11th edi.(1929)p.59*
(2) The gist of Rattigan1s chapter on succession and inheritance.
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only a life-interest in both and after her death the property is 
bound to return to the agnatic relations of the deceased. The males 
related through females like the daughter's son or the sister's son 
etc. are entirely excluded to prevent the property from fallinginto 
the hands of another family. Though a nearer blood-relation like 
sister is excluded, a khana-damad has an important place in the line 
of succession; for he stays in the family and consequently is genu­
inely interested in cultivating the lands of the family to get his 
food (khana) which he enjoys in common with his parents-in-law.^^
Thus the Punjab customary law represents a stage much earlier than 
the stage of Hindu law as known to the commentators. It is noteworthy 
that these general rules of succession are followed in almost all the 
leading aboriginal tribes of India with one prominent exception,
namely, that amongst many of them the widow has no right at all ex-
(2)cept that of maintenance.
As regards woman's property Rattigan mentions the following 
general rules: Amongst the agriculturist tribes wife's personal
(1) For fraternal polyandry in some of the districts and rules
of succession amongst such polyandrous people see Rose's
Compendium of the Punjab Customary Law pp.49-52. It is to
be noted that unlike as amongst the Nayars, polyandry in the
Punjab did not give rise to matrilineal succession there•
(2) See infra.
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property usually merges into that of the husband who is entitled also
(1)to ail her earnings. Ornaments made up by the husband and given
to the wife subsequent to the marriage cannot ordinarily be disposed
of by her against the wishes of her husband* Upon the death of the
wife during the life-time of the husband the latter succeeds to all
such property of the wife of which she was possessed at the time of
her death. Where the husband has predeceased his wife her special
property devolves upon the sons and then upon the male collaterals
of the last full owner if it is immoveable; if it is moveable like
ornaments etc. the daughters have a preferential claim and unmarried
(2)daughters usually exclude the married ones. It has already been
shown that their Lordships of the Lahore High Court had doubted the
validity of the statement made in this last sentence and had decided
succession to such property under the rules of the general Hindu law
(3 )and not under customary law as expounded by Rattigan. But as the
(1) Rattigan pp.1055-56 relying on Tupper vol.II.p.158, vol.IV p.145 
and vol.V p.73. At the same time Rattigan mentions that immove­
able property purchased by a woman out of the proceeds of the 
moveable property belonging to her such as the ornaments given 
by the husband etc. constitutes her * special property* but that 
immoveable property purchased by a widow from the income of her 
husband’s property which she has inherited from him presumably 
becomes a ’capitalized part’ of the inheritance. So it seems
a wife can haye both moveable and immoveable property with 
incidents of what we may call strxdhana in ordinary Hindu law. 
Really speaking this does not appear to merge in husband’s pro­
perty.
(2) Rattigan pp.1056-58; the husband appears to be the most pre­
ferential heir also according to Ellis p.102-3. For special 
customary rules about devolution of a prostitute’s property 
see Rattigan pp.490-91; Ellis p.103.
(3) See suprapp^^j §urdial Singh v. Bhagwan Devi (1927)8 Lah.366 
followed in Kehar Singh v. Attar Singh A.I.R.(1944)Lah.442. It 
is surprising to find that Tekchand J. who in the former case 
denounced Rattigan*s book as being of no authority unless support;
ed by some original evidence like Riwaz-i-am etc. now praises }
the same book - apparently because the book elicited a very ;
i" ‘ U  k t . •’I M l  1 J *. J  |
later editions of Rattigan1s book have usually been supported by the
statements in the Riwaz-i-am as well as by the observations of other
authors like Tupper, Ellis etc, and as even their Lordships of the
Privy Council have accepted Rattigan*s book as being of unquestionable
(1)authority in the Punjab it is hoped that much more weight would 
be given to Rattigan*s statements than has been given in the past. 
Moreover it is.important to note that not only under the Punjab cus­
tomary law but under almost all other customary laws of India except­
ing, of course, the customary matrilineal law the husband*s position 
is much stronger than it is in the Sastra: during coverture he ex­
ercises complete control over her property and after her death he is
(2)
usually the first preferential heir.
We then come to another system of law, namely, the Jaina 
law which is based upon the scriptures "of the Jains who form an in­
dependent religion in India. It is well-known that long since the
Jains have always been held by the Anglo-Indian courts to foe governed
(3)by ordinary Hindu law subject to any custom to the contrary* Their
attempts to get recognition in the eyes of the law as an independent
(4)community as such have always failed probably because there is at 
least an apparent similarity between the Jaina and the Hindu systems 
of religion or because the Jains religious leaders were reluctant to
favourable remark from their Lordships of the Privy Council - 
as having been, since its first edition, * the locus classicus* 





(4) For cases see supra pp. 1 *+17.
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produce before the courts cogent evidence about the existence of 
their scriptural authorities. In 1926, however, a Jaina scholar 
Mr•Champat Rai Jain published a book called *The Jaina Law* which 
appears to challenge the hitherto accepted position, namely, that the 
Jains are to be governed by the general Hindu law.^^ After perusing 
the book one feels that the Jains scriptural law has not been
treated as being on a par with other personal laws like Hindu law, 
the Mahomedan law etc, there is no reason why it should not now be 
treated at least as a system of customary law like the Marumakkatta­
yam law, the Punjab customary law etc.
For his enunciations of the Jain law Mr. Jain relies on 
six leading Jaina works called the Sdipurana, the Vardhamananiti, the 
Arhannxti, the Indranandi Jinasamhita, the Bhadrabahusanihita and the
Traivarnikachara which, according to him, were compiled between the
( 2 )ninth and the seventeenth ccenturies A.D. Some of these works are
in Sanskrit and there can be no doubt that they follow the general 
terminology and tenor of the Hindu Dharmasastras. But it is to be 
noted that the Jaina law is much more favourable to women than the 
accepted provisions of the Hindu law and so the salient features of
nuiB w  mi n ii ii n'Hiii r m i n n il rn i* i nnnii 1   mm murium > mii nm mm hip i ■ i n imp *i ■ i m mi m i nr inumi n m ■■ 11 n n hmh. ■ mu minimi uiimii
its provisions about succession may be specially noted here.
The order of succession to male* a property is his widow,
sons and other male descendants in the male line, brother, brother*s
(3)son, nearest bahdhus, gotrajas, castemen and the King• As in the
(1) Champat Rai Jaina : The Jaina Law (1926). See ibid at pp•21-22
for difference in general between the Jaina law and ordinary
Hindu law. The first book on Jaina law seems to have been pub­





(X)Burmese customary law, the widow is the most preferential heir
She succeeds despite the existence even of a son, takes an absolute 
estate in the inheritance and succeeds either to joint or separate
categories, namely, strxdhana and the rest* Strxdhana constitutes 
adhyagni, adhyavahanika, prxtidana (prxtidatta in Hindu law) and 
audayika or sau day ilea with the same import for these terms as in 
ordinary Hindu law* Strxdhana goes first to daughters whether 
married or unmarried, then to sons in default of whom it devolves 
upon the husband* The step-son is also recognised as an heir* It 
is specially important to note that the father or his heirs are not
at all entitled to a married woman*s strxdhana. The unmarried girl1s
- (4)strxdhana,. goes to her brothers as in Hindu law. A woman * s property
other than her strxdhana devolves successively upon £ier husband, sons
and other male descendants in the male line, and husband * s brothers 
( 5)and nephews.
broad features of the Hindu law it shows marked deviations from the 
hitherto accepted rules of the latter. It is interesting to note 
how almost each deviation is counterbalanced by another deviation: 
for instance, the widow gets an absolute estate in her inheritance 
from the husband but by introducing for such inherited property, if
(1) See infra p. 610.
(2) The Jaina Law p.80.
(3) Ibid pp.81,82,84,86.
(4) Ibid pp.83 & 89-93.
(5) Ibid p.79.
(2 )roperty of her husband. All females take an absolute interest
n inherited property. A  female * s property is divided into two 
It is thus clear that although the Jaina law follows the
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it remains unexpended and (presumably) in specie, a line of success­
ion different from the one prescribed for strxdhana sufficient care 
has been taken to see that the property does not pass out of the 
hands of the husband1® family. Similarly strxdhana devolves upon 
daughters without any distinction between a married and an unmarried 
daughter but in default of both succession devolves not upon the 
daughter's son but upon the son so that the preferential right of 
the married daughter is limited to herself and not allowed to extent 
to her issue.
On the basis of a proof of a custom to that effect it has
been recognised by the courts that a Jain widow takes an absolute
estate in the non-ancestral property which she inherits from her
husband.^^^ The advantage has not been so far extended - and for
(2)obvious reasons - to other female heirs. In the only reported
case on strxdhana in which Mr.Jain's book was produced as an author­
ity their Lordships of the Nagpux* High Court refused to accept the 
authority of the Bhadrabahusainhita according to which both married 
and unmai'ried daughters succeed simultaneously to their mother's 
strxdhana and on the principle of stare decisis followed the rule 
that the Jains are governed by Hindu law subject to proof of a 
specific custom to the contrary.Considering that in all the 
Jaina scriptures published by Mr. Jain there is a conscious attempt 
at brevity, simplicity and uniformity in rules of succession the
(1) For a discussion about the case-law see supra pp.l^-*^ (Chap.II).
(2) The reason is that the widow's right has been admitted on the 
basis of a specific custom which can not be extended by process 
of analogy.
(3) See Jaiwanti v. Anandi (1937)A.I.R.1938 discussed supra pp. ^17.
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decision appears^, ament able; for, the Court failed to realise that 
the scriptural law of the Jains which was laid down much later than 
many of the leading commentaries of Hindu law is, to say the least, 
the best possible evidence of the growth of their customary law which 
is, in some parts, contrary to Hindu law. It is high time that the 
question of applicability of Hindu law to Jains were radically re­
viewed and reconsidered in the light of the scriptures of the Jains 
themselves.
It is well-known that the Hindus who went from India to the 
neighbouring countries carried along with them their scriptures and 
law as well as their culture. It is necessary, therefore, to con­
sider here the three reputed non-Indian systems of customary law with
a view to ascertain how far, if at all, Hindu law has influenced them.
.b
The three systems are known as the BuUaist customary law which is 
prevalent in Burma, the Thesawalamai or the customary law of the 
Tamils in Ceysfion and the ICandyan law which was once .the customary 
law of the Sinhalese people of Ceylon.
The most important amongst these is the Burmese Buddhist 
law or the Burmese customary law which, subject to the changes brought 
about by a few enactments, still applies to all Buddhists in Burma in 
matters regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, caste or re­
ligious usages and i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e  sources of that law are
three: (a) The texts, namely, the Dhammathats and the Vinaya; (b)
( 2)Custom; (c) and the judicial decisions. The Dhammathats are
(1) Burma Laws Act XIII of 1893 s.13; O.H.Mootham p.3. For detailed 
information about the Dhammathats see U.Shwe Baw: Origin and 
development of Burmese legal literature; a thesis submitted for 
the degree of Ph.D.(1955) of the University of London, chap.3.
(2) Mootham p .3.
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thirty-six in number and date from the eleventh century A. D. They
are not codes or digests of laws but contain records of customs and
decisions concerning disputed points. They are more like collections
of illustrations to a section and are given without any apparent
logical arrangement or divisionJ^There being a confluence in Burma
of both the general Hindu law and Buddhistic customs the Dhainmathats
bear analogies with the Hindu law on many points though discrepancies
(2)between the two are by no means non-existent. Vinaya is a name
given to the five texts which govern the conduct of the monks and 
regulate ecclesiastical matters. Although the Dhammathats form an 
important source of information about customs the rapidly changing 
conditions in Burma have rendered them an unsafe guide in ascertain­
ing the present position of the customary law which it is better to
( 3)ascertain from the modern usage of the people themselves. The
judicial decisions form perhaps the most important source of the
Burmese customary law as they fill in, by inductive reasoning, the
lacunae in the customary law and also restate the law in the changed
(4)conditions of the present.
We may begin our discussion about the Burmese customary law
(1) Mootham p.4.
(2) Ibid pp.4-5. But see Dr.Shwe Baw* s summary of the thesis where­
in the author contends that the Dhammathats borrowed only the
method but not the substance of the law from the Hindu Sastras.
(3) Mootham p.6. See the comments of page C.J. in In re Maung
Thein Maung v. Ma Kywe (1935)13 Ran.412 at 419: "Much of the
ancient customary law of the Burmese people to be found in the 
Dhammathats has become anachronistic, and cannot intelligently 
be applied to the Burmans of the present day; for the facts 
and the conditions upon which many ;of the rules laid down in 
the Dhammathats rest find no counterpart in the conditions and 
customs that exist in modern Burma, and i&nder which the people 
now live and move and have their being. "
(4) Mootham pp.6-7.
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by making a very brief survey about the provisions about marriage 
and inheritance* Marriage, under the Burmese customary law is a
(X)civil contract without any religious or sacramental element in it.
Polygamy among the Buddhists is legal though it is looked upon with
(2)disfavour. A husband may also enter into and maintain conjugal
relations with a woman whose position falls short of a * superior*
wife* Such woman who is known as an 'inferior* wife has a position
which is higher than that of a mistress but lower than that of a
(3)superior wife* Amongst the Burmese the husband and the wife
manage their concerns together and it is not unusual to find that in
(4)business the wife takes more active part than the husband*
Property under this law is divided into three main cate­
gories :
(i) Payin or atet i.e. property which belonged either to the husband 
or wife before marriage;
(ii) Lettetpwa i.e. property which is acquired during marriage by 
the husband or the wife by succession or individual exertion.
(1) Mootham p.14; Shew Baw p.287.
(2) Mootham pp.16-17. For comparison between the earlier and the
present position of the law on this point see Baw pp.308-12.
(3) Mootham p.17; Baw pp.395-97. For comparison beteween the pro­
visions about marriage in Burmese law and Hindu law see Baw
pp.312-334; but the Sanskrit terms mentioned therein have 
undergone terrible transformation at the hands of the author 
and the position stated about the devolution of strxdhana is 
not entirely correct.
(4) But see Baw p.305 wherein the author points *out that according 
to the Dhammathats the husband, after marriage, gains complete 
control over the property of the wife but that the wife has no 
control over the husband's or the joint property. Pointing out 
that the Anglo-Burmese courts rejected these texts as being 
obsolete he, however, accepts that by the commencement of the 
British period in Burma the wife had usually become the manager 
of the family property and business.
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(iii) Nhapazon i.e. property acquired by both the spouses by joint
(X)exertion during marriage. Payxn brought to the second marriage
includes property acquired during the first marriage and also during
the time between the termination of the first marriage and the time
(2)
of the second marriage. There is a rebuttable presumption that
the property purchased by one of the spouses during marriage with
(3)the help of his or her payin has become nhapazon. The profits of
payin and nhapazon become nhapazon but profits of lettetpwa remain
(4)lettetpwa.
As regards rules of succession the Burmese customary law 
is quite remarkable in the sense that both husband and wife have 
exactly the same rights in each other's property and the rules of 
inheritance as well as the line of succession applicable to the pro­
perty of a male and female are the same.
The property of marriage consists of the lettetpwa and
nhapazon of both the spouses and apparently includes payin brought to
(3)the marriage by either of the spouses. The husband and wife both
havd, during the continuance of marriage, a common interest in the
property of marriage; they own it as tenants-in-common with vested
( 6)rights in their individual shares. Each one of the spouses has a
(1) Mootham p.8; Baw p.370.
(2) Mootham p.9.
(3) Ibid p.9.
(4) Ibid p.10. Kanwin and Thinthis are two other minor kinds of 
property. Kanwin is property given by the bridegroom to the 
bride at the time of the marriage and belongs to her probably 




one-third share in the payin and lettetpwa by succession of the other
spouse and one-half share in the lettetpwa individually ’acquired' by
the other spouse as well as in the nhapazon.^^^ The interest of each
(2 )of the spouses is alienable and liable to attachment under a de-
(3)cree. On partition upon divorce by mutual consent both the
spouses take the shares above stated except for the fact that genera­
lly each party takes the whole of the payin which she or he brought 
to the marriage.
The three fundamental rules of inheritance are the rule of
intestacy, non-ascent of inheritance and the predominance of propin-
(4)quxty. A Burmese Buddhist is incapable of making a will and his
undisposed^of property devolves upon his death, in accordance with
(5)the rules of the customary law. According to the second principle
the inheritance does not ascend so long as there are any descendants; 
where the deceased has died without leaving any descendants it may
/ Q \
ascend but not more than what is absolutely necessary. The only
prominent exceptions to this rule the right of the surviving spouse
to take the property of the deceased spouse and the right of the
brothers and sisters of an unmarried child who has died after its
parents but before the partition of their property to take the pro-
(7)
perty of such child. According to the rule of propinquity a
(1) Ibid p.31.
4/JC bi d "Ip * 3 2. 2)
(3) Ibid p.33.
(4) Ibid p.69; Shwe Baw p.384.
(5) Mootham pp.69-70; for detailed discussion see Shwe Baw pp.384-87
(6) Mootham p.71; Baw pp.387-89.
(7) Mootham pp.71-72.
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nearer heir would exclude a more remote one* Thus children or grand­
children exclude great-grandchildren; or a brother excludes the
(1)children of deceased brother* The most prominent exception to
this is that brothers and sisters of a deceased are preferred to his 
parents.
The general order of succession, therefore, is:-
(i) firstly, the surviving spouse subject to the share of an orasa;
(ii) secondly, the descendants;
(iii) thirdly, the first line of collaterals, namely, brothers and 
sisters;
(iv) fourthly, the parents;
(vJ fifthly, the second line of collaterals, namely, uncles, aunts
Partition of the property of a person may be claimed by
(4 )
his heirs after that person*s death or remarriage* The general
rules about partition are as follows:-
(A) After the death of either of the spouses the surviving
spouse takes the whole of the estate of the deceased spouae to the
(5 )exclusion of all others. The only exception is that of an orasa
(6)who, in some cases, takes one-fourth of the property. There are
(1) Ibid pp.73-74.
(2) Ibid p.74; Baw pp.389-93 should be consulted for a discussion 
about this rule.
(3) Mootham p.75. But see Baw p.393-94 where the line given on the 
basis of the Dhammathats is the surviving spouse, descendants, 
parents or brothers and sisters, grandparents, descendants of 
brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, descendants of uncles 
and aunts etc.
(4) Mootham p.86; but see Baw pp.408 wherein these conditions have 
been enlarged into three.
(5) Mootham p.103; Baw p.408.
(6) For orasa and his share see Mootham pp.90-102.
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two exceptions to this rule. The property of a spouse which is in 
possession of his or her parents who stay with the couple will pass 
on to such parents and not to the surviving spouse. Similarly when 
a man simultaneously has two or more wives the children of either 
wife and not the husband are entitled as heirs to her estate on her 
death.^ ^
(B) If the surviving spouse dies shortly after the death
of the other spouse the relatives of each would severally succeed to
(2)the ihoiety of the joint property of the couple.
(C) The whole of the estate of the surviving parent who
has not remarried till his or her death, devolves upon the surviving
( 3)children and children of the pre-deceased children.
(D) On remarriage of the surviving parent the children by
his or her former marriage take the following shares from his or her
estate:-
(i) The eldest child takes one-fourth share if he or she
has already not taken the share of an orasa.
(ii) The younger surviving children collectively take one- 
fourth share.
/ . . . \ . (4)( m )  i\n only surviving child takes one-half share.
(E) On the death of the common parent after remarriage and 
leaving the step-parent surviving the partition takes place as
follows
(i) From the payin brought to the second marriage by the
(1) Ibid pp.103-5; for exceptions see Baw p.409.




common parent one-fourth goes to the surviving parent and three-fourth* 
to the children by former marriage.
(ii) In nhapazon the step-parent gets seven-eights or 
five-sixth share respectively depending upon whether there are child­
ren by the second marriage or not respectively. The rest is taken by 
the children of the first marriage.
(iii) Lettetpwa of the second marriage is divisible equally
between the surviving step-parent and the children of the first
(1)raarrxage.
(F) On the death of a common parent after remarriage and 
after the death of the step-parent the rules of division of the 
common parent*s property amongst his or her children by two marriages 
are as follows:-
(i) If the step-parent does not bring payin to the marriage 
and no property is acquired during the second marriage, the payin 
which the common parent brought to the second marriage would devolve 
upon the children of the first and second marriage respectively in 
three-fourth and one-fourth shares respectively. Otherwise the 
whole would pass on to the children of the first marriage.
(ii) Lettetpwa {acquired* by the common parent during the 
second marriage would devolve equally upon children by both marriages.
(iii) In nhapazon the children of the marriage during
which the nhapazon to be divided was acquired, take double the share
(2)of the children of other marriage or marriages.
(1) Mootham pp.111-13; Baw p.414.
(2) Mootham p.113-15; Baw pp.416-17
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(iv) The whole of the property of the second marriage,
shall, in the absence of children of that marriage be divided equally
amongst children of the previous marriage or marriages of either
(1)spouse•
A few more particulars of the Burmese law worth noting are 
as follows:-
(i) An inferior wife living with her husband is entitled
to two-fifth of his estate. The one not living with her husband is
not entitled to any inheritance but may probably retain only so much
(2)of her husband's property as has passed into her possession.
(ii) An illegitimate child is ordinarily not entitled to
inherit especially in the presence of the legitimate ones; however,
it appears that in one case illegitimate children were treated as
(3)being on par with step-children.
(iii) Step-children and step-grandchildren exclude the
collateral blood-relations except in succession to undivided ancestral
(4)
property m  succession whereto they share with the latter in moieties.
(iv) A physically or mentally incompetent child is eom- 
petent to inherit and takes a full share.
(v) By adoption a person loses his right of inheritance in
his natural parent’s property; by divorce of one's parents one loses
one's right in the property of the parent with whom he or she ceases
(1) Mootham p.116.
(2) Ibid p.78.
(3) Mootham p.76; but see Baw pp.394-98 in favour of illegitimate
children.
(4) Mootham p.83; Baw p.397.
(5) Mootham p.82; Baw pp.397-99.
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to live after such divorce. A person loses his right in another 
person's property also by his deliberate intention to sever family
(1)ties with such person whose property he may otherwise claim as heir.
Thus the provisions of the Burmese customary law differ
widely from the sastric provisions of Hindu law in as much as, for
instance, there is no distinction between succession to a male's and
a female's property or between a male and a female heir or between a
physically or mentally defective heir and a normal heir. But the
core of this custom represents the most archaic provisions of Hindu
law: the rules about remarriage and divorce show that the provisions
of the sastra which became obsolete in India continued to influence
the people in Burma. The rules of succession show that Brihaspati's
(2)text preaching unity of husband and wife has been carried out in
Burmese law to a perfection which was never anticipated even by the
sastric law. At the same time we can see the influence of another
text of Brihaspati wherein he preaches the identity of oneself with
( 3 )one's own progeny: the surviving spouse inherits the whole pro­
perty of the deceased spouse but subject only to the existing though 
dormant right of the children who are entitled to get their share 
upon remarriage of the surviving spnpse. The &Hstra probably noticed 
the danger of carrying into perfection the doctrine of the identity 
of husband and wife, for, as we have already seen, this doctrine, 
when coupled with the customs of divorce and remarriage, would inevit- 
ably lead to innumerable complications in intestate succession.
(1) Mootham pp.117-20.
(2) Supra pp. 5*7-5$•
(3) Supra p. .
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In Ceylon five different systems of law were given a Royal
(1)sanction during the British regime. However, amongst the systems
of customary laws of Ceylon the Thesawalamai stands as the most com- 
(2)prehensive one and applies to the Tamils in Ceylon who, by their
total strength of approximately 1,400,000 persons, form a considerable
(3)portion of the Ceylonese population. There is no evidence of the
history of the Thesawalamai before the Portugese period although it
is known that Tamil kings of the Cola dynasty rules Ceylon from the
(4)twelvth century. Dr. Tambiah says that there have been two waves
of Tamil immigrants from India to Ceylon: the first one carried
along with it the Marumakkattayam law of the Malabar whereas the
second one took Ordinary Hindu law to Ceylon as a result of which the
Thasawalamai stands as a peculiar blending of the two systems though
(5 )with less influence of the ordinary Hindu law.
Very scanty information about the rules of the Thesawalamai 
during the Portugese period is available but in 1707 during the 
Dutch regime the rules of the Thesawalamai were officially collected 
by one Claas Izaacs and came to be known popularly as the code of
(7)
Thesawalamai. The British also accepted the same as the governing
customary law of the Tamils of Ceylon and even today it retains the
(1) S.Katiresu : A handbook of the Thesawalamai or the customary 
law of the province of Jaffna p.4.
(2) H.W.Thambiah : The laws and customs of the Tamils of Ceylon p.22.
(3) Ibid p.l. The Ceylonese Tamils and Indian Tamils together form
one-third of the population of Ceylon.
(4) Ibid p.22.
(5) Ibid p.23.
(6) See rules from De Queroz*s *Conquista De Ceylao* stated in 
Thambiah p.23.
(7) Ibid pp.17, 25 etc.
4 A i V>* - -]> rv o 2. ’
ky fck© same author The law of Thesawalamai, Tamil Culture 1953 
pp.586-408.
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same position subject only to the changes brought about by recent
(1)legislation* However, we are concerned here only with the original
(2)
customary law and not with the later legislative development*
According to the code property is divided into three kinds, 
namely, mudusam, che dan am (stridhanam? ) , and thediyatettam 
attamg-}. The first one represents the hereditory property, the 
second one is the dowry property and the third, the acquired property. 
Hereditary property is one which is acquired by either of the spouses. 
Dowry is that property which is given to a bride at the time of her 
marriage by her parents or brothers. Acquired property represents
(3)
separate property acquired during coverture by either of the spouses.
A wife's inherited property is, like her dowry property, her separate
property. Similarly gifts to a woman, money acquired by selling dowry
(4)lands etc., constitute a woman's separate property.
Father's inherited property devolves upon sons to the ex­
clusion of daughters. Daughters are given dowry out of their mother's
property. The rest of the property of both the spouses devolves
(5)equally upon sons and undowered daughters. It will thus be seen
that dowry which is really advancement by way of portion to daughters 
plays an important part in intestate succession according to the 
Thesawalamai. During the Dutch regime the law appears to have become 
more favourable towards the daughters; for, during the Portugese
(1) The code was considerably modified by the Matrimonial Rights 
and Inheritance Ordinance (Jaffna)Ord.l of 1911 and Jaffna 
Matrimonial Rights and Inheritance Amendment Act of 1947 - 
Thambiah p.31.
(2) See Katiresu's book for a complete reprint of the code.
(3) Katiresu p.8; Thambiah p.36.
(4) Katiresu p.9.
(5) Katiresu pp.21-22; Thambiah p.36.
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period daughters could get dowry only from the dowry property of
their mother and not from her other property. If a married woman
(2)dies childless her dowry property reverts to her own family. It
devolves first upon her married sisters and in their default upon her
brothers. But in some cases the mother takes possession of the pro-
( 3)perty according to custom and retains it during her life-time.
Ganapathi Iyer rightly compares the three kinds of property 
mentioned in the Thesawalamai with the three kinds of property known 
to Hindu law, namely, ancestral property, strxdhana, and self-acquired
(4)
property. The similarity in nomenclature as well as in the broad 
incidents of the divisions of property in these two systems discloses 
an evidence of a common bond between the two. Dr.Tambiah, however, 
makes two ridiculous suggestions namely, that chedanam has a parallel 
in the Marumakkattayam law and that it ftoriginated when a new house­
hold branched off from the Thavazhi illom known to the Marumakkatt­
ayam Law.1* Secondly he suggests that the conception of strxdhana i 
which was "developed later in order to create the separate property
of the woman11 had its foundation in the customary law of the Thesawal-
(3)amai. Now that we have seen the working of the Marumakkattayam
system as well as the history of the development of strxdhana it is
(1) De Queroz's Conquista De Ceylan referred to in Tambiah p.24.
This continuity in heridatory transformation of the mother's 
property into her daughter's property in the female line bears 
a very close resemblance to one of the oldest provisions of 
Hindu law given by Baudhayana: "Maturalankaram duhitarah 
sampradayikam bhaj erananyadva.11 - Bau .2.2.49 supra. F r ;
*  * y> /  -g « \
"r\ ^ " '** a . 4 * " ‘j *■ 1
(2) Katiresu p.11.
(3) Tambiah p.38. This may well be connected to the two interpre­
tations of Gau.28.26-7 according to &hich the sulka of a 
daughter devolves upon uterine brother or the mother. See supra.
(4) Iyer's ;;Hindu-l»aw vo.I p.36 referred to in Tambiah p.36.
C5J Tambiah p.36-37.
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not necessary here to show at length how baseless these statements
Kandyan law is the indigenous customary law of the Ceylon­
ese people and in some respects shows a collateral affinity towards
(2)
ordinary Hindu law. There are two kinds of marriage under the
Kandyan law, namely, dxga and binna; in the former the wife goes
to stay with her husband whereas in the latter the husband goes to
stay with his wife, either because her parents are rich or because
she herself has inherited a considerable amount of property from
( 3 )either of her parents. Thus there can be a binna marriage on
father's or mother's property depending in each case upon whether the
daughter's financial strength depends upon her paternal or maternal
(4)wealth. Divorce can be had at the instance of either party. Each
spouse has absolute ownership in his or her property which, according
(5)to Hayley, is a corollary to easy and frequent divorce. Property
acquired by the wife in any way before or after the marriage belongs
to her absolutely. When property is acquired jointly by the husband
(6)and wife it belongs to them jointly. Dowry plays an important
(7)part in the law of property. In the dxga marriages the bride
(1) For discussion see infra.
(2) For comparison between the two see Dr.J.D.M.Derrett : The origins 
of the laws of the ICandyans, University of Ceylon Review vo.XIV 
pp.105-150.
(3) F.A.Hayley : A treatise on the laws and customs of the Sinhalese 
including the portions still surviving under the name Kandyan 
law pp.194-95.
(4) Hayley p.195.
(5) Ifoid p.285. But this reason is not true; for, in many of the 
aboriginal tribes divorce is free and/or frequent but the wife 
either does not possess any property or her property, at least 
during coverture, is completely controlled toy her husband who 
treats his wife herself as his property. - See infra.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid pp.331, and at 334-35 wherein the author traces the analogy 
 between the Kandyan law and the Thesawalamai.
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usually takes very large sum from her parent*s house to the bride-
(1)groom*s house. However, in case of divorce the wife takes her
dowry and her separate property as well as her share in the joint 
property of husband and wife.*2*
The importance of dowry in the law of succession can easily 
be understood if it is remembered that the family of a diga-married 
daughter is something very similar to an ordinary Hindu family where­
as the position of a binna-married daughter is nearer to a marumakk-
attayi female who remains in her own family which again may be a
(3 )binna-married daughter*s father’s or mother’s house. The effect
of dowry may be seen from the fact that succession to immoveable
separate property of a male devolves together upon his widow, sons,
and unmarried and binna-married daughters but his diga-married
daughters are entitled to succeed only in default of these heirs or
(4)their issue. There are conflicting tables about the line of heirs
who are entitled to succeed to such property in default of the issue
(5)of the deceased but on the whole the line of heirs bears a con­
siderable resemblance with the line given in Hindu law. As regards 
succession to father*s property the position of a diga-married dau­
ghter is very much similar to that of a daughter in Hindu law who is 
entitled to get only marriage-expenses out of her father’s property 
in the presence of his sons.
The immoveable property of a diga-married daughter devolves
(1) Ibid p.333.
(2) Ibid p* 287•
( 3 ) SflE pv* *
(4) Hayley pp.351, 369-70.
(5) See ibid pp.430-32. Succession to moveable property of 
females not much different - see ibid p.452.
620
equally upon her issue, male or female, single or married, living in
(1)diga or binna, legitimate or illegitimate. Thus the mother’s xn-
(2)heritance is equitably distributed. The husband has no right in
his wife’s inherited property if any of her nearest blood-relations
survive her. However, in the absence of children, he takes the pro-
( 3)perty acquired by her during married life. In the case of a
daughter married in binna on her father’s property, her paternal 
inheritance devolves in accordance with the rules laid down for 
succession to male’s immoveable property whereas the rest of her pro­
perty devolves equally on all her children in the above-mentioned 
(4)manner. In the case of a daughter who is married in binna on her
mother’s estate and having her daughters also married in binna on her 
estate, her property devolves on her daughters to the exclusion of
(5)
her sons, if her husband has sufficient property to go to her sons.
This is quite in accordance with the general principle of the Kandyan
law that if a descendant has been unduly benefited from the father’s
estate by gift, bequest, or inheritance he will lose pro tanto his
(6)share in mother's property. The Niti Nighanduwa mentions a 
hereditary series of binna marriages on mother’s premises whereby 
mother’s property is being continuously passed on to the female heirs 
in the female line with a descent 'similar to that of the maternal




(5) Ibid p.468. This provision is very similar to the provision of
Bandhayana referred to supra p R ^ l a n d  resembles the matrilin- 
eal succession in general of the Marumakkattayam law.
(6) Hayley p.468.
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muthusom of the Mukkuwas1.^^ This is essentially the characteristic
of strxdhana as expounded in the very old sastric law of Baudhayana
(2)and Gautama. The husband of a binna-married daughter has no right
(3)in her immoveable property. The other heirs inherit female’s
immoveable property in the same way and order in which they inherit
(4)male's immoveable property.
The moveable property of a female devolves firstly upon
her children in like manner as her immoveable property. In their
default the husband takes property acquired by her, in preference to
all her own relations and her property acquired by her before marriage
in preference to her remote relations like uncles, aunts etc. Xhro-
perty obtained by dowry, gift or inheritance from parents or brother
goes to them respectively. But brothers cannot claim the dowry given
to a diga-married daughter by her parents; it goes to the husband.
(5)But they do take such dowry given to a binna-married daughter.
It is interesting to note that the proprietory rights of 
the husband of a binna-married daughter in her family are not the 
same as those of a khana-damad known to the Punjab customary law or 
a gharjawai known to many other aboriginal communities in India al- 
though the social position of all these is the same. Such husband
in Kandyan law goes ike a stranger and remains a stranger throughout 
his life. The favour shown to illegitimate children is strikingly
(1 ) Niti Nighanduwa 109 cited in Hayley p.464.




(6 ) For khanad; cmad see supra p. *>99 , for ghar-jawai see infra*p.£3X
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important since they inherit not only their mother’s property but
also their putative father’s property excepting his paraveni i.e.
(1)estate of inheritance* One more thing to be noted xs that pro­
stitution is banned and there exists a very severe punishment for
(2)the offenders. Perhaps free and frequent divorce leaves very 
little room for prostitution; consequently there are no separate 
rules for succession to prostitute’s property as they exist under 
some other systems of law.
The provision about a diga-married daughter being initially 
excluded from paternal inheritance reminds us of the provision of 
Yajnavalkya whereby in partition amongst the sons during the life-time 
of the father the mother does not get a share or gets a pro tanto re­
duction in her share if she has already received some strxdhana from
( 3)her husband or father-in-law. It is to be noted that such dowry
is like strTdhana and is in fact called strxdhanam or varasulka
(4)amongst the Malabar brahmxns. The provxsxon about successxon to
dowry and other moveables obtained from the parents* family reminds 
us of the provisions of Yajnavalkya, ICatyayana and Vriddha Katyayana 
according to Miom the strxdhana given to a female by her bandhus goes
( 5 )  h o w e v e r ,  j
to bandhus in default of her children. Dr.Berrett remarks that the
9 !
i
law of succession to female’s property bears a strong resemblance to
i
1 1  — —  ’....... . I"*-.'.".-    — - . 1 .    j
(1) Hayley pp.390-91. j
(2) Ibid p.122. .
(3) Yaj.2.115.
(4) See supra. Strxdhana included in the kinds of impartible pro­
perty really meant varasulka or dowry given by the bride’s t
parents to the bridegroom - supra.
(5) Yaj.2.144; Katyayana : ’’Bandhudattam tu bandhunam.•.etc”;
Vriddha ICatyayana : "Fitribhyam cha^yaddattam ...etc” - supra.
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the developed rather than to the primitive rules of descent to strld- 
hana and that ’’that development itself must be attributed to the grow­
ing predominance in some parts of India of the surviving traces of 
pre-Sryan female independence and the necessity for keeping dowry and 
the acquired property of the females out of the hands of the husband’s 
collaterals.11 ■ ;*
The rest of the material available on the customary laws of 
India may be said to be represented by individual works of authors 
who tried to ascertain and state directly or incidentally the custom­
ary law of a particular country, community or locality. The material 
collected by such authors may be divided into three categories, namely 
legal, ethnographical and anthropological out of which the first cate­
gory, which is most useful for our purpose, does not appear to have 
attracted enough scholarly attention.
The earliest attempt to collect material on customs from a 
legal and not merely from a sociological point of view appears to 
have been done by Steele, who in 1326 published a digest-type book 
entitled ’The Law and Custom of Hindu Castes.' The information given 
in this book is based mainly upon the official inquiries conducted 
district by district by the government officers in parts of Mahara­
shtra including Poona, Satara and Khandesh. The inquiries which
elicited replies from the sastris as well as from the leading repre-
(2)sentatives of the different castes were conducted with three 
objectives, namely, to ascertain the particular text-books and
(1) The origins of the laws of the Kandyans opp.ci.p.132.
(2) Steele (1808) Preface pp.viii, xiv-xvi.
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commentaries referred to as authorities by the sastris; to investi­
gate the number and the relation of the existing castes and their 
mode of preserving old or establishing new custom; and to compare
the written law with the unwritten customs, Mand note their conformity
(1)with or opposition to each other.11 The book which contains
material referring to customary law of nearly 150 castes or more
could have hardly done full justice to the stupendous task which its
author undertook; nevertheless, the book reveals many customs, some
of which show the existence of the rules of the sastra which are
otherwise taken to have become archaic and obsolete; at the same
time some of the customs appear to have continued in existence either
in disregard for, or in ignorance of, the sastra, or to have been
newly introduced in defiance of the sastric provisions.
Customs of the former kind exist with regard to divorce
and remarriage, which were allowed by the now obsolete rules of the
s a s t r a . F o r  instance amongst the lower castes widows are entitled
to contract a second marriage called pat♦ In a majority of the lower
castes the wife can leave the husband and contract pat if her first
husband is impotent; if the two spouses continuously quarrel; if
there is mutual consent of the two; or if the husband becomes an
(3)outeaste. Similarly, as in the olden days before the age of
commentators, the father has a right ad libitum to disqualify a son
(1) Ibid Preface pp.vi-vii. For a very meagre statement about the 
general conformity and disagreement between the law and customs 
see Steele Preface p.xvii.
(2) For a succint statement about the development of the Sastra 
see supra.
(3) Steele pp.159, 168-69, 369. For difference between the first 
marriage and pat see ibid. pp.364-66.
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from having a share in partition on account of the latter*s ill- 
conduct such as a tendency to quarrel. The son usually is not en­
titled to claim partition during the life-time of the father and has
(1)to be pleased with whatever the father gives hxm.
The whole customary law about the property of women in­
cludes the latter kind of customs which seem to have remained current 
despite the precepts of the sastra or have been introduced at a later
stage when the invading Aryans came into deeper contact with the in-
(2)digenous aboriginals so as to form a mixed society. Amongst the
majority of the castes, all the property of a wife is regarded as
being her husband*s property and she has to consult him in making a
gift etc. of such property. The husband*s control usually exists
whether the wife stays with him, with her parents or separate from
them both. Naturally after the death of the wife the husband is the
first preferential heir. The succession then devolves upon children;
brother-in-law and nephews; parents; brothers and sisters. Presents
given by the husband go, in default of the children, to the mother-in- 
{ 3 )law. Thus it is clear that the customary law of the D*ekkan is 
very similar to the Punjab customary law in giving supreme authority
(1) Steele pp.213, 405-8. According to Yaj.II 114, Yaj.II 116, 
Na.Smr.16.4 i.e. Na.Sam.14.4, Na.Smr.16.15 i.e. Na.Sara.14.15, 
it is obvious that the father had a supreme authority in par­
titioning family property though the commentators try to direct 
these texts to the father*s self-acquired property. See, how­
ever, Brihaspati quoted in Vya.Pra.439 prohibiting a father from 
disqualifying without reason a son from having a share in par­
tition. This seems to have been a later development of the law.
(2) For the law amongst the aborigine see infra. For vratystoma or
ceremony of converting non-Aryans into Aryans see infra p.*>£t7.
(3) Steele pp.236-37; 366-67. For possession of jewels of the
wife during the solemnisation of the marriage and maturity of
the wife see ibid pp.359-60.
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and importance to the husband as regards the wife’s property; at the
same time it differs from the latter in as much as the former accepts
(1)a married woman’s blood-relations as heirs to her own property*
The second attempt seems to have begun as early as in 1827
in which year the Bombay Sadar Bivani Adalat issued a circular and
deputed Borrodaile to collect information about the customs of castes
(2)
in Gujrat. The circular was issued in pursuance of the Bombay
Regulation IV of 1927 which obliged the Courts to take into considera-
tion?and to give a decision in accordance with, the custom of the 
( 3 )parties* It seems that soon after this deputation Mr.Borradaile
started his work and collected information about the customs of 257
(4)castes m  Surat and of 56 castes in Broach* He had prepared a
questionnaire which was presented to the leading representatives of
(5)each community and he recorded their answers given in detail. The
questions, which were based mainly on inheritance, succession and
special property of females, have brought out interesting information 
with such enormous details that one wonders why the results of the 
inquiry remained unpublished till as late as i , 1884* However, it is 
not surprising to find that Borradaile*s efforts are almost unknown 
to modern scholars since they could hardly have been referred to by
the Divani Adalats of Bombay; when they eventually came in a pub­
lished form before the High Court the law had probably already grown
(1) Supra pp* h*-* fHe Punjab I^^ .
(2) See the circular reprinted in Rao Bahadur Nana Moroji: Borra­
daile *s Gujrat Caste Rules p.1*
(3) Supra p* 5 o
(4) Gujrat Caste Rules p.2.
(5) lbid.p.3* For the three lists of questionnaire see ibid.pp.
5, 13, 22.
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too rigid easily to acquire a new pattern.
The information reveals one important fact, namely, that 
each and every community in Gujrat has some custom or another which 
is in direct contravention of the sastra. It appears that it is only
•’"“N
the Brahmana; .modha ChaturvedX SuratX caste which is almost uniformly
(1)governed by the sastric law. Amongst the customs of the other 
castes the deviations from the sastric rules display such a bewilder­
ing diversity that one easily agrees with Nelson who writes: **But,
for obvious reason^ I would vastly prefer a collection of usages and
(2)
customs to a code of Sanskrit law.1* The information most important
for our purpose is the one about palla which means money given by the
bridegroom or his party to the bride on the occasion of her marriage
(3 )and for her separate use. The sum to be paid as palla is fixed at
different amounts in different communities and the rules about its 
possession, control and succession vary widely in different communi­
ties. If one admits that money offered as a bride-price by the bride­
groom to the bride*s parents and presents given as varasulka or vara- 
daksina by the bride’s parents to the bridegroom in the tsura and
Brahma marriages respectively were gradually transformed into the
(4)earliest categories of strxdhana, one would easxly realise that
the diversity in the customs about palla represent the different
(5)phases of this transformation. It is no wonder, therefore, that
(1) Ibid. pp.871- 22- the usual answer given to all questions is 
* Je sastramah clnhe teja pramana cfche1.
(2) J.H.Nelson: Indian Usage and Judge-made law in Madras (1889)
pp.20-21.
(3) Ibid.p.3; Palla is also spelled sometimes as pulla but really 
it ought to be 1pallun* as it is in Gujarati.
(4) For this see Awprrac* pp. 9 pp.<3o-3!„
(5) For an unsuccessful attempt of the defendant to distinguish 
between palla and the bride-price see Jotiram v. Bai Biwali A.I.R
(t *“ K 9 » ke K&v l~ 3<. ^
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from ’Bombciy
the earliest reported cases about strxdhana had palla as their/s
(1)subject-matter.
The other two important attempts to ascertain customary 
material from a legal point of view have been made by Mr.Pannalal and 
Dr.Joshi, who focus their attention on the customary law of the Khasa 
tribes residing in the Kumaon hills. But the information furnished by 
their works will be considered later on together with the anthropolo­
gical material which deals with the customary law of the other abor­
iginal tribes of India.
By the close of the last century the government of India
proposed to make an official ethnographic survey of India which
eventually resulted in publication of several provincial surveys of 
the different castes and tribes. The survey was headed by Risley who
was the first to publish his own survey under the name HThe tribes and
(2)
castes of Bengal11. This was soon followed by information about the
other tracts which was published by eminent authors like Thurston,
(3 )AiiOnthakrislina Iyer, Russell etc. However, this ethnographical
survey was conducted mainly to note the religious and the cultural
1939 Bom.134 supra; he would have been much benefited if he had 
resorted to the information collected by Borradaile.
(1) See supra pf. 5L6S-65.
(2) II. M. Risley: The Tribes and Castes of Bengal (1891).
(3) W.Crooke: The Tribes and Castes of the North Western Province
and Oudh (1896); E.Thurston: Castes and Tribes of Southern India; 
Ananthakrishna Iyer: The Cochin Tribes and Castes; R.V.Russell: 
The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India (1916);
Syed Siraj U1 Hassan: The Castes and Tribes of H.E.H. the Nizam*s{
Dominions (1920); R.E.Enthoven: The Tribes and Castes of Bombay J 
(1920-22); H.A.Rose: A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the i 
Punjab and North-West Frontier province; Ananthakrishna Iyer: j
The Mysore Tribes and Castes (1935); Krishna Iyer: The Travan- j
core Tribes and Castes (1937-41).
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side of the castes and tribes and not to enunciate the law of property
as current in each caste and tribe. Risley himself thought that
minute details of inheritance had no bearing on the subject and that
it was enough to note whether a tribe followed Islamic law or followed
pagband or chunaband rule etc.^^ But these works are important from
the point of ascertaining the social customs which have an indirect
bearing upon the development of the law of property and furnish vast
(2)and reliable material on this subject.
Anthropological research in India is having to its credit 
a considerable number of publications about the aboriginals of India 
and these are fast growing in number as well as information and 
importance. Such works incidentally deal also with the proprietory 
law of the aborigines. The importance of the customary laws of the 
hundreds of the aboriginal tribes cannot be overestimated since they 
represent quite a considerable part of the population of India; the 
Gonds and the Santals alone are about three millions each; the 
Bhils have a population of about two and a half millions and the 
Bhuiyas of Orissa form a number of above one and a half million
(1) The Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Ethnographical Glossary Vol.II 
p.181. But the volumes published by Ananthakrishana Iyer and 
his equally illustrious son Krishna Iyer do contain notes on 
rules of inheritance amongst almost each and every caste and 
tribe mentioned therein. The same is the case with Syed 01 I
Hassan's publications which occasionally give notes on rules j 
of inheritance. {
(2) For instance, for prostitution see the Mysore Tribes and Castes I 
Vol.I pp.214-222; for female infanticide see Thurston*s Ethno­
graphic Notes in Southern India pp.502-509 and Rose Vol.I p.635; 
for exclusion from inheritance see the Mysore Tribes and Castes 
Vol.Ill p.428. For the only two cases in which Thurston was and 
was not relied upon respectively in determining customary rules 
about inheritance see infra p. %£ "b ■
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Indian citizens.*1^
Most of these aborigins have a similar frame of the law of 
projjerty so far as the proprietory capacity of women is concerned.
As in the case of the customs incorporated in Steele's treatise the 
customs prevalent amongst the aboriginals sometimes represent the 
existence of archaic provisions of the sastra and sometimes they are 
even much more primitive, so as to justify some of the earliest pro­
hibitions in the sastra.
The rules amongst the aborigins may be stated to be 
generally as follows:-
For obtaining a girl in marriage the bridegroom or his 
family usually has to pay a bride-price to the parents or brother of
the bride. It is no wonder, therefore, that this kind of form of
marriage was termed in the sastra as 'Ssura* since the invading 
Aryans used to designate the indigenous aborigine > as asuras or
dasyus* Moreover the bride-price shows an early stage of the sulka
in as much as it becomes the property not of the bride but of the
(2)
bride's parents or brothers. It is no wonder, therefore, that
Manu and other sastric authors carry on a big tirade against such
( 3 )'sale' of daughters. As a result of this conflict between the
(1) Indrajit Singh: The Gondawana and the Gonds (1944) p.l; P.O. 
Biswas: Santals of the Santal Parganas (1956)p.2; Nabendu Datta } 
Majumdar: The Santals, a Study in Culture-change (1956)p.32; j
T.B.Naik: The Bhils p.3; Sarat Chandra Roy: The Hill Bhuiyas
of Orissa (1935)p.41. !
(2) For bride-price see Santals of the Santal Paraganas p.156; j
W.V.Grigson: The Maria Gonds of Bastar (1938)p.295; The Santals 
p.84; W •H .R •Rivers: The Todas (1906)p.522; Tarakchandra Das:
The Wild Kharias of Dhalbhum, University of Calcutta Anthropo­
logical Papers No.3 p.25; The Hill Bhuiyas p.177; Sarat Chandra 
Roy: The Kharias (1937) p.299 etc.
(3) See supra. !
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existing custom and the incoming sastra it would seem that this 
bride-price got transformed in sulka so as to form one of the cate­
gories of stridhana. It retains, however, the traces of its origin 
by having a special line of succession consisting of the blood-rela- 
tions of the female. Unlike the case of the Aryans there are no 
child-marriages and a girl usually marries after puberty.^ Women 
move freely in society and work along with men. Divorce and re­
marriage are quite free and frequent, and they are resorted to with-
£2)out any tinge of social odium or censure. Amongst the Santals
such divorce is usually the result of adultery for which the husband:
(3 )
may, at his option, claim compensation from the adulteror. Widow-
(4)remarriage also is neither disfavoured nor rare. It is quite a
unique feature of these tribes that polyandry, in whatever quarters 
it exists, takes the shape of a fraternal polyandry which is worked
/ p“ \
out in a thoroughly agnatic and patriarchial type of family. It
might probably be the result of the lesser number of females in a
particular tribe or more probably the result of poverty in which case
the members of a particular family may think it worthwhile to spend
( 5)
r  > only the amount required as bride-price which can becomeA
(7)
* a severe tax* upon the family economy.
(1) The Gondawana and the Gonds p.90; The Kharisa p.225 etc.
(2) The Santals p.85; L.D.Joshi: The Khasa Family Law pp.2,150-67 etc
(5) The Santals p.85; See also Steele pp. according to which it
appears that amongst a great number of lower castes the adulter­
er has to pay compensation to the husband of the adulteress.
(4) The Gondawana and the Gonds p.94; The Hill Bhuiyas p.175; The 
Khasa Family Law p.2 etc.
(5) The Todas p.515; The Khasa Family Law p.77 etc.
(6) For reasons of polyandry see supra pp.
(7) The Maria Gonds of Bastar p.295.
632
With post-puberty marriages and frequent and free divorce
one may expect that women might have greater proprietory rights
(1)amongst the aborigins than amongst the caste-Hindus. But the case
is exactly otherwise. They usually do not have any kind of property
moveable or immoveable. On the other hand a woman herseif is con-
(2)
sidered as a piece of property - and a valuable one - of the husband.
Amongst the Khasa she is merely considered as a chattel; amongst
( 3 )the Purdhans a wife is called vmal' which means property. In
succession to a male’s property the widow and the daughter have no 
right of inheritance at all. The widow usually gets only maintenance 
and in some cases she does not get even that much. Amongst the San­
tals the widow can get mere possession of her deceased husband's pro­
perty and that too only if her sons are minors. It should also be 
noted that whereas daughters are unanimously excluded from inheritance
the ghar-jawai or a son-in-law who stays with his sonless father-in-
(4)law is accepted as an heir. His position, therefore, is very
similar to a khana-damad in the Punjab customary law and the reasons 
for his importance must also be the same•
We already conjectured that several customs amongst the 
aborigins either correspond to, and thus may be supposed to represent
(1) See, for instance, Hayley's reasoning supra p. 61 g .
(2) The Maria Gonds p.293; The Khasa Family Law pp.111-116; Shamrao 
Hivale: The Purdhans of the Upper Narbada Valley (1946)p.149 etc.
(3) See ibid.
(4) For rules of succession see Santals of the Santal Purganas 
pp.155-56; The Maria Gonds pp.293-95; The Santals p.84; The 
Todas p.563; The Bhuiyas pp.176-77; The Kharias pp.168-72;
The Khasa Family Law p.3; The Bhils pp.67-68; P.C.Biswas: 
Primitive Religion, Social Organisation, Law and Government 
amongst the Santals, University of Calcutta Anthropological 
Papery, New Series no.4 (1935)pp.82-84.
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prototypes of, the rules of the Sastra which we know to be archaic, 
or are just the things which the progressive Sastra wanted to pro­
hibit altogether.
The instances of the first kind are as follows
(I) Women are usually excluded from inheritance. This
reminds us of the archaic provision of Baudhayana to the effect that
(1)women are incapable of having a share in inheritance•
(XI) As an instructive parallel from another branch of law 
we find that amongst the Bhils and Bhuiyas the eldest son takes a
f
larger share and amongst the Bhils all the sons take shares in order
(2)of their seniority. This reminds us that the eldest son used to
get the lion's share according to the smritis but that by the time of 
the commentators these texts were treated as obsolete on account of 
their being opposed to the existing public opinion amongst the caste 
Hindus.
(III) Again amongst the Khasas the second husband of a
(4)woman has to pay the debts of the fxrst husband which reminds us
of the provisions of Yajnavalkya, Narada etc. to the effect that a
person who takes by inheritance the property or women of some other
(5)person must pay the debts of the latter. The explanation given by
(1) See supra p. SO.
(2) The Bhils p.67; The Bhuiyas p.176.
(3) See Manu 9.112, 9.117; Yaj.2.114; Na.Smr.16.13-14 i.e. Na.
Sam.14.13-14; Brihaspati quoted in Vya.Pra.446-47 etc. But see 
Mit.on Yaj.2.117 which declares such texts obsolete.
(4) The Khasa Law p.114.
(5) Yaj.2.51; Na.Smr.4.21 i.e. Na.Sam.2.18; Na.Smr.4.22 i.e. Na.Sam. 
2.19; Na.Smr.4.23 i.e. Na.Sam.2.20.
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the commentators that the word •woman* denotes wife of the deceased^^
is strengthened when one sees that the rule is still applicable to
the wives of the Khasas who apparently remained aloof from the fast
progressing trend of the Hindu Dharmasastras.
(IV) Amongst the Khasas in Tehri state the sonless man^s
property, widow and unmarried daughters till recently were escheat to
the King(2) which reminds us of the old provision of the smritis
whereby the king has to take possession of the property of a deceased
(3)sonless person while providing ohly maintenance for his widow. It
also reminds us of the verse of i which declares that in the
absence of support of either of the two families of a woman the king
(4)becomes her lord and protector.
Some of the current customs account also for the leading
prohibitions of the sastra
(I) The institution of polyandry well accounts for the
statements in the Mahabharata in which the sages Dirghatamas and
Svetaketu are shown to have introduced a new rule that women ought to
(5)be monogamous. The notorious instance of fraternal polyandry amongst 
the Pandavas who had their wife Draupadx in common ceased to be
(1) See for instance the comments of Visvarupa, Vijnanesvara and
Apararka on Yaj.2.51; Asahaya commenting on the above verses of
Narada gives an explanation which talleys exactly with the 
custom amongst the Khasas. However, the later tendency of the 
Dharmasastra was to forbid remarriage of widows so that the con­
tingency mentioned in the above smrities could hever have arisen.
(2) The Khasa Family Law p.112, 278-79.
(3) Na.Smr.16.52 i.e.Na.Sam.14.49. But see Mit.on Yaj.2.136, for 
instance, wherein like all other succeeding commentators Vijna­
nesvara refuses to include wife of the deceased in the *strX* 
mentioned in this text.
(4) fMcf. S 11*e
(5) Ma.Bha.1,104.34-37 and 1.122.8-21; see also supra
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imitated at least amongst the Aryans* Thus where the Sastra could 
not remould the aborigins of the country it at least insulated the
(1)people whom it professed to govern against such aboriginal customs.
(II) Amongst the Khasas the husband acquires a disposable
property in his wife by paying a bride-price in marriage and he can
(2)make a gift of her to the brahmins. This reminds us of the po­
sition taken by the Sastra which admits that a man has property in
his wife and sons but takes care specifically to exclude them from the
(3)list of *deyas1 or things capable of being given.
(III) Amongst the same people when a fraternal polyandrous
family breaks up by partition even the wives are included in the pro­
ton
perty to be partitioned; so we come to know why women are specifica­
lly excluded by Manu and others from property which is capable of 
being partitioned.
Keeping these various facets of the sastric and customary 
laws in mind we now turn to the new enactments passed by the Indian 
Parliament which have brought about a dynamic change in some aspects 
of Hindu law. The customary material which we have seen would help 
us to appreciate this change from different angles, and would help 
us to know whether this change is leaning towards either or both of
(1) For Kumarila's argument in defence of Draupadi^s instance see 
Jha: Purva-Mimamsa in its sources Vol.I pp.225-33; See also 
Kapadia pp.106-10.
(2) Tha Khasa Family Law p.113.
(3) For a discussion see supra p p . F o r  the old position of the
Sastra see Tai.Aranyaka 7.11.3: "StrTnam danavikrayatisarga 
vidyante na pumsah". But see Yaj.II.i?5; Na.Smr.7.4-5 i.e.Na. 
Sam.5.4-5; Brihaspati quoted in Apa.on Yaj.II 175 etc.; Daksa 
quoted in Vi.Ta.600 etc. for the list of 1adeyas* or things 
which should not be given away.
(4) The Khasa Family Law p.80. For the Sastra see supra pp.
(5) See Gautama 28.48; tfStrisu cha samyuktasu’1 which seems partic­
ularly to refer to such common wives. See also Vi.Smr.18.44;
Manu 9.219; Usanas quoted in Mit.on Yaj.2.119 etc.
the sastric and the customary laws or towards some third system. j
Both sastra and (in cases, for the present, other than those of the 
Scheduled Tribes) the customary laws have given place, in India, to 
a new scheme which, as it replaces both the former systems (or rather 
group of systems), may be accounted for and criticised from two 
essentially distinct standpoints.
C H A P T E R  S I
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After having the sastric, judicial and the customary 
law concerning stridhana we have now to turn to the recent 
Indian enactments which have brought about a metamorphosis in 
the old sastric and judicial law concerning stridhana. Before 
turning to these recent enactments it is worth noting that 
legislative measures affecting proprietory x^ights and
the
particularly succession under^ordinary Hindu law in British 
India began as early as in 1850 A.D. when the Caste Disabilities 
Removal Act XXI of 1850 was passed. 'This enactment was followed 
by several central and provincial enactments like Oudh Estates 
Act I of 1869, Hindu Wills Act XXI of 1870, Special Marriage 
Act III of 1872, Bombay Heriditary Offices Act II of 1S74 etc. 
till the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act XVIII of 1937 went 
to the extent of affecting the devolution even of a coparcenary 
interest in a joint Hindu family.(1) But such piecemeal 
legislation did not in fact overhaul Hindu Law which continued
(1) See also Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act Madras Act I of 
1914-; Hindu Disposition of Property Act XV of 1916; Hindu 
Transfers and Bequests (City of Madras) Act VIII of 1921; Hindu 
Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act XII of 1928; Hindu 
Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act II of 1929; Hindu Gains of 
Learning Act XXX of 1930; Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 
XVIII of 1957 etc. But see the Bibliography of the Hindu 
Succession Bill p. 1 (published by the Government of India) 
which mentions that the Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act Madras 
Act . | fyflf v i  I  i )  was the first legislative measure
affecting succession underbid Hindu law and that it was followed 
consecutively by the six enactments mentioned just above*
to be ascertained only with the help of the Sastra and £
judicial decisions* "However, the expediency of having a 
codification
consolidatory^of Hindu law was being continuously felt by 
the central legislature of British India since 1939*(1)
During the years 1941 to 1948 several private bills concerning 
enlargement of women*© proprietory rights came before the 
central legislature*(2) As an effect of this prolonged 
process the Indian Parliament has recently passed four 
enactments which consolidate the law governing marriage, 
guardianship, maintenance, adoption and succession*(3)
h a V • injfj
BeforeAthe changes brought about by these recent enactments 
it would be worthwhile to note that such attempts had already 
been made in the states of Mysore and Baroda, which had gone 
far ahead of British India in attempting to have a coasolidatory 
codification of H^ .ndu law.
Between the enactments of the Mysore and the 
Baroda states the Mysore enactment called the Hindu Law Women's 
Rights Regulation X of 1933, being the first of its kind, deserves 
special notice. The enactment is outstanding in as much as it
(1) Bibliography of the Hindu Succession Bill p.l*
(2) See, ibid. pp* 4-5.
(3) See The Hindu Marriage Act 25 of 1955, Hindu Succession Act 
30 of 1956; Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956;
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 72 of 1956*
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not only anticipated so early as in 1933 almost all the reforms
introduced by recent central codification but contains provisions
which, in some respects, are even better than those contained
in the recent codification* The main objects of the bill which
came before the Mysore legislature were: to eliminate those
provisions of Hindu law which disqualify an heir on account of
any physical defect, deformity etc.; to establish equality
between men and women as regard proprietory rights; to destroy
the unquestionable priority of agnates in succession under the
ordinary Hindu law and to destroy the discrimination between
/
the illegitimates of the Sudra and the other classes. (1)
According to this enactment, which applies 
only to persons of the Mitaksara school (2), at a partition 
between a person and his sons, his mother, unmarried daughter, 
and widow a ? ! unmarried daughter of a predeceased son or 
brother are entitled to have a share. At a partition amongst 
brothers, their mother, unmarried sisters, widows and unmarried 
daughters of predeceased sonless brothers have a right to take
(1) Sec. VI Mys. L. J. 53 for K.T. Bhasyam Aiyangar*s speech 
moving the resolution for i' e consideration of his Hindu Law 
inheritance Bill. The question how far^i^ese objects are desirable 
or in conformity with the spirit of the ^a*stra or the present 
society will be considered later on in the conclusion. But here 
see S.N. Naraharayya : Hindu Lav/ of Inheritance Bill VI Mys. L. J. 
35 for a very strong and orthodox attack against the objects of 
the Mysore enactment.
(2) Hindu Law Woman*s Rights Regulation X of 1933 Sec. 2(i).
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a share.(1) The widow takes one-half of the share which her
husband would have taken if he were alive; the mother takes
one-half of the son’s share if he is alive or one-half of the
share which her husband would have had if he were alive; a
daughter or a sister takes one-fourth of her brother*s share 
he
if is alive or one-fourth of the share which her father wouldA
have taken if he were alive.(2) The share of an unmarried
sister or a daughter is inclusive of and not in addition to,
the expenses for her marriage.
It is thus evident that the roots of the Mitaksara
*
joint family system received a blow in Mysore which was much 
earlier and much more severe than the one it received by the 
Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act of 1937 in British India.
In the ^irst place, unlike the second enactment, even the 
unmarried sisters and daughters receive a share in joint 
family property and in the second, place, such property, as 
we shall presently see, becomes stridhana of the females concerned. 
There can be no doubt that this arrangeoient does not establish 
,complete equality between the two sexes as far as their shares 
are concerned but one cannot lose sight of the fact that normally
(1) Ibid s. *8(i).
(2) ibid s. 8(2).
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at a partition under this enactment, three generations of 
females would partake against only two generations of males*
Succession to the property of a male Hindu dying 
intestate devolves successively upon his (l) male issue to the 
third generation, (2) widow, (3) daughter, (4) daughterfs son,
(5) mother, (6) father, (7) widow of predeceased son; (8) soil's 
daughter, (9) daughter's daughter, (10) brother of full blood;
(11) brother of half-blood; (12) son's son's daughter, son's
S .£ $ G ttYJ Jo h  !$ d  ci 1*3 Vi ftYj etc* 1*3 t> ttwj 4  u  -1 3 V» K o
daughter's son,***** cU^hr, ^ daughter' s daughter's daughter; 0 3 J1
widow of predeceased grandsons and great-grandsons. In dafault
9
of all these heirs which constitute the 'family of the propositus 
his estate devolves upon the 'family* of his father and the heirs 
standing in same relation to the father as to the propositus 
mentioned above succeed amongst themselves in almost the same 
successive order. In default of these the estate devolves 
successively upon the family of the father's father, father's 
father's father and upon the families of the maternal ancestors 
of the propositus in the same order.(1).
Thus it will be seen that preference to the agnates 
is not thoroughly destroyed in this enactment since, for instance,
(1) Ibid s. 4. See also Dr* J.D.M. Derretts Hindu Law Past and 
Present pp. 229-30.
the male issue in the male line is preferred to the descendants 
who are cognates, or since succession devolves in default of the 
family of the propositus upon the families of the paternal male 
ancestors in preference to those of the maternal ancestors. Even 
son's daughter is preferred to daughter's daughter.(l) Similarly 
equality between the two sexes is also not fully established since 
son's daughter and daughter's daughter who are equally removed 
from the propositus as his son's son, come much below the latter 
in the order of succession.
The outstanding feature of this line of succession 
is that it includes many female heirs, whether cognates, agnates 
or widows of pre-deceased agnates, who were utterly unknown to 
the line of succession under the old Hindu law. The Act, however, 
keeps some relationship with the old Hindu law by retaining intact, 
with few exceptions, the compact series of heirs in which many 
heirs like widow, daughter, mother etc. take successively and 
not simultaneously as under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956.
The most important provision;' of the Act is 
contained in s. 10 of the Act which pertains to stridhana and 
runs as follows:-
(l) But all the direct descendants of the propositus related to 
him in the fourth degree, whether agnates or cognates, male or 
female. , succeed to him simultaneously and equally - Bee ibid 
s. 4(1) XII,
" »S* 10 (1) "Stridhana" means property of every description
belonging to a Hindu female, other than property in which she 
has, by law or under the terms of an instrument, only a limited 
estate.
(2) Stridhana includess-
(a) all ornaments and apparel belonging to a female;
(b) all gifts received by a female at any time 
(whether before, at or after her marriage) and 
from any person (whether her husband, or other 
relative or a stranger);
(c) property acquired by a female by her own exertion, 
skill, learning or talents;
(d) property acquired by a female by purchase, 
agreement, compromise, finding or adverse 
possession;
(e) the income, and savings from income, of all 
property whatsoever k vested in a female, 
whether absolutely or otherwise;
(f) property obtained by a female as her share at a 
partition; and
(g) property taken by inheritance by a female from 
another female and property taken by inheritance 
by a female from her husband or son or from a male 
relative connected by blood except when there is
a daughter or daughter's son of the propositus
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alive at the time the property is so inherited*
(3) All gifts and payments other than and in addition to 
or in excess of, the customary presents of vessels, apparel and 
other articles of personal use made to the bride or bridegroom 
in connection with their marriage or to their parents or guardiana 
or other persons on their behalf, by the bridegroom, bride, or 
their relatives or friends, shall be the stridhana of the bride. "
It will thus be seen that the Mysore enactment has 
almost totally accepted the etymological definition of stridhana 
as given by Vijnane^vara and his followers. Subjection (9) of 
St 10, however, puts a small limitation on the etymological 
meaning of the word stridhana. According to this subjection 
property inherited by the wido\y or daughter of the propositus 
would not be her absolute property if a daughter or a daughter's
a
son in the former case, andAdaughter*s son in the latter case 
are alive. But in the absence of these reversionary heirs the widow 
or daughter, as the case may be, would take an absolute interest 
in the inheritance. The widows of the male agnates of the propositus 
can, hoxvever, never take absolute estate in the inheritance. In 
all other cases property inherited by females would be ifeg ir 
stridhana. Thus in this respect the post-enactment position in 
Mysore is very similar to the position of the ordinary Hindu law 
of the Bombay School.
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The question about woman*s right of disposing of her
)
property is completely set at rest by the provision that woman 
shall have absolute power of disposing of her stridhana except 
during minority during which alone her husband can exercise some 
control as a guardian.
Succession to stridhana devolves first upon the
t '
children, male or female, of the propositus and then upon 
grandchildren, male or female. However, property mentioned in 
S. 10 (a) & (b) above i.e. property which may roughly be called 
as the technical stridhana of a woman devolves upon the daughter, 
daughter's daughter, daughter's son, son, son's son and son's 
daughter the last two heirs talcing together. (2). Thus equality 
amongst the two sexes is introduced so far as succession to non- 
technical stridhana is concerned but the old Mitaksara line is 
adhered to as regards succession to technical stridhana. The 
advantages retained, in some cases, by males in succession to 
males are, in this manner, counterbalanced by the advantages 
retained by females in succession to females.
(1) Hindu Women's Rights Regulation S.11.
(2) Ibid s. 12 (I).
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In default of the above-mentioned children and grand­
children of the female propositus succession devolves upon her 
husband, her husband*s heirs, uterine brothers and sisters, mother, 
father, father's heirs, and mother's heirs.(1) 'It is th&&. clear 
that at least as regards succession to the stridhana of a child­
less married woman all distinction based upon the source of her 
property or the form of her marriage etc. are thoroughly wiped 
out. In view of the large body of persons who could be husband's 
heirs it is evident that the mother or father of a woman can 
rarely hope to inherit her stridhana whereas she herself is one 
of the nearest heirs to them. It is also to be noted that the 
position of a great-grandson who has been totally neglected 
under old Hindu law of the Mitaksara School is none better under 
the Mysore enactment: he succeeds along with the step-children 
of the woman and only as an husband's heir.
Another notable feature of the line succession is 
that 'children* of a woman include her legitimate as well as 
illegitimate children (2) which means that the encatment accepted 
the rule laid down in Myna Bace's case and also closed theA
controversy on preference between legitimate and illegitimate 
children. It has, however, been held that this privilege does
(1) Ibid s. 12(11 & III). See also Hindu Law Past and Present 
p. 236.
(2) Ibid explanation to s. 12.
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not extend to an illegitimate grandchild who in this particular
case was an illegitimate child of the legitimate child of a
woman*(1) Although their Lordships of the Mysore Chief Court
did not distinguish openly between the case of an illegitimate
child of a legitimate child of a woman and a legitimate child of
her illegitimate child it appears from their Lordships1 reasoning
as well from the analogy furnished by the case of a legitimate
;
child of an illegitimate child of a Shdra, that a legitimate 
child of an illegitimate child of the woman would have been 
considered as her heir* It would be seen later on how the Mysore 
enactment is at the basis of th^Jprominent changes introduced into 
Hindu law by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956*
As compared with the Mysore enactment, the Baroda Hindu 
Nibandha of 1937 is much more of a comprehensive and consolidatory 
nature but contains very little which may be considered as a 
spectacular deviation from the ordinary Hindu law. (2) It may
(1) Gangamma v. Veerappa (1947) 26 Mys. L,J. 50*
(2) As a result of its consolidatory nature the Hindu Nibandha of 
1937 has repealed all other previous Baroda enactments concerning 
marriage, debts, adoption, succession, joint family^viz. Hindu 
Vidhava Nibandha of 1901; Hindu Lagna Nibandha of 1905; Hindu 
Vadilarjita Karaja Niyamana Nibandha of 1907; Hindu Battaka 
Nibandha of 1910; Hindu Varsa Nibandha of 19&0; Hindu Avibhakta 
Kutumba Nibandha of 1910; Hindu Mabapa and Putra Nibandha of 1910; j 
Hindu Milkatani Vyavastha Nibandha of 1910 and Hindu Lagnavichchdda } 
Nibandha of 1931. I
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roughly be said that it only makes precise the complicated and 
the already ascertained laiv of the Bombay School adding, at some 
places, a few more complications of its own* To begin with, woman's 
property has been divided into two categories vis. stridhana and 
'woman's other property1 *(l) Up to this the old Hindu law is 
conterminous with the Baroda enactment. But then the latter category 
is again divided into property in which a woman has limited owner­
ship and the one in which she has absolute ownership.(2) A further 
examination of these and of the lines of succession thereto dis­
closes a very strong influence of the Mayukha on this enactment.
Stridhana includes four categories, namely, yautaka,
/
ayautaka, sulka and other property obtained with the help of the
property mentioned in these categories. Yautaka includes adhyagni,
     /—\ ^
adhyavahanilca, and pritidatta stridhana where as ayaute^ includes
saudayika, anvadheya, adhivedanika and vritti. Ail these terms have
/— • 
been defined in the same sastric way in general. Sulka includes
palla, which is common all over Gujrat, or property given by the
father-in-law in lieu of the household things. The second alternative
exj>lanation is obviously accepted from the Mayukha.(3) The phrase
(1) Hindu Nibandha of 1937 Sec. 5 sub-sec. dha and na.
(2) See ibid s. 43 (2), 193(7). For the effect of this distinction 
see ss. 132 220-21, 224 etc. However, while defining woman*s limited 
estate, which the Act wants to put on equal par with the widow's 
estate, as known to ordinary Hindu Lav/, the terms fsvatv_af and 
♦svamitva* have been used as indiscriminately as has been done by 
commentators like Mitra Misra and others. Consequentially we get 
such queer terminology as *sitatva of svamitva* - See s. 5 sub-sec. 
chcha. c o yv* * v>
(3) Hindu Nibandha 1937 s. 5 (dha). For palla which is most^in 
Gujrat and which consists of money given to the bride at the time
of her marriage by the bridegroom or his family see supra pp.^3.7-^8-
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"woman1s other property11 includes property obtained by inheritance 
or partition, gained from the last surviving coparcener of a joint 
family, given by stranger's, acquired with one's own skill or labour, I
i
purchased, acquired with profits, and includes all other property,
1
except stridhana, acquired in any manner whatsoever* (1) This last 
category would include property acquired by adverse possession, 
finding etc. This last category together with gifts from strangers 
and property acquired with one's own skill or labour, becomes 
stridhana of a woman after her husband's death. It is obvious that 
the two categories of women's property in the Act, namely, stridhana 
and woman's other property represent the two supposed categories in 
the Mayukha, namely technical and non-technical stridhana.(2). But 
a few more provisions in the Act make the matter further convplieated. 
From amongst the categories mentioned in "woman's other property" 
property obtained by partition and property obtained by inheritance 
from a male by a widow, mother or widow of a sagotra sapinda is 
not to be her absolute property. The latter rule is again not 
uniform: if the widow etc. get an inheritance which is worth upto
I
Rs* 12000 they get an absolute estate in the same; if it is worth
i
more than Rs. 12000 they get absolute estate to the extent of j
in t*Y l”“ j
property worth Rs. 12000 and limited in the rest. The figure of ;/\
(1) Hindu Nibandha s. 5 (na). _ ;
(2) This interpretation of th<^>rovisions of the Mayukha which has 
been accepted on all hands has been specifically disproved in this 
thesis with the help of the customary law in Gujrat as well as the 
text of the Mayukha• See supra pp. ft 8 ~ 3 ^  •
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Rs. 12000 here appears to be as arbitrary as the figure of 2000
panas declared by Vyasa as being the limit of the sura to be given
< z v twoto the woman for her maintenance.(a) Excepting these categories
consisting of property acquired by partition and, in some cases,
by inheritance all other categories of "woman*s other propertyM
become woman's absolute estate. With the exception of the
concession upto Rs. 12000 granted to the widomr etc. which compares
favourably with the absolute right of such females under the
Mayukha law to dispose of the inherited movables during their
lifetime (2), it appears that thw two categories under this Act,
—  <
namely, stridhana and woman's other property* over which she has 
absolute control represent nothing but the sum total of the 
categories of stridhana as knftuMa to the Bombay School. Except the 
special lines of succession prescribed under this Act there is 
hardly any characters!ic distinction between these two categories.
A woman can have independent transaction with strangers 
though her liability would be limited under this Act, to her 
stridhana or her 'other property* in which she has absolute 
estate. (3) She can also freely dispose of the property coming 
under these two heads,(4) Provisions as regards the husband's
(1) Hindu Nibandha ss. 43 (2), 193(1). But for the text of the 
verse and the attempted explanation of the figure 2000 see supra.
(2) Supra pp. I 5 6 "59.
(3) Hindu Nibandha s. 132.
(4) Ibid s. 224.
right to utilise stridhana of his wife and, in some cases, to
return it are almost a replica of the old sastric provisions. (1) 
For the purpose of succession a married woman*s 
property has been divided into three categories (2): stridhana, 
woman*s other property in which she has absolute estate and
woman*s other property in which she has limited estate* The last
category of property devolves upon the heirs of the husband of 
the female proprietress* Stridhana of a married woman devolves 
successively upon the following heirs: sons and daughters, 
daughter*s sons and daughter*s daughters, son's sons, husband, 
mother, father, sister, brother, sister's son, brother*s son, 
heirs of the husband, and heirs of the father*(3) Thus for the
purpose of succession distinctions based on things such as the
discarded* It is noteworthy that though sons and daughters have 
equal importance in this line the issue of a daughter excludes 
the issue of a son; that the parents of the propositus and her 
brother and sister have a much more reasonable place in this line 
than the one they have under the Mysore enactment or the Hindu 
Succession Act of 1956; that the first two secondary sons
(1) Ibid ss* 125-26.
(2) All the pi*operty of an unmarried female devolves upon full 
brother, mother, father and father's heir i.e* according to the 
same old sSstric.^,order - See ibid s. 218. For succession under 
this enactment see also Hindu Law Past and Present pp. 227-29, 
235-36.
(3) Ibid. s. 219.
A
kind of stridhana or the form of marriage havebeen totally
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mentioned in Brihaspati's text gain a tremendous advantage over 
the others mentioned in that text.(l) Woman's other property- 
over which she has absolute control devolves upon her own heirs 
in the following order: son, son's son, son's son's son, daughter, 
daughter's son, daughter's daughter, husband, mother, father, 
sister, brother, sister's children, brother's children, husband's 
heirs, and father's heirs*(2) The order has ; . i evidently been
influenced by the order prescribed in the Mayukha for the so-called 
non-technical stridhana* From the fact that the male issue of a 
woman has been given an outright preference over the female issue 
it seems that the Act, in common with Nilakantha and many other 
commentators, intends to retain such property in the family of 
the husband of the propositus; if such is the case, the preference 
given to woman's own heirs in her parents family over her husband's 
heirs appears to be inconsistent with such intention.
In the end one special provision^which appears to 
be quite modern^must be noted. If a woman has obtained some 
property from the husband and if divorce is granted to the husband 
on account of the adultery of the wife the judge can make arrange­
ment whereby the woman will hav^to return any part of that property 
to the husband for the benefit of the husband, the issue of 
marriage or both. (jS) This seems to be a counterpart of the custom
(1) For Brihaspati's text see supra.
(2) Hindu Nibandha s. 220.
(3) Ibid s. 173.
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amongst the Kamma families in Andhra whereby upon estrangement 
the husband is required to return to the wife all the property 
which has been given to him by the bride*s family.(l) Taking 
into consideration the fact that divorce and remarriage have 
been quite common under customary law in Gujrat and that they 
would soon become common all over India, provisions of such type 
need special attention. We have now to turn to the Hindu Succession 
Act to see the extent of the changes introduced by the same and 
to examine whether the drafting of this enactment has been 
benefited by the previous attempts on the same line.
That the most important innovation introduced by 
the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 is its provisions concerning 
women•s property can be easily seen from the fact that almost 
all the reported cases based upon this Act were concerned directly 
or indirectly with the interpretation of these provisions. Section 
14 of the Act which confers on woman absolute interest in all 
property possessed by her runs as follows
14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether 
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be 
held by her as full owner theredf and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.- In this subsection, property" includes 
both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu 
by inheritance or devisa, or at a partition, or in lieu of main­
tenance or arrears of mantenance or by gift from any person 
whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or 
by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription 
or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held
(1) See i^*andhamayya v. Navaratna A.I.E. 1949 Mad. 825. See also 
Hindu Law Past and Present p. 237.
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aJ)
by her^stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section(l) shall apply to any 
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other 
instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under 
an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument 
or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in 
such property.
The ambiguous wording of the section which centres 
around the phrase ’possessed by1 gives rise to several questions
(I) Whether these words denote only possession of a woman 
or her ownership or both?
(II) Whether the section refers to property possessed by a 
woman at, after or even before the Act came into force?
u»hi‘ch
(III) If it does not apply to property was possessed by a
A
woman only before but not at the time when the Act came into force, 
to whom will such property belong?
It is evident that the words ’possessed by* do not mean 
the mere possession of a woman since in that case a woman who is 
possessor of a property even as a tenant or lessee would get an 
absolute interest in that property.(1) The question of interpreting 
this phrase came, for the first time, before their Lordships of 
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkayamma v. Veerayya (2) who
observed that ’’The object of the Act was to confer benefit on Hindu 
females by enlarging their limited interest in property inherited 
or held by them into an absolute estate, with retrospective effect,
(1) See Krishna Dassi v. Akhi Chandra Saha A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 671 at 
673 for a suggestion to this effect*
(2) A.I.R. 1957 And. Pra. 280.
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if they were in possession of the property. .. *.'*(1) Viswanath 
Sastri J. further explained that possession in this context has 
a broader sense and means "the state of owning* or having in one's 
hands or power." He accordingly decided that the possession need 
not be physical and that the possession of a licensee, lessee or 
mortgagee from a woman is tantamount to possession of the woman 
herself.(2) He correctly went to the extent of holding that even 
if the property were in the hands of a trespasser whose title has 
not been perfected by the statutory period the female owner be
A
recognised as being in possession of the property.(3) Supporting
this interpretation in Marudakkal v. Arumugha(4), Subrahmanyam J.
rightly remarked that the words 'Possessed* and 'held* in s. 14 
trV> t
mean one and same thing and that the 'parliamentary draftsman*
A
should have better used the latter word in the place of the former.
(1) Ibid. at p. 284.
(2) Ibid at p. 281, followed in Marudakkal v. Arumugha A.I.R. 1958 
Mad. 255 at 260, Sansir Patelin v* Satyabati A.I.R. 1958 Ori. 75 at 
76, Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 459, Krishna Dassi v. 
Akhil Chandra A.I.R. 1958 Cal. at 673-74. For a detailed discussion 
of the meaning of the word*possession' See Arumugha v. Nachimuthu 
Supra•
(3) Venkayamma v. Veerayya A.I.R, 1957 And. Pra* 280 at 281 followed 
in Marudakkal v. Arumugha A.I.R. 1958 Mad.255, Krishna Dassi v.
Akhil Chandra A.I.R, 1958 Cal. 671 at 674, but dissented from in 
Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati A.I.R. 1958 Ori.’75. It is obvious that 
possession in such case falls outside the scope even of actual or 
constructive possession - see Krishna Dassi's case supra at p. 671. 
Where, however, the trespasser's title had been perfected by 
statutory period the woman was held not to havebeen benefited by
s. 14 of the Act - Patha Pedda Flliah v* Palagiri Ganamma A.I.R. 1957 
And. Pra. 776
(4) A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255 at 260.
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Discussing all the previous view expressed on this point by their 
Lordships of the different High Courts Mullick J. in Krishna Dassi 
v. Akhil Chandra (1) made the interpretation more precise by stating 
that the words 'possessed by* mean 'ownership which gives right 
to possession*. The liberal interpretation has not been dissented x 
from in any of the reported cases. Accordingly it has been held 
that where a woman has mortgaged property in which she has limited 
interest but has not sold her equity of redemption the property 
is deemed to be possessed by her.(2). Similarly where in a part­
ition suit the property of a female limited owner was in the hands
(3 )of the receiver it was held that the woman possessed the property.
10 67
As early as in January their Lordships of the
A
Supreme Court declared that "there is no doubt that by reason of 
the expression *whether acquired before or after the commencement 
of the Act' the section is retrospective in effect.,f(4) Since 
then it has been admitted in almost cases that the section is 
retx*ospective in, at least, as much as it applies to the property 
acquired by the woman before the commencement of the Act. The 
use of the word 'retrospective' in this sense is loose and -probably 
; for, if it is accepted that the operative part of 
the section which transforms existing limited estates into absolute
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 671 at 674.
(2) Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 459.
(3) Krishna Dassi v. Akhil Chandra A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 671.
(4) Kamala Devi v. Bachulal A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 434 at 444. The provi­
sions of the Succession Act are applicable to a case even in itsiappe­
llate stage - Laxmi Bebi v. Surendra Kumar A.I.R*1957 Ori.l followed in 
Bhabani Prosad v. Sarat Sundari A.I.R.1957 Cal.527. But usually a sta­
tute does not restrospectively affect vested interests - Balwant Singh 
v. Sardarni Balwant Kaur A.I.R.1957 Pepsu 1.
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ones comes into operation only after the Act comes into force then 
the section must be held to be prospective and not retrospective. 
The change brought about by the enactment, in such case, does not 
precede the enactment but succeeds it. However, for the time being 
at least, there were two views amongst the High Courts of India 
as regards the extent of the retrospectiveness of s. 14 of the 
Act. It may be stated at the outset that almost all these cases 
consider the question whether the reversioners of the last full 
owner have a right to ask for a declaratory decree by impeaching 
any alienation made by a female limited owner without legal 
necessity and before the commencement of the Act.
Observing that a widow who has, before the enact­
ment caine into force, sold without legal necessity her property 
inherited from her husband ’retains no right or interest in the 
property*. Sastri J. in Venkayamma v. Veerayya(l) held that in 
such case s. 14 does not apply and that reversioner has a right 
to get the declaratory decree. This Andhra case was unreservedly 
followed by their Lordships of Punjab, Calcutta, ICerala, Madras
(1) A.I.R. 1957 Andh. Pra. 280 at 284
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and Orissa High Courts.(1) In Gostha Behari v. Haridas(2), 
Sarkar J. pointed out that the words ‘whether acquired before 
or after the commencement of this Act* refer to the word 
'property' and not to the word 'possessed' so as to mean 
'possessed at any time', 'as it would affect interests already 
acquired or vested and such cannot be deemed to have been the 
intention of the legislature, in the absence of express words 
to that effect.'(3) In the same case Mookerjee J. also rejected 
such a retrospective interpretation remarking that in that case 
the words in the section ought to have been "shall be deemed to 
have been held" instead of "shall be held" as they, at present,
(1) Hari v. Hira A.I.R. 1957 Pun. 89, Gostha Behari v. Karidas A.I.R.
1957 Cal. 557, Thailambal v. Kesavan A.I.R. 1957 Kerala 86, PatJia 
Pedda v. Palagiri Gangamma A.I.R. 1957 Andh. Pra. 776, Chandra­
sekhara v. Sivaramakrishna A.I.R. 1958 Kerala 142, Marudakkal v. 
Arumugha A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255, Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati A.I.R.
1958 Ori. 75, Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 459. In a 
case where a widow who had inherited property from her son got 
remarried before 1956 according to the customary law their 
Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that she forfeited her 
property and that section 14 is not applicable to such case as
^ e ’revives the estate of a limited
Addition to p.658 note 1: * ^«th.
death nas a rj.guv w  -__
(2) A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557
(3) Ibid at p. 559.
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and Orissa High Courts.(l) In Gostha Behari v. Haridas(2), 
Sarkar J. pointed out that the words 'whether acquired before 
or after the commencement of this Act1 refer to the word 
•property* and not to the word * possessed* so as to mean 
•possessed at any time*, *as it would affect interests already 
acquired or vested and such cannot be deemed to have been the 
intention of the legislature, in the absence of express words 
to that effect.*(3) In the same case Mookerjee J. also rejected 
such a retrospective interpretation remarking that in that case 
the words in the section ought to have been '‘shall be deemed to 
have been held" instead of "shall be held" as they, at present,
(1) Hari v. Hira A.I.R. 1957 Pun. 89, Gostha Behari v. Laridas A.I.R.
1957 Cal. 557, Thailambal v. Kesavan A.I.R. 1957 Kerala 86, Patka 
Pedda v. Palagiri Gangamma A.I.R. 1957 Andh. Pra. 776, Chandra­
sekhara v. Sivararaakrishna A.I.R. 1958 Kerala 142, Marudakkal v. 
Arumugha A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255, Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati A.I.R.
1958 Ori. 75, Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 459. In a 
case where a widow who had inherited property from her son got 
remarried before 1956 according to the customary law their 
Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that she forfeited her 
property and that section 14 is not applicable to such case as 
there is nothing in the Act which 'revives the estate of a limited 
owner determined before the commencement of the Act by death, 
actual or civil. - Ramaehandra v. Sakharam A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 244. 
Their Lordships, however, <dh’d v'TrigtrreL. - - solve the anomaly 
between the two positions of the same High Court, namely, a 
widow who remarries after her son's death forfeits the property 
inherited from him but that c^vidow who remarries before her son's 
death has a right to inherit his property.
(2) A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557.
(3) Ibid at p. 559.
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stand in the section*(1) To the extent that such property does 
not come within the purview of s. 14 of the succession Act, these 
decisions were correct* As for the other part, namely, about 
reversioner1s right to get a declaratory decree, we shall presently 
see that decisions have adopted a deceptive ratio*
Their Lordships of the Patna High Court took a different 
view of the situation* They held that s. 14 of the Succession Act 
has been made deliberately retrospective so as to abolish widow*s 
estate in all cases as a result of which the whole class of 
reversioners also has been abolished.(2) Explaining more clearly 
the meaning of s. 14 Prasad J. in Ramsaroop v. Hiralall (3) observed 
that by virtue of s* 14 a female Hindu "shall have full right as 
owner in ail properties acquired and possessed before or after 
the commencement of the Act". Commenting on the above-quoted 
remarks of Mookerjee J. that in that case the legislature would 
have inserted the words "shall be deemed always to have been 
held" Misra J. in Ramsaroop*s case attempted to give a feeble
(1) Ibid at p. 560. His Lordships further observed that the section 
"does not seek to affect past transactions by declaring that the law 
(which was admittedly different and which was being changed by the 
section) shall be deemed to havelbeen always or in the past as 
enacted in the section. It is, in that sense, purely prospectiv e 
legislation and in no way retroactive or retrospective.1* See also 
Marudakkal v* Arumugha A.I.R. 195S Mad* 255 at 258 wherein their 
Lordships relied upon the principle that every Act speaks from
its commencement.
(2) Ram Ayodhya v. Ragnunath A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480 followed in 
Dhanvatia v. Deonandan, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 447, Dhirajkunwar v. 
Lakhansingh A.I.R. 1957 Mad. Pra. 38, Mankunwar v. Mt. Bodhi A.I.R. 
1957 Mad. Pra. 211 danki Kuer v. Chattu Prasad A.I.R. 1957 Pat.
674, Baijnath v* Ramautar A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 227, Ramsaroop v.
Hiralall A.I.R. 1958 Pat* 319.
(3) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 319
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defence by saying : 11... • however, it is difficult to make the 
language of any statute so exhaustive as to cover all the 
situations. It may well he that the section could have been 
more clearly worded.n(l) He accordingly countered the suggestion 
by saying that words 1 at the commencement of the Act* were needed 
to be put immediately after the words 'any property possessed by 
a Hindu female1 for the purpose of limiting the full retrospective 
operation of the section. This view about retrospective operation 
s. 14 of the Act was accepted in Madhya Bharat also.(2) Recently, 
however, their Lordships both of the Patna and Madhya Bharat High 
Courts unexpectedly taken an 'about turn1 and have held that pro- 
perty which is alienated by a Hindu female before the commencement 
of the Act does nto come under the operation of s. 14 and that the 
reversioners have a right to sue for a declaratory decree in respect 
of property which has been alienated without legal necessity by a 
female limited owner before the commencement of the Act.(3). It may 
be remarked at this stage that as regards the latter part of these 
decisions the original position of the Patna High Court was sound 
and correct.
Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court took a 
more sensible view of the situation and cut a midway path between 
the view of the Andhra High Court and the original view of the
(1) Ibid at. 324.
(2) See supra note (l) above.
(3) Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 F.B.
Lukai ICatikram v. Niranjan A.I.R. 1958 Mad. Bha. 160 F.B.
Patna High Court, Admitting that section 14 is fJretrospeetive in 
some respects and prospective in some11 their Lordships held that 
a woman who has alienated her property before the commencement 
of the Act cannot be benefited by s,14,(1) At the same time they 
held that reversioners under the old law have no right to claim 
a declaratory decree as the whole class of reversioners has been 
totally abolished by the enactment. However, the ratio adopted by 
them for this latter proposition was different from the one followed 
by their Lordships of the Patna High Court, who held that it is 
because of s, 14, which retrospectively widened the widow’s estate 
into a full estate, that the class of reversioners has been abolished. 
Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, 
accepted that the female in such case does not get full estate 
but, following the view formerly propounded by Dr. J.'D.M. Derrett, 
they held that as a result of the new scheme of succession introduced 
by the new Act which totally replaced the old scheme of succession 
under ordinary Hindu Law, the reversioners under the latter hWv.fc 
now ceased to be so and that heirs to such alienated property ]
i
will have to be ascertained in accordance with theprovision of !I
j
Act,(2) This leads us to the third question after the full j
discussion of which we shall feel convinced that the view adopted 
by the Allahabad High Court is thej/proper one. j
Si) B. Hanuman v, Mst, Idrawati A.I.R* 1958 All. 304, j
(2) Dr. J.D.M. Derrett: Problems under the Hindu Succession Act 
(1959) Bom. L.R,J. 33 at 49 quoted with approval in A.I.R. 1958 j
All. 304 supra at p. 310, But Dr. Derrett no longer accepts his 
earlier view and rejects both the Patna and the Allahabad doctrines, 
prefering the Bombay High Court view point which is shared by 
Andhra, Madraife etc.
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If it is admitted that property which has already 
been alienated by a woman before the commencement of the Act 
does not come within the purview of s.14 the next question is 
this: if she has alienated property without legal necessity or 
benefit to the estate to whom does the remaining interest belong 
after the commencement of the Act? It is an accepted position 
that so far as the female limited owner is concerned the alienation 
without legal necessity is not void but voidable at the instance 
of the reversioners and that the interest of the female herself 
is completely transferred to the alienee.(l) In such case it has 
been held that as the object of the Act was primarily to benefit 
the female limited owner and not her alienee the latter does not 
get any benefit out of s. 14 of the Act: when he purchased property 
from the widow he did so with open eyes knowing fully well that 
he was entering into transaction without any legal necessity on 
the part of the female limited owner3and following the principle 
that transferee can get only as much as the transferor had, the 
purchaser gets only a limited interest in the property and must 
remain content with it even after the commencement of the Act.(2)
(1) Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 F.B. at 584-85.
(2) Venkayamma v. Veerayya A.I.R. 1957 And. Pra. 280, Marudakkal v. 
Arumugha A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255 at 260, Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.I.R. 
1958 Mad. 459, Lukai v. Niranjan A.I.R. 1958 Mad. Pra. 160 F.B., 
Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. A. 1958 Pat. 581 at 583.
In Harak Singh*s case their Lordships of the Full Bench observed 
that in interpretang a statute it is legitimate to consider the 
previous law and the mischief which the new law seeks to establish 
and that the Court must adopt such construction as would supress 
the muschief and advance the remedy.
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It has also been held that the rule of interest feeding the 
estoppel which has been incorporated in s. 43 of the Transfer 
of Property Act does not apply to such alienated property and 
does not increase the interest of the female owner therein.(1)
As neither the female owner nor the purchaser is entitled to the 
remainder it is evident that it is the Aext heir to the property 
who would be Entitled to the remainder. The question as to who 
that heir can be would be discussed below while dealing* with the 
order of succession introduced by the Act.
The words * gift from any person* appearing in the 
explanation to s. 14 mean a valid gift. Accordingly where a female 
limited owner made a gift over of her inherited property to her 
granddaughter and such gift was invalid according to the Punjab 
customary law by which the female was governed it was held that 
the granddaughter was not benefited by s. 14 and that after her 
grandmother*s death she remained in possession of the same only 
as a trespasser.(2)
According to sub-section(2) of s. 14 a woman shall have 
only limited estate in property which has been acquired by her by 
way of gift or under a will, instrument, decree etc. if the terms 
of such gift, will, instrument, decree etc. prescribe only limited 
estate. But a case came before the Calcutta High Court in which
(1) Arumugha v. Nachimuthu A.i.S. 1958 Mad. 459.
(2) Mat. Basi v. Mst. Kax^ura A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 208.
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a preliminary decree was passed by the lower Court whereby, under 
the Hindu Women1s Rights to Property Act of 1937, certain property 
representing her husband*s share was alloted to a widow to be 
enjoyed by her in the manner prescribed for a Hindu widow. The 
question was whether the widow was entitled to an absolute interest 
in the property by virtue of s.14(l) or whether the property came 
under sub-section(2) of s. 14. It was held that the widow in 
this case acquired an interest in the property not by the 
preliminary decree but by succession under the Hindu women*s 
Rights to Property Act and that despite the limited interest co­
nferred on her by the decree she acquired absolute interest in the 
property after the commencement of the Act.('l) It has also been 
held that although the Hindu Succession Act repeals the Hindu 
Women*s Rights to Property Act it does not affect in any way the 
rights already vested in a female in consequence of the jjrovisions 
of the latter so that where a female has acquired such right 
under the Hindu women * s Rights to Property Act but has not taken 
steps to enforce her right to ascertain and take possession of 
her share, the Hindu Succession Act does not make her right 
imperfect or render it inchoate in any manner.(2)
(1) Hiralal Roy v. Kumud Behari A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 571; >Smt. 
Billasbasini v. Dalai Chandra A.I.R. 1958 Cal, 472; Krishna Dassi v. 
Akhil Chandra A.I.R. 1958 Cal, 671. It ought to be suggested, 
however, that the word ’interest* is a better substitute for the 
word ’property* in s. 14(2).
(2) Kuppathammal v, Sakthi A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 695.
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The effect of s. 14 is radical and far-reaching. It 
has destroyed the distinction between stridhana and widow's estate. 
The Mitaksara definition of stridhana has been accepted in toto. 
Property inherited by a woman and acquired by her dt partition 
now becomes her absolute estate. As regards property acquired by 
her own skill or labour, by adverse possession, by gift or will 
etc. it has already been observed that the trend of the modern
i
courts was to interpret the isastra as well as precedents, as far 
as possible, in favour of the woman. But even in those categories 
a few presumptions based upon sex distinctions were unfavourable 
to women. The sex distinction has disappeared. The inequality has 
been removed. So far as acquirement, of property is concerned woman 
stands shoulder to shoulder -he and on par with man. However, the 
section which brought about this dynamic change could, as we have 
already observed, have been better worded. Even the Mysore enact­
ment (l) uses the more appropriate words 'belonging to' in the place 
of the words 'possessed by' found in s. 14 of the Hindu Succession 
Act. Moreover, as j>ointed out by their Lordships of the Allahbad 
High Court the Act does not make any specific provision for 
property alienated by a Hindu female before the commencement of 
the Act and without legal necessity.(2) Such provision would have
(1) Mysore Hindu Law Women's Rights Regulation X of 1933 s.10(1) 
supra•
(2) B. Hanuman v. Indravati A.I.R. 1958 All. 304 at 310.
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put an end to much unnecessary litigation* It must be pointed out 
here that as regards property inherited by a widow Before the Act 
and possessed by her at the time of the commencement of the Act, 
the legislation has done much injustice to the daughter. But for 
the Act, the daughter, who in such case had a spes successionis, 
would have succeeded to her father's property after the death of 
the widow. Even if her father had died after the commencement of 
the Act she would have succeeded to her father's property equally 
and simultaneously with the widow.(l) But in the case of jjroperty 
already inherited before the Act by the widow she gets neither
o Hitr
this nor the^benefit• The Mysore Provision in such case is 
remarkable indeed and ought to have been remembered by the Indian 
legislators.
As for the part of the Act dealing with 
succession we find that certain kinds of property ^ expressly 
excluded from its operation. They represent property to the 
descent of which the Indian Succession Act is applicable by virtue 
of s. 21 of the Special Marriage Act 43 of 1954, estate which 
descends to a single heir by terms of any enactment etc. S. 6 of 
the Act which deals with joint property runs thus
lf6 • When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this 
Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara 
coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve 
by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and 
not in accordance with this Act:
(1) Triveni Devi v. Sharda Devi A.I.R. 1958 All. 773.
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Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a 
female relative specified in class X of the Schedule or a male 
relative specified in that class who claims through such female 
relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara 
coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate 
succession, as the case may he, under this Act and not by 
survivorship •11
It is evident that the words 'after the commencement of this Act1 
are superfluous in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act accord­
ing to which an Act does not .affect interest already vested under 
the old law.(l) The words appear to be all the more redundant as 
the construction of the section is such I^that its main purpose 
appears to te exclude, with certain exceptions, the Mitaksara 
joint family property from its operation. Thus the words 1 after 
the commencement of this Act* are tantamount to words 'even after 
the commencement of this Act*. This being the case it seems it 
would have been better if this section were added as sub-section(iv) 
to see. 5, with an exception incorporating the paragraph beginning
(1) In view of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act the words !,shall 
devolve by survivorship .... and not in accordance with this Aetn 
occuring in s. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act would have applied 
even otherwise only to the interest of a coparcener who has died 
after the Act. It may be argued that the words were necessary to 
meet a situation in which the coparcener has died before the Hindu 
Succession Act but his interest has been taken by his widow under 
the Hindu Women's Rights^to Property Act and the latter dies after 
the Succession Act. But 4fvi$ is not true because his share, in such 
case, does not devolve as his interest in coparcenary property but 
devolves as his personal property upon his own heirs. - See Mayne,
11th Kdi. p.708.
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with the word© 1 provided that1* It is evident that as class I 
of the Schedule (1) contains many heirs who are females or 
cognates of the propositus the Mitaksara joint family property 
would be going into speedy disintegration* It is, however, remark­
able that the Act does not give to such heirs any share at a part­
ition of the coparcenary property; so they can acquire interest 
in coparcenary property only by intestate succession* As they 
have no present right to property it is possible for the present 
members of the coparcenary to prolong by mutual agreement or 
devise its pre-enactment structure* Thus in joint family property, 
at least, females have not been given equal rights with the males* 
The Act has introduced revolutionary changes in success­
ion to separate property of males and females* As succession to 
female's property devolves, in certain cases, upon 'the heirs of 
the husband* and *the heirs of the father* it can hardly foe treated 
separately from succession to male's property* Before entering into 
detailed discussion the main provisions of the Act regarding 
succession ought to be noticed ad verbum* Provisions about success­
ion to separate property of males are contained in ss. 8-13, 
Sections 8 and 9 are as follows
"8* The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall 
devolve according to the provisions of this chapter:-
(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives 
specified in class I of the Schedule;
(1) See infra.
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(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the 
heirs, being the relatives specified in class IX of the 
Schedule;
(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, 
then upon the agnates of the deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates 
of the deceased,
9. Among the heirs specified in the Schedule, those in class I 
shall take simulteneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs; 
those in the first entry in class in class II shall be preferred 
to those in the second entry; those in the second entry shall be 
preferred to those in the third entry; and so in succession.”
According to s. 10 the mother, son and daughter shall 
take one share each and the widow or all the widows to-gether 
shall take one share. Amongst the branch of a predeceased child, 
which gets one share, the divisions would take place in the 
following manner, namely, if the hhild were a predeceased son, 
his widow or widows to-gether, son, daughter and the branch of 
his own pi’edeceased son would get equal portions; if the child 
were a predeceased daughter her sons and daughters would get 
equal portions. Amongst the heirs mentioned in class II of the 
Schedule heirs mentioned in any one entry shall take equally. 
According to s. 19 all the heirs taking simulteneously take as 
tenants-in-comman and not as joint tenants.
The order of succession amongst agnates and 
cognates has been considerably simplified by the three rules given 
ixi s. 12 which runs as follows
11 12. The order os succession among agnates or cognates, as 
the case may be, shall be determined in accordance with the rules 
of preference laid down hereunder
Rule 1.- Of two heirs, the one who has fewer or no 
degree of ascent is preferred.
Rule 2.- Where the number of degrees of ascent .is the
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same or none, that heir is preferred, who has fewer or no 
degree of descent.
Rule 3.- Where neither heir is entitled to be preferred 
to the other under Rule 1 or Rule 2 they take simulteneously.11
Before going over to provisions about succession
to female*s property the Scheduled heirs to male * © property ought
to be noticed. They are:-
Class I
r,son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a predeceased son; 
daughter of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased daughter; 
daughter of a predeceased daughter; widow of a predeceased son; 
son of a predeceased son of a predeceased son; daughter of a 
predeceased son of a predeceased son; widow of a predeceased son 
of a predeceased son.**
Class II
** I, Father.
II. (l) sonfs daughter*® son, (2) son*s daughter’s daughter,
(3) brother, (4) sister.
III. (1) Daughter*s son’s son, (2) daughter’s son’s daughter,
(3) daughter’s daughter*s son, (4) daughter's daughter's
daughter.
IV. (1) Brother's son, (2) sister's son, (3) brother's 
daughter, (4) sister's daughter.
V, father’s father; father's mother.
VI. father's widow; brother's widow.
VII. Father’s brother; father's sister.
VIII. Mother’s father; mother’s mother.
IX. Mother’s brother; mother's sister.
Explanation.- In this Schedule, reference to a brother or 
sister do not include reference to a brother or sister by 
uterine blood."
The whole law of succession to female's property is
condensed into two sections which run as follws:-
"15. (l) The property of a female Hindu intestate shall devolve 
according to the rules set out in section 16,-
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters( including the 
children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the 
husband;
(fo) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
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(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her 
father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son 
or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any 
predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs refer-
 ^ red to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein,
\ but upon/the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her 
husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the
, absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including
the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon 
the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order 
v, / specified therein, but upon the .heirs of the husband.
16. The order of^succession among the heirs referred to in section 
15 shall be, and luhedistrxbution of the intestatefs property among 
those heirs shall take place according to the following rules, 
namely5- v
Rule 1.- Among the heirs specified in sub-section (l) of 
section 15, those in one entry shall be preferred to those in any 
succeeding entry, and those included in the same entry shall take 
simultaneously.
Rule 2.- If any son or daughter of the intestate had pre­
deceased the intestate leaving his or her own children alive at 
the time of the intestate1s death, the children of such son or 
daughter shall take between them the share which shell son or 
daughter would have taken if living at the intestate's death.
Rule 3.- The devolution of the property of the intestate on 
heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d) and (e) of sub-section (l) 
and in sub-section (2) of section 15 shall be in the same order 
and according to the same rules as would have applied if the 
property had been the father's or the mother's or the husband's 
as the case may be, and such person ha.d died intestate in respect 
thereof immediately after the intestate's death.7*5
Before examining these sections in detail it is 
necessary here to determine the question which has been left 
pendant in ou£ discussion, namely, who is entitled to the property 
which had been inherited by a woman but has been disposed of by 
her before the commencement of the Act and without legal necessity?
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Such inherited property may he of two kinds: it may be separate 
property of the last full owner who is a male or may be stridhana 
of the last female propositus* If the Act had not been passed, 
the next heir, in the former case, would have been the nearest 
reversioner to the last male propositus? in the latter case the
IaJOh )4 hdU&
next heir would have been the person who w;entitled to stridhana 
of the last female propositus immediately after the female heir 
who had inherited the same* To take a concrete example of the latter 
case if a woman govened by the Benares School had died leaving 
a son and a daughter then the daughter would have taken a life- 
estate in her mother’s stridhana and the son would have succeeded 
after the daughter’s death* SimiIarlyAif the daughter had alien­
ated her mother’s stridhana without legal necessity, on the death 
of the daughter, it would have devolved upon the son* The question 
is whether the position remains the same even after the commence­
ment of the Hindu Succession Act 1956,
The answer to this question is to be found in the 
phrase ’dying intestate* occuring both in section 8 and section 15 
which lay down new order© of succession for male’s and female’s 
property respectively. The same phrase was incorporated in the 
preamble of the Xiindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act II of 
1929 (1) which amended the Mitaksara order of succession in as
(l) See infra* See also the phrase ’dies intestate* occuring in 
the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act ss* 2 & 3(1),
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much as it provided that son’s daughter, daughter's daughter, 
sister and sister's son shall, in that order, be entitled to 
inherit a male's property in default of his paternal grandfather 
and in preference to his paternal uncle* Question arose before 
their Lordships of the Privy Council as to whether the new order 
applies to property of the deceased who had died before the 
commencement of the Act but whose property had been inherited 
by a female owner who herself died after the commencement of 
the Act*(1) Accepting implicitly the ratio that the deciding 
factor is ^ tirae when succession to the property opened - and in 
this case it obviously opened again after the death of the limited 
owner - hr, Jayakar observed that the words 'Aying intestate'
"are a mere description of the statu© of the deceased and have 
no reference and are not intended to have any reference to the 
time of the death of a Hindu male* The expression merely means 
'in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male*' " It was accordingly 
held that in the given case succession devolved in accordance with 
the order renewed by the Act of 1929*
The question involved in the above interpretation 
of the Hindu Law Inheritance (Amendment) Act is on all fours with 
the question under our consideration* It is evident that the pur­
chaser of the property alienated by a female limited owner without 
legal necessity and before the commencement of the Act gets only 
limited interest in the property and that his interest extends 
only up to the life of the female owner upon whose death succession
(1) Lala Buai Chand v* Anar Kali (1946) 73 I*A* 187.
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to the last full owner opens again.(l) In such case it is evident 
that the heirs to such property, may it be separate property of a 
male or stridhana of a woman, are to be ascertained in accordance 
with the order of succession laid down in the Hindu Succession Acr 
of 1956. It is thus evident that the class of reversioners under 
the old law has been completely abolished. The authority, therefore, 
behind the decisions in which their Lordships of the various High 
Courts granted declaratory decrees to the reversioners, is highly 
questionable.(2) It is, however, important to note that except in 
one case (3) the question as to who is entitled to succeed to such 
property was not considered in any of these cases and their Lord­
ships remained content merely with granting declararoty decrees.
The question has not come before their Lordships for direct decision 
in any one of the reported cases. But all the obiter dicta are in 
favour of the interpretation suggested above. In Harak Singh v. 
Kailash Singh (4) their Lordships of the full Bench of the Patna 
High Court accepted that succession to such alienated property 
opens after the death of the female owner, namely, after the 
commencement of the Succession Act. In Bari Krishna v. Hira (5) 
their Lordships confirmed the declaratory decree given by the lower
i
(l) See supra.
( ‘P. "1 s t in m  . n n .  ^  ChaK rloo 1 o r a t n r v  riA /« ro a e  a a i i !  ^ hrttycurar* , be
Addition to p.674 note 2: er
But for the daughter’s right to sue foar declaratory decree for the pur- s
pose of challenging the validity of an adoption made by her mother on 
the ground that such adopted son would eventually compete with as her 
mother's heir under S.15 of the Succession Ac£ see Sugandnabai v.
Sundrabai (1959) 61 Bom.L.R.560.
10; A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89
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to the last full owner opens again.(l) In such case it is evident 
that the heirs to such property, may it be separate property of a 
male or stridhana of a woman, are to be ascertained in accordance 
with the order of succession laid down in the Hindu Succession Acr 
of 1956. It is thus evident that the class of reversioners under 
the old law has been completely abolished. The authority, therefore, 
behind the decisions in which their Lordships of the various High 
Courts granted declaratory decrees to the reversioners, is highly 
questionable.(2) It is, however, important to note that except in 
one case (3) the question as to who is entitled to succeed to such 
property was not considered in any of these cases and their Lord­
ships remained content merely with granting declararoty decrees.
The question has not come before their Lordships for direct decision 
in any one of the reported cases. But all the obiter dicta are in 
favour of the interpretation suggested above. In Harak Singh v. 
Kailash Singh (4) their Lordships of the full Bench of the Patna 
High Court accepted that succession to such alienated property 
opens after the death of the female owner, namely, after the 
commencement of the Succession Act. In Hari Krishna v. Hira (5)
their Lordships confirmed the declaratory decree given by the lower
(1) See supra.
(2) See supra, pp.657-3* Such declaratory decrees could, however, be 
justified, in some cases, on the basis that the leversioners under 
the old law were just the persons who would have succeeded to the 
property under the provisions of the new Act. This facet of the 
question, however, was not considered in these cases.
(3) Hari Krishna v. Hira A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89.
(4) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 F.B.
(5) A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89
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court in favour of the plaintiff reversioners who were nearest 
heirs according to the old law but comparatively remoter heirs 
under the new enactment; but they did so only on the ground that 
the reversioners were nearest heirs when they instituted the suit 
so that the litigation was in no way speculative and further observed 
that the decree would enure to the benefit of any other nearer heir 
who might succeed to the estate after the widow’s death although 
such heir might not be the plaintiff-reversioners• This nearly 
amounted to an obiter dictum that the next heirs are to be ascertained 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act* Their Lordships of 
Allahabad High Court were more clear on this point* Refusing to 
grant a declaratory decree to the reversioners they observed: "The 
customary law of succession has been completely abrogated by the 
Act which exhaustively amends and codifies the law relating to in­
testate succession amongst the Hindus*... The next reversioner, who
(1)was a creation of the customary law, is no longer in the picture.n 
Mallick J. in Hiralal v, ICumud Behari(2) compared, with the help of 
the decision in Lala Duni Chand's case, the provisions of the Hindu 
Law Inheritance (Amendemnt) Act and the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and 
observed that the succession Act would be applicable to the property
(1) B. Iianuman v. Idravati A.I.R. 1958 All. 304. However, their Lord­
ships were self-contradictory when they obs<?ved that succession to 
such property would devolve on widow's heirs under s.15 and not on 
husband's heirs under* 8; for they had already held that the widow 
ceased to have any interest in such^alienated property and was not 
benefited by. s.14 of the succession Act. The expression^customary 
law^has been loosely used in the place of ordinary Hindu law.
(2) A.I.R. 195? ual• 571.
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of any person who died before the Act but succession to whose 
property opens after the Act on account of the intervening life- 
estate of a female heir* He further explained that " To place this 
interpretation on the Act is not to give retrospective effect to 
its provisions, the material point being the date when the success­
ion opens, namely, the death of the widow*"
Here a reference must be made to the decision in 
Lateshwar v* Mst* Uma O.jhain which appears to the most whimsical 
amongst the decisions considered in this work* The facts of the 
case were as follows:- The husband of the defendant and the plain­
tiffs were coparceners* The defendant claimed that she was entitled 
to her Husband's property on two grounds, namely, that the husband 
died separate and that he died after 1937. On the former ground 
she could have taken her husband's property by succession under 
the ordinary Hindu law; on th^latter ground she could have taken 
her husband's interest in the coparcenary property by virtue of 
s. 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. After considering 
the conflicting evidence on both these points Prasad J. accepted 
that the husband of the defendant ,died joint but after 1937 as a 
result of which he held that the defendant succeeded to her husband's 
share in the coparcenary and that she acquired absolute interest 
in the same by virtue of s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. It 
would have been better if his Lordship had gone thus far and no 
further. But assuming the apparent^uncalled for duty of supporting 
the defendant's cause from all its angles his Lordship further
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held that for the purpose of this decision it did not matter 
whether the husband died before or after 1937, To vindicate his 
decision as regards the interest of a coparcener who had died 
before 1937 his Lordship suprisingly relied on s. 8 which, accord­
ing to him, is retrospective on two grounds* Firstly, he compared
i
sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and argued that the 
words fafter the commencement of this Act 'which are-incorporated 
in s* 6 are not to be found in s. 8 and that this distinctive 
exclusion makes the latter section fully retrospective in its 
operation. Secondly, he relied on the interpretation which their 
Lordships of the Privy Council put upon the words 'dying intestate* 
occuring in the preamble of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) 
Act (l) and observed i "In my judgement, therefore, section 8 
will apply to all cases where a male Hindu dies intestate leaving 
behind his property, irrespective of the time of his death, and 
the words 'dying intestate' used in s. 8 are a mere description 
of the status of the deceased, and, have no reference to the time 
of the death of a Hindu male." The only requisite for the 
application of s. 8 in his Lordship's opinion, is that a Hindu 
male should have died intestate 'leaving behind his property'.
The whole reasoning is flimsy and baseless.(2) Firstly, 
his Lordship ought to have remembered that in the absence of express
(1) Lala Duni Chand v. Anar Kali (1946) 73 I.A. 187 supra.
(2) For a detailed attack on this decision see Dr. J.D.M. Derrett : 
Anomalous Decisions from Patna on the Hindu Succession Act 1956 
(1958) 21 S.C.L. J. 259.
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provision to the contrary every Act speaks from its commencement - 
a principle which was implicitly admitted in a later decision of 
the Full Bench of the Patna High Court reversing all its previous 
decisions to the contrary*(1) .Secondly, s« 8 has no application 
at all to coparcenary property succession to which is governed
by s. 6* Thirdly, it has already been pointed out that the words 
•after the commencement of this Actf have been almost redundant 
in s. 6* Moreover, s. 6 being essentially *hegative in character 
the words bar even the future application of the provisions of
<K
this Act to the devolution of coparcenary interest. The words are 
not necessary in s# 8 simply because the section is positive and 
would have a future application to the property concerned whether 
the words referred to are inserted therein or not. So these words 
are necessary in s. 6 not to bar its retrospective effect, as 
Prasad J. thinks, but to eliminate, subject to few exceptions, 
the possibility even of the future application of the .provisions 
of this Act. In any case it is evident that because of s. 6 of 
the General Clauses Act neither s* 6 nor s. 8 of the Hindu Success­
ion Act applies to the undivided interest of a deceased coparcener 
who has died before the commencement of that Act. Succession to 
his interest is governed either by survivorship or by the Hindu
(i) Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 F.B*
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Women's Rights to Property Act.(l) Fourthly, the decision in Lala 
Duni Chand's case does not furnish an analogy for this case at all.
r    i .1 I. ' ■»— .........    ' 1  ~
The implicit ratio of that case was not that the provisions of the
Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act governed succession to
property of all the males who have died intestate before that Act
but that they governed only those cases in which the propositus
had died before the Amendment Act and succession to his property
had re-opened after the Act. The circumstances in Lateshawar1s
(2)
case and Lala Duni Chand's case are, therefore, wide apart from 
each other; for, prior to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 
succession to undivided interest of a particular coparcener could 
take pace once only. It is hoped that this eccentric decision 
would be reversed by the Full Bench at the earliest possible 
opportunity.
Some of the; salient features of the new order 
of succession to woman's property may stated here in comparison 
with the old order of succession to stridhana.
(1) For th^purpose of succession the distinction between 
a married and an unmarried woman, a woman married in approved form 
and one married in unapproved form, a childless woman and one 
having children, and, subject to sub-section(2) of s. 15, between
(1) After the death of the female limited owner who takes her 
husband's share pader the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act the
i „ i $
property would devolve not upon the surviving coparcener but upon 
the heirs of the coparcener whose interest was inherited by such 
female limited owner. - See Mayne 11th edition p. 708.
(2) Supra.
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one and another kind of woman*s sparate property has vanished 
altogether•
(2) The general preponderance in favour of females
which used to subsist in succession to stridhana exists no more
a
and now sons and daughters of woman inherit her property equally 
and simultaneously,(l)
(3) The distinction between a married and an unmarried 
daughter as well as between a stabilised and unstabilised 
(apratisthita - more commonly known as ’unprovided for1) daughter
S' \
has ceased to exist.
(4) The doctrine of representation has been newly in­
troduced by the Act so that the daughter of a' pre-deceased daughter 
of the female proposita now competes simultaneously with her own 
aunt in succession to her grandmother's property. This provision
is only a counterpart of the similar provision in succession to 
male's property.
(5) The husband of the proposita now shares with her 
children whereas formerly he could succeed only after the children 
and that too only if he was married to the proposita in an approved 
form of marriage; if not, he was one of the remotest heirs. The 
principle underlying this provision appears to bc^that succession
............»     mwiiw .* ■M1 BIIMHI1       ii.nwum     wu m i MU n i U H n M W ............  ■■■■■. W Hi ml
(l) However, this is by no means a novelty since according to the 
law of all except the Benares and the Bombay Schools sons and 
daughters shared at least some kind of, ;stridhana of their mother - 
see supra.
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should devolve simultaneously upon the progeny and the surviving 
spouse of the deceased*(l)
(6) Subject to subsection (2) of s* 15 and in default of 
the children and the husband, the heirs of the husband of a woman 
succeed in preference to all other heirs and in all cases*
(7) Some of the persons who are prominent in the scheme 
of succession under the Act were utterly unknown as heirs to the 
old law of stridhana : daughter*s daughter was no heir at all under 
the law of the Dayabhaga School; son’s daughter, widow of a pre­
deceased son and widow of a predeceased son of predeceased son of
Yr\ ot _
the female proposita were ^ entitled to inherit her stridhana accord­
ing to the Benares or the Dayabhaga School.
(8) In view of s. 3(ti) illegitimate children of a woman
A
are noo entitled to compete equally and simultaneously with the 
legitimate children of woman*(2) The descendants of the former
V*
also staid on equal footing with the legitimate descendants ofA
the latter. There is no provision as regards the illegitimate 
issue of the legitimate issue of a woman. But following the inter­
pretation which their Worships of the Mysore Chief Court put upon
(1) It may be suggested here that in view of this provision of
s. 15(1) (a) the husband of a predeceased daughter also should be 
entitled to succeed along with her issue to the share which comaes 
to her branch in succession to male's and female’s property and 
which is divided amongst her heirs under s. 10 Rule 4 (ii) and 
s. 16 Rule 2 respectively; for, succession per stirpes in such 
cases proceeds on a fiction that the predeceased daughter is alive 
and takes hex'* own share which, under the Act, is equal to her own 
separate property. If the husband of the deceased herself shares 
with her own children there is no reason why the husband of the 
predeceased daughter should not share with her own children.
(2) However they cannot inherit the property of their mother's 
relations.
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a similar provision in the Mysore enactment it appears that such 
descendants will not be considered as heirs to the woman*
Two outstanding instances of* the inconvenience produced 
by the order of succession under s* 15 (l) must be noticed here* 
Firstly, as sub-section (l) (a) includes woman*s own descendants 
only to the third degree it is evident that woman's own great­
grandchildren can succeed only as 'husband's heirs' and along 
with the grandchildren of woman's step-children# The defect under 
the old law, according to which the great-grandson of a woman was 
unable to find a place prior to her step-great-grandson in the 
order of succession to her stridhana, has thus been left unremedied* 
Secondly, in view of the massive ntunbefe of the husband's possible 
heirs it is evident that the parents of a woman stand a Very meagre 
chance of inheriting her daughter's stridhana* Moreover, unlike 
the terms sapinda and samanodaka under the old law, the terms 
agnates and cognates can include a person who is removed from the 
propositus by any number of degrees* So it would not be a surprise 
if a person, who is related to the husband of the proposita by 
twenty degrees upwards and then twenty degrees downwards, stands 
to defeat the claim of her own father*
As for sub-section (2) of s* 15 it may be said at the 
outset that it would have ;been much better if this sub-section 
had not existed at all in the enactment* The section exhibits 
vestigal traces of the provisions of Katyayana and Ifriddha
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Katyayana to the effect that property given to the bride by her 
relations in her parent's house devolves, in default of her child­
ren, upon those relations (bandhus).(1) The provision nearly 
amounts to reversion of the property inherited and not disposed of 
by a deceased woman.(2) The object of the Succession Act being to 
establish equality between the two sexes there was no reason why 
this particular characterstic should have been superimposed upon 
the property of females only.
Moreover, the section has been very badly drafted.
The words fI not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section(1) 
in the order specified therein," which occur both in (a) and (b) of 
this sub-section may be interpreted so as to negative either of
S. \ ?  O  )  o r  t h e  T L j h l T  o f  - f h t  h e  its rn  c n  t  i"o ^  c
the two things namely, either the order of the heirs specifiedAin 
s. 15(1) (b), (c), and (e) in respect of property mentioned in 
s. 15(2) (a) and of heirs mentioned in s* 15(1) (c), (d), and (e) 
in respect of property mentioned in s.15(2) (b). According to the 
former interpretation the meaning of s. 15(2) (a), for instance, 
would be that succession to property mentioned therein would 
devolve firstly, upon the heirs of the father but that the rights 
of the other heirs mentioned in s, 15(1) are not totally denied
(1) Fpr a similar custom in the Kathiawar states see Bhagwanji 
Fashram v. Wala Godad (1892) III Kathiawar Reports 105.
(2) See the Law Rehfing to Hindu Succession Government of India 
Publication (1956) pp. 15-16.
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and that such heirs
are entitled
to succeed to property mentioned in s. 15(2) (a), in default of the 
heirs of the father of the deceased/ According to the latter inter­
pretation only the heirs of the father are entitled to inherit 
the property of woman which she inherited from her father or mother 
hut the other heirs mentioned in s• 15(1), except her own children, 
would not at all be entitled to inherit* A further analysis of 
either of these interpretations exposes the defective arrangement 
of this Act. If it is presumed that the words under consideration 
affect only the priority in the order of succession mentioned in 
s.15(1) then it is evident that the whole of s. 15(2) (b) is re­
dundant; for, even in the absence of this part of the sub-section 
the property mentioned therein would have devolved first upon the 
heirs of the husband of woman in preference to any other heirs 
mentioned in s. 15(1) except the woman's own children. Moreover 
this interpretation would lead to mischievous results* For instance, 
the property which a woman has inherited from her own mother would 
devolve upon the "heirs of the father"(1) in preference to the 
father himself who is mentioned as an heir in s. 15(1) (c). If 
the second interpretation is accepted, namely, if the words under 
consideration are considered as totally denying the right of any
(1) In accordance with the provisions of s. 16 Rule 3 "the heirs of 
the father" will have to be ascertained upon a fiction that the 
father of the proposita owned the property and that he died 
intestate in respect thereof immediately after the death of the 
proposita herself, thus the term 'heir* has been used in the Act 
not in its legal but popular sense.
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heir other than the ones who are mentioned in s, 15(2) (a) and (b) 
then we come to a nediculous position, namely, as regards property 
inherited by a woman from her Biother, her father cannot inherit 
the same but " the heirs of the father1* can. Moreover, in such 
case the words 1 in the order specified therein1 become redundant 
in s, 15(2) (a) and (b)• It is thus impossible to extract any sensi­
ble meaning from this whimsically drafted section* But the intention 
of the legislatore appears to foe to create two orders of success­
ion somewhat similar to the two orders which were known to the 
old Hindu law and which were based on the distinction of the form 
of the marriage in which the deceased woman was married: in one 
case the husband and his heirs were preferred to the father and 
his heirs; in the other, the father and his heirs were preferred 
to the husband and his heirs* If such was the intention of the 
legislature then this awkward sub-section must foe redrafted as 
follows :«
11 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), (a) any property inherited by a female from her father or 
mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the 
deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or 
daughter), upon the heirs mentioned in sub-section (1) (c), (d), (e), 
and (b) in that successive order,n Part (b) of the subrsection 
ought to be deleted as it is redundant.
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But in the pamphlet published by the Government of India 
it is F- - u that the intention of the Parliament was to put forward 
this sub-section in the light of the second interpretation, namely, 
the Parliament wanted that the property mentioned in sub-section
(2) (a) and (b) should devolve only upon the heirs mentioned in 
those respective parts of the sub-section and not upon the other 
heirs mentioned in sub-section (1)• The relevant paragraph of the 
pamphlet runs thus
11 In order that properties inherited from a Hindu 
female do not go to families to whom reason and justice would 
demand that they should not go, certain special rules are laid 
down in section 17 for their reversion to the original family.
If a Hindu female who has inherited property from her father or 
mother dies leaving her surviving neither children nor grand­
children, although she may have left behind her husband, the 
property does not go to the husband but reverts to the heirs of 
the father; similarly if a Hindu female who has inherited any 
property from her husband or from her father-in-law dies leaving 
her surviving neither children nor grandchildren, the property 
goes to the heirs of the husband. These special rules apply both 
to movable and immovable property.*' (1)
If such really was the intention of the legislature 
in incorporating this sub-section into the Act then it must be said 
that the provisions contained therein are perverse and opposed 
to all reason; for, according to this interpretation the property 
which a woman inherits from her father would devolve upon the 
Crown in preference to her own great-grandson, great-granddaughter 
or husband. The undesirable contigency of the father not being the
(1) Government of India, Ministry of Lav/ : The Law Relating to 
Hindu Succession (1955) pp. 15-16• Besides giving a mischievous 
interpretation of the section the paragraph also leaves the trails 
of the haste and carelessness of its scribe by misquoting the 
number of the relevant section.
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heir hut his heirs being entitled to inherit the property of a 
deceased woman has already been shown* It appears that the 
parliament did not anticipate these funny results which the
I
whimsical part of its legislation would inevitably produce* But if 
it really wanted to produce such a situation and still persists 
in its irrational mood then it may be suggested that, at least 
for th^purpose of clarification of the sub-section, the words 
♦in the order specified therein* may be deleted from both the parts 
of the sub-section, as they are meaningless and redundant.
In the case of persons governed by the Marumakkattayam 
law the property of a female devolves firstly, upon sons and 
daxighter© (including the children of any pre-deceased son or 
daughter) and the mother; secondly, upon the father and the husband; 
thirdly, upon the heirs of the mother; fourthly, upon the heirs 
of the father; and fifthly, upon the heirs of the husband*(l)
A recapitulation of the foregoing discussion about Marumakka11ayam 
law would prove that the present provisions display a deliberate 
attempt to intermix and blend the matrilineal and the patrilineal 
systems of inheritance so as to bring the former into a state of 
transition in its move towards full patrilineal system as known to 
the persons governed by Hindu law.
(l) It may be remarked here that if the husband and his heirs are
entitled to succeed to all the property of a woman even according to
the provisions relating to the Marumakkattayi people it would be 
abeurd to suggest that they are excluded from succession to property
mentioned in s. 15(2) (a) - see supra*
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A few other provisions affecting succession to women*s
property may be noted here
(l) According to s. 28 no person shall^disqualified from
succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease, defect,
or deformity. The provision is ^ further improvement on the Hindu
Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act 12 of 1928 since accord­
ed
ing to the latter ^ congenital lunatic or idiot was a disqualified
Succession Act 1950 apply also to persons governed by the D&yabhaga 
School*(1)
to a Hindu who has converted himself to another religion are dis­
qualified from inheriting to the property their Hindu relatives 
unless they themselves are also Hindu at the time when the success­
ion opens. It is strange that when the filial bond which subsists 
between a person himself and his Hindu relatives remains intact 
even after his conversion to another religion the one between his 
children and his Hindu relatives should be regarded as being broken*
H Where a decree of nullity has been granted in respect 
of any marriage under section 11 or section 12, any child begotten
(1) See the overriding effect of s*4 of the Hindu Succession Act* 
For disqualifications under the Hindu Succession Act see ss. 24-26*
(2) For the effect of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act see supra*
heit* Moreover unlike the Act 12 of 1928 the provisions of the
(2) According to s* 26 of thefeuccession Act children born
(3) Section of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 runs thus :
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or conceived before the decree is made who would have been the 
legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if it had been 
dissolved instead of having' been declared null and void or annulled 
by a decree of nullity, shall be deemed to be their legitimate 
child notwithstanding the decree of nullity : • , •.11
Thus for the purpose of determining the legitimacy 
of the children born of such marriage the marriage would be 
supposed to have been dissolved instead of having been declared 
null and void or annulled* But 1his fiction of dissolution of 
marriage has inevitably to be preceded by a conclusive presumption 
that such marraige is valid.,So for the purpose of determining the 
legitimacy of StMfth children the marriage ought to be considered to 
have been valid. The children born thereof, therefore, would be 
legitimate subject only to the provisions of s. 112 of the Indian 
Evidence Act. These children would be heirs to the property of the 
woman who was a party to such marriage though, according to the 
proviso to this section, they cannot inherit the property of any 
of the relatives of their parents.
(4) It is obvious that the Hindu Succession Act does 
not expressly include adopted relations into the schedule or heirs 
or in the list of heirs mentioned in s. 15. But s. 12 of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 cures this defect by putting 
an adopted child on common par with a legitimate natural-born child. 
However, it is doubtful whether an adopted son would be entitle d 
to succeed to his relations in respect of intestacies occnring 
in between the period beginning with the^commencement of the 
Hindu Succession Act and ending with the commencement of Hindu
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Adoption and Maintenance Act* It has been suggested that an adopted 
son etc. would not be entitled to inherit property in respect of 
v/hich intestacy has occured during the intervening period.(l)
The suggestion is important and needs deeper attention. On the 
other hand, however, according to s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession 
Act any word denoting relationship would include persons related 
*by legitimate kinship1. As the Hindu Succession Act did not over­
haul the whole of Hindu Law, it had left unaffected the general 
principle of Hindu law, namely that an adopted ©on is, with a few 
exceptions, equal to a natural-born son in all respects.(2)
Therefore the words ’son* etc. in the Succession Act would include 
any persons who stand in that requisite relationship with the de­
ceased by legitimate kinship. This interpretation would include 
the word * son1 an adopted son as well as a natural-born son. The 
matter is, however, not entirely free from doubt. After the 
commencement of the Adoption Act, however, adopted females would 
also appear for the first time in the line of succession under 
Hindu law. few spinsters and 1 ? widows being unfettered in adopt­
ing children to themselves the number of the adopted children in 
succession to female*s property would increase considerably.
Although detailed analysis of this Act falls outside the scope 
of this thesis one or two deficiencies in the same ought to be 
noticed here. Section 14 of the Act gives several permutations of
(1) Hindu Law Past and Present p.
(2) For an argument that a half-sister *s son shouid foe included in 
the words * sister's son* occuring in Hindu Law Inheritance(Amendment) 
Act See Mayne 11th edi. pp. 656-57
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cirsumstances which make the spouse of the adopting person an 
adoptive parent or step-parent of the adopted child* But it does 
not mention whether one of the spouses who has died before the 
adoption made by the surviving spouse becomes an adoptive parent 
or step-parent of the adopted child* Secondly, sub-section(3) of 
the same section says that when a bachelor adopts a child any 
woman whom he subsequently marries would be his step-mother*
This would throw the adopted child info a strange position of 
never having had an adoptive mother and having a step-mother 
only* Moreover as, by marriage, a wife gets ownership in her 
husband’s property which he has acquired not only since his 
marriage but also since his own birth it seems unreasonable to 
presume that she cannot mother a child whom ha has adopted before 
his marriage*
Having surveyed the whole developement of the law 
about separate property of Hindu women from its earliest to its 
latest stages we now relax to recapitulate the whole trend of 
its progress and to forcast the possible direction and effect of 
its undercurrent.
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We have now finished our survey of the development of the
proprietory capacity of a Hindu woman and have seen that having
started her economic progress by the humble possession only of bride-
price and nuptial presenti^he now stands in India upon an equal
footing with man* It is to be hoped that, with the help of some
other supplementary provisions, the recent enactments in India would
cohesively be put together to form a consolidatory code* Against
codification some critics raise several objections, namely, that
codification is bound to be incomplete, that it will, in due course
of time, be overlaid with an accumulating mass of comments and
judicial decision, that it fends to stereotype the law and that being
the result of the cumulative efforts of many persons it is bound to
be defective and incoherent* Admitting that some of these objections
against codification are true it must at once be pointed out that they
(2
can be raised a fortiori against unwritten law or common law as well* 
Taking into consideration these facts there is no wonder, therefore, 
that the opinion of many leading jurists such as Halsbury, Macaulay,
(1) The custom of bride price was found to prevail in 303 out of the
434 tribes statistically sampled by the English anthropologists
Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg* "It is the common thing in 
Africa; it is the regular practice amongst the patrilineal 
tribes of Indonesia; and it occurs in one form or another in 
all other parts of the world" - E.A.Hoebel: Man in the Primitive 
World (1949)at p.206. For the significance, goal and medium
of bride price see ibid pp*205-210. In almost all cases except 
those of the Romans and Protestant English the custom of bride 
price was gradually replaced by the custom of paying a dowry for 
the wife. - see T.E.James: Prostitution and the Law (1951)p*53.
Amongst the English as amongst the Hindus the father, in due 
course of time, started endowing his daughter with the money 
which the prospective bridegroom used to pay as bride price - 
Ibid p*65.
(2) For objections against codification and replies to such object­
ions see B.IC.Acharyya: Codification in British India T.L.L.1912
pp.139-149*
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Pollock, Stephen, Maine, Stokes etc. is in favour of codification in 
modern society.^^
Admitting that codification is a necessity for the pro­
gressive and modern society there is no reason, however, why a 
particular code should go unchallenged in all its aspects. In fact 
the charge of incompleteness which is so often raised against codifi­
cation can be met with only by a constant revision of the cofidied 
law with a view to bridge over the gap between the existing pro­
visions of the law and the demands of social necessity as evidenced 
by public opinion. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to suggest a 
few changes in the provisions of the recent enactments in India:
The most outstanding change which has been brought about by 
the Hindu Succession Act is that the daughter, whether married or 
unmarried, succeeds to her father's property simultaneously and 
equally with the son. Viewed on the background of the prevalent dowry 
system in India this change does not appear to be wholly justifiable. 
It is well known that an average Hindu family in India receives a 
terrible economic set back by marriage of any of its female members. 
The dowry which the bride's party has to give to the bridegroom or
his party as a condition precedent to marriage usually consists of
(2)thousands of rupees in addition to some other nuptial gifts.
(1) Ibid. It may be noted that despite the misgivings of many 
people the Anglo-Indian Codes in general have, in the words of 
the late Sir Janies Stephen, been "triumphantly successful". - 
See W.Stokes: Anglo-Indian Codes Vol.I.p.71.
(2) For the development of dowry system see supra (introduction).
For instances of the prevalent dowry system see Jot,indranath 
Sarkar: The Fair Sex (1935)at pp.52-53 wherein the author
quotes;; a few typical matrimonial advertisements from the Bengal 
Marriage Gazette. See also Mrs.C.A.Hate: Hindu woman and her
future (1948)p.283, table No.6.
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Especially amongst the poor middle class the father of the bride or, 
in his absence, her brother has to burdon himself with heavy debt 
and to toil throughout his life to be able to repay it. Such being 
the case it appears to be inequitable that the married daughter who 
has already deprived her father of a major part of his earnings should 
again present herself as a participent of his wealth after his death. 
It is necessary that her right should be completely quashed or, in 
the alternative, she should be allowed to succeed to her father's 
property only in default of all other heirs mentioned in class I of 
the schedule of the Hindu Succession Act. On the other hand, to 
fortify her complete identity with the new family by marriage it is 
essential to give her legal right in her husband's property. It has 
been shown that the identity of the husband and wife both from the
economic and social points of view had always been accepted by the
—  (1)Sastra in principle and practice. During modern times the
principle of common property of husband and wife has been incorporated
1
(o\ i
in the legal systems of the United States, Russia and France. Even * j
T
t
in England opinion of some of the leading scholars is leaning in j
( 3) Ifavour of it. It is high time, therefore, that India should j
j
borrow in this respect the legal system of its neighbouring country, j
namely, Burma. There can be no doubt that the detailed working out j
j
I
of this principle would, as we have already seen in the case of the
I
Burmese customary law, involve many intricacies in the provisions of ■{
(1) Supra pp.
(2) Prostitution and the Law pp.70-71, 76 and 97.
(3) See Prof.R.H.Graveson: The Future of Family Law p.425, an
essay published in 'A Century of Family Law' edited by Prof.
R.H.Graveson and Prof.F.R.Crane of Kings College London.
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(1)
the Act. But from the psychological as well as from practical
point of view the wife1s right in her husband*s property is too 
important to be neglected through fear of complicated and intricate 
legislation.
In the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 the absence of any pro™ 
vision of divorce by mutual consent appears to be a serious short­
coming. Admitting that divorce, though no longer a disgrace, still
"remains a tragedy, and for the children of the marriage a capital
(2)tragedy" there remains the problem of psychologically incompatible
couples for whom marital life is a continuous, uninteresting and 
tiresome battle. It is also quite likely that the children born of 
such marriage stand in the danger of being juvenile delinquents 
through neglect or disaffection of their parents. It may be argued 
that in case divorce by mutual consent is allowed couples who take a 
light-hearted view of marital relations may try to get out of the 
matrimonial bond as quick&y as they get in it. It may also be 
objected that in such case the husband might coerce the wife to 
signify her consent to the petition for divorce. However, it may be 
said against both these objections that even in the absence of any 
provision of divorce by mutual consent such cases might occur in the 
form of collusive or apparently collusive petitions in which one of 
the spouses makes a false and shameful charge against the other and 
the other meekly admits or cunningly allows it to be proved. More­
over the presence of such provision in the Special Marriage Act of
(1) For Burmese Customary Law see supra pp.
(2) The Times, 1st February 1956 quoted with approval by Prof. 
Graveson - A Century of Family Law p.411-12.
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1954 makes all the more copious its absence in the Hindu Marriage Act*
According to the Hindu Marriage Act s•16 read with s.11
children born of a marriage which is void ab initio on account of the
contravention of some of the conditions laid down in s.5 for a valid
marriage, will be considered as legitimate provided they are born
before the decree of nullity is given. Such children are entitled to
inherit the property of both their father and mother both of whom are
also naturally entitled to inherit from such children. But if the
essential moral principle behind distinguishing between legitimate
and illegirimate children be to disallow any man lawfully to beget
children by any woman except his own wife then there is no reason why
there should be any distinction between children bofn of a void
marriage and other illegitimate children especially as the provision
applies also to a case in which the contracting parties knew from the
(1)beginning that they were entering into a void marriage. On the
other hand, if the principle involved in such apparently progressive 
legislation be that children should not be punished for the inten­
tional or inadvertent mistakes of their parents, then there is no 
reason why other illegitimate children should not be put on the same 
footing as children born of a void marriage before a decree of nullity 
in respect of that marriage is given. Moreover there is no reason 
why children born of such void marriage after the decree of nullity
(1) A provision similar to s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act existed
in s.21 of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869 whereby children born 
of a marriage which was annulled on the ground of insanity or 
because it was bigamous, were held as legitimate provided in 
the latter case the parties had contracted the marriage in good 
faith. The provision was probably borrowed from the Scots law 
which is similar - see A Century of Family Law pp.419-20.
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in respect of such marriage is given should, as S.16 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act seems to suggest, be treated as illegitimate children.
It is therefore essential for the legislature to make its choice 
between the traditional moral principle and the comparatively modern 
sociological principle and to follow it logically.
According to S.ll(i) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act of 1956 a Hindu cannot adopt so long as he or she has a son, 
son's son or son's son's son (whether by ligitimate blood relation­
ship or by adoption) living. This is quite in consonance with the 
original Hindu or Roman concept of adoption as being merely a means 
of perpetuating the family of a childless couple. But in England 
the existence of natural-born children of the adoptive parent is no 
bar to adopting other children. This provision in the present English 
law is based upon a broader and more humane principle, namely, that 
adoption is made not only with a desire to perpetuate the family of 
the adopter but also with a desire to provide the advantages of a 
real home for the thousands of children who, for one reason or 
another, are denied those a d v a n t a g e s . I t  is advisable for Hindu 
law, therefore, to imbide the sociologically advanced principle 
accepted by the English law.
Since prostitutes were almost the first amongst women to 
( 2 )gain economic freedom a reference must be made also to the 
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in ?/omen and Girls Act 104 of 1956 
according to which a prostitute could be imprisoned up to six months
(1) Prof.R.H.Graveson: The Background of the Century p.18 - an 
essay published in *A Century of Family Law*.
(2) See supra chapter V.
(1)
upon her first conviction for solociting or, may, upon informa­
tion received by a magistrate, be ordered by him to remove herself
from any place within his jurisdiction whether she has committed any
(2)offence under the Act or not. Admitting that prostitution is a
social disease every government must realise that a war against pro-
(3 )stitution is not a war against prostitutes. Legislation against
(4)prostitution can be of a restrictive and not of suppressive nature; 
otherwise it will merely scratch the surface and will neither restrict 
nor suppress prostitution. Before talcing such strict measures against 
prostitutes the Indian Parliament ought to have considered the socio­
logical and the anthropological view of prostitution the two pre­
cipitant© , if not causes, of arhich are unsatisfactory marital re-
(5)lations and comparatively lower economic status of women in society.
To drive away a prostitute from the so-called respectable society
. ( 6)without considering or curing the causes which led her to pros­
titution is, to say the least, perverse and preposterous. Even in 
England where stricter measures have been taken against prostitutes
(1) See section 8 of the Act.
(2) Ibid s.20. For a possible abuse of the provision against soli­
citation see Prostitution and the Law p.126 and A Century of 
Family Law p.287.
(3) See, for instance, the correct attitude adopted by the Soviet 
Government - Prostitution and the Law p.
(4) Remarking that Prostitution is a commercial enterprise and will 
not be suppressed by legislation...1 (at pp.24-25)T1E.James 
concludes: nIt is considered that little if any good would be
achieved merely by amendments to the laws relating to prostitu­
tion and kindred offences...... Strictly, research should be con­
ducted on a scientific basis into the emotional causes in both 
the male and female partners to the act of prostitution; pend­
ing any such course being taken the law 'must be a teacher. -
Prostitution and the Law pp.132-133.
(5) Ibid pp.12 and 57. For prostitution as an emotional problem 
see ibid p.4 and Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. pp.
(6) For a succint resume of the possible methods of this cure see 
Prostitution and the Law p.124.
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since September 1959 judges and learned scholars have opined that
such stricter measures against prostitutes would merely drive the
(1)profession underground. It must not be forgotten that prostitu-
(2)tion will thrive so long as there is demand for prostitutes.
There are two groups amongst the critics who oppose the 
economic equality granted to Hindu women by the Hindu Succession Act 
1956. The first group contends that the inequality between the two 
sexes is natural and hence perpetual. The gist of the mentality of 
these critics is well represented by Tennyson in his poem *The 
Princess*:
**Man for the sword and for the needle she :
Man with the head and woman with the heart :
Man to command and women to obey ;
All else confusion.*1
Ignoring all the provisions in the Sastra in favour of women such
critics resort to some old and archaic provisions in the smritis
which tend to lower the position of women and, for the purpose of
substantiating their own stand, resort to so-called sociological
(3)arguments which, on their very face, are bigotrical and illogical.
The best way of replying to such critics is to ignore them.
The other group of critics, although it supports in 
principle the economic equality between men and women, has a subtle 
argument against the sudden introduction of such economic equality.
(1) Ibid p.125. See also the speech made at Vancouver by Lord 
Parker, the Lord Chief Justice of England, as reported in the 
News Chronicle of 3.9.1959 or The Times of 4.9.1959.
(2) It is remarkable that no country except the U.S.S.R. claims to
have totally wiped out prostitution, but it is difficult to 
ascertain the truth of the bold claim made by the U.S.S.R. - 
see the Prostitution and the Law pp.6-7,9,92,102.
(3) For an excellent and comparatively a larger specimen of this
type see V.V.Deshapande: Dharmashastra and proposed Hindu
Code (1943).
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These critics contend that emancipation of women has three facets,
of
namely, economical, political and social all which should progress
A
parri passu. They argue that the growth of the social emancipation
of women in India is not complete and that such being the case to
grant them complete economic freedom at this stage would, even from
the point of view of women*s own interest, be disadvantageous and
disastrous. To examine the truth of this argument we may profitably
refer to the history of the growth of emancipation of women in
England from which country modern India has borrowed most of its
legal, social and political principles.
To begin with, the economic position of a married woman in
England before 1870 was much worse than that of a Hindu married
woman in India. Except in the case of a marriage settlement to the
contrary, almost all the property of a woman together with the woman .
herself became, upon her marriage, her husband*s property.^ I t  was
the Married Women*s Property Act of 1870 which first recognised
The
women*s right in their earned property. Married Women*s Property
A
Act of 1882 brought about further amelioration and put women almost
on equal footing with men till the Married Women*s Property Act of
1893 recognised full and equal status of women in proprietory
(2)matters. However, the social and political emancipation of women
was not simulteneous with their economic emancipation. Although the 
movement of triple emancipation of women had acquired a great 
momemtum by the middle of the 19th century and although women gained 
a great number of supporters from men in the second half of the same
(1) Prostitution and the Law pp.63-66; A Century of Family Law p.2.
(2) A Century of Family Law pp.15-16.
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(1)
century "The truth was that in the nineties the women1s movement
was in the doldrums: people had grown tired of talking about it;
the press ignored the women's campaign: women's rights had become
a bore. Even the Labour party which at first had been sympathetic
(2)
sheered away from the issue lest it should harm their own cause."
It is significant that despite their economic emancipation in the
nineties of the nineteenth century women were not granted the right
(3)
to vote in, or stand for, the Parliamentary elections till 1918.
As regards education it is interesting to remember that the first 
time women were admitted to degree course was in 1878 in London. 
Cambridge admitted them in 1892 and they did not have the same
(4)
advantage at Oxford till 1920. As regards professions it may be
noted merely that women doctors numbered only 25 in 1881, 100 in
1891, 212 in 1901 and 477 in 1 9 1 1 , Till 1922 women could not foe
legal practitioners. As regards many other professions and services
they could not march shoulder to shoulder with men till the Sex
(6)Disqualification Act (Removal) Act of 1919 was passed. It is
evident, therefore, that even in England, from which India has 
borrowed its inspiration in this respect, the economic emancipation 
of women had not been contemporaneous with their social and political 
emancipation. Even now in England, as in India, there are a 'large
(1) For a succint survey of the women's movement during the 19th 
century see Norman S t.John-Stevas: Women in Public Law pp.
256-75 - an essay published in A Century of Family Law;
Margaret Mead: Woman, Position in Society, Encyclopedia of 
Social sciences (1932)Vol.XV.




(6) Ibid p.283; Prostitution and the Law p.66.
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number of people1 who regret this modern trend of the society towards 
equality of sexes.
As against this we must take a review of women’s movement 
in India. The movement of emancipation of women was first started 
in India in the last quarter of the 19th century by the late 
Mr. Gopalrao Agarkar and Dr. D.K. Karve whose birth centenary was 
officially celebrated last year by the Indian Government by issuing 
special postage stamps. Then outstanding women like Mrs. Ramabai 
Ranade, Pandita Ramabai, Mrs. P.1C. Ray, Lady Bose and other worked 
with the help of Mrs. Annie Besant, Mrs. Margaret Cousins etc. for 
the uplist and emancipation of Indian women. As a result of the de­
putation of the Women’s Indian Association which was established in 
1917 women participated, though on a limited restricted franchise, 
in the 1926 elections. In the struggle for independence Gandhiji 
used the means of non-vjblent co-operation and thought that the 
technique was specially suited to women. As a result of this in 
the first ten months of the Satyagraha movement of 1930 nearly
17,000 women who had taken part in the movement were convicted. In 
1936 a large number of women came to legislature. In the ’Quit 
India* movement of 1942 several women took part with the same 
enthuiasm as men.
In the first general election based on adult franchise 23 
women were elected to the Lok Sabha and 19 were elected to the Rajya 
Sabha. In the 1957 elections 27 women were returned to the Lok
(1) Prostitution and the Law p.
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Sabha and amongst the persons elected as members of the states1
legislatures nearly 10 per cent were women. There have been women
ministers both in the Union and state Governments. Mrs. Vijaya
Lakshmi Pandit has served not only as a High Commissioner for India
but also as a president of the General Assembly of the United
Nations. On the professional side it may be noted that nearly 21
per cent of the one million teachers in India today are women. Nearly
77,000 women are in the medical and health services. The Government
of India itself employs 20,668 women. The report of the 1951 census
revealed that nearly five million women were at that time self-
supporting and from amongst them 800,000 were engaged in production
(1)and 500,000 women in commerce. The progress of literacy amongst
(2)
women today compares favourably with that amongst men. It is
therefore evident that the position of women in India today is not 
only equal but in many respects far superior to the position of 
English women in 1882 when the Married Women’s Property Act was 
passed there. It is hoped that this comparative survey would con­
vince those critics who advise the Government to adopt in this 
respect the Fabian virtue of hastening slowly, that the economic 
emancipation of women brought about by the Hindu Succession Act was 
not only timely but, in fact, belated.
But ^n even in the present age of equality of sexes there 
stands a broader question before our eyes, namely, whether equality 
of sexes means identical and equally valuable work for both the
(1) For the above information see India 1958 pp.120-123 - a 
publication of the High Commissioner of India in Great Britain.
(2) See the literacy tables given in India 1958 - a publication of 
the Government of India, Delhi.
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sexes or supplementary and equally valuable work for them. Even at
present women expect from men chivaliry, , in social atmosphere and
maintenance in difficult times. The husband is bound to maintain
his wife whereas the latter has no corresponding obligation. The
wife can pledge her husband*s credit for the purpose of her
necessaries though the husband does not possess a corresponding
right even against his wealthy wife. As Sir Alfred Denning has
pointed out "By putting these obligations on the husband, moreover,
the law recognises the natural state of affairs whereby the man's
proper function is to work to provide for his wife and family, and
the woman's proper place is to look after the home and bring up the
children. If a wife is to do these things properly, she has usually
to withdraw from the money market and find her reward in the home -
(1)a reward which is much more worth while." Many women have 
realised that competition with men in outside work is only the means 
and not the end of the struggle of establishing the equality between 
the two sexes. Women have already proved that they could equal men 
in almost every sphere which was till recently supposed to be man's 
exclusive sphere. But there are certain other spheres in which 
women not only equal but surpass men. Drawing the family budget, 
looking after the house, bringing up children are some of the things 
in which men can never hope to outbeat women and the former have now 
realised that this sphere of work is by no means less important, 
intricate or valuable than the sphere of work in offices, factories 
and workshops. It is well known that apart from the economical
(1) Sir Alfred Denning: The Changing Law p.98.
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aspect of the problem the difficulties suffered by a widower in 
bringing up his children are much worse than the difficulties 
suffered by a widow; for a widower can purchase a house but he 
cannot make a ’home* of it. The progress of a nation depends as much 
upon this life within the four walls of a 'home1 as upon the life 
without. It is indeed in commendation and not in humiliation that 
the Vedic literature says that the wife is the mistress of the hous^^ 
Manu declares that the wife should be given the job of accumulation 
and disbursement of money. In India the majority of the husbands of 
the modern generation find that on the first of every month their pay- 
packets are immediately taken possession of by their wives and the 
former ungrudgingly concede the latter*s right to do so, for they 
have realised, not necessarily to their discomfiture, that their 
wives can manage the family income and expenditure much more com­
petently than they themselves could. Let us hope that this idea of 
partnership in marriage which is based on the principle that the 
husband earns for the family and the wife spends for it shall soon 
crystalise in the message given to us by a Victorian poet :
Either sex alone 
Is half itself, and in true marriage lies 
Nor equal, nor unequal : each fulfils 
Defetst in each, and always thought in thought,
Purpose in purpose, will in will, they grow,
The single pure and peffect animal,
The two-cell*d heart beating, with one full stroke,
Life."
(1) Supra p.
(2) "Arthasya sangrahe chainam vyaye chaiva niyojayetl" - Manu IX-11.
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Manusmriti♦ Ed.by Mandlik, Bombay, 1886. 
Krityakaipataru (Vyavaharakanda), Gaekwad ;.j 
Oriental Series, Bafoda, 1953. 
Madanaratnapradxpa, Ed. by P.V.Kane, : t 
Bikaner i 1948>
Parasaramadhavxya Y Vols. I-XXX, Bibliotheca 
Indica Series, Calcutta, 1889-1899. Also 
Bombay Sanskrit Series ed.-'vol; III;
Bombay, 1911. . t
: Madhvabhasya, a commentary on the sutras
of Badarayana together: with Jayatxrtha^s 
Tattvaprakasika, Haghavendratxrthat s Pra- 
kasa and Vyasatxrtha’s Chandrika. Govern­
ment Oriental Library Publication, Vols. I : 
Mo IV. Mysore, 1911-1922.
A commentary on the Dayabhtiga. Calcutta,
. • 1863.
Ed. by Leopold Von Schroeder, Leipzig,
1881-1886. . y ,
^[Cavyaprakasa^with Nago jxbhatta1 s Udyota 
and OoVindathakkura* s Pradxpa. Ed. vf 
Jlaandasramasanskritagranthavali, Poona, y 
1911. ■"/ y-
Maskaribhasya, a commentary on the sutras 
of Gautalna; Government Oriental Scrips, 
Mysore, 1917. : / .
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Vivadachandra. CoiUntt^ ^ 19 31 .
Viramitrodaya, a commentary on the Yajna- 
valkyasmriti. Benares, 1924.
VXramitrodaya, a digest. Chowkhamba Sans­




NandanX, a commentary on the Manusmriti. 
Mandlik*s ed. Bombay,1886.
Naradasamhita. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; 
Trivandrum, 1929. (Chapters rearranged 
in accordance with the order followed in 
the Dharmakosa.)
Naradasmriti• Ed. by Julius Jolly, 
Calcutta, 1885. (Chapters rearranged in 
accordance with the order followed in they 
Dharmakosa.)
Vyavasthasarasanchaya i.e. Vyavasthasara- 
samuchchaya, ms.Egg.1497, I.0.L.251 (fo). ; 
Vyavaharamayukha.Ed. by P .V .Kane, Po ona, 
1926.
Prayaschittasangraha. Bombay, 1921. 
Prayaschittasangraha. Bombay, 1921. 
Parasarasmriti. Bibliotheca Indica Series, 
vols. I-III, Calcutta, 1889-.1899. 
Nyayaratnakara, a commentary on Kumarila'.s 
Slokavartika which is a commentary on 


















Sankarabhat t a • •
Sankaracharya
Sarvajnanarayana
Dayakaumudx, a part of the Vivadakaumudx, with 
the commentary of Ramanatha Gosvami, Calcutta,? 
1826.
Sarasvatxvilasa, vyavaharakanda. Government 
Oriental Library Publication, Mysore, 1927.
A copy of the ms, in the possession of Prof. 
Dave of Bombay.
Manvarthachandrxka, a dommentary on th e Manus- 
mriti. Mandlik’s ed. Bombay, 1886*
Prakasa, a commentary on Vyasatxrtha1s 
Chandrika. See Mqdhv*.
A commentary on the Dayabhaga. Calcutta, 1863.; 
Dayatatva. Ed. by Lakshmi Narayan Serma, ; P 
Calcutta, 1828.
Frayaschittatattva, with Hi*.commentary of Radha- 
mohana Gosvami Bhattacharya, , I88S-
Prayaschittanirnaya i.e. the &astranirnaya. 
iCumbhakonam, 1907.
DayabhagSrthadxpika
A commentary on the Dayabhaga. Calcutta, 1863. 
Manubhavarthachandrika, a commentary on the 
Manusmriti. Mandlik's ed. Bombay, 1886. 
Smritiratnavali, ms. Egg.1526-27, I.O.L.1595. 
PrayaschittaniriXpana, Calcutta, 1906. 
Sabarabhasya, a commentary on the sutras of 
Jaimini. See Jaimini.
Dvaitanirnaya i.e. the Dharmadvaitanirnaya. Ed 
by J.R. Gharpure, Bombay, 1943. 
Brahmasuirabhasya, a commentary on the sutras 
of Badarayana, with Vachaspati Misra*s Bhamat' 
and AmalanandasarasvatX * s Vedantakalpaiaru, 
Bombay, 1938.
Manvarthavivriti, a commen tary on the Manusm­
riti. Mandlik*s ed. Bombay, 1886.
Sarvatfu. Sarman
SrXdhara Balabhadra
vagXsa Bh a tt a charya













Vachaspati Misra . 
Vaidyanatha
Viv^dasararhavav ms*>Egg.l505, 1.0.L.V c 
/.// / . :  3145 (b) .?// , V'J> ' / . / //; , ’. ’ '
Tarka- Dayabhagasiddhanta, ms .Egg.1529, I.G.L.
■ ' : 1386 (c). ,.o. V ^ ;/'
Dayabhaganirnayay a part of the Vivadanir- 
naya, ms. Egg.1523-24, I.O.L.1587 (a & b). 
A commentary on the Dayabhaga. /Calcutta,// 
; . ’ 1863./'.' , : //■;" : ; , / //,/
Dayalcramasftngraha i Ed. by Lakshmi Narayan 
Serma, Calcutta, 1828.
A commentary on the Dayabhaga. Calcutta,
• : 1866. /.y ’ /'/ ; ■ / ‘ /;'/,'■
. a Conmientary on the Dayabhaga* Calcutta,
’ /. 1863, ■ / / \ //// ;■ •'
Sukranltisara. Satyasadan Press ed. Alibag
. _
DXpakaiika, a commentary on the Yajnavalk- 
yasmriii. Ed. by J.It.Gharpure,•■Bombay,'"
. 1938. ’ _ . / . ' : •
Prayaschittaviveka* Calcutta, 1893. /;
. Prayaschitta. Surat V 1918.
33d. by Anantasastri Dhupakara, Oundh,
' . J . . 1945. : ‘ . / //’ /x '/■ : _
BhamatX, a commentary on the Brahmasutra- 
bhasya of Sankaracharya. See Baxikaracha-/
. / • . rya. / /. / . ';/'x ;-"‘/ ,/ /// /.y . ///
Smritisarasangraha, ms. Egg.1490, I.O.L. ; 
--/,, /_ 482:.;.v;' ., ; / :;x/.//.. \ ..;/,-
Vivadachintamani, Ed. hy Ramachandra 
yidyavagXsa. Calcutta,\Saka 1759i 
, VyavaharaChintamani. Ed . by L. Rocher, 
Gent, 1956. /■’. ‘ 7 / -//:-://’ / • ; ;//?/xy
Smritiniuktaphala, Prayaschittakanda. Ed*, 















Vyavaharanirnaya• Rangaswami1 Aiyangar * s
ed. Adyar (Madras ), 1942.




Smritisaravyasvastha, Egg.1498, I.0.L.1629. 
Mitaksara, a commentary on the Yajnavalkya- 
smriti. Nirnayasagara ed. Bombay, 1909. 
Visnusmriti. Ed. by Julius Jolly, Calcutta, 
1881.
S ahi tyadarpana• P .V .Kane * s e d. Bombay,
1951.
Balakrxda, a commentary on the Yajhavalkya-
smriti. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series,* •
Trivandrum, 1922.
Madanaparijata. Bibliotheca Indica Series, 
Calcutta, 1893. :
Subodhinx, a commentary on Vijnanesvara*s 
Mitaksara. Ed. by J.R.Gharpure, Bombay, . 
1914, translation Bombay,1930. 
Yajhavalkyasmriti. Nirnayasagara ed.
Bombay, 1909.
Nirulcta, with Burgacharya1s commentary. 
Znandasramasanskritagranthavali, Vol.I & 
II, Poona, 1926#
Chandrika, a commentary on Jayatxrtha’s 
Tattvaprakasika. See Madhva.
Keith ms. 5514, I.O.L. Buh.222, 222 (a).
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